After COP27: the geopolitics of the Green Deal
Winter, 2022: The geopolitical “interregnum” that we are living through is bringing with it readjustments that have previously been considered impossible. Two major parts of the Paris Agreement that had lacked means of implementation since 2015 were resolved at the COP27 in Egypt, which was beginning under the worst auspices.

For more than thirty years, vulnerable nations have been demanding recognition of the “loss and damage” — climate convention jargon for the costs of the impacts from climate change — they are experiencing. For thirty years, the nations who emit the most have resisted acknowledging their individual responsibility. It was in Sharm el-Sheikh that a diplomatic alignment which had always seemed highly unlikely suddenly emerged, driven by Europe and a willingness on the part of the United States that was unthinkable for American legal experts until very recently.

This marks a tipping point. While multilateral governance is struggling to structure our responses to the “polycrisis” described by Adam Tooze, member of this revue’s scientific committee, including the catastrophic realities of climate damage, new nodes and connections are appearing, hinting at much more far-reaching realignment to come, with the challenge of integrating climate justice into its institutions. This climate justice, the mention of which was ripped away in the final hours of the Paris Agreement, has finally entered an implementation phase.

The other improbable result of this COP is the implementation of article 2 of the Paris Agreement which involves a complete overhaul of the international financial system. This reform has been mentioned countless times and has been the subject of a large number of G20 reports and meetings, but always pushed off until later. It was in Sharm el-Sheikh, under the leadership of Mia Mottley, Prime Minister of Barbados, in light of the impasse over funding for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the necessary adaptation to the changes that are already underway, that countries agreed to launch this reform. This “Bridgetown Initiative” — an updated version of which was published on the pages of this review ahead of COP

27 – that was launched in Barbados and that President Macron has endorsed, brings attention to a complex climate governance — a regime — which has, since the Paris Agreement, reorganized institutions well beyond the COPs. The necessary responses are of such magnitude that the different negotiation and regulatory frameworks are communicating with each other and becoming entangled, clouding the traditional institutional mandates: from central bankers who, through a spillover effect, see their mandates for financial stability being extended to climate risks, to local governments, cities or states, who are freeing themselves from delegating power to a higher level in order to apply the rules of an agreement to which they are not signatories.

The paradox of the polycrisis is that we seem at once paralyzed and, at the same time, drawn towards the newly possible. These shocks are destabilizing and, at the same time, allow us to overcome our inertia and understand the extreme danger of immobility, how unrealistic it is.

It is in this context that I was given this opportunity, with this third volume of GREEN, to outline a response to the following challenge: to give an overview of the geopolitics of the European Green Deal. This is a difficult exercise in a volatile situation of war and emergency. The final result is a kind of snapshot that helps us to isolate this paradox and look beyond the limits of our structures of governance.

For example, this volume of GREEN allows us to analyze the expectations placed on the COPs. Some of the texts pre-date the developments of the Sharm el-Sheikh conference. With this perspective, the interview granted to us in September by Frans Timmermans — who was one of the summit’s most visible protagonists and who was able to embody a Europe of climate action as it had rarely been in the past — is even more relevant now. My exchange with Vanessa Nakate highlights another essential element of these events: as imperfect as they may be, they remain a unique phenomenon in global governance for the role they can accord to civil society, to young people, and to a powerful new convergence of demands that I will call eco-feminism.

In this regard, and as many feared, this COP27 was a disappointing failure on the part of the Egyptian presidency for respecting the role of civil society.

We are publishing in these pages the contribution of Avinash Persaud, architect of the Bridgetown Initiative, whose proposals promise to stimulate one of the most consequential debates over global governance in the last few decades. From the concept of climate damage, to the issue of the share given to debt in our macro-economic systems, to the need for a new form of taxation on fossil fuel profits, this is the most comprehensive expression to date of the Bridgetown proposals. It is a reference text that has the potential to profoundly mark the year to come, as well as the special summit announced for mid-2023 by French President Emmanuel Macron.

Rather than simply offering an atlas of the Green Deal in relation to various geographies of the world, it seemed important to me to offer, through the following expert opinions, a vision based on different scales. All are rooted in Europe: whether its diplomacy, its trade, its security, its agricultural strength, or its villages. These multi-scale perspectives revisit or contest the notions of geopolitics and sovereignty. All these perspectives assert forms of legitimacy that are not solely linked to the definition of a state or the European Union, and yet are reinforced by the implementation of the Green Deal. It is in this spirit that we are re-publishing “The Green Deal is The New Social Contract”, which was published before the invasion of Ukraine in the pages of Grand Continent, with a new introduction that revisits this position in light of the war.

One of these intersecting scales is that of legal action, creating spaces for asserting and legitimizing climate issues at multiple levels. Marta Torre-Schaub describes a phenomenon in which the Paris Agreement continues to play a transformative role, particularly in the development of European climate law and its global reach.

Other, local scales are also central: Paul Magnette, mayor of Charleroi, paints a dynamic portrait from the frontlines of cities as powerful democratic tools for climate and social action. Fanny Lacroix, mayor of Châtel-en-Trièves,
which is at yet another scale, offers us a reflection on rural villages: these communities represent a large majority of the European territory, and they are an essential test for the Green Deal's credibility. This test can be seen in the “right to the village” proposal, a sort of right to contribute and to reconcile the individual’s field of action in their relation to these global scales, and a right of the citizen to see the world and their local community in the same movement. Céline Charveriat offers us the opposite approach, giving us the account of a Green Deal which would be above all, for the time being, a missed opportunity between the Brussels institutions and citizens.

In terms of the formal geopolitical matters, one of the most transformative events of this past year is, without a doubt, Lula’s return to power in Brazil. His former Minister of the Environment, Izabella Teixeira, generously granted us an interview in the days after the results as she was preparing to accompany the president’s delegation to the COP. Bernice Lee and I co-authored an analysis of Europe’s role in the balancing of climate ambition within the US-China tensions. Pascal Lamy and Genviève Pons, for their part, have drawn up an essential overview of the challenges of environmental protection within European trade relations. Sébastian Treyer questions the notion of “non-alignment” which has marked geopolitical debates since the Russian aggression in order to situate European diplomacy within a web of challenges — both in terms of climate and finance — and the relations that must be maintained with African countries in particular.

The “polycrisis” is, fundamentally, a crisis of security concepts. As such, I have brought together three perspectives that enrich our thinking on this topic. Olivier de Schutter, drawing on his experience as United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and — in his previous mandate — on food security, gives us an essential analysis of Europe’s role in the creation of a sustainable agro-ecology in the service of food security. Mary Kaldor proposes ways to integrate the notion of human security within NATO and EU structures. Taking conflict situations that are aggravated by climate shocks as a starting point, Antoine Foucher highlights the urgent need for a policy of adaptation that combines human security and restoration.
of ecosystems. He reminds that, in the sometimes stifling shadow of institutions and processes, there are lives and a fragile human society, in its relationship with biodiversity and the earth.

I am also pleased — and moved — to conclude this volume with a very lovely interview with Bruno Latour from June 2018, Down to Europe.

"The global leads us astray", Bruno said at the time, summarizing the intention of this introduction. We have no choice but to find our way back.

Laurence Tubiana • Scientific director
The European Green Deal in key figures

The Green Deal aims to make the European Union climate neutral by 2050. Proposed in 2019, at the beginning of the von der Leyen Commission’s mandate, it has become the main framework for legislative proposals at European level. It comprises a set of measures including the European climate law (carbon neutrality is a legal obligation for Member States) and the Fit for 55 strategy. According to the latter, European greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced by 55% compared to 1990 levels by 2030.\(^1\)

The RePowerEU strategy, presented in May 2021, which seeks to make the Union independent from Russian fossil fuels well before 2030, is part of this overall strategy: the rapid deployment of renewable energies meets a twofold imperative: combating global warming

\(^1\) Other strategies included in the Green Deal are: EU Strategy for Adaptation to Climate Change, EU Biodiversity Strategy 2030, From Farm to Fork, European Industrial Strategy, Circular Economy Action Plan, Batteries and Battery Waste, Just Transition Mechanism, EU Chemicals Sustainability Strategy, Forestry Strategy, and imports of products that do not contribute to deforestation.
and ensuring the security of supply of Member States.²

According to the European Environment Agency (Graph b), at EU level, the transport sector (including domestic and international transport and aviation) is the main emitter of greenhouse gases, responsible for approximately 27.6% of total emissions, followed by the energy sector (25.9%), industry (22.1%), the commercial and residential sectors (13.3%), agriculture (11.7%) and waste (3.46%).

Greenhouse gas emissions in the EU decreased by 32% between 1990 and 2020 in all sectors except transport, which increased by 7% over the same period.

In the context of the post-Covid economic recovery, in 2021, emissions at European level have increased by 5% compared to 2020. However, they remain below the level recorded in 2019.

The internal geopolitics of the Green Deal

The new European social contract following the invasion of Ukraine: origins, priorities, transformations

The use of eco-grazing, above the salt marshes of Guérande.

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The Green Deal: Origins and Evolution

When Ursula von der Leyen promised in July 2019 to launch the Green Deal within the first 100 days of her mandate, she surprised many commentators in the Brussels bubble. The choice of member states to appoint Ursula von der Leyen, a politician from Germany’s CDU (Christian Democratic Union) party, as president of the European Commission was not expected to result in revolutionary policy announcements on environmental issues. In 2019, Germany – which is expected to have difficulty reaching its 2020 targets for greenhouse gas emissions – was viewed as a serious liability to increasing European ambitions for fighting climate change. The CDU’s strategy towards the Green party, which was based on the notion of realism, led to considerable reluctance for increased European ambitions as long as the existing targets had not been implemented.

Yet Ursula von der Leyen will not settle for greening her agenda around the edges, as her predecessor did. In her December 2019 speech, she affirmed that the goal of the Green Deal is to “reconcile the economy with our planet, to reconcile the way we produce and the way we consume with our planet and to make it work for our people.” The legislative themes and proposals outlined in this first speech not only include a climate law that would ratify the target of climate neutrality by 2050, but also biodiversity, pollution, innovation, public and private finance, a just transition, and trade. In doing this, she makes these subjects central to her policy, responding to calls from the scientific community and a growing share of the electorate.

At the end of 2018, The European Environment Agency (EEA) had just released its report on the implementation of the Seventh Environment Action Programme for the European Union. Reading it gives cause for concern; the EEA predicts that two thirds of targets will not be met in 2020. Among the most serious failures is the protection of nature as no target will be met except for increasing forest stocks.1 Eurostat’s analysis of progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) makes the same observation about the disappearance of birds from agricultural areas, ammonia emissions, waste production, ocean acidification, etc... It therefore seems obvious that the policy of the two previous Commissions has failed to meet objectives and that a new approach must be taken. At the same time, the IPCC report has warned the international community of the impacts of an increased average temperature beyond 1.5 degrees, implying a need to accelerate the implementation of greenhouse gas mitigation policies. Many other voices from civil society, such as the European Environmental Bureau (EEB), Climate Action Network Europe (CAN Europe), and Think2030, are also demanding a change of course.

This feeling of urgency is also coming from public opinion. The Eurobarometer conducted before the 2019 elections shows that European citizens are increasingly concerned with climate change and the environment; this issue comes second only to growth and is tied with immigration as their main concern.2 In the IPSOS MORI survey, 77% of potential voters identify climate change as an important criteria for making their choice.3 These voters also see a clear added value to Europe’s action in this area, which is likely due to certain environmental policy successes such as the reduction of acid rain, the cleaning of coastal waters, and waste management, all of which clearly highlight the need for cross-border collaboration and the value of having a lever for change able to put pressure on member states that are reluctant to take environmental action. These are likely the reasons why European citizens are voting for Green parties at a higher rate than in previous elections, with these parties gaining 25 more seats in the European Parliament than in 2014.4 In her speech to the Parliament on December 11, 2019, Ursula von der Leyen directly refers to these election results to justify her new policy: “It is the people of Europe who have called us to take decisive action against climate change. (...) It is for them that we are presenting such an ambitious Green Deal for Europe.”5

But Ursula von der Leyen’s Copernican revolution, in contrast to her party’s political agenda, is above all the consequence of the political circumstances surrounding her nomination. The results of the election are such (see above) that the President proposed by the Council must

3. Frédéric Simon, Climate change will be key issue in EU elections, poll shows, Euractiv, 16 April 2019.
count on some of the votes of the Party of European Socialists to obtain the support of the Parliament. The outgoing coalition of the EPP and Liberals no longer has an absolute majority in the new European Parliament. The EPP, burned by its previous experience, has made it very clear that it no longer wants to give carte blanche like the one given to President Junker when he was elected in 2014, who they believe betrayed them. This is why they insist on a government agreement with very concrete strategy and policy elements. Frans Timmermans, whose ambitions on sustainability were thwarted during the previous Commission, is throwing his weight behind it in order to tip the balance. It is also important to note that his party's stance, the PES, has dramatically evolved since the previous elections, placing a strong emphasis on the inextricable links between economic, environmental and social issues within the SDGs.

This is how the Green Deal was adopted by Ursula von der Leyen. This concept was coined in 2007 on the other side of the Atlantic by a journalist, Thomas Friedman, who was the first to propose the concept of a "Green New Deal". This term was quickly borrowed by several British NGOs, including the New Economics Foundation, and appears in the publication commissioned by the European Green Foundation from the Wuppertal Institute. The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) also published a report calling for a global Green New Deal in 2009. The need to stimulate the economy after the 2008-2009 crisis is central to the original concept, hence its clear link with Franklin Roosevelt's famous New Deal. It is also interesting to note that the New Deal, which was launched during the 1929 crisis, is seen by many American commentators as a turning point in American public policy on the environment with major initiatives such as the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC).

Yet in 2019, there is no economic crisis. The economic growth rate is 1.5%. It is therefore more of a structural transformation that NGOs are recommending when they call for the Green Deal: "The 'Green New Deal' should pursue a positive agenda that meets citizens' desire for clean air, clean water, access to diverse nature, plastic-free oceans and non-hazardous products." Likewise, in the Green Party's platform for the European elections we find my wording, “Europe has the opportunity to become a world leader in the just transition to carbon neutrality and the circular economy through a 'Green New Deal'."

11. EEB Summer 2019 Newsletter.

The gamble of synthesis

When Ursula von der Leyen delivered her speech, she was attempting to achieve a synthesis that would win the approval of the other political parties in her majority, the liberals and the conservatives. She therefore focused her speech on sustainability as a driver for economic growth. The vice-president in charge of economic issues, Valdis Dombrovskis, is a highly orthodox economist, and was a fervent supporter of the harshest austerity in his country. This is therefore a far cry from the degrowth theories favored by environmental NGOs. These NGOs nevertheless enthusiastically welcomed the announcements of the future President, believing that the new direction proposed by Ursula von der Leyen was a unique opportunity to put the environmental agenda at the heart of the new Commission's priorities.

This hope for synthesis in terms of economic policy can also be seen in the European Commission's adoption in 2020 of an “annual sustainable growth strategy” and the attempt to better integrate sustainability into the European semester process, during which the European Commission issues recommendations for structural reform for each member state based on a table of indicators and the objectives of various European policies. Another attempt to synthesize the Green Deal concerns the digital transition, which is presented as the “twin sister” of the green transition.

Ursula von der Leyen's gamble proved to be a winning one. The Parliament approved the Green Deal in a resolution that received 482 votes. As for the European Council, it “has taken note” of the Green Deal in its December 2019 conclusions, though not without a certain amount of irritation from some members. As the legal form of the Green Deal is a strategy by the European Commission, there is no obligation for member states to give prior approval, and some have complained about the lack of consultation on the matter. This relative lack of prior consultation continues to plague the Green Deal's implementation, which, almost three years after its launch, is barely used by member states, who prefer national schemes that are more or less in line with the Green Deal's main objectives. Not surprisingly, a large portion of national civil servants say they are unfamiliar with the Green Deal, according to the Green Deal Barometer survey, published in 2020 by the Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP).

Despite this deficit, the European Commission managed to reach ambitious agreements during the discussion of most of its proposals, starting with the climate law, which demonstrates the support of most member states for the underlying concepts of the Green Deal. There are, however, two major exceptions to note: the reform of the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the taxonomy of private finance. These are two issues that member states agree should be revised downwards to the point where the objectives of these two initiatives are in jeopardy. These two dossiers perfectly illustrate the difficulty of transforming this spirit of synthesis into legislative proposals that are coherent both in terms of environmental integrity as well as political viability.

**An agenda strongly shaped by international realities**

The Green Deal was conceived of and implemented as a domestic agenda responding to political needs within Europe. Its emergence, however, also has its roots in international dynamics.

In 2019, the European Union is suffering from a post-Paris disillusionment. To begin with, the compromises that had to be made to successfully conclude the agreement make it difficult for an effective virtuous cycle to emerge between IPCC reports and increased national commitments to reduce greenhouse gasses. The sluggish nature of international political time creates ever greater dissonance with what the science says. The election of Donald Trump in 2016, less than 4 days after the Paris Agreement went into effect, also sent shock waves through the European multilateral intelligentsia. The announcement in 2017 of the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, instigated by Donald Trump, only confirmed the need for the European Union to abandon a solely multilateralist approach, whether on environmental or other issues. This is all the more tempting as unilateralism had already proven its worth, such as in the area of standards governing chemical products (REACH) or automobiles (EURO IV). In these sectors, European legislation has in fact led to these standards being adopted worldwide. It is this normative power linked to the internal market, considered more effective than multilateral action, that the EU wants to use with the Green Deal. With the Green Deal, this new unilateralism is clearly illustrated by the Commission’s decision in 2019 to implement a carbon adjustment mechanism at the borders, a subject that was still taboo only a few years earlier. This introduction of defensive unilateral tools against states that refuse to play the game in terms of national commitments reflects the end of a certain benevolent innocence in the European Commission’s approach and echoes certain member states’ protectionist temptations, led by France.

Some analysts (CHECK) also attribute the Green Deal to concerns about the competitiveness of the environmental goods and services sector in Europe. Because Europe cannot easily compete with other countries in terms of abundance of raw materials or cheap labor, the future of its industry is primarily in innovative, capital-intensive sectors, including green technologies. The competitive loss of European-produced photovoltaic panels on world markets is a wake-up call. In addition to anti-dumping measures against Chinese photovoltaic panels, the European Union’s strategic response includes overhauling research and development policies in an attempt to boost green public investment and a reindustrialization strategy.

The global economic crisis linked to COVID has also allowed for the implementation of a very ambitious green recovery program, which was not on the agenda in 2019. The very particular circumstances of the crisis led the Commission and the Council to break down solid barriers like those protecting the Stability and Growth Pact. The crisis has also allowed the European Commission to increase its powers to independently mobilize funds in order to finance counter-cyclical investment programs in member states. The Green Deal has therefore become a program of structural transformation combined with major investment programs which stands in contrast to the much more modest Junker Plan in its sums and ambition to reform for sustainability.

The supply crises caused by COVID have cruelly highlighted the EU’s lack of autonomy in certain key sectors and value chains for both its economy and decarbonization. This dynamic, which is more sovereigntist and less free-market, has clearly been reinforced by the energy crisis related to the war in Ukraine and is now leading to the emergence of a European diplomacy that is focused on the security of resource supply.

This same crisis is also driving the European Commission to put the issue of fossil fuel dependency on the table. The Commission is also beginning to talk about sobriety and focusing on reducing energy demand, both of which had been overlooked in the first two years of the Green Deal for fear of creating counterproductive reactions among citizens and member states. In doing so, the Green Deal comes much closer to the original vision of a program of systemic change, where supply and demand are addressed, and where eco-sufficiency is no longer a taboo. The Green Deal is now also benefiting from a real paradigm shift in the European institutions, notably in terms of the relationship to globalization, but also in terms of stronger state interventionism in the economy.

**A missed opportunity with citizens**

The Green Deal, however, still suffers from a democratic deficit that is all the more problematic because its success depends on profound changes in consumption and production practices in all companies, including SMBs, and among citizens. At the end of his speech announcing the New Deal, Franklin Delano Roosevelt promised “a new deal for the American people”.

However, this dimension of a new deal is largely absent
from the Green Deal, which is not designed as a new deal with European citizens and other stakeholders. The European Commission has abandoned a large-scale communication policy on the Green Deal in favor of Next Generation Europe, its post-COVID recovery program. Neither the Climate Pact announced in 2019 nor the environmental dimension of the European Citizens’ Convention allow for the societal participation required for developing such a deal due to a lack of resources and political will. While the Green Deal does include redistribution measures for the poorest, these are not presented as part of a new “socio-ecological contract” between leaders and citizens. The Green Deal also does not entail a new deal with nature, as described in the thinking of Michel Serres. There is certainly a stronger will to protect biodiversity or to restore nature, but this remains above all utilitarian and based on the notion of ecosystem services. The European Commission uses the word “ecocide”, but no large-scale initiative, which would translate into a shift to anti-speciesism, is present in the Green Deal’s agenda.

On the other hand, the European Commission, in response to climate marches as well as through the German Constitutional Court’s recognition of intergenerational equity, seems ready to explore the modalities of a new deal between generations, which could be acknowledged in the Treaties, thereby enshrining a paradigm shift in the European Union’s legal order.

Halfway through the term of the European Commission chaired by Ursula von der Leyen, the Green Deal seems destined to last. But its legal weakness – since it is only based on a communication – could prove fatal in the next European elections, as could this missed opportunity to reach out to European citizens, who are likely to be disappointed or even cynical because of the lack of information on the progress made. What will remain is the numerous legislation and regulations that result from it. But civilization cannot be changed by decree. Consequently, a priority for the continuity of the Green Deal should be to initiate a much deeper engagement with European citizens, in multiple forms and modalities, with the active collaboration of civil society, local authorities and the private sector. In her recent State of the Union speech, Ursula von der Leyen expressed the willingness of the European Commission to continue using the Citizens’ Convention model beyond the Conference on the Future of Europe. Let us hope that this announcement will bring about a beneficial change of direction, which would finally make the Green Deal a new socio-ecological contract between leaders and citizens, between member states, between generations, and between man and nature.
The Green Deal and the war in Ukraine

Are we witnessing the birth of “war ecology”? Will the Kremlin’s use of gas as a weapon have an effect on perceptions of the transition and, more broadly, of European action?

We must realize that Europe must be sovereign when it comes to energy and that our sovereignty can only be built on renewable energy. We do not have oil, we have very little gas, very little coal and we must face very serious climate issues. It is therefore through wind, solar and geothermal energy that we will be able to build our sovereignty, without being dependent on Russian gas or other hydrocarbon exporters. The green hydrogen market will be a global market, for example, but it will be a very diversified market, which will not give certain countries the opportunity to blackmail others.

Is gas still a viable transitional energy as a number of European countries, including Germany, claim?

Yes, of course. At the Commission we have always assumed that natural gas would be a transitional energy because the emissions from natural gas are much lower than from coal, for example. For some countries, which have to abandon coal, gas is a key transition energy. What has changed is that today, this gas can no longer come from Russia, which for Europe means finding other sources at prices that will certainly be higher.

The last few months have also shown that the transition to renewables is going much faster than before. There is a scenario where certain countries will perhaps continue to use coal for a little while longer and then immediately switch to renewables instead of using natural gas as a transitional source.

Furthermore, gas will not only play this role in Europe, but in Africa as well.

What do you think of the opposition to nuclear power that seemed to be a consensus in Germany during the Merkel era? Was this a strategic mistake?

I fully understand the German government’s reasoning under Merkel’s leadership, as well as the French government’s position – it is not up to the Commission to dictate the energy mix of Member States. Our duty is to enforce the 55% reduction in emissions by 2030, but it is up to the member states to decide how to do it. Having said that, we can clearly see that, in the context of the war and at a time when natural gas has become a weapon for Vladimir Putin, the German government is reversing certain positions – this is also the case with nuclear energy.

Could Europe manage without Russian gas this winter and with what strategy?

Yes, we will be able to manage without Russian gas. We have succeeded in organizing our supply; our reserves are filled to 82.5%, which is a sort of feat.

Which countries are most vulnerable?

The most vulnerable countries are those that are highly dependent on Russian gas, particularly the Central European countries, but also Germany. At the same time, European solidarity as we have organized it will be able to avoid the worst scenarios. Barring an exceptionally cold winter, I believe we are prepared. In reality, the challenge will be to organize ourselves for next year, since we still had Russian gas this year. We have to be prepared and assume that next year there will simply be no more deliveries from Russia.

In the first weeks of the war, many analysts argued that if Europe succeeded in adopting an embargo on Russian hydrocarbons, the war would have ended, as the foundations of Putin’s regime would have been undermined. Today, it is Russia itself that is halting gas exports. What have we not understood?

We must not make the mistake of believing that the European sanctions have not had and are not having any effect. They are profoundly transforming Russian society and its economy. I lived in Russia; I know the country quite well. The advantage of an autocracy that controls information so strongly is that you can manipulate the truth, and this is Putin’s game. He wants to create the impression that we would be greatly weakened by using hydrocarbons as a weapon, and that he is stronger.

Beyond the manipulation, the context is clear: Russia...
is isolated and seriously weakened. At the same time, it has enormous revenue thanks to hydrocarbon markets. I never believed that an embargo on Russian gas would bring Putin to his knees, nor that the war would end after only a few weeks. The war will be prolonged and an autocracy is able to hide things and put incredible pressure on citizens, who no longer dare to speak out. After twenty years of lies, most Russians don’t know what to believe anymore. And then there is fear; opposition is arrested and locked up.

European governments have so far opted for limited and national measures to deal with rising energy prices. What are the possibilities today of coordination at the European level, especially in the short term, in order to confront rising prices?

There are already measures at the national level taken by some member states. In the short term, we must now organize European solidarity. We can clearly see that rising energy prices weigh more heavily on those who have very little to spend. Others are able to pay and to bear this burden. It is a matter of redistribution. We will be making proposals along these lines, to find ways of relieving the pressure on the most vulnerable sections of society. One proposal – supported also by the German and French governments – would be to ensure that the energy sector’s windfall profits are redistributed to businesses and citizens.

Is a review of the electricity market’s architecture on the table? The accumulation of political interventions in the energy markets is stretching the idea that energy can circulate through markets to its limits. Do you think we should recognize that energy is not like any other commodity?

We must be very cautious. It took us thirty years to construct the electricity market as it is structured today. At the Commission, we are convinced that there are reasons to re-examine this architecture because the market has changed, notably with the increased share of renewable energies in the energy mix. This is leading us to re-examine the balance between the different energy sources and this could lead to proposals aimed at striking a new balance between the portion of the price coming from renewables and the portion coming from carbon-based energy sources. The main takeaway is that the price of electricity should no longer be tied to the price of natural gas to the same extent.

The link between spending to protect consumers from rising energy prices and European budgetary rules is now clear. Does the Commission’s work plan include revising the Stability and Growth Pact?

Not at the moment. But we will obviously face, as we did during the pandemic, a particularly difficult situation. The rules are the rules, but the circumstances are fundamentally different. I recently spoke to the head of the IMF and she reiterated that we will need massive, global investment to get the economy back on track. This means rethinking certain rules without pretending that from now on money will cost nothing and that we will have unlimited access to new resources. Everything we spend, we will have to pay back. But if we don’t invest in productive change, we will be placing an impossible burden on our children.

Is it possible to imagine a new post-war recovery plan?

Yes. We will experience a very difficult period, and I fear that we do not fully understand the difficulties that lie ahead. But I believe this will be followed by a period of remarkable recovery. If we consider the potential of a country like Ukraine, the potential of renewable energies, the speed with which, for example, industry is adapting, whether it is cars, steel, or computing, I am still optimistic.

Some member states are making significant investments in fossil fuel infrastructure. Is this a danger to climate goals?

We will be using coal a bit longer than expected, even though at the moment it is very expensive and there is not much of it. With regard to fossil infrastructure, if we build infrastructure for natural gas and then make it accessible for green hydrogen later, that is an investment I can totally understand. We are going to try to push those who still need to invest in natural gas infrastructure, in order to provide heat for homes and industry, to prepare that infrastructure for green hydrogen transport.

The European Union had given itself a framework for action: the Green Deal. Is the EU responding to geopolitical changes — from the war in Ukraine to the U.S.-China rivalry — by following the path of carbon neutrality it set out to achieve by 2050?

When we developed and presented the Green Deal in 2019, before the pandemic and before the war in Ukraine, we had to face criticisms and accusations, from people who said, in essence, “It’s a good Green Deal, but come back in ten years and we’ll see”. Over the course of these crises, we have been able to prove that the Green Deal was also a response to the pandemic because we had to rebuild our society, we had to rebuild our economy, we had to transform our industry. We were able to prove that the energy transition and the circular economy were job creators, that they reenergized our economy while also...
returning Europe to the forefront of global industrial development. With Russia’s war in Ukraine, the element of the Green Deal that has become even more important is the transition to renewable energies. Beyond its objective of reducing emissions, the Green Deal has become the tool to create real European energy sovereignty.

**Is the energy crisis weakening Europe’s position as a climate leader?**

I have just returned from a G20 summit in Bali and I do not feel that we have lost our leadership position at all. We affirmed it at COP 26 in Glasgow and we are building bridges between the various positions, for example concerning the need to increase spending on adaptation to compensate for losses. Our position is halfway between that of the U.S. and of developing countries, and I think we have a certain amount of credibility, but I hope we can increase it further. More than half of our spending on climate policy goes towards adaptation. Member states must also be prepared to spend a little more on losses and damage caused by climate change, because that is what developing countries are asking for. The tragic fact is that those who are suffering the most from the effects of climate change are not those who created it. Africa is responsible for only 3% of global emissions. There is a responsibility on the part of certain developed countries, which are responsible for 30% or 20% of emissions, or the European Union which is responsible for 8% of global emissions. We are the ones who for two hundred years benefited from coal, then oil, and then gas to create our wealth.

**The COP 27 in November will bring the issue of financing climate action in developing countries to the fore. How will the EU position itself?**

I repeat, once again, that we must accept our responsibility. I believe that the European Union is assuming its responsibility; we are already responsible for one third of all global spending on adaptation and climate policy, but we must do more. We must also guarantee investments in these countries, which will be made easier if we are also able to invest in adaptation. At the same time, if we don’t reduce our emissions – and this is the G20’s responsibility, because 80% of the world’s emissions come from the 20 G20 countries – then no amount of money will be enough to confront the climate crisis. If we exceed 2°C and we head towards 3 or 4°C, then the crisis will be so acute that we will not be able to respond to it. There is always this relationship between mitigation and adaptation. Developed countries have an additional responsibility to do what we have promised, and also to respond constructively to the demands of developing countries for the losses and damages caused by climate change.

**Why are African partners not aligned with the European Union? What is the Commission’s strategy to counter this, and to what extent does the fight against climate change and access to energy play a role?**

I recently spoke with four African presidents and indeed, you are right, they are not 100% aligned with us on the Russian war in Ukraine. Why? Because they have concerns about the supply of grain, energy policy, as well as security policy because the Russians are particularly active in Africa at the moment. The most important thing in the short term is to show our solidarity, especially with regard to food. But what is even more important is to facilitate investments in African countries to help them increase energy production. Six hundred million Africans do not have access to electricity today, and it would be a revolution to finally be able to give them access through photovoltaics and wind energy. Secondly, we must help African countries to make this energy transition, including through the use of natural gas. There should be no taboo between Europe and Africa on this.

**Is the European political community a useful framework for organizing the continent? What could its contribution be in the climate field?**

Yes, I think we need to create a forum, a place, an agora, where all the European countries can meet to talk about common issues. I find it very difficult to see how, for example, we can create a renewable energy space in Europe without the British or the Norwegians. This of course surpasses the limits of the European Union. I also find it very difficult to see how we can talk about security in Europe without having discussions with the Ukrainians or the countries of the Caucasus, and especially the Balkan countries that are candidates for accession. I believe that President Macron’s initiative is useful for security in Europe and also for the ecological and energy transition.

**What does the geopolitical conversion of the Union mean? What is its logic and what is its perspective?**

I believe that as politicians we are responsible for the security and prosperity of our citizens. What is the purpose of a security policy? To avoid war, to create stable international relations, to provide the possibility of stable economic development. To ensure social peace and to ensure that all our citizens have access to development and economic growth. This is the objective of our policy, and if we want to achieve this, we must address the climate crisis.

**Do you share the growing sentiment in Washington of a “new Cold War” with China?**
No, I don’t share this idea. Our systems are different, our vision of both society and democracy is different from that of the Communist Party in China. But this does not mean that we are in a state of confrontation or Cold War. I still see potential for cooperation with Beijing, though we should be neither excessive nor naïve. I believe that Europe needs to determine what exactly its own position is to avoid becoming dependent on China, as we have done with Russia. China can be a partner in the climate field, as well as in the field of economic development and international trade, which is very important to us.

Is there a risk of becoming dependent on other regions of the world for rare earth metals?

This risk always exists, but it also depends on our ability to develop new products which are less dependent on rare earth and to diversify our trade relations. I believe that the experience of Putin’s war has taught us to avoid one sided dependence, which weakens us. I believe that one of our continent’s most remarkable assets is its ability to reinvent itself and to invent new technologies and new products. I can already see that in the field of batteries, for example, we are moving very quickly to develop recyclable batteries produced in Europe. I have no doubt that we will do the same with solar panels.

This is a difficult task at a time when war is ravaging Ukraine. How do you think the Union’s relationship with Russia should be structured?

This will continue for a very long time until Russia finds an answer itself: where does it want to go? Who will be its friends? What alliances will it form?

I believe that we can help this process by showing how Russia can be part of the European family, which means respecting the rule of law and respecting democracy. At present, we are very far from that, but Russia will not disappear; it will continue to be part of the European continent. We must therefore also make an effort of imagination, an intellectual effort, and also, I would say, a political effort to imagine a constructive relationship between the Union and Russia. For the moment, the course chosen by President Putin precludes such development.

Should Russia be given a place in constructing the security architecture in Europe — and under what conditions?

Russia already has in place a structure that was established in the 1970s through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which developed into an organization, the OSCE, but Russia has preferred to isolate itself from it.

The tragedy of Russia is that it isolates itself. There have been countless proposals for cooperation from European countries. We must now wait for Russia to take a cooperative stance and to abandon this domineering posture. There is a philosophical difference between us and the Russians on what defines security and cooperation. For Russia, security lies in exporting instability to regions outside Russia – it dominates its neighborhood by creating instability on its borders. The European vision is the exact opposite; we create stability by exporting our stability and growth. This is what we did after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and this is how we changed Central and Eastern Europe. And this is how we must continue.
After COP 27: the geopolitics of the Green Deal

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Agroecology at The Heart of the European Green Deal

The need for a paradigm shift: promoting agroecology and moving from uniformity to diversity

Agricultural markets are volatile by nature. This is first and foremost because food production is highly dependent on unforeseeable phenomena (drought, floods, epizootic diseases, pest infestations, etc.) that can affect harvests. This is also because producers react poorly to price signals. When prices are low they tend to reduce production and focus on other crops. Yet, since all producers react to the same signals, the result is that there is under production the following season, leading to higher prices. Conversely, when prices are high, producers tend to increase production which leads to overall overproduction the following season. This price volatility in agricultural markets makes planning production very problematic.

In addition to the inherent vulnerability of this system are difficulties that amplify structural ones. These include the growing financialization of agricultural markets with increasingly influential financial players introducing a completely speculative approach to many markets (notably wheat, corn, and soybeans), as well as the hyperspecialization linked to the development of international trade which leads to financial speculation that is increasingly detached from the fundamentals of supply, demand, and stock levels.

These difficulties threaten the sustainability of our food systems, including environmental sustainability. The challenge of food production with little environmental impact is one that we all face. Yet the response varies from one region to another. Highly mechanized, large-scale commodity production – as practiced in most European countries, the United States, or Canada – cannot be the future of agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example. This is not least because there is a much larger population employed in agriculture, and therefore labor intensive agriculture is much easier to conceive of in these countries. The answers can be found at the level of each region based on local characteristics. What is clear, however, is that paradigms of uniformity and economies of scale must be abandoned everywhere to focus on more local diversity, to promote resilience, but also because greater agrobiodiversity means more efficient agroecology.

It is very important to promote agroecology and it is not a utopic vision to think that we will be able to progressively generalize it. Agroecological agriculture is not organic agriculture that is certified by a label as not using chemical products. It is a more intelligent form of agriculture that relies on cycles that exist in nature between crops, trees, and animals. It focuses on the use of agronomic techniques such as crop rotation, companion planting on a particular plot of land where these crops can protect and support each other, the planting of legumes to introduce nitrogen into the soil, agroforestry, etc.

Agroecological systems are characterized by low input use, little or no pesticides, and little or no nitrogen fertilizers. Farmers can be at differing levels of progress in these agroecological transitions. Agroecology is a direction, not a series of designated practices like organic farming. However, agroecology aims at reducing the use of inputs, reducing the cost of production and the farmer’s dependence on the use of these inputs whose costs have become exorbitant. It is therefore a way to promote a mode of production that uses resources more efficiently.

But is agroecology more productive by the hectare? This is a controversial and complicated question. In general, calculating productivity per hectare is asked as: what, for example, is the volume of corn produced per hectare? In an agroecological crop, corn is grown with other crops. What must be calculated is the output per hectare of all these crops combined. Taking into account the reduced use of nitrogen fertilizers and pesticides, and therefore energy, the system is very performant. But everything depends on how this performance is measured.

It is inconceivable that we would do without agroecology, especially in light of the increase in input prices and the loss of natural soil fertility due to the erosion of biodiversity. Moving towards this form of agriculture makes sense. Of course, farmers must be satisfied with it. They must be trained and financially supported in this three- or four-year transition. If we succeed, we will have made enormous progress in European food systems.

More precisely, when it comes to the length of the transition, three/four years is the estimated amount of
time a farmer needs to transition towards agroecology. During this period the farmer will see revenues fall and they will have to experiment (for example to find new ways to create cycles between the different parts of their land). But it is clear that for agroecology to be supported, there is a need for different marketing channels, local processing capacity, and local distribution channels. It is the entire system that must change so that the evolution taking place at the scale of the individual farmer’s land is supported by the rest of the system’s evolution, which is a complete revolution that will take more than three/four years.

Agroecology is not a return to traditional practices, though they can be a source of inspiration. Agroecology is the science of the 21st century. It relies on the best scientists developing production methods that use less pesticides and nitrogen fertilizers, along with a thorough understanding of how farming systems and nature work. These techniques can be very sophisticated and highly productive, along with being knowledge-intensive and which must be taught.

Presenting agroecology as a return to traditional practices is extremely hard to sell and is not at all attractive to governments in the Global South. This is all the more true because the European Union’s trading partners are convinced that they can only export to member states by charging relatively low prices, and therefore by producing sufficiently large volumes on a sufficient scale. This implies agro-industrial methods that are the exact opposite of agroecological production. The European Union should do more to encourage agroecological production in its trade policies. It has begun introducing stricter environmental standards, notably relating to deforestation and forest deterioration, but more could be done. For example, the EU could generalize environmental conditions for all imports of agricultural products. It could also do more in terms of development cooperation to encourage its partners to make this shift to agroecology.

The importance of achieving better coordination between levels of governance

Food production choices depend on market signals and the liberalization of international trade, leading to an international division of labor and hyperspecialization. This makes each country, each region, increasingly dependent on imports to feed themselves at the same time that they specialize in certain crops for export. These shifts in one sense reinforce efficiency in production, but this happens at the expense of resilience, which requires diversity at the local, national, and regional levels. Recent crises – whether it was the Covid-19 pandemic to the Russian aggression against Ukraine – have revealed the danger of overspecialization.

We are in a paradoxical situation where a growing number of towns and regions are looking to develop more diverse and sustainable territorial agrifood systems but are not receiving support from higher levels of governance, particularly national government. International and European levels of governance do not encourage this diversity and reterritorialization either. On the contrary, they promote hyperspecialization. Our challenge consists of achieving better coordination between the different levels of governance. The local level, where the center of gravity for innovation has shifted, must receive more support from national and regional levels of governance, including in the management of international trade.

Local communities have a very important role to play. A series of social innovations driven by civil society are crucial, especially direct channels between producers and consumers, as well as networks of social and solidarity-based grocery stores. We must take an interest in these innovations which, without the support of local communities and governments, risk having a limited life span and will not be able to grow to a sufficient scale.

Here again it is vital that local levels of governance are supported by higher levels of governance so that a transition towards more resilient food systems – systems which are truly more territorialized, where local seasonal products would be affordable for a significantly larger public, where the distance between producers and consumers, between farmers and consumers, would be shorter – can be achieved.

From a fair food transition to the reconciliation of ecological transformation and social justice goals

The main thing holding back the transition of our food systems is that household food budgets have been steadily decreasing over the past fifty years. Today, in countries like Belgium and France, approximately 12-13% of household budgets go towards food – although this has been increasing dramatically over the past six months. The resulting low-cost foods are facilitated by hyperspecialization, by the takeover of food systems by large players who are able to exploit economies of scale and control extensive supply chains with highly complex logistics, bringing consumers and producers together on extremely large scales. Until now, the low-cost food economy was also a major substitute for social policies which could protect the lowest income and underprivileged households. A change in model means we must question this low-cost system. It is the main obstacle, even more so today with the inflation of food and energy prices.

In May 2020, the European Union launched a very promising strategy, Farm to Fork, which is an element of the Green Deal. This strategy’s main innovation is to move away from this siloed approach regarding food thanks to
an improved coordination of sectoral policies which, up until now, were detached from each other – agriculture, environment, health, land use planning, jobs. Even if some of these policies fall more within the responsibility of member states, the European Commission is proposing a much more integrated, coordinated, and cross-sectoral policy for a more sustainable food system.

This is extremely pertinent. Yet the social aspect is missing. Without addressing the issue of low-income households’ ability to access sustainable food, we run the risk of not succeeding in this transformation. More generally, the European Union has not sufficiently taken into account that the fight against inequality is central to the ecological transformation.

The issue is all the more pressing as the Union maintains a mindset that economic growth is the priority which will be the determining factor for resolving all other problems. Yet we can no longer make ecological transformation and reducing poverty dependent on economic growth as the condition sine qua non of all the rest. The EU remains stuck on this obsession with GDP, including in its Green Deal, which is defined as the European Union’s new model of growth. This is problematic given that, up until now, we have not – contrary to what we would like to admit to ourselves – succeeded in separating economic growth from environmental impacts. Consequently, we can no longer pretend that economic growth can be the driver for ecological transition. It is the EU’s mindset which must change.

Moreover, there has long been competition between the goal of ecological transformation on the one hand, and the social justice goal of reducing poverty on the other hand. Two factors explain this competition. The ecological transition requires massive investments in renewable energies, public transportation infrastructure, and insulation of buildings. All these investments will use a budget which will no longer be available to finance public services and social protections.

Secondly, the ecological transformation often entails socially regressive fiscal measures such as the carbon tax. This makes many organizations that are committed to the fight against poverty and defending the rights of the working class and workers wary of the fiscal tools used to achieve these transformations.

Yet eradicating poverty and environmental sustainability are complimentary, and they must be viewed as such. They are complementary because there is a whole series of measures that can be taken in the fields of mobility, energy transformation, food, or even building renovation, which provide a threefold dividend: they create jobs, including for low-skilled workers, they make the goods and services essential for a decent life affordable for low-income households, and they reduce our ecological footprint.
The Green Deal is the New Social Contract

Autumn 2021: for avowed climate activists – of which I am one – this is an autumn full of contradictory signals. On one hand we see the rise in climate anxiety, geopolitical paralysis on the other, and a European political response which is both strong and weak.

The publication of the 6th IPCC report in the middle of A Season in Hell – echoing Rimbaud’s poem – cast a shadow over the chances of controlling the climate crisis. Six years after COP21, it is a final warning to act. Even the most experienced observers of climate change were rattled by the report. It makes it nearly impossible to fall back on the usual psychological techniques – downplaying the crisis – to ward off the deep anxiety caused by this threat. Even before the disasters of the last several months, surveys of young people in ten countries published by Lancet Planetary Health show that 75% consider the future to be “terrifying”, and 56% think that “humanity is doomed”.

In a context still marked by the pandemic’s effects and the weaknesses it revealed in our international system and societies, the world’s third largest emitter, the European Union, acts – despite its weaknesses – as an anchor point. This is true both in terms of vaccine and climate strategy. The green pact as a mandate commitment is in fact a response to the expressed desires of European societies. Following Brexit, electors that had often been disengaged from the Union decided, through greater mobilization for voting, to give Europe a chance. This green pact is therefore the opportunity to revive the European affectio societatis – the political space for accelerating societal transformation – all while holding a central place in the international scene. A symbol of hope, but also of profound change, it will be a test of the meaning of Europe and a possible cure to treat the democratic deficit afflicting the Union.

Green pacts on both sides of the Atlantic

Calls in favor of green pacts or legislative packages of comparable ambition have existed for years in Europe as well as in the United States but had never moved beyond narrow circles of debate. It is striking to observe that on both sides of the Atlantic these projects have begun to materialize and have generated political alignment almost simultaneously. In light of the climate fight, there are two new societal projects – one which sprung from citizens, the other from institutions. Of course, this emergence coincides with a wave of social mobilization on an unprecedented scale under the influence of the younger generations.

Let us not forget that it was the Women’s March organized following Donald Trump’s election which launched a true mobilization movement which went beyond the limits of feminist issues, and which embraced multiple causes, including the climate crisis. In 2017 these grassroots organizations mobilized between 1.8% and 2.8% of the American population. The activists in the Sunrise Movement, relying on mobilizations rooted in local efforts, built over time the Green New Deal project. This ambition was centered on both resolving the climate crisis as well as reducing inequality, a central issue in the American debate during the 2020 Democratic primary. If Joe Biden was one of the rare candidates not to align himself with this identity, he was careful to never criticize it in order to bring the Democratic camp together. In the end, he retained a number of its principles, even if he failed to mobilize the scale of his massive investment plans (for bailouts, jobs, and American families).

On our side of the Atlantic, following a year of mobilization – notably among youth – political analysts and elected officials or candidates understand that the ecological transition is a real aspiration for citizens which goes beyond that age or social class. It’s about time. At the end of 2019, one in ten people throughout the world lived in a territory (city, region, country, etc.) which had declared a climate emergency. The North American political situation has also had a certain influence: the Green New Deal could be enshrined in real policy and not simply a useful political incantation.

This popular demand for climate action was confirmed at the ballots, and not just in the countries which are home to Greta, Luisa, or Adélaïde. In France, Europe Écologies les Verts (EELV) – the French Green party – came in third and established itself as the leading force.

1. This text was first published on 28 September 2021 by Grand Continent. This publication has been slightly revised and updated to take into account the consequences of the war in Ukraine on the prospects for the transition in the EU. See conclusion, p. 35.


of the left, a first! In the Czech Republic, nearly one in three voters voted to fight against the climate crisis and to protect the environment. It is also interesting to note that in Great Britain, Boris Johnson adopted the idea of a green industrial revolution and carbon neutrality, making them central to his political agenda. He is not the only center-right political leader to understand the necessity of adopting this agenda. In Lithuania, the government led by Krišjānis Kariņš was one of the first to support the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% at the European level for 2030.

In parallel with European elections, European heads of state and government expressly called for climate action to be a priority for the Union while taking into account its social consequences. President Von der Leyen therefore proposed a Green Deal to the European Parliament, led by a heavyweight, Frans Timmermans. This was a political necessity. The European Green Deal is effectively a synthesis of proposals made by political parties and member state positions in response to social pressure. It is due to this successful synthesis, a true political coup, that the current Commission has been able to rally a majority in the European Parliament. Europe is therefore building a new promise, a new project, centered on the ecological transition. But contrary to the American movement, the European Green Deal is a political project rooted in institutions in response to citizen demands and not a project brought directly by citizens. This is a strength for its institutional character and a weakness for its dynamics.

If the previous Commission had proposed that the European Union reach carbon neutrality in 2050 – the objective laid out in the Paris Agreement – its formal ratification was made possible by the current Commission, allowing climate to be officially added to the European political agenda. Nevertheless, carbon neutrality was still a long-term objective in search of tangible measures. This was achieved through the increase of the European contribution (the NDC, or Nationally Determined Contribution) as well as the adoption in December 2020 of a mandate for action to define a legislative package. This is the origin of the “Fit for 55” legislative package that is now in the spotlight.

Through its European Green Deal and coming under pressure from Parliament and member states, the Commission made the decision to go even further. The Green Deal states that “All EU actions and policies will have to contribute to the European Green Deal objectives”. Beyond revising the EU’s policy on climate and energy, it is also a demand that weighs on all of the Union’s actions.

The European Green Deal, according to the European Commission:

1. Change the fundamentals of the economy:
   - Under the "traditional" climate and energy umbrella, this means: raising climate ambition, changing energy sources, creating a circular economy, building and renovating our buildings, accelerating the transition to sustainable mobility, building a new food system, preserving biodiversity and removing toxic substances from the environment;
   - Beyond these policies traditionally linked to climate action, the Green Deal also promises to promote green finance and investment and ensure a fair transition, to make national budgets green and send the right price signals, to mobilize research and foster innovation, and to accelerate education and training. It also promises to "do no harm" by avoiding any policy that would run counter to these goals.

2. Create a Green Deal diplomacy: the EU aims to continue promoting the Paris Agreement and multilateralism, engage all its partners to accelerate climate action, use trade policy as a platform for dialogue on climate action and continue its commitment to an international financial system that supports sustainable growth;

3. Unite around a European Climate Pact: the Commission will promote the exchange of best practices between citizens and companies, create spaces for sharing in order to develop solutions to the crisis together, and will support more education on climate and environmental issues in schools.

It must be said that some shock therapy is needed. At a time when, in all of Europe, trust in institutions and politics is in decline and European construction uneven. Economic Europe is strong thanks to the single market – the great driver of integration – but nearly nonexistent on the social level, with this area having remained under the control of the member states. Because it is an economic as well as a technological, social, and international political project, the Green Deal reverberates differently: it is a unifying force, but above all a clear, concrete, and visionary direction for the European project. By aiming for consistency in all policies implemented, Europe is adopting an approach which goes beyond the traditional limits of climate policy. Thus, the Green Deal becomes the standard of measurement and reference. It is a political evolution which is also taking place in the United States with Joe Biden’s “whole of government” approach. It is an extremely logical evolution given the scope and breadth of actions which must be taken, but it is a true
revolution in European governance, for in order for the idea of the green pact to work, it must inspire international, European, national, regional, and local actions. It means creating new benchmarks and allowing each level of decision and action to contribute to the common goal. The Green Deal represents a metamorphosis of European identity, a new definition which reflects the aspirations of its citizens.

A new social contract

The pandemic has raised questions about the social model for many European citizens. If the debate on the “world after” was quickly shut down in favor of messaging about the return to normal, many questions and concerns remain. The gradual emergence from the health crisis reveals increased inequalities between countries in terms of illness, poverty, and employment – even within our wealthy societies. At the same time, there is increasing awareness of environmental crises. The return to “normal” should not be an excuse to overlook these. This thirst for transformation creates a space to rebuild a post-COVID-19 societal model which is more durable and more just. It is a project which resonates in European society, particularly with young people. A recent survey showed that protecting the climate and environment are the top priorities for 15-35-year-olds surveyed in 23 European countries and 77% recognized that our consumer habits are not sustainable. This is a generation of new engagements which go beyond traditional political participation such as voting or campaigning for a party, which has a passion for associations and protests, and which can be felt all over Europe. These youth, which have been particularly affected by the crisis, are looking for alternatives and wish to participate in bringing about change, which can be seen in a large number of initiatives. The ecological transition as a new societal and political project might be persuasive beyond generational or political divides, but for the first time the demand for social justice has become a central component.

This demand is understandable. Faced with the profound changes that the ecological transition implies, the question of the social contract has once again arisen. How will the costs and benefits of the changes – whose scope we are only just beginning to grasp – be distributed? The denial of the climate crisis in particular has obscured the scope of industrial restructuring, the transformation of agricultural production models, and the redevelopment of urban spaces. At the same time, the foundations of previous social contracts founded in large part on increasing consumption of material goods and access to long-term employment, have largely been eroded. The perception of the environmental costs of economic growth for the least privileged and most precarious social groups in Europe is becoming increasingly real. These groups are (and will be) the ones most exposed to pollution and climate-related impacts, but also the ones who currently receive the least amount of economic aid to confront them. Among the public policy tools available to policy makers, certain public policies are more regressive whereas others are more progressive. But European environmental policies have until now been rather regressive.

In the coming era, solving the climate crisis and reducing inequalities cannot and should not be separated. This integration has progressively imposed itself in the debate as the condition for succeeding in the transition and the Green Deal, the sine qua non. The Yellow Vest movement in France, which opposed the increased carbon tax on fuels for automobiles while fuels for aircraft were exempt, clearly demonstrated the need for fairness and equity when it comes to the distribution of costs arising from the ecological transition. The main challenge of climate action lies in moving from a policy which has until now been peripheral to a more central and fundamentally structuring role in all collective decisions. This requires policy makers to shift their mindset in order to not think about policy in terms of policy, or instruments in terms of instruments, but to reconsider their very way of thinking. The effectiveness of such lies in its intersectional nature and in the leveraging and influencing effects of the various sectors between them. Managing this level of complexity, this new and more strategic role of public institutions, requires deliberation, learning, and consistent long-term thinking.

We now find ourselves at a crossroads: the old world is no longer relevant, the image of the new one is not yet in focus, the debate on the nature of this change is just beginning, and visions of the future – still largely abstract – are mostly technical. Who, then, think about the collective change within societies that are divided in terms of life paths, identities, ambitions, and ideological references? It is difficult to imagine traditional institutions – alone – being able to address this question at a time when, in order to be heard, discourse must come from “ordinary heroes”, from citizens, and be spoken from the field and the action and reflect this diversity. Technocratic discourse and governments of experts will

A pact to negotiate

Political disenchantment is being met with multiple modes of collective engagement which are mainly local and at a direct, citizen level: new forms of alliances have emerged, including pacts that have been defined as ecological pacts for climate action. In a compilation from the think tank Energy Cities, we read about a large variety of forms and ambitions, always with a common foundation.13 The parameters of this green pact change by continent, by country, and even by city, but a few parameters are consistent: decentralized leadership allowing for greater citizen participation, a variety of actors engaged beyond the political sphere, a multi-thematic project, and the desire to bring more citizens together. These pacts are policy vehicles which can allow our societies to progress not only in terms of climate, but also on matters of discrimination, economic inequalities, and conflicts over identity. This is a change of political mores which puts collective deliberation at its heart in order to consider changes in the economic paradigm and the perception of progress and the public good, to develop societal projects based on concrete problems to be solved, urban planning and space optimisation, energy, transportation, food, solidarity, etc.

At the European level, once it had been given a mandate, the Commission relied mainly on its area of authority – legislation – to create the European Green Deal. This explains its strengths, but also its limits. Its strength lies in the fact that the Green Deal serves as a benchmark in the inevitably fractious debate that each piece of legislation provokes. Its limits lie in the difficulty of reaching consensus among member states on each text which can weaken overall coherence. As with agriculture, international trade – despite being a domain overseen by the Commission – is currently missing from the European Green Deal’s strategy. This inertia, the “path dependency” that has been used over and over again to conclude trade agreements, weighs heavily, as does the lack of definition of a clear and coherent doctrine with the Green Deal.

Of course, free-trade agreements which exclude climate-protection clauses – like the one concluded between the United Kingdom and Australia – are no longer possible in Europe. Any agreement must be in line with the implementation of the Paris Agreement. However, the interpretation of these principles still remains too generalized and ad hoc as the clauses related to sustainable development are not always binding. This can be seen in the MERCOSUR trade deal which has become a political headache for the present Commission.

However, these environmental clauses are an integral part of the trade agreement with New Zealand. But Europe cannot change its character depending on who it is dealing with, and environmental clauses cannot only be applied to our climate allies. The Green Deal must become the frame of reference that will render null and void any agreement that does not respect the Paris Agreement. In order for the Green Deal to have an impact on all public policies – and this is no small task – three handicaps must be overcome: the burden of the past, the authority of Brussels, and the distance between the institutions and European societies.

- The burden of the past: while new initiatives must be aligned with the goal of carbon neutrality, the necessary legislative revisions which are a part of the traditional arsenal, such as common agricultural policy, among many others, promises to require significant effort.

- The Commission’s authority: as the Commission’s freedom of movement is greatest in the realm of environmental policy, this aspect of the Green Deal is more developed. However, we must go further in the fiscal and social domains and the member states should give them a larger role.

- Distance: the representatives of the European Commission are governments and elected officials, never directly citizens. Yet if the Green Deal remains a project of experts, it is undoubtedly destined to fail. Here again, the willingness of governments to share is not obvious, as shown by the right of scrutiny and veto demanded by the member states on the proposals resulting from the Conference on the Future of Europe.

If these three handicaps cannot be quickly overcome, there are nevertheless some initiatives which must be urgently undertaken which are in line with the established institutional order. I will propose five which should be considered as priorities. The successful alignment of these policies is the key to a successful mandate for the President of the Commission, her Executive Vice-President, Frans Timmermans, as well as for national governments and parliaments.

First initiative: Anchor the Green Deal within societies

A Green Deal designed, driven, and negotiated by Brussels will certainly have a large political and economic reach, but it is clear that this government of experts does not have much credibility with Europeans and will not be

able to single handedly ensure citizen acceptance.

Beyond legislative negotiation, implementing the Green Deal depends in large part on governments and national institutions which have a great deal of freedom. For example, governments will be solely responsible for delivering greenhouse gas emission reductions in sectors that are not covered by a carbon price. The new rules of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) leave much of the details of implementation to governments. The survey of opinion leaders by the Institute for European Environmental Policy shows that the three main reasons that could impede the implementation of the European Green Deal relate directly or indirectly to member state responsibility.14 Lack of commitment, absence of adequate governance mechanisms to measure progress, in combination with the lack of uniform progress across European countries may put the effectiveness of the Green Deal in jeopardy.

However, the present situation lends itself to a different exercise and European social movements demonstrate new aspirations for climate action. In France, the Citizens Convention for Climate showed the appetite for a coherent reform project. In Germany, at the behest of nine young citizens, the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe ruled against the government for its insufficient action in regard to its international engagements. This decision caused a swift response from the government, recalling what was observed in the Netherlands. In Poland, public protests against the rollback of women’s rights and in favor of climate action put pressure on the government. These citizen-led mobilizations use European and international texts to make the case for urgent climate action, including through the use of judges. Even though citizen mobilizations for the environment are generally local and focus on concrete projects (gas infrastructure projects, highways, air or water pollution, etc.) and are aimed at local political decision-makers, they also allude to global challenges, from greenhouse gas emissions to loss of biodiversity.

These mobilizations therefore shape – on the ground and through direct action – the narrative of tomorrow’s society. It is this connection between the different scales of decision-making and collective action which can, in my opinion, create the dynamics of change for which the Green Deal is ideally suited. It is therefore necessary to anchor the Green Deal in national political ecosystems and develop green pacts based on mobilizations and problems in citizens’ lives and which link the European, national, and local levels. In order to fight against inertia and political deadlock, the different pacts linked together could offer solutions to citizens. The European Green Deal should be used to advance local struggles that share the same vision.

By connecting the different levels of governance, this new choreography of collective action could restore the agility that we currently lack. It would allow parties involved in each pact to see and understand their place in a complex ecosystem. In order to become a legitimate political project, the Green Deal needs a dynamic architecture which once again gives citizens control of their lives, and the vision of their futures. We must launch the green deal initiative as soon as possible in the member states with green pacts that can be adapted to national issues while still meeting Europe’s climate objectives for 2030. This will allow European action to reinforce national dynamics that are already in place.

Second initiative: Reconcile Social and Climate Justice

Not all the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis can yet be felt. However, we already know that the inequalities which existed before were reinforced by the crisis, particularly for the most vulnerable people.15

The Green Deal cannot be summed up in a calculation of tons of tons of carbon prevented. As a social project it must anticipate its impacts and support the rapid changes in all sectors. This is its greatest challenge. In broad terms, the decarbonization of the European economy and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to zero have technical scenarios which are mostly known: the production of zero-carbon energy, the electrification of energy use, changes in agricultural and dietary practices, the recycling of resources, etc. These technical scenarios systematically lead to economic and social changes: industrial restructuring, the need for new infrastructure, professional transitions, changes in the distribution of wealth in the economy, etc.

The Green Deal’s success will be measured by its ability to anticipate these shocks and the formulation of a fairer social pact in a context where the machine for creating inequality is still highly efficient. Without a social pact, legitimate opposition will multiply. We must acknowledge that purely European instruments are limited and are largely in the purview of national policies. The implementation of the Fit for 55 legislative package, and especially the decision to put a price on carbon in the building and road transport sectors, made the social impact of these measures and their regressive nature clear. Both member states and European institutions will need

14 Céline Charveriat et Caroline Holme, “European Green Deal Barometer”, Institute for European Environmental Policy, 7 May 2021.

a solid response for a population which already feels particularly vulnerable. The “social climate fund” is one of the envisioned solutions, but it will not be sufficient. It will be even less sufficient if the revenue generated by the different mechanisms related to carbon pricing are primarily used to quickly pay down debt. Furthermore, actions to offset the impacts of public policy on revenues are difficult to get people to understand and accept and require intense communication. Trust is often not forthcoming, as the French experience has shown in the past.

This narrow approach to social justice therefore runs the risk of quickly being invalidated, for at any given moment circumstantial events could be used to point the finger at climate policies. This is exactly what is happening today with the continual rise in electricity prices in a number of European countries along with the surge in natural gas prices. These increases feed the arguments of those opposed to the Green Deal, which will then be blamed for what is presented as a policy meant to impoverish European citizens who will be sacrificed at the altar of the climate.

The Green Deal project is one of new promise. Adopting a social approach to the ecological transition does not mean simply anticipating the negative effects of public policy or verifying that they are working properly. It is also about anticipating the problems that will impact citizens during the transition, whether or not they are related to climate. In an historic moment of reorienting the economic and technological system, it is a matter of discussing the social bases and conditions for societies’ acceptance of this future. This debate is at once European, national, and local and must be carried out at the different levels without opposing them.

Third initiative: Defeat Short-term Thinking and Fight Against Advocates of the Status Quo

Climate action sceptics will always find opportunities to blame Europe and its Green Deal to absolve themselves. Polarization of debate as a political strategy, which plays on fear and the feeling of belonging to one group over another is more the rule than the exception. Building and capitalizing on false arguments designed to divide societies and which constantly appear in political news, is an effective strategy to prevent dealing with complexity. It’s a well-known recipe: Euroscepticism, questioning science, and evoking the coming economic catastrophe. These are easy elements to activate in the public communications sphere. Added to this is the idea that climate policies are the result of liberal and elitist conspiracies which will unfairly and disproportionately impact ordinary citizens (Counterpoint, 2021).

Within democracies which have been weakened by the pandemic, these attacks are serious, especially as their instigators can skillfully link them with legitimate social demands, notably when it comes to energy prices. The decision by the British government to ban gas heating is a case in point. This resulted in a media frenzy and a campaign led by the conservatives themselves against climate action, as a sign of society’s decline. Another example is the attacks on the Spanish government’s climate policy in the face of rising electricity prices. This campaign will not be the last. Denying the reality of the climate crisis remains a convenient way to mark political differences, even if it does not play the identifying role seen in American society. Confronted with the impressive ambition — it bears repeating — of the Green Deal, the “coalition of ill-intentioned”, as Mickael Mann would say, will increase their attacks and use any and all lobbying and communication tactics.

Denouncing climate inaction does not mean, however, imposing measures without consultation or refusing to take into account the actors affected by them. Policies geared towards mitigating the climate crisis will necessarily imply constraints, choices, and sacrifices. They will only be socially acceptable if they are also debated and evaluated in function of the criteria of justice and if they leave room for the power of action by citizens. Otherwise, these policies will leave room for populist, demoralizing speeches and defenders of a wait-and-see attitude and the status quo.

Waiting, stalling, criticizing excessive haste, negotiating more time... the arsenal of those defending the status quo is well developed. They have the advantage of moving over sure ground, in a universe known to political leaders who are used to evaluating the risk of changing the status quo and trained in negotiating exceptions or delays. The projection into the future that the Green Deal implies is full of uncertainties, while the familiar short-term is reassuring.

It is for this reason that politicians must not alone be left to find compromises. Mobilizing societies’ power of action is the surest way to generate a wider political space that can make room for the long term and its integration into today’s life. In order for the Green Deal to succeed, we must be able to count on the political leadership of member states, who must stop criticizing Brussels. We must also be able to count on the economic

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actors who have chosen this time frame for action and who are honestly undertaking this transition. Finally, we must be able to count on the commitment of diverse societies who can adopt and adapt to pave the European path and become the vigilant safeguards of the commitments made.

Fourth initiative: Definitely Integrate Climate Action into Macroeconomic Policies

In this context, the question of European budgetary governance comes into its own and can have a long-term impact on climate action. The Green Deal and its means of implementation have macroeconomic consequences and depend on decisions and rules outside climate and energy policies. The Recovery and Resilience Facility was one response, as was the creation of the still too modest Just Transition Fund. The question now is how to pay it back and, more generally, the debt status of the European countries in the eurozone. This is a crucial discussion. The transition to climate neutrality requires infrastructure investments that will weigh on public budgets and, in one way or another, on taxpayers.

Climate is now considered "macro-critical" according to the words of Christine Lagarde, then Managing Director of the IMF, and currently President of the ECB, who holds the same conviction. This conviction is now widely shared by academic macroeconomists and central bankers. Problems are no longer only sectoral. In order to solve them, the ecological transition will mobilize large-scale resources and make major transfers, particularly in terms of investments that will transform the European economy.

The Green Deal therefore cannot be isolated from the debate on the governance of public finances. Yet the question of managing a potential common debt as well as individual debts within the eurozone is one of the most difficult, crucial, and strategic political issues on the European political agenda.

Following the economic support measures put in place by European countries during the COVID-19 pandemic, this debate is now being framed in new terms. The Franco-German initiative for a joint recovery plan led to the creation of a recovery fund of more than 800 billion euros available to member states. The possibility for the Commission, on behalf of the Union, to borrow money on the markets in order to finance the recovery plan made it possible to overcome taboos and to demonstrate true solidarity between European countries. This is the biggest step forward in the construction of a political Europe in recent years. The exceptional circumstances of the preceding months led to the suspension of certain rules governing public debts, where the question of solidarity arose in terms of limiting risk. The purpose was to prevent the negative impact of an out-of-control sovereign debt of one State on the markets and the ability of other member States, particularly those in the eurozone, to obtain financing. Such considerations were abandoned when exceptional measures had to be taken to support the economy. This loosening of restrictions has led to an increase in the debt/GDP ratio from 83.9% to 98% for Eurozone countries and from 77.5% to 90.7% for the whole of the EU.

But the question of a return to previous rules, especially regarding fiscal discipline, arises. The political scene is divided. While countries such as France, Italy, and Spain are in favor of revising the rules, the so-called frugal countries, led by Austria and supported by the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Sweden are strongly opposed. The debate is open, however, even if no significant movement is expected before the German elections and the formation of a new government.’

However, the debate should be reframed beyond the opposition between “free spenders” and “frugals”. As Jean Pisani-Ferry shows, the macroeconomic implications of the transition to a climate-neutral economy have not been sufficiently taken into account. If economic growth continues in Europe, there is no doubt that its composition will change. Should we anticipate a reduction in private consumption and an increase in investment, especially public investment? Where will the resources come from to finance these investments? Will they come from the increasing use of carbon tax mechanisms?

In their publication last September, Zsolt Darvas and Guntram Wolff showed that European governments have not yet been able to reconcile an investment program capable of implementing the Green Deal with deficit consolidation. In order to overcome this dilemma, they explore three solutions:

1. a general relaxation of rules
2. the creation of a centralized European investment capacity to finance the transition through markets
3. the removal of green investments from the accounting of sovereign debt, a solution that would enable these necessary expenditures to be protected. It is an entire philosophy of debt that

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needs to be rethought at a time when young generations are calling for climate policies in order to preserve their future.

The debate, as presented by Darvas and Wolff, must also include the political dimension. Citizens have little confidence in the future or in their governments, yet this confidence is the basis of consent to taxation. Fiscal consolidation will, in most cases, be achieved through increasing taxes. At the same time, extending carbon pricing to sectors that affect citizens, such as transport and heating, risks creating the impression of a one-way policy. Citizens would only be expected to pay and pay back. It is therefore necessary to strike a deal with citizens, to debate the justice and equity of contributions, and the collective priorities of the common goods to be provided. Arbitration in favor of the future must be managed through collective deliberation. There is a risk that rising energy prices and taxes, coupled with a lack of opportunities in the labor market, will be attributed to climate policies. However, it will be the lack of investment, of planning, and the failure to question the current situation that will truly be responsible for this.

Fifth initiative: Towards Diplomacy in Line with the European Green Pact

The European Green Deal implemented in member states will have real economic repercussions, both at the level of citizens and at the international level. Indeed, it is a great opportunity for Europe to show climate leadership on the world stage. Since COP21, carbon neutrality has become a baseline that states, local authorities, and companies have been able to seize upon, admittedly sometimes clumsily or dishonestly. By adopting its 2050 carbon neutrality goal in 2019, Europe was already ahead of other major emitters. Subsequently, in September 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping caused a stir by announcing China's goal of carbon neutrality by 2060 and peak emissions before 2030. China's announcement is in line with its own commitments to climate action, but it also echoes earlier announcements by the European Union, which remains a key partner of the Chinese government on this issue.

Although there are growing mentions of carbon neutrality by the middle of the century, most of them lack precision on the trajectories to achieve this and which endangers this objective which is central to the Paris Agreement. As of today, more than 100 countries have committed to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, in accordance with the 2015 Paris Agreement. Yet the new 2030 targets (NDC) would lead us to a 16% increase in global emissions compared to 2010 when they would need to be reduced by 45% to maintain the chance of keeping global temperature rise below 2°C. There is already justifiable criticism pouring in, denouncing empty commitments, long-term commitments. This is a far-off prospect that allows supporters of the status quo to remain vague and to promote disingenuous commitments because they are poorly framed. What is worse, the fight against climate change is read by the United States and China as part of the global military, technological, and commercial competition. The world's two largest emitters are in fact jeopardizing their sovereignty – their control over their national territory – which they claim to want to protect at all costs.

The Green Deal is currently the most specific path to decarbonization among the proposals of the three major global emitters. It gives the European Union the means to display leadership in climate diplomacy, a leadership that today depends more on actual implementation than on international negotiating skills.

It should be recognized that the European Union's impact on the international scene is greater once internal compromises have been reached and a roadmap drawn out. Political resources available are now being mobilized by the internal negotiation of the Green Deal. This mobilization, while logical, carries risks in a particularly turbulent geopolitical scene. Green Deal diplomacy is necessary to make its deployment possible, for the Green Deal implies a realignment of many financial and commercial relations. To fully appreciate the scale of the transition now underway, it is worth recalling that nearly three-quarters (72.2%) of the European Union's total energy needs are currently met by fossil fuels and that three-fifths (61%) of the EU's energy is imported. To achieve a 55% reduction in emissions by 2030 - let alone net-zero by 2050 - the European Union will have to embark on a radical overhaul of its energy dependencies, which will have profound implications for its diplomatic partners. This is the case for countries around the Mediterranean, in the Balkans and in Central Asia, as well as for more distant exporters.

With the European Union's oil imports accounting for 20% of the global market, a decline in these imports also implies a fundamental change in the oil economy, regardless of the specific trade relationship with Europe. For major exporters as diverse as Norway, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, the price of a barrel of oil has been a central feature of their geopolitical arsenal for decades.

The Green Deal sets a target of 40% renewable energy by 2030, up from 20% today. A significant share of Europe's energy will likely come from imports and will therefore require new partnerships with neighboring countries and beyond. Combined with the anticipated application of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) to these energy imports, this dynamic will certainly have regional and global ripple effects. It is also a question of capitalizing on European progress in terms of climate ambition and transforming it into diplomatic ambition: neither the Chinese New Silk Road (Belt & Road Initiative), nor the "Blue Dot Network" partnership led by the United States are currently references on the world stage in terms of international cooperation aligned with the objectives of the Paris Agreement. This is the message sent by the President of the Commission during her State of the Union address with the "Global Gateway" project. All that remains now is to define its content.

The return of the United States to the center of the diplomatic stage has allowed the European Union to regain a strong partner to stand together with on major issues. However, the acute tensions between China and the United States remain the largest obstacle to implementing ambitious climate policies. This dangerous game is leading to paralysis within the G20, a second critical obstacle to advancing climate action. Europe must do all it can to implement the new dynamic created by the Green Deal. This implies understanding and accepting that intra-European decisions have major repercussions for its partners. As a "benevolent" actor within the international system, Europe must engage in discussions on the consequences of its policies. Indonesia's reaction to the freeze on palm oil imports in response to the mobilization of European efforts to decarbonize, especially in heavy industries, but the implementation of the CBAM goes hand in hand with the necessary increase in domestic carbon prices. Indeed, it is facing strong opposition from our trade partners, who see it as a form of climate protectionism. Due to World Trade Organization rules, the CBAM will probably only be applicable to raw industrial materials (steel, cement, fertilizer, or aluminum) for which "carbon leakage" presents a real risk. In the Commission's proposal, the mechanism would primarily concern Russia, Turkey, Korea, India, and China, and it has also raised concerns – but also interest – in the United States.  

The CBAM and the extension of the carbon market to air and maritime transport have the advantage of sending a signal to the freeloaders of climate action. It sends out a warning, potentially a deterrent, which has and will have a domino effect. Of course, the internal market will not alone bring along the rest of the world, but the EU is still the largest market in the world, owing to its openness. It will now be necessary to balance the tension between European objectives and diplomatic consequences. The EU must explore opportunities for positive international cooperation – support for the transition, standards for measuring carbon content, markets for zero-carbon products – with special provisions for the least developed countries. The Green Deal can become a formidable diplomatic tool for European leadership.

European politics operates on five-year cycles, coinciding with European parliamentary elections. During the next elections in 2024, the Green Deal project will still be present. It will have to be expanded and updated. Until then, the question will be to know if this vast project has succeeded in its challenge: to change the European political system. Responsibilities are and will be shared: the President - a conservative - has made it her pet project, the Commissioner - a socialist - ardently defends the project, while the President of the European Parliament's Environment Committee - a liberal - has built a narrative around the Green Deal. Beyond the responsibility of Brussels, the responsibility of member states must be stressed. Parliamentarians, local elected officials, and all national stakeholders have a role to play in encouraging the creation of national green pacts in collaboration with their citizens.

The Green Deal has the potential to be a political revolution and its narrative can change Europe's identity. These European, national, and local green deals could establish its founding principle: a fair ecological transition, to be built together.

Conclusion

This text has been written before Russia's invasion of Ukraine has violently rendered accepted conceptions of European security obsolete. Before it reorganised the very boundaries of the concept of 'security' in Europe, be it military, as well as in terms of energy, economics or climate. Before it made the Ukrainian people a model of courage and hope for the European democratic ideal.

My pre-war statement put European citizens at the centre. This Pact, which they had made possible at the ballot box, outlined a new social contract in a fluid but energetic moment, between climate anxiety and political...
possibility. We had before us a set of reforms that, across the continent, offered profound possibilities for transforming society. But only if we seized them. The current ‘polycrisis’ makes these conditions more complex: the war in Ukraine, the energy war in Europe. The state must centralise, intervene, be decisive. It must control energy prices. It must protect the vulnerable. In essence, it must produce legitimacy and cohesion between the war economy and the continued fight against the climate crisis. Two wars, two time horizons and colliding vocabularies: the eradication of Ukraine as a nation, climate chaos for humanity with, as a foretaste, the ‘climate carnage’ in the words of Antonio Guterres of floods in Pakistan in the summer of 2022.

In other words, the interactions between citizens and the state are a matter of greater and more intense dialogue. Should we govern from above as in a ‘war economy’ or build on the mobilisation of citizens’ commitments and solidarity? The political equation behind the Green Deal has changed in any case. But its importance is growing.

New trends are at work: Europe’s centre of gravity is shifting. For too long, leaders in the west have ignored the warnings of governments East of Berlin. Everything has changed. The Baltic states are unexpected champions. Polish society has been exemplary in many ways. Of course, yesterday’s grievances have not disappeared. Problems with the rule of law persist. The right to abortion, for example, is still severely repressed and the situation is being used by populist forces across the region. But Polish citizens, especially the women’s movement, are organising for relief; like Krakow, Polish cities want to be free of pollution; never has the idea of abandoning gas and coal in favour of renewable energy seemed so synonymous with security and assertiveness against Russian aggression.

The Visegrád triangle, broken up by Hungarian policy, thus opens up a space for integration in the East, with the Ukraine at the forefront, but also to other countries that see Europe as the anchor of their security: this is a historic moment of redefinition of the European project. But this moment is fraught with danger. Faced with the energy crisis, centrifugal dynamics have been reinforced: bilateral gas contracts, pressure on European electricity and gas interconnections, uncoordinated subsidies to industry. In a theoretically integrated area, governments are weighing up the cost of solidarity with neighbours for their industry and consumers. From 1 January 2023, Sweden holds the six-month rotating presidency of the European Union, under the leadership of a far-right coalition, whose ability to deliver on climate priorities is being severely challenged by the dissolution of its own environment ministry. Finally, Germany risks continued political isolation: the slow pace of its coalition’s deliberations is frustrating Europe, while the scale of its energy subsidies — coupled with a continued frugal stance in Brussels — promises tense debates on solidarity and the new European economic governance framework in 2023. Yet the EU has moved to end its dependence on Russian gas with the new RePowerEU. The sanctions regime against Russia also defies expectations, while setting implicit deadlines for an even faster phase-out of fossil fuels than set out in the Fit for 55 strategy. This winter will be tough, but the next will be even tougher. Gas and LNG supply issues will remain extremely difficult, with no Russian gas reserves and a potential increase in Chinese demand. The budgetary room for manoeuvre of governments, including Germany, will be reduced and Russia still has more room for escalation. The EU has bought 50% more LNG from Russia than it did before the war: a serious shadow cast over independence efforts.

Green Deal diplomacy is tricky. Europe is facing a new geopolitical ‘non-alignment’ movement. Echoing Tim Sahay’s words, this non-alignment can be read as a necessary position for any government wishing to obtain reasonable trade and technology deals with the US and China, while protecting itself from Russian retaliation in commodity markets. However, this move isolates Europe, accusing it of double standards, and puts its diplomacy at odds. Can Europe’s climate diplomacy help reopen the dialogue? The election of Lula in Brazil — although explicitly non-aligned — is good news because Brazil intends to play an active role on the multilateral scene, by chairing the G20 in 2024 and hosting the conference of the parties on climate 10 years after Paris.

Finally, Europe can play a full role in the necessary reforms of an outdated international financial system that cannot meet the colossal needs of financing the necessary transitions. President Macron’s support for the “Bridgetown Agenda” of Barbadian Prime Minister Mia Mottley appears to be a necessary and promising way to put European climate diplomacy on a new path. The anchor of European climate ambition will always have to be based on Europe’s citizen power. For now, Russian aggression has not deterred the mobilisation of cities, local authorities, businesses and citizens to save energy and accelerate the uptake of renewable energy. Will we go fast enough? Will Europe be able to work with others? In any case, for the European peace project as well as for the preservation of human societies, there is no choice. We are on board, we need each other.

The Green Deal sets a course for European policies. It has become the framework - as the RePowerEU strategy shows - that defines actions at European level.

The 750 billion euro recovery plan, adopted in December 2020, is part of this dynamic: at least 37% of the total spending is to be directed towards actions to combat climate change (Graph d). The total amount involved is more than 215 billion euros.

The EU budget for the period 2021-2027, amounting to €1,074.3 billion, devotes 30% of spending through the various programmes to the fight against climate change.

A Just Transition Fund, totalling €17.5 billion over the period 2021-2027, aims to support the transition of regions most dependent on fossil fuels. Poland, Germany and Romania will be the biggest beneficiaries.

** Allocation of resources in the National Recovery Plans**

**Recovery Plan: climate and energy spending, 2021-2023**
After COP 27: the geopolitics of the Green Deal

LA COMPLIANCE, UNE IDÉE EUROPÉENNE ?
The scales of climate justice

The village, the South, the urban dimension. How to build the ecological transition in the midst of asymmetry?

The use of eco-grazing, above the salt marshes of Guérande.
The European City in The Climate Transition

The Green Deal is undoubtedly the most ambitious European policy project of the last thirty years. But, as the European Union is primarily a normative power and does not possess significant means of enforcement or budgetary tools, this extensive plan can only be turned into reality if it is fully integrated into other levels of power and embraced by populations. From this point of view, towns and communities have a fundamental role to play which deserves to be better recognized and supported. This is, first of all, because they are directly impacted by natural changes and the evolution of carbon-based economies and societies that result from climate disruption, and are therefore at the forefront of thinking about and implementing the necessary adaptation policies necessary to prevent or mitigate these phenomena. They are also among the first levers, even the first lever, of public investment which is indispensable for reaching carbon neutrality within one generation. Finally, despite their shortcomings, these towns and communities remain the forms of democratic organization most widely supported by citizens and the ones with the highest potential for democratic innovation.

I. Cities at the forefront of the transition

During the summer of 2021, Belgium and Germany were affected by violent flooding which caused dozens of deaths as well as extensive natural and material damage. The region of Wallonia, with 40 dead, hundreds of injured, and thousands of climate refugees forced from their places of home and work, bore the brunt of this natural disaster. Huge amounts of human and financial resources were deployed by local and regional authorities to house and compensate thousands of families, clear thousands of tons of debris, and rebuild destroyed towns and buildings. But despite sympathetic visits from the prime minister and the president of the Commission, no real help came from the federal government or the European Union. This inaction reveals much about Europe’s lack of preparedness for the well-known challenges of climate change. If, as IPCC experts warn, episodes of heavy rain, drought, and tornados are expected to increase in the coming years, Europe, which aspires to be a pioneer in the fight against global warming, cannot remain powerless.

Not every future natural disaster will be as violent as those experienced by the communities of Eastern Wallonia during that deadly summer of 2021, but they will nevertheless have major impacts which will force local authorities to dedicate ever greater resources to protecting people and territories against the devastation caused by climate change. When heatwaves threaten the health and lives of the most vulnerable citizens, including school children, individuals living in nursing homes, and hospital patients; when drought affects harvests; when floods and heavy rains make housing and public buildings inhabitable, it is local public authorities and their personnel who are on the front line. When epidemics proliferate as a result of deforestation and urbanization, it is also local public authorities who are called on to organize vaccination centers, distribute masks, apply and enforce social distancing measures, check on isolated individuals, inform the population... and bury the dead.

This increase in local responsibilities is all the more brutal as many of these cities must, at the same time, deal with transitioning to carbon-free economies and societies. One way favored by the European Union to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions consisted of encouraging – either directly or indirectly – the relocation of the most polluting forms of industrial production to other parts of the world. An ultra-liberal trade policy, which was long devoid of social and environmental norms, combined with the establishment of a free market for carbon credits, contributed to the accelerated destruction of European industry to the benefit of other regions of the world, especially China. Tens of thousands of jobs were destroyed, particularly in the European “fossil crescent” which stretches from Northern England to Silesia, passing through the Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Wallonia, and Ruhr regions. In the process, thousands of hectares of productive land have been transformed into industrial wastelands whose clean-up and redevelopment costs have been left – in accordance with the good old rule of privatizing profits and socializing costs – to the responsibility of public authorities.

1. See Laurence Tubiana, Le Green Deal est le nouveau contrat social, le Grand Continent, September 2021.
2. The Walloon regional government spent more than 2.8 billion euros on disaster relief and rehabilitation work. It received a simple loan from the federal government, and a European grant of 88 million euros, less than 3% of the expenditure caused by the natural disaster.
This natural and human disaster, which struck what was once the capital of the global industrial revolution — and the cradle of European construction — is a taste of what awaits many other regions if the transition to a decarbonized society and economy is left to the discretion of the free market. That these regions are also the ones experiencing the highest levels of political decay is in no way surprising. In societies that have been built around industry, the destruction of industrial structures leads to the breakdown of societal structures themselves. The labor movement, in both its union and political dimensions, is the first victim, and the political entrepreneurs of the extreme right have understood how much they can benefit in these desolate regions from rhetoric that combines the rejection of foreigners, globalization, and European integration. They play on the fears that the climate transition creates to tighten their grip. The cradle of our prosperity and our political integration, the fossil crescent could indeed become, if we leave it to its sad fate, the home of a “fossil fascism” which will further erode the social and civic capital of these regions.

II. Cities as a lever for carbon neutrality

The only good news in this bleak assessment is that, if given the means, towns and communities can become the best antidote to these risks of decay. Local public powers in both urban and rural areas have been pioneers in developing the collective services that structured the new societies at the beginning of the Anthropocene. The construction of sewer systems and the supplying of drinking water, urban lighting, the production and distribution of gas and electricity, the construction of collective housing, the development of public transportation — in short, all the material infrastructure essential to life in a modern society — was essentially the task of municipalities and associations in Europe at the end of the 19th and early 20th century. Likewise, the rollout of collective services enabling the renewal of social life and the blossoming of human faculties, from social assistance to health, from schools to theaters and libraries, including parks and gardens, day-care centers and nursing homes, was carried out by local authorities long before it became the focus of national public policies.

Given their history, it is not surprising to see cities and communities once again reviving the pioneering spirit of the early days of the Anthropocene and taking the lead in making the necessary investments for the transition to a carbon-neutral society.

- Towns and villages manage many public buildings (schools, cultural and sports centers, administrative offices, fire and police stations, community centers, hospitals and nursing homes...), all of which must drastically reduce their consumption of energy and raw materials;
- Municipalities have regulatory powers over land use planning and housing policy and are also responsible for the design and maintenance of public spaces;
- They also have responsibility for certain aspects of mobility and logistics – the last few kilometers, which are often the most crucial – and directly or indirectly manage public transport;
- The majority of towns and villages are responsible for the collection and management of waste, which is a critical aspect of the circular economy, and many of them manage wastewater treatment either directly or indirectly as well as business parks, both of which they can encourage in their transition to a circular economy approach and the promotion of biodiversity;
- Their land holdings include vast natural areas, woods and forests, fields and pastures, parks and vacant urban lots. These areas are under direct strain from climate change, but they also have an essential role to play in carbon sequestration, as well as being a refuge for biodiversity and for human educational and recreational activities;
- These natural spaces are also often spaces where food is produced, with urban centers being the main potential beneficiaries. Local authorities can play a central role in relocating food production and processing by encouraging orders from the public sector (schools, hospitals, nursing homes, agencies, etc.), and by supporting the development of collective tools such as distribution centers, logistics hubs and processing facilities (mills, vegetable factories, presses, etc.);

Taken together, these levers would allow local authorities to design large-scale projects for transitioning to carbon-free spaces. A number of them have already initiated this movement and share their best practices within the network of cities in transition.

However, this ambition comes up against major structural obstacles, which are largely the responsibility of the European Union, and should be removed within the framework of a Green Deal that is extended to local actors.

Valuing the skills and expertise of towns and villages is indispensable for accelerating the transition and ensuring that it is devised and implemented in ways that are adapted to local realities, but all these efforts will be in vain if they continue to come up against the counter-forces inherent to the current European model of production and consumption.

- Local transport policies come up against the high cost of trains and trams compared to travel by car or plane.
- Initiatives to relocate food production run into the productivist agriculture model and the unfettered free trade that subjects producers to unfair competition.
- European budgetary discipline limits local authorities’ investment capacity.
- Repair and recycling projects for electrical and electronic equipment are overwhelmed by a market dominated by over-consumption and programmed obsolescence.
- Etc.

In short, local initiatives – just as the “small gestures” made by citizens who get actively involved in reducing their emissions – seem like the courageous but infinitely unequal battle of the Davids of the transition against the Goliaths of the extractivist and productivist model. The Green Deal can only be up to these challenges and clearly involve local and regional entities in the transition if all European Union policies are in line with the Paris Agreement’s objectives. But we are quite far from this; essential public policies such as the common agriculture policy, mobility and transport, competition and trade, are still shaped by the ideologies of the old world. As for the normative and regulatory agendas concerning vehicles, equipment, heating and ventilation systems, chemical products, planned obsolescence... they fall far short of the ambitions set out by the European Union itself. A Green Deal expanded to local authorities should begin by examining the structural obstacles they face and reorient Union policy based on this assessment.

The Union must also recognize that the transition will not be a long, calm river. Such a profound energy and technological revolution will inevitably lead to the decline of entire sectors of our economies, resulting in the devaluing of workers and vast territories as well as massive job loss. All this can be anticipated and corrected, and the European Union does not lack the experience or the levers to design and deploy such ecological and social planning. The European Coal and Steel Community, the Common Agricultural Policy, the Cohesion Fund, and the European Social Fund are examples of public mechanisms designed to anticipate and accompany the transformation of key European economic and social sectors. It is therefore not a matter of reinventing the wheel, but of conducting a critical assessment of these practices in order to reshape and expand them from the perspective of the transition. If the Union hopes to be up to the challenge, it must make these programs more coherent, drastically increase their budgets, and develop the range of interventions by creating a true European Job Guarantee Programme, and by designing transition plans in conjunction with social partners in all sectors of the carbon economy that will be directly affected by the transition – from fossil fuels to automobiles, including road, sea and air transport.

It is also essential to overhaul the tools intended to support the territories most affected by the transition. The European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the Globalisation Adjustment Fund, the LIFE programs, etc. have developed an understanding of these territories and public expertise that are useful resources, but which must be greatly expanded. All the statistical data needed to identify the places that will be the “losers” in the transition – because they will suffer the natural, economic and social consequences – is available. As for existing tools, they can be coordinated and expanded within the framework of local transition contracts to provide these territories with the financial, logistical, and technological support they so urgently need. Of course, all of this will cost money, but the European Union has a large borrowing capacity, only slightly diminished by the Recovery and Resilience Facility, and it can tax carbon at its borders, better tax the profits of multinationals, and tax large estates.

III. Cities as laboratories of democratic innovation

While the high places of the Anthropocene have become places of civic withdrawal and social decay, exploited by far right wing political groups, they are also very often areas that pioneer social and democratic innovation. It is in the regions most directly affected by the deindustrialization of recent decades that support, training, and integration measures for workers who have lost their jobs have been developed. This is where union practices have been the most creative, going beyond the corporatist defense of workers in powerful sectors to contribute to defining industrial and training policies. It is also where the third sector of the social and solidarity economy has developed, revitalizing the democratic, social, and environmental ideals of the cooperative movement. It is also where local democratic innovations aimed at involving citizens in redefining their living spaces have been experimented with most extensively.

This social capital, patiently built to resist the ravages of deindustrialization and urban decline, renews the am-
bitions for strong democracy that were born in the bosom of communities at the beginning of the Anthropocene; in other words, before the nationalization of political life. This is fertile ground for inventing the transition’s deliberation and decision-making mechanisms. Ecological and social planning must naturally give the European level an essential role: this is the level of power at which the normative and regulatory agenda governing production must be established, from energy, social, and health standards to rules against planned obsolescence.

It is also at the European level that social and environmental standards for trade, rules governing public procurement, and tax standards must be decided. But these broad principles will only be widely accepted if they are then adapted to local realities. As for public investments, whether they involve the insulation of buildings and housing, mobility, land use planning, the protection and restoration of biodiversity or food production, it is – by definition – at the local level that they will be translated into action. It is therefore urgent that we reinvent a European social contract whereby the Union and its territories establish partnerships that allow general guidelines to be adapted to local conditions.

European initiatives for restoring biodiversity, social cohesion, training, or industrial transition already have experimented extensively with these collaborative and contractual practices. At this stage, however, they remain largely limited to a dialogue between European, regional, and local civil servants, which sometimes include a few “stakeholders”. Civic participation is largely absent from these mechanisms, despite the fact that a local scale is ideally suited for their development. If we want to make the Green Deal a lever for transition that is accepted and supported by a social majority, we need to set up “transition contracts” that involve the vital forces of civil servants, citizens, and local and European elected representatives.

Local committees, made up of elected municipal officials, citizen volunteers, as well as of representatives of associations and social actors, could begin by assessing the suffering and resources of the various territories through a broad participatory process – following the example of the proposals outlined by Bruno Latour in his book, Down to Earth: Politics in the New Climatic Regime?, which are currently being tested in several French towns. From this assessment, action plans would then be drawn up to mobilize – in the local context – European policy resources in the areas of industrial and agricultural transition, biodiversity, flood and heatwave prevention, or training and employment. These action plans would also be developed through structured dialogue between local elected officials and civil society representatives and would be subject to an annual, participatory evaluation to review the causes of failures and delays and identify ways to remedy them. At the same time, transnational assemblies, which would bring together local actors with national and European elected officials, would regularly analyze local practices in order to identify “best practices” and share them as widely as possible. Such mechanisms are already emerging in many territories.

They anticipate the reordering of deliberation and decision-making processes by connecting different levels of power and different categories of actors, which are the crucial complement to a Green Deal that, should it remain the exclusive domain of technocrats and organized interests, will be unable to take root in the real world.

From Europe to the villages, a personal account

From the global to the local: democracy put to the test by climate change

Tackling the ecological transition puts our scale of thinking to the test. Everything must fit together or else this difficult equation will not be solved. Individual action and collective action, European citizens, businesses, farmers, associations, public entities... All must be looking in the same direction to find the meaning, and therefore the necessary impetus, to undertake the great, practical transition that lies before us.

The ecological transition is often presented as a technical and technological challenge. Without underestimating the importance of research and the conversion of the industrial and technical fabric, I am convinced that the challenge posed by the ecological transition lies above all in our capacity to put into action the overused expression “vivre ensemble” (“live together”) or, more precisely, “faire Cité ensemble” (“create a community together”) – an expression that better reflects the dimension of political and democratic transition. When, due to its monarchic history, French society tends to wait for the security of an overbearing State – in an increasingly uncertain context, and with the presidential election becoming the moment of acute crisis regarding this shortcoming between the Strength and Virtue of Man and the providential State – the reality of the transition which must be undertaken is more about cooperation and the advent of a civil society which is fully involved and active in taking our world’s history in hand.

And so, the political challenge of our century is to find the way to play this collective score by enabling each and every one of us to act, at all levels. This is a truly difficult challenge, especially at a time in our history when the individualistic and consumerist attitude seems to have reached its zenith and when the very notion of what it means to be a citizen is difficult to define. What does it mean to be a citizen today? This debate, which is so crucial for the survival of our democracies, deserves to be addressed on a national and, by the same token, European scale. The impermeable compartmentalization that our societies have built into the lives of individuals between work – which represents the only form of contribution to the community– and private life and leisure, often and increasingly leads to the fact that we no longer have any collective obligations when we return home from work. Those who are lucky will be able to live their lives entirely through meaningful work. But for everyone else?

Are we truly accomplished beings without political awareness and participation in the political process? Is this not a fundamental need identified by Aristotle, who saw in man a "political animal"? Identifying this shortcoming in the organization of time, life, and space in our societies helps to explain the deep malaise that individuals feel in an international and environmental context that requires rapid reaction. This malaise paves the way for a generalized resentment towards our social structure, a resentment that can have direct and harmful effects on the functioning of our democracies and our institutions, since there is so much hope in their capacity for political and social balance. The growing distrust of all forms of institutions, the increase in voter abstention, the rise of radicalism and of voting for extremists, these are all symptoms of a society in crisis of involvement.

We must therefore rediscover a taste for effort and involvement. This is not a bad thing, given that we feel the need to regain meaning in the lives we lead. It is as though we were suffering from a sort of schizophrenia: unhappy with this lack of meaning in our existence and suffering from not having any control over the course of history, and, at the same time, unconsciously refusing to finally play our part in the task, so much so that we may be filled with resentment towards a State that takes no action and an elite deemed to be responsible for this situation. What are we waiting for? We don't really know.

If there is a need to affirm an ecological, political awareness on the European scale, this observation leads us to question the effectiveness of the major European policy and planning documents in promoting change. Political orientation on its own, even at the highest level, as necessary as it is, will not make it possible to meet the challenges of the transition before us. How then can we succeed in mobilizing Europe, its nations and its citizens?

Major participatory and public debate initiatives must be organized at the European and national levels in order to reunite the major political orientations and citizens. In
France, we witnessed the experiment of the Citizens' Climate Convention which, despite considerable criticism, nonetheless symbolically marked the recognition of the need to involve citizens in defining national policy. However, it is in actions, in doing, that the greatest number of people will be able to understand and find their unique place in this new world that we will invent together.

In France, we have a tendency to only consider intellectual effort – from the way in which our educational system is designed, to the value placed on professions, and even to the exercise of so-called participatory democracy. The forms of contribution offered by public authorities are those of meetings with varying degrees of involvement. Yet it is clear that not all of our fellow citizens identify with this type of exercise. They tend to involve a concerned and active minority, often with a high level of socio-cultural capital, who already have the opportunity to contribute at the local level. Even if some of these initiatives try to reach other groups by random selection, thus involving a number of ordinary individuals, they do not in any way address the need for cultural change, which is the only way to realize the ecological transition.

More than a participative democracy – which often sounds like a technical answer to the crisis of engagement and not like a political answer, and which allows us to develop nice toolboxes to patch up the system “around the edges” – I now prefer to advocate for (a position shared by a number of my elected colleagues in our rural communities) a “democracy of doing”, which offers to each person, with their differences and fragilities, the ability to be concretely involved in carrying out actions in the closest proximity to the territory where they live. The “democracy of doing” allows us to finally arrive at proposing this gamble of Life: to take into consideration people, all people, in the greatest universality, and what makes up their existence, their daily life, their reality. From the most global assessment that the understanding of climate change implies, and the necessity of coordinating all public policies, we necessarily arrive – following the initial assumption that we wish to preserve what must be considered as the hallmarks of our enlightened Europe, which is to make the ecological transition a tool for strengthening our democratic organizations – at reinforcing the citizen’s role in his or her most accessible, and therefore most local, area of life. In France, in particular, this involves the village.

The rural community — political space of the ecological transition

A careful examination of each territory, put under the microscope, already reveals interesting examples of transitions capable of creating a society. While the media spotlight is usually on urban areas and large regions, which are often presented as being at the cutting edge of innovation, what is actually happening in the way our fellow citizens live? Do they truly feel that they are part of a collective history?

We invite you to explore the universe of France’s rural communities, which have been much disparaged in recent decades in a political division that has made managerial optimization the guiding principle of our elected officials. Covering more than 80% of the country, rural areas possess strategic, common assets for tomorrow’s transition: mountains and glaciers, wetlands, coastline, forests, water resources, and agricultural land. If the notion of space is still overlooked in the French political system, it is obvious that the ecological transition cannot be achieved without the resources of rural areas. We are therefore faced with two options:

- that of a return to national control of “natural common assets” with a view to the general interest and health of the nation. This is difficult for the 21st century mentality where the individual is currently at the heart of considerations. Opposition will be very strong, and we risk wasting time
- or to trust in the political capacity of these rural territories and people.

This is the stance taken by the Association of Rural Mayors of France (AMRF). This association of elected officials, created in 1971, today brings together nearly 10,000 mayors in a network of solidarity, which is completely independent of political powers and parties. Its raison d’être is summarized in its ten commitments, among which are: “to defend the community and municipal freedom, a constitutional principle and the primary expression of democracy” and “to work for a balanced, fair, and concerted development of mainland and overseas territories, taking into account the specificities and assets of the rural world”. The AMRF maintains that rural communities of less than 3,500 inhabitants, far from being an organizational error, are in fact part of the “French genius”. The small size of the community allows a true republican and democratic culture to live at the village level and to make public policies both accessible and adaptable. The rural community makes it possible, in sparsely populated areas which are sometimes on the fringes of centralized planning, to bring to life accessibility of Institutions and politics in the space occupied by the town hall, which remains at the center of the village. Beyond the overarching and unsuitable policies, rural mayors represent the human scale of the Republic. Indeed, all citizens know their village mayor and recognize themselves in him or her, beyond labels. The elected officials of municipal councils often avoid descending into the partisan conflicts that often prevent the territory from moving forward. Here pragmatism dominates the methods of reaching compro-

1. See Paul Magnette, Pour une écologie épicurienne, le Grand Continent, December 9, 2022.
mises. Interconnected knowledge places individuals at the heart of local politics, which stands in contrast to the technostructure in place once you ascend the ranks of the Republic. The pursuit of conviviality, gatherings, the occasional heated exchange, it is people who are at the heart of the local scene.

When coming from an urban environment, discovering rural life is like discovering another world, one that offers a completely different political and social framework, and which is somewhat at odds with the centralized French state and its habitual conceptualization. It is the France of terroir and pragmatism, the France of action and common sense. This is the rural France that has so strongly shaped the national identity, but which has little influence on the political framework. It is the France of villages that I believe, I am certain of it, can help our country – and even beyond, Europe – in this quest for a successful response to climate change by restoring the hope of taking action, in simplicity and common sense, making room for everyone.

The AMRF has only recently become aware of the role it could play in driving the ecological transition. Its traditional areas of involvement were until now mostly focused on the daily reality of rural towns and villages: school, security, intercommunity relations, and routine management. Elected mayor of my village of Châtel-en-Trièves in March 2020, I was elected Vice-President of the Ecological Transition in September 2021, the day after the National Congress that celebrated the association’s 50th anniversary, after having led an afternoon of reflection on “Women, the Village, the Republic”. A dedicated working committee was created following this, initially bringing together highly involved mayors who had already made significant achievements. Our first objective is to understand what makes these stories specific to rural areas and to try to structure a role for the AMRF in its active contribution to the fundamental issue of ecological transition within an ecosystem teeming with actors.

Let us begin with the history of my village, the one I know best, Châtel-en-Trièves, to understand the driving forces behind community action in villages “à la française”.

The case of Châtel-en-Trièves, a French village of 500 inhabitants

Châtel-en-Trièves is a new village created in 2017 from the merging of two other villages: Saint-Sébastien and Cordéac. Located in the South Isère, right next to the Hautes-Alpes and Drôme departments, the village has, as of the 2019 census, 463 inhabitants. Châtel-en-Trièves suffered a wave of rural depopulation in the years between 1970-1980, resulting in a closure of the services available in the two former communities.

The closing of Saint-Sébastian’s school strongly marked the collective imagination. In 2016, when the neighboring town of Cordéac learned from the Éducation Nationale that its school would be closing in 2018, it was too much for the elected officials in place who made the decision to join forces to fight against the loss of services. The creation of the new village was accompanied by a founding charter, sealed in the walls of the new town hall, establishing the fight against depopulation, defending the very existence of the village and its local public services, as the political cement of the new community.

Thanks to the change in the boundaries of the school map, the school with its single class was saved in 2017. A policy of active citizenship is promoted in parallel so that everyone participates in order to sustain the life of the village which is presented as a common good and as a universe where the realm of possibilities and access to the right to exist together, are available to all. The inhabitants chose to give their new town the name of “Châtel-en-Trièves – Village of Possibilities”. Participative workshops were organized by the municipality to reclaim public spaces. The first was in Saint-Sébastien, on the Domaine de Talon – a 3-hectare estate with two heritage buildings that were initially abandoned – where the Town Hall was built. In this central location, which has become the town center, a cooperative café-grocery store, shared gardens, and a municipal equestrian facility managed by a local association have also been created. This newfound centrality in Saint-Sébastien, achieved through the strength of citizen involvement, has attracted a number of projects which have been welcomed into the heart of a vast, little-occupied local heritage: a physiotherapist’s office in 2019, followed by a puppet theater company in 2020, marking the opening of the Maison des Marionnettes de Châtel-en-Trièves, which is the seed of an interactive museum for young people dedicated to the art of puppetry, on the site of the former St. Sébastien Town Hall. And perhaps tomorrow in Chatel-en-Trièves, “the Village of Puppets” will be born?

Elected to head the new village in 2020, I launched a new mandate project that will promote the revitalization of Cordéac around a theme rich in social ties, shared interests and enjoyment, and the recognition of local know-how: “eating well together”. The geographical context of the area is particularly well suited for developing this promising approach. Trièves is an agricultural and livestock farming area which simultaneously distinguishes the local population’s sense of belonging and identity, and brings together the aspirations of the local population around the values of living well and ecology. Eating well together is among the values of this art of rural living that unites more than it divides, and is capable of supporting this inclusive transition policy, allowing all populations to see themselves in the perspective of desirable territorial development, in line with current challenges. The art of
eating well together, which used to be shared in the public space at the tables of cafés and restaurants, has waned in Châtel-en-Trièves. Like other services, stores have closed and are concentrated in town centers and cities. However, villages remain attached to the activities provided by the cafés and inns which once existed there.

The idea is to hold on to what we have left in Cordèac – this single class saved – and to develop around the school a cafeteria open to all citizens from here and elsewhere. Covid opened our eyes to the deep loneliness that affects our residents who are losing their autonomy, when the absence of mobility solutions forces them to stay in their homes. We will pick them up in our school’s mini-bus to share a meal in our cafeteria. We will eat healthy local products, as well as prepared products that will allow our friends, the farmers, to make a better living from their work: Alain and Sophie’s goat cheese, Mathilde’s eggs, Florent’s potatoes and lamb, and beef from Jean-Pierre, Agnès and Hervé. The challenge is to forge links between men and women through the act of eating and to rebuild a vast network of social interdependence. This is one way of creating social cohesion in our village. The cafeteria will allow inhabitants to meet and participate in community life. It will be located on the ground floor of the old boys’ school in the center of Cordèac, and the upper floor will be arranged to accommodate residents who wish to work together. There will be a community center, recreational workshops, and a small library. Just as in St. Sébastian, the citizens will be in charge of creating their own civic space and building their village.

From fragmented experience to republican universalism: towards village rights?

While the global issues raised by the transitions at play seem to elude the ordinary citizen, thereby breeding skepticism and doubt in the ability of our republican political system to be up to the challenge of this historic moment, it is small towns, and in particular the small rural ones, which represent 82% of municipalities in France and 70% of the national territory, that can be the venue for a re-anchoring and a re-appropriation of politics. Here and now, it is in the close proximity of institutions and their capacity to make a place for each citizen that a new hope can be born.

If this challenge is presented to France because of our country’s specific nature in Europe, as previously mentioned, there is very likely a universality of these aspirations that unites each of the countries of the European Community, which is much greater than the nature of their political systems. That is what French villages, and particularly rural villages, stand for.

Rural areas have the strength of being made up of small rural communities (less than 3,500 inhabitants according to the INSEE definition) which have the exceptional advantage of allowing a territory, a community of actors, to converge with a shared political vision that is meaningful. A rural community can bring about real cultural change and mayors can be the conductors of this change. The municipality becomes the place where citizenship is awakened and the breeding ground for engagement.

I attempted to show that in Châtel-en-Trièves, food is a powerful tool for social cohesion, which resonates with all inhabitants of a community and reconnects them to their territory, to its richness, its fragility, and its resources. Through eating well together, we can experience a very accessible and inclusive way of re-appropriating politics in the sense of sustainably creating a society together. Faced with the often anxiety-provoking complexity of prevailing discourse where technicalities have taken precedence over the sense of experiencing a common journey, the policy of eating well together in Châtel-en-Trièves whispers in our ears, unobtrusively, that solutions may be found in the simplicity and common sense of a bite to eat and shared enjoyment.

It is at the most local level that we, the mayors, can cultivate the soil of active citizenship, thereby enabling us to reconcile, create links, and renew the somewhat frayed threads between our populations and the Institution. Every public building, every piece of public space offers an opportunity for the citizen to reclaim public property. In this way, the citizen has the possibility and the right to make his or her own unique contribution to the life of the community. Being a citizen in Châtel can consist in designing and building the shelves of the cooperative café-grocery store, fetching products from our producers, participating in the group of horseback riders who maintain the town's trails, planting squash in the shared garden, or even coming to help develop public policies in the open commissions alongside elected officials.

I see my role as mayor as encouraging everyone to join in the collective effort, in their own way. Each person can imagine and build his or her own area of contribution if it does not already exist. This is how they will be able to take on their role as citizens if this is not already the case. I believe that the access to citizenship is so fundamental for individuals because of the power of what I have personally experienced and which has awakened in me this flame of involvement, that it must be established as a new right, as well as a fundamental step in the perception that it will also be a first step towards the notion of duty, more specifically for understanding the requirement to play one’s part in the ecological transition’s challenges.

The right to the village could be defined as the right to be able to contribute and to put one’s mark on one’s local living space. It is the right, in the most immediate proximity, to be able to contribute to world history.
right to the village allows us to bring the individual closer to the world in which he exists, and to reconnect the citizen with the different scales of political intervention. The right to the village therefore establishes, in a spirit of subsidiarity, the village as the most suitable political space to play a part in the ecological transition. The right to the village would not only concern the French countryside, but could be established as a republican principle, along the same lines as equality or secularism. All citizens of France could claim the right to the village, even in cities.

In order for the right to the village to not just be that of Chatel-en-Trièves' history, we have to strive for the city to be inspired by this art of bringing democracy to life in the heart of villages, to "make a village in the city". Each piece of public space must become a realm of possibility, a space for democracy to breathe, a place of creativity, where each citizen can, if he or she wishes, make his or her mark. We must do away with dehumanizing asphalt and build cafés, gardens, playgrounds and small, safe, play areas where children can reinvent the world through their imagination, under the caring gaze of adults. We must re-establish local crafts, administration, and decentralized, "village" sized cultural venues, with an eye towards the citizen. We must regain a taste for regional planning to recreate a physical and meaningful link between citizens and the community. More nature in our cities is not enough. We want the city, just as much as the villages, to carry this profoundly humanistic vision of our political aspirations. We want a more human city, to find minimum services of proximity everywhere, places for social interaction, places for civic contribution, that continuously remind us of our citizenship and our involvement in global history.

One of the main functions of the municipality would therefore be to bring to life this right to the village for all the inhabitants of its territory. The mayor would become the facilitator of an active citizenship with a universal vocation, offering everyone the opportunity to work towards bringing our social pact to life and shaping the ecological transition. What an exciting and political vision of the world through their imagination, under the caring gaze of adults. We must re-establish local crafts, administration, and decentralized, "village" sized cultural venues, with an eye towards the citizen. We must regain a taste for regional planning to recreate a physical and meaningful link between citizens and the community. More nature in our cities is not enough. We want the city, just as much as the villages, to carry this profoundly humanistic vision of our political aspirations. We want a more human city, to find minimum services of proximity everywhere, places for social interaction, places for civic contribution, that continuously remind us of our citizenship and our involvement in global history.

This is how we would declare an ambitious will to undertake, from below and involving all people, this cultural change that the ecological transition requires.

The European Green Deal, a new chance for Europe to uphold the values of liberal democracies

For the first time in human history, the acceleration of climate disruption has led to the realization that man's actions on his environment have tragic consequences. And the only way we can hope to find a livable outcome is if we recognize the obvious need to work collectively. No single individual will be able to change this trend. Dismay will be followed by despair. However, citizens will feel invested with a great ability to act if their own actions reflect those of others. We must quickly learn to become resourceful leaders on a global, continental, and national scale to achieve the quantitative ambitions of our various planning documents, which have been developed with the help of climate science experts.

Yet, the international scene has begun a new act in the confrontation of two political visions, one between authoritarian powers and democratic regimes. This can be seen in the rise of political Islamism and the rise to power of new authoritarian figures all over the world, even in Europe. Recent conflicts in progress and those with power potential (Ukraine, Taiwan) place us in a new geopolitical universe.

For the past twenty years or so, Europe and the nations that make it up, including France, have been suffering from a clear existential crisis – which is not due to the climate crisis alone. This is a deep crisis that is leading to our geopolitical erasure and our alarming weakening in the face of authoritarian regimes. Almost everywhere, identity-based right-wing groups have been able to take advantage of this moment of crisis of meaning. Europe, the continent of liberal democracy, finds itself in a stranglehold in the face of increasingly powerful forces, constantly being challenged, pushed to its limits, and questioned regarding its fundamental values. Europe: Old continent? Old politics? What if we turned the tables? The question crosses our minds and is now strongly resonating with parties at the extremes, flirting dangerously with the temptation of populist tendencies.

Yet, as Jean Monnet proclaimed so well in 1945, Europe reveals itself in times of crisis. The Covid crisis, and especially the Ukrainian resistance to Russian imperialism, have revived a sense of European belonging around a strengthened foundation of values. On February 24, 2022, we all woke up with the feeling of being Europeans, surprised to finally feel this sense of belonging, after having shunned Europe. It is not unlike that terrible day of January 7, 2015 when, in France, we discovered that we were
all "Charlie". In both cases, it is the fundamental values of our model of civilization that have been attacked and that reveal our innermost selves. Far from the nonsense promoted by the right-wing identity movement, the France of Charlie and the Europe of Ukraine defend the values of democracy, freedom, and humanism.

Let us suppose that the climate and the war at our doorstep offer Europe the tremendous opportunity to reaffirm an extraordinary raison d’être by building its outstanding civilizational model, whose greatness is not based on violence and imperialism but on progress and conscience, in opposition to the authoritarian models that compete with it. The long-awaited and much desired ecological transition could be the catalyst for the emergence of a Europe of democracy, freedom, and humanism. This is a Europe capable of bearing a strong vision of the future of humanity in the face of authoritarian powers tempted to reduce the ecological transition to a dictatorial fraud.

The European Green Deal follows this grand idea of creating a political Europe in response to the climate crisis we are experiencing and making ours the first carbon neutral continent. But beyond the guidelines, objectives, and actions, the ambition of the European Green Deal, if it hopes to be worthy of history, may above all be a tremendous opportunity to give substance to European values: those of Charlie, those of Ukraine. This would be the moment to realize the necessary and imperative obligation to undertake the ecological transition, the moment to make democracy work better.

It would demonstrate to the whole world that, far from being an old and obsolete model, the democratic model that we defend is, on the contrary, the one that will allow us to orchestrate world change, by building a society that recognizes that everyone has a place within it, and without retreating from our values of freedom and humanism, and without denying what we are, deep down.

The European Green Deal, after giving a place to experts to formalize the objectives and guidelines, must now carefully observe the human organizations supported by the old democracies that make it up. It must observe and understand the fundamental link that unites it with the citizen. This is a universal value that resonates within each person at every moment of his or her existence, and which allows the individual to resonate with the collective. We must try to feel the pulse of what a community united in the universal may be. This goes beyond national borders. We need a telescope to observe what is around us and to take the time to enter the world of people. These people are "ourselves", who still manage to be carried away by a victory at a sporting event, a World Cup, or the death of a popular singer. People who manage to love their communities, and who still are able to be a nation when its most deeply held values are trampled on.

We must rediscover the taste for observing human nature. "Look, with all your eyes, look".
Climate Justice in Europe in Light of The Green Deal

Introduction

On 4 March 2020, the European Commission presented a proposal aimed at making several improvements to legislative policies on climate change. The proposal contains a set of elements which form what is known as the “European Green Deal”. As a transitional step towards climate neutrality, the EU increased its climate ambitions for 2030 committing to reducing emissions by 55% by then. As part of the “Fit for 55” package, the European Union is currently working on revising its climate, energy, and transport legislation to bring it in line with the ambitions set for both 2030 and 2050. A number of new initiatives are also included in the package.

While the target of a 55% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 is intended to be binding and will have to be adopted by Member States — once the Union has structured it as a legally binding form — it is still under negotiation following the ordinary legislative procedure of Union law. In fact, the Fit for 55 package was presented to the Council in July 2021 and is currently being discussed in several policy areas such as environment, energy, transport, and economic and financial affairs.

A deal for a more ‘just’ society

On 11 December 2019, the European Commission made public the Deal’s full set of measures, thereby establishing it as the framework for all new legislation proposed by the European Union: eliminating net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050; setting up a “just transition” mechanism to support all regions in the ecological transition, especially those dependent on fossil fuels; establishing European climate law; promoting economic growth through the efficient use of resources by moving to a clean and circular economy. All economic sectors are concerned: transport, energy, construction, agriculture, environment, transportation, industry, sustainable finance; massive investments, a carbon tax at the EU borders, protection and promotion of biodiversity; societies where each citizen finds a place.

Although the package has been named the ‘Climate law’, it is at present a set of proposals containing a diverse and ambitious set of measures that would complement existing climate and energy packages, the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading schemes, and a number of tools aimed at significantly reducing GHG emissions. It would also complement social and economic mechanisms aimed at making the European system more ‘resilient’ and more just in terms of climate change impacts.

A mechanism to strengthen the European climate agenda and achieve ‘climate justice’

The package’s main objective is to ensure that the European Union commits to achieving climate neutrality by 2050. This commitment is based on European communications about the Green Deal. Once adopted, it became the main tool for including climate neutrality and sustainable growth objectives into European climate legislation.

The ‘Fit for 55’ package is a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation and put in place new initiatives to ensure that EU policies are consistent with the climate objectives agreed by the Council and the European Parliament.

Other than the question of the proposed mechanism’s effectiveness and feasibility — which we will not analyze here — it is interesting to consider what the Green Deal could change in terms of climate justice. What is meant here is that there is a dual sense of climate justice. First of all, it is a question of designing a European legislative system that takes into account the equity between Member States, equitable burden sharing in terms of the fight against climate change, as well as taking into account the different economic, social, political and legal vulnerabilities of different states.

The second aspect of climate justice that will be of particular interest to us is the aspect of access to justice


(understood as the courtroom) by civil society in Europe, thereby asserting their fundamental and human rights before the courts in the face of adverse effects of climate change. Climate justice in this sense also refers to the set of legal proceedings brought by civil society to pressure states to honor the GHG emission reduction targets they have committed to, both through the ratification of the Paris Agreement and through their commitments under European law.

This makes it worth considering whether the Green Deal – which entails an ambitious timetable for achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 for the entire European Union, as well as for states individually – will have an influence on climate justice. Conversely, this article will explore whether the climate justice movement, as it has been developing in Europe since 2015, will be able to improve existing European mechanisms and advance the goal of carbon neutrality.

This article raises the question of the interactions between the proposed Green Deal and climate justice, in both the broad sense and, above all, in the sense of court action combined with civil society initiatives. In this sense, what will be of interest in these pages is to know whether ‘climate justice’ – understood as actions and lawsuits that give a ‘boost’ to achieving the targets set by the Paris Agreement – will be modified or improved in the European framework modified by the new Climate Package.

Because the European Union (EU) legal system operates with inflexible rules, especially regarding access to justice (the General Court and EU Court of Justice), I will also analyze the obstacles to climate justice that may persist at the procedural and substantive legal levels. However, in order to give a complete picture of the issue, I will also present the promising work of national courts in the field of climate justice, which may in the medium term influence the functioning of the ECJ itself.

To conclude the presentation of the following pages, it is interesting to take an ‘aside’ and ask whether and how the two systems of European law – that of the EU and that of the Council of Europe – interact in climate matters. It is also interesting in this sense to not overlook the work of developing the jurisprudence of a nascent climate justice, which is carried out by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in its interpretation of EU law as well as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Indeed, several appeals are currently pending before the ECHR concerning climate justice. Given that the two European legal systems are not completely isolated, it is likely that the one will have an influence on the other. Finally, these various appeals will in turn have a definite influence on the law of member states. All these elements are therefore inseparable from the study of the relationship between the Green Deal and climate justice in Europe.

I. The European Green Deal and climate justice

The Deal, which is now a set of proposals to ‘adjust European law to meet the 55% target by 2050’, is rich in content and ambition. It aims to realign existing climate, energy, and transport legislation, while giving it a more ‘just’ approach. It presents a number of central issues and legislative priorities.

First of all, and from a purely legislative point of view, the proposal attempts to overcome three challenges that international environmental treaties often confront:

- First, the matter of whether all States will participate in the process implemented by the regulation.
- Second incorporating the functions of international organizations in legislative forms.
- And as a third issue, the proposal wants to ensure the cooperation of all parties.

These three elements – participation, integration, cooperation – are already a major step towards climate justice.

In terms of content and purpose, it is worth recalling that the main, binding long-term goal is no net emissions in the European Union until the year 2050 (General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 2021). Another binding target is a 55% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of Human Rights. In the original system, three institutions were responsible for enforcing the commitments made by the contracting states: the European Commission of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. All applications under the Convention, by individual applicants and by Contracting States, were subject to a preliminary examination by the Commission, which decided on their admissibility. If a complaint was declared admissible, and if a friendly settlement could not be reached, the Commission drew up a report in which it established the facts and formulated a non-binding opinion on the merits of the case. The Commission and/or the government of an interested State could then refer the case to the Court for a final and binding judgment. If the case was not referred to the Court, it was the Committee of Ministers that decided. Since its adoption in 1950, the Convention has been amended several times and many rights have been added to the original text.

7. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, more commonly known as the European Convention on Human Rights, was first opened for signature in Rome on 4 November 1950 and entered into force on 3 September 1953. It was the first instrument to give concrete form and binding force to some of the rights set out in the Universal Declaration.
(other GHG) emissions in the European Union by 2030 compared to 1990 emissions levels (General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 2021). This is known as ‘55 for 50’.

In accordance with the binding mechanism, each member state will have to prepare a national energy and climate plan in which all the objectives of the European climate law will have to be adhered to. Consequently, the proposal's requirements, which will become a directive or a set of directives, i.e., a series of regulations, would have to be directly integrated into each EU country's national plans (General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 2021).

If the Deal were to become a set of directives, the matter would still take several years to be incorporated into national law by each member state. However, given the fact that many countries already have fairly advanced "climate laws" that are consistent with the objectives of the Paris Agreement and EU regulations, this should not be a major problem. The only question raised in this scenario is that of obligation: as long as there is no national law in each State incorporating the new directive(s) resulting from the Green Deal proposal, the Member States bound by the ‘Fit for 55? The answer is clearly yes, because the directive or directives resulting from the Green Deal are binding from the moment of their announcement. The time given each State to “adapt” their law to the new European measures is not the time frame that will determine the level of obligation, but the time given for national legislation to develop national implementation measures.

We are therefore in a ‘process’ of updating existing law and adjusting it to a new, more ambitious target. This ‘process’ will have a ‘cascading’ or ‘interlocking’ effect: first, the relevant provisions of Union law will be reviewed and modified if necessary, by adopting a classic legislative form of European law, so that it can be given the appropriate legal form and become binding legislation. It will then be the turn of member states' laws, which will have to do the same and update their normative and legislative provisions containing emissions reduction targets in order to adapt them to the European ‘55 to 50’ objective. On paper, it could not be simpler.

Should the Deal become one or more regulations, the issue would be even more simply resolved. This is because an EU regulation does not need to be incorporated into national law. There is therefore no deadline for States to immediately adopt the European regulation(s). In this case, the regulations will be directly enforceable before the national courts of each member state and will become binding for both national and European public administrations, which will have to promptly ‘implement’ the targets of the ‘55 to 50’ regulation(s) in their internal policies.

The difference between this and the previous scenario is significant. In the first case, that of a directive, the deadline would in a way be ‘postponed’, until all the member states had reached the end of the time allowed for incorporation into their respective laws. In a way, this would delay the adjustment process. In this scenario, the ‘55 to 50’ target would be shortened and it would be even more difficult to achieve because there would be even less time for transition. The conditions for a just transition could be lessened, or even end up in jeopardy.

In the second scenario the adjustment of the ‘50 to 50’ target is accomplished through regulation. In this case, the target becomes immediately binding and must be applied directly and immediately by States. The ‘just’ transition would require a little more time. We would gain at least 4 or 5 years to better adapt to the new limits by 2050. Our lifestyles, our energy consumption, the use of sustainable transport, and our climate policies would be able to ‘readjust’ in a more calm and serene manner because we would have a bit more time.

In the end, the ‘just’ transition and ‘climate justice’ will largely depend on the legal form that the package will take. To some extent, ‘the ball is in the court of the EU institutions’ and our future rests on these discussions.

II. Climate justice improved through the Green Deal

The European Commission is seeking to strike a balance between legislation and the national policies of member states in order to make them inclusive and open to ideas and discussions from all sectors so as to achieve the common goal of climate neutrality.

Through implementation of the transition, the Green Deal is expected to have a positive effect on many areas, such as energy security, equity, and solidarity of European member states’ economies, as well as education and training programs.

The proposal also draws on the principle of sustainable development by establishing climate neutrality for all sectors.

Another important point is the responsible contribution of all European Union member states to implementing the Paris Agreement’s climate change targets, based on the principles of precaution, ‘polluter pays’, ‘priority to energy efficiency’, ‘transparency’ and the ‘no-harm’ prin-
ciple. All these principles are clearly present in climate justice, which emerged as a concept in the 2000s in Latin America around the NGO movement that promoted this doctrine, and which also appears in the preamble to the Paris Agreement, referring to the “ability of all to contribute to the fight against climate change”. Similarly, when it comes to protecting minorities and different vulnerable populations in the face of climate change, the Green Deal envisions linking climate policies to social and energy policies.

The only negative factor is that since the conflict between Russia and Ukraine began, energy prices have spiraled out of control and out of proportion to the purchasing power of European citizens, with both poverty and energy insecurity on the rise. Faced with these exceptional circumstances, the Green Deal will have to demonstrate flexibility or else exceptional measures will have to be taken while awaiting the more generalized deployment of non-fossil fuels in Europe.

III. Towards greater or limited climate justice?

Two factors could constrain the rapid advancement of climate justice. One is the nature of the climate package (A) and the other is the existing procedural system of justice before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (B).

A. Is the new climate legislation “justice-able” in nature?

The first factor is that the so-called ‘European climate law’ seems to be too ambitious in relation to its legal basis, thereby limiting it before it can even be implemented.

In fact, for the time being, it does not include binding measures for individual countries. In the event that a member state decides to pursue policies that are inconsistent with the climate neutrality targets, the European proposal does not provide for any sanctions, except that it become a directive or regulation as soon as possible.

In the meantime, a regular evaluation of implemented national measures will be carried out. Also, additional recommendations will be provided in case of non-compliance with the major targets. In this sense, the ‘European climate law’ can be described as a structure or framework treaty similar to other international treaties such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change or the Paris Agreement. The Green Deal primarily offers guidelines for member states and other stakeholders to follow in order to implement climate neutrality targets, though it does not yet include binding measures. However, the proposal will eventually be broken down into several binding texts, which, as mentioned earlier, will be either directly applicable or transposable and therefore also invocable before national and European courts.

It is precisely this last point that could also pose a problem for climate justice in its ‘judicial’ aspect.

B. Is the European justice system suited to ‘climate justice’?

The answer deserves some thought because it is not simple. There are several possible scenarios to consider.

The first is that private individuals may cite European legislation before the ECJ. In this regard, and given the rather disappointing result of the ‘climate people’s Carvalho v. European Commission case, the ECJ will adhere to its ‘Plauman’ jurisprudential doctrine and will not accept – in line with what has already been decided on many occasions – a petition directly from citizens. In fact, the ECJ’s procedural doctrine is currently such that it does not accept petitions filed directly by citizens because it does not recognize their legal interests, and only accepts petitions from States.

If this doctrine were to be relaxed, climate justice cases would undoubtedly be brought before EU courts in the years to come. This is due not only to the fact that the new legislative package establishing the Green Deal will give citizens a strong case for claiming before the ECJ that the Green Deal should be implemented by member states, but also to the fact that the Commission itself will be able to bring cases before the ECJ against member states for

13. M. Torre-Schaub et S. Lavorel, Justice climatique. Pour une nouvelle gouvernance du climat plus juste, Paris, éd Léopold Mayer, in the process of publication. The concept of “climate justice” comes from the recognition that climate change has and will have environmental and social impacts that will not affect everyone equally. Studies on vulnerability to climate change, such as those conducted by the Tyndall Center for Climate Change Research, have found that the countries most affected by global warming and where its consequences will be felt most intensely (desertification, droughts, floods and other extreme weather events) will be developing countries, which have worse starting conditions and fewer resources to adapt to these new situations. The idea of climate justice is to promote a just transition to a sustainable, fossil-free future that protects the most vulnerable people and countries from the impacts of climate change. In 2004, the Durban Climate Justice Group was established at the international meeting in Durban, South Africa. There, representatives of NGOs and grassroots movements discussed realistic policies to address climate change. At the Bali conference in 2007, the global coalition Climate Justice Now was founded, and in 2008, at the inaugural meeting in Geneva, the Global Humanitarian Forum focused on climate justice; “Durban Group for Climate Justice”. Transnational Institute 6 July 2009; The Global Humanitarian Forum Annual Meeting 2008.
14. Ibid note B.
failing to adopt or comply with climate legislation. Even if the climate legislation package is not yet binding, it will be binding the moment it is turned into a regulation or a directive. Moreover, even if the package itself does not contain any sanctions, the fact that it contains requirements that climate policies and neutrality objectives be reassessed as part of the 55 to 50 package is already likely to be brought before the ECJ.

IV. Climate justice strengthened through connections between European and human rights

Although EU law remains an independent and separate legal system from that arising from the Council of Europe, both are subject to mutual influences and confluences.

For example, the EU is a member of the Council of Europe, which therefore implies that the EU is subject to the European Convention on Human Rights. In addition, most EU member states have agreed to the European Convention on Human Rights. This means, again, that the law of the European Convention on Human Rights applies to them. What effect can this have on climate justice within the EU?²¹

The well-known Urgenda case,²² consisting of three court decisions in the Netherlands is a prime example of this crucial, evolving point.²³ In 2014, the Urgenda Foundation, together with nearly 900 citizens, filed an appeal with the Court of First Instance in The Hague. On June 24, 2015, the court handed down a decision that was unanimously described as historic, because it recognized the responsibility of the Dutch state for its lack of ambitious climate action, and also gave normative value to international, European, and – by extension – Dutch climate law. The court ruled that the Dutch government²⁴ had to take the necessary steps to bring its climate policy into line with reduction targets set by European law and that the Netherlands, as a “leading” and developed country, had to fulfill its duty of care towards citizens and prevent the damage and risks that unambitious climate legislation could cause to the population.

In this appeal, the plaintiffs also pointed out that the Dutch government had violated articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights by not acting ambitiously to prevent increased CO2 emissions. By failing to act, the State violated its ‘positive obligations’ under the European Convention on Human Rights and failed to protect Dutch citizens’ human right to life (article 2 ECHR) and their right to private and family life (article 8 ECHR). The court of first instance in The Hague did not wish to rule on this point.

The Dutch government had appealed to the Court of Appeal in The Hague and the latter and, on October 9, 2018,²⁵ the court once again ruled in favor of the Urgenda Foundation and the plaintiffs, faulting the government once more for its weak climate policy. The appeal decision acknowledges the violation of Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This appeals decision is therefore pioneering in Europe in this respect: it is the first time that a national court has ruled on the applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights to climate justice.

The Dutch State submitted a cassation appeal to the Court of Cassation in The Hague, which again ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and dismissed the State’s claim. The ruling from December 20, 2019 upholds that articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights were violated.²⁶

During the same period, a coalition of NGOs and citizens from various member states filed an appeal for climate justice, claiming that their fundamental rights (to life, to property, to culture, to freedom of trade) had been violated. The ECJ dismissed this appeal on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not have any legal standing before the Court, and that only States could file an action.

Two types of climate justice are therefore being implemented in Europe. One is on the side of the European Court of Human Rights, which has a broad and flexible interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights on the rights to life and to private and family life, and recognizes that government inaction can violate these


In this respect, six petitions are currently before the ECHR concerning climate justice: a Swiss petition regarding climate vulnerability; a Portuguese petition, for violation of the right to life and to equal opportunities; a Norwegian petition, for violation of the right to life and to private and family life; and a French petition based on the same arguments. The French petition, presented on behalf of Mr. Damien Carème, former mayor of the municipality of Grande Synthe, follows decisions concerning climate justice handed down by the Consell d’Etat in 2020 and 2022, in which the latter, while finding that the French State has binding CO2 emission reduction targets, and while recognizing the delay in its climate policies, nevertheless dismissed the petition filed on behalf of Mr. Carème as a potential victim vulnerable to the negative effects of climate change. As a result, in May 2022, Mr. Carème submitted a petition to the ECHR, which will soon have to rule on the issue.27

The other climate justice that is being implemented in Europe is the one before the CJEC. But, as explained earlier, climate appeals before the EU justice system are not moving in the desired direction. The procedural obstacles are still high and the CJEC’s doctrine in this respect is not very flexible. However, with the adoption of the Green Deal measures, this is expected to change. If the climate package soon becomes applicable to all Member States, and if the Fit for 55 targets become ‘hard law’, and are binding, it is very likely that enforceability will further develop; governments will have to adopt these measures and then comply with them. This will have implications for the way litigation develops at the European level.


Not only will appeals to EU bodies increase, but climate appeals before national and member state courts will grow exponentially.

V. Climate justice strengthened by the Green Deal in Europe and member states

Since 2015, following the first Urgenda decision mentioned earlier, the judicial aspect of climate justice has been developing at a rapid pace.28

The last IPCC report of 202229 refers to this by explaining that climate appeals are a new element in climate governance and that thanks to them, governments are obligated to improve their climate policies and also, thanks to these appeals, States are tending to clarify their GHG reduction targets by adopting more ambitious climate laws.30 The IPCC has therefore dedicated long passages extensively praising the beneficial effects of climate justice.

The fact remains that while the phenomenon is now global, climate justice structured and delivered in this way remains at a national level. It consists of legal actions brought before national jurisdictions so that domestic judges can render decisions that are largely based on each country’s national law. International climate law, and in particular the Paris Agreement, forms a basis for these appeals. In Europe, EU law is also cited as a source of obligations for States. Laws resulting from the European Convention on Human Rights have so far had limited success, but they can also be cited. However, it will be the national laws of the country where the climate trial takes place that will apply and be interpreted mainly by domestic judges.

This is why it is important that within the EU, each member state has robust climate law which is also common to all member states, which is infused by European law itself, and which can eventually serve as a model for other regions of the world.

Let us therefore stick to the idea that the stronger and more binding European law is, the more obligations it imposes, and which must be adopted and applied by member states, the more they will be obligated to apply it. Similarly, the more demanding European law becomes towards member states so that they quickly adapt their


29. 6th 2022 IPCC Report.
national laws to the new Fit for 55 reduction targets, the more national laws will include these reduction rules that can be enforced before a judge.

Therefore, the more understandable, binding, feasible, and ambitious European climate law is, the more that national law in member states will be in the image and likeness of EU law.

These new national climate laws could be cited before a national judge, who would then be required to apply and rule on them. Climate justice will therefore be strengthened by EU law and, in turn, national law.

There would therefore be no need to file an appeal directly with the CJEC because member states would be subject to European law as enacted into national law. But even if someone wants to file a climate appeal with the CJEC, this will be even more possible once the climate package has been fully integrated into national law. If member states do not adopt the package, individuals will be able to demand that the Commission force a member state to adopt it. Through this, which is still somewhat limited and indirect, climate justice can be further developed within the EU.

**Conclusion**

Climate justice is being implemented in Europe faster than we could have thought 3 years ago. The Green Deal will most certainly give this movement a boost and encourage its development. It would, however, be preferable for the CJEC to be more flexible in its procedural rules and more readily accept citizen appeals. After all, climate justice is characterized by 'access to justice', and this access must therefore be open, without discrimination and without obstacles, to all of civil society. The new climate package also poses the challenge of 'allowing for the construction of a society where everyone finds their place'. It is time for EU institutions to get to work and modify their doctrines concerning access to justice in order to better implement these new provisions. By doing so, Europe will not only become the home of a new model of climate legislation but also of a new democratic model that is more just and closer to citizens.
The Green Deal at the service of human security

What we are learning from the war in Ukraine is that any future rules based set of international political arrangements will have to be combined with a green new deal not just for Europe but world-wide. The war has revealed the way in which fossil fuel dependence is not just a problem for the environment. It has skewed the global economy and has contributed to the rise of authoritarianism and war.

We are living through a fundamental transition, an ‘interregnum’ as Antonio Gramsci called it, ‘where the old is dying and the new cannot be born’ and where all sorts of ‘morbid symptoms’ are experienced. This is a period when our political institutions are out of step with far-reaching economic, social and technological change. On the one hand, the American and Soviet dominated model of development based on mass production and mass consumption, militarism, and, above all excessive dependence on fossil fuels, is exhausted. On the other hand, a new model based on information and communications technology and resource saving is waiting in the wings, but our political institutions, mainly states, are still shaped by the outdated model. The old model was based on a set of political arrangements consisting of states and blocs. The new model requires a rules-based form of global governance, for which the European Union may offer a possible model.

In the past, major inter-state wars played a critical role in enabling the new to be born, by transforming states and the international order. This is why the legitimacy of states is bound up with classic national security strategies, based on regular military forces designed to fight war against other states. This is no longer possible. Military technology has advanced so much in accuracy and lethality that wars cannot be decisively won. The kind of extremist contest theorised by Clausewitz would lead to annihilation. What this means is that any fundamental transition needed to avoid the possibility of human extinction has to involve not just climate action but also the end of war as a way of settling international differences. It does not necessarily mean the end of military force but it does mean a change in how military force is used and composed. It means a shift from war-fighting to the use of force, in limited ways, to uphold international law based on human rights. As I shall explain, this is what I understand by a shift from national to human security.

The Changing Nature of warfare

Archetypal Inter-state wars were the wars theorised by Clausewitz in his classic book On War, required reading for every military man or woman. They are wars through which states capture territory militarily and consolidate their control over territory. Clausewitz defines such wars as a clash of political wills and his foundational argument is that such wars tend to the extreme as each side tries to win. The politicians want to achieve their political objectives; the generals need to disarm their opponents; and passion and hatred is unleashed among the population.

These wars had clear beginnings and endings. Indeed, throughout the modern period, the duration of war declined and periods of peace began to alternate with periods of war whereas earlier, war was more or less continuous. At the same time, such wars grew in scale and intensity characterised by ever higher casualties and culminating in the two twentieth century world wars, which together may have involved between 80 and 100 million deaths including the genocides in both wars. The whole modern period was, of course, characterised by incessant violence in the colonised parts of the world, mainly directed against civilians but this violence was not counted as war.

Clausewitzian war was intrinsically bound up with the modern state, empire, and the states system. ‘War made the state and the state made war’ says Charles Tilly. Up

until the mid-nineteenth century, states were primarily war-making machines. At the end of the seventeenth century, for example, Louis XIV was spending 75% of state revenues on the military, Britain was spending a similar amount, while Peter the Great was spending 82%.4

Clausewitzian wars were existencial moments, when the war effort required large-scale adaptation involving far-reaching administrative, political, technological, social, cultural and economic changes. They were hugely destructive but also transformative. They were experimental moments when, after a period of trial and error, states adopted the kind of reforms needed to win wars or else were defeated. Thus the Napoleonic Wars ushered in administrative and judicial reforms all over Europe that provided the conditions for the spread of the industrial revolution. The wars of the mid-nineteenth century marked the end of slavery in the United States and of serfdom in the Russian and Habsburg empires, the unification of Germany and Italy, and the spread of the railway and the telegraph.

Alongside this layering of the administrative and political foundations of the modern state, wars also forged the national identities of many states, and served to rank states into an established international pecking order. Indeed each of the major wars established the leading powers as well as a new set of international arrangements.5 It can be argued that the Cold War represented the institutionalization of the innovations introduced during World War II, thus providing a framework for the spread of the American and Soviet models of development.6 Central to these innovations was the widespread use of the international combustion engine, in the form of cars, tanks and aeroplanes, dependent on a continuing supply of oil.

Intractable Conflicts

The kind of contemporary wars that we observe in places like Syria, Yemen, or East and Central Africa are very different. They are better described as a social condition, or even a mutual enterprise, rather than a contest between ‘sides.’ They involve numerous armed groups, both global and local, who gain from the violence itself rather than from winning or losing. They may gain politically because they are associated with extremist identities (ethnic or religious) that are often constructed through violence. Or they may gain economically through revenue raising activities linked to violence, for example, loot, pillage and hostage-taking, the creation of checkpoints, the ‘taxation’ of humanitarian aid or diaspora remittances, or the smuggling of resources, whether oil, drugs, antiquities or human beings to name but a few. Battles between armed groups are rare, with most violence instead directed against civilians; this is because the various groups establish territorial control through political rather than military means - they kill or expel those who oppose them, usually those of a different religion and ethnicity. Forced displacement, ethnic cleansing, the destruction of cultural symbols, or systemic sexual violence are all hallmarks of contemporary wars.

These wars tend to persistence rather than to the extreme. They are very difficult to end. And they tend to spread through refugees, smuggling networks or extremist ideologies. They are wars of state-unbuilding and fragmentation. They disassemble public authority and turn state power into an archipelago of armed fiefdoms. They deliberately weaken and undermine the rule of law.

The wars are symptoms of the profound changes that took place in the last few decades as the prevailing model of development became started to falter and as neo-liberal recipes supplanted the kind of state intervention that had been typical of the post-World War II model of development. Indeed, the new wars could be described as an extreme form of neo-liberalism. Typically, they take place in authoritarian societies opening up to the world as a consequence of economic and political liberalisation.

In political terms, liberalisation opens up the possibility of pro-democracy protests or demonstrations and this is often the way that wars begin. This new type of war can be interpreted as a way of suppressing demands for democracy through fomenting sectarian conflict. Whether we are talking about the former Yugoslavia or Syria, the majority of protesters oppose violence and in response to violence, they transform themselves into civil society groups - providing the humanitarian first response, documenting crimes, offering local mediation, trying to maintain schools and medical facilities, opposing sectarian narratives. Those that turn to violence are often unemployed young men from rural areas who join militias or armed groups defined in terms of ethnic or religious identity. Civil society is often the first target of the warring parties; many leave or are killed.

In economic terms, a typical combination of trade and capital liberalisation, privatisation, and macro-economic stabilisation leads to reductions in public spending including social services like health and education or food and energy subsidies, increased unemployment especially in rural areas, and the emergence of a ‘crony capitalist’ or ‘oligarchic’ class owning the newly privatised state sector or under contract to the state. The war speeds up these processes. National Income falls dramatically as does public spending and tax revenue. Unemployment increases. All this is often compounded by sanctions. War-related

military/criminal elites come into being or are strengthened with a vested interest in continued disorder.\(^7\)

**The Role of Oil**

It is often argued that these new wars are caused by and contribute to climate change. Thus Prince Charles, now King Charles, suggested that it was drought that caused the wars in Darfur and Syria.\(^8\) The problem with this argument is that whether or not extreme weather events cause conflict depends on social relations; water shortages, forest fires, or flooding can increase social co-operation as much as conflict. In Syria, it can be argued that it was the failure of the regime to help those affected by the drought that contributed to the war rather than drought in itself. As David Livingstone has put it: ‘When we shift the blame for violence to weather and treat human struggle as simply a state of nature, we reduce the complexity of warfare to a single dimension. We also absolve the agents of conflict of moral responsibility for their actions.’\(^9\)

As for the consequences, the evidence is mixed. Wars may involve illegal logging and deforestation and destruction of agricultural lands or even nuclear power stations as well as an absence of management that may lead to water depletion, lack of flood defences, and so on. On the other hand, the fall in industrial production reduces the use of fossil fuels and shortages may lead to more climate friendly local solutions. For example, in Syria, solar panels have been introduced to compensate for shortages of diesel oil due to the war, new types of ‘climate-smart’ agricultural practices have been introduced to compensate for water shortages, while organic fertilisers have replaced chemical fertilisers because the latter are less available.\(^10\) Where there does seem to be a clear connection is the relation between war and oil dependence.\(^11\) The crony capitalist or oligarchic regimes that are associated with war are almost always rentier regimes; that is to say, state revenues depend on rent rather than taxation. Rent may take the form of economic aid or foreign borrowing, or mineral rents, especially oil. It was Max Weber who pointed out that the character of states is shaped by the type of revenue.\(^12\) Where states depend on taxation, this requires some kind of implicit or explicit social contract with the citizen, who pay taxes in return for the provision of services, such as policing, education, health, and so on.\(^13\) Rentier states, by contrast, are very often characterised by political competition about access to rents rather than about the provision of public services. The term ‘resource curse’ originally applied to economies where value-adding forms of production like manufacturing or agriculture decline as a consequence of increased flows of oil rents. But it is increasingly used to describe the kind of systematic corruption linked to authoritarianism and violence associated with oil rents. What Alex de Waal calls the political marketplace refers to a situation where political entrepreneurs compete for access to resources controlled by the state and where violence is an integral part of that competition.\(^14\) ‘Crony capitalists’ or ‘oligarchs’ created through the privatisation of state assets or through state contracts are typical of this syndrome.

**The War in Ukraine**

So will the war in Ukraine become another intractable conflict? The Russian side bears a considerable resemblance to the sorts of regimes that characterise many contemporary wars. The Putin regime can be compared to the Milošević regime in Yugoslavia or to Assad’s Syria. Putin has been fighting this kind of conflict ever since he came to power – Chechnya, Georgia, Syria. Through these wars, a narrative has been constructed in which a kleptocratic criminalised regime increasingly defines itself as a great power based on ethnic Russian nationalism. The war in Ukraine actually began in 2014 and can be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to suppress the democratic demands of the Euro-Maidan and to promote ethnic tension. It came straight out of the Gerrassimov playbook; the Russian Chief of Staff wrote an article in February 2013 where he coined the phrase non-linear war to describe a new type of “special operation” in which the use of information technology, special forces, and internal opposition can rapidly produce a “web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe and civil war”.\(^15\) It can be argued that the new phase of the war is an expression of Putin’s need to sustain and reproduce the ideology that underpins his political position and perhaps a desperate reaction to the prospect of the phasing out of oil.

The Ukrainian side, however, is different. For Ukraine, this is a contest along the lines of the classic Clausewitzian war logic. It is a contest between Putinism (the criminalised ethnic nationalist system) and a civic state. Almost the entire country is mobilised in the war effort behind the type of activities typically carried out by civil society actors; in particular, the emphasis on international law


\(^8\) ‘Prince Charles: Climate Change may have helped cause the Syrian Civil War’ Guardian, 23 November 2015.

\(^9\) David Livingstone ‘Stop Saying Climate Change Causes War’ Foreign Policy Magazine December 4 2015.

\(^10\) Turkmani, Mehchy and Gharibah, Building Resilience in Syria; assessing fragilities and strengthening positive coping mechanisms, 2022. Published by The Peace and Conflict Resolution Evidence Platform.


\(^12\) Terry Karl The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petrostates University of California Press, 1997.


\(^15\) The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War | In Moscow’s Shadows (founderscode.com).
and the efforts to collect evidence of war crimes is unprecedented. Moreover, the dominant idea of Ukraine is civic rather than ethnic - that is to say, an idea of a political entity that includes Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Poles, Crimean Tartars and so on; an idea that was cemented in the Maidan protests. While Ukraine has its own oligarchs and has experienced pervasive corruption, huge efforts are being made to reduce corruption and preserve the social infrastructure.

But how long can this be sustained? If Ukraine is able to carry out a successful counter-offensive, could this lead to the use of nuclear weapons? Alternatively, is there a risk of an intractable nuclear weapons on Europe’s doorstep if it turns into a long attritional struggle in the Donbass region. On the Russian side, we can already observe many of the characteristics of the contemporary wars - deliberate shelling of civilians, sexual violence, what appears to be systemic looting, mad and terrifying disinformation campaigns. Is it conceivable that, on the Ukrainian side, hatred of Russia could come to be directed against ethnic Russians and that the widespread arming of civilians to resist Russians could be used for looting and other crimes as shortages mount, weakening the Ukrainian civic spirit? There is also the risk that the main effect of economic sanctions on Russia, needed to express outrage, will further fragment and criminalise Russian society. Any diplomatic solution, which of course is preferable to continued fighting, would be likely to freeze current territorial positions allowing extremist criminal gangs to control the Russian occupied parts, as happened in Crimea, and maintain permanent pressure on Ukraine, perhaps in the form of constitutional interference, as was the case in the earlier Minsk agreement.

Western countries are balancing on a tightrope between the risk of escalation and annihilation, the consequence of trying to win along classic Clausewitzean lines, and supporting Ukraine in all possible ways to prevent Russia from winning. What we are learning from this experience is not only are invasions wrong and illegal, but they can never succeed in Clausewitzean terms. They cannot be won. But they can be horrendously destructive and they can produce the new war social condition. So how should military force at the disposal of civic democratic states be organised? What kind of international arrangements and policies might minimise the syndrome of violence?

**From National to Human Security**

When the Cold War ended many hoped that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be dissolved and replaced by a new pan-European security system including Russia - it was Gorbachev’s ‘Common European Home’ or the Palme Commission’s ‘Common Security’. The idea was a security system based on the three Helsinki baskets that were agreed in the 1975 Helsinki Agreement. These included:

- Security and acceptance of the territorial status quo, that is to say, no aggressive wars
- Economic, social and cultural co-operation
- Human Rights

It can be argued that these three baskets together constitute what later came to be defined as human security. The Helsinki process, then the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was institutionalised after the end of the Cold War as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). But it never became the dominant security framework for European countries as initially envisaged. Instead NATO, an organisation based on national and bloc security, was expanded along with classic war-fighting military apparatuses.

Human security is usually defined as the security of individuals and the communities in which they live, in the context of multiple economic, environmental, health and physical threats, as opposed to the security of states and borders from the threat of foreign attack. The first use of the term was UNDP's Human Development Report of 1994, where the emphasis was on economic and social development as a way of preventing war; this understanding remains the main approach to human security in UN circles. Subsequently, it was associated with Canadian ideas about how to use military force to uphold human rights and led to the concept of Responsibility to Protect. But more relevant for our purposes is the way the term has been used, first, by the European Union, and subsequently by NATO.

In the early 2000’s, a series of reports on European security capabilities were presented to Javier Solana, then High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, by the Study Group on European Security Capabilities, later renamed the Human Security Study Group. The Study Group proposed a human security doctrine for the EU as a distinctive way of doing security. According to this version, human security is what individuals enjoy in rights-based, law-governed societies. It is assumed that the state will protect individuals from existential threats and that emergency services - including ambulances, firefighters, and police - are part of state provision. In a global context, human security is about extending individual rights beyond domestic borders and about developing a capacity at a regional or global level to provide emergency services that can be deployed in situations where states either lack capacity or are themselves the source of exis-

potential threats. The Study Group also proposed a human security force composed of both civilians and military and based on a set of principles, which are very different from the principles that apply to the military in a classic war-fighting role. The commitment to human security was reiterated in both the Global Strategy and the Strategic Compass and these proposals for a human security approach were echoed in the state of the Union address by Ursula von der Leyen in 2021:

“The European Union is a unique security provider. There will be missions where NATO or the UN will not be present, but where the EU should be. On the ground, our soldiers work side-by-side with police officers, lawyers and doctors, with humanitarian workers and human rights defenders, with teachers and engineers. We can combine military and civilian, along with diplomacy and development – and we have a long history in building and protecting peace.”

More recently the term human security has been adopted by NATO as well as by some individual Nato countries. A Human Security Unit was established within the office of the NATO Secretary General in 2019. Human Security was understood as an umbrella term that encompass Building Integrity (anti-corruption), Protection of Civilians, Cultural Property Protection, Children and Armed Conflict, Conflict-related Sexual and Gender-based Violence, Human Trafficking, and Women, Peace and Security. Several NATO members have also applied the concept of human security along similar lines. These include Canada, Belgium, Portugal, Italy (in relation to cultural heritage), the UK, the Netherlands, Germany and France. In the 2022 Strategic Concept, the outcome of the June 2022 Summit in Madrid, Nato ‘emphasises’ the need to ‘integrate’ human security, along with climate change and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda ‘across all our core tasks’.

These developments seem to suggest there are openings through which NATO as a security organisation might come closer to the kind of security approach that characterises ESDP and would have characterised the kind of pan-European security organisation originally envisaged through the Helsinki process when the Cold War ended. It can be argued that the European pillar of NATO has been enhanced partly as a consequence of the Trump years, when the US was less present, but more importantly under the impetus of the war in Ukraine and the impending membership of Sweden and Finland. The New Force Model proposed in the 2022 Strategic Concept will increase the number of ready forces available to NATO and these are likely to be European. If there really were to be a shift from national to human security, or from a predominantly geo-political alliance to one more in tune with human rights and the international rule of law, this should involve all three baskets of Helsinki.

The first basket, security, requires a fundamental shift in military posture. It is not just about protecting civilians alongside military operations, it is about giving priority to the protection of civilians. NATO forces are currently guided by International Humanitarian law (IHL) or the Laws of war. An important principle of IHL is what is known as ‘necessity’, ‘proportionality’ or ‘double effect’. The idea behind these concepts is that killing or harming enemy civilians can be justifiable if it is an unavoidable side effect of an attack on a military target, which is necessary in order to win the war, if it is unintentional, and if the harm done is proportionate to the harm that might be done if the military target were not destroyed or captured. A human security approach implies that human rights overrides IHL and the protection of civilians comes before military victory. In other words, the principle is the other way round. Hence, killing, or better still arresting, of enemies is justifiable provided it is necessary to protect civilians. What does this mean in terms of NATO’s core tasks?

In terms of collective defence of NATO members, there is clearly a need to defend NATO members from attack as in the case of Ukraine. But this is different from engaging in military competition along geo-political lines. During the 1980s, there was much concern about the offensive posture of NATO and the dangers of weapons of mass destruction. It might be worth revisiting proposals for what was known as defensive deterrence, i.e. deterring foreign attacks through a credible conventional defensive posture rather than through the threat of nuclear or conventional retaliation. It was the idea behind Gorbachev’s notion of ‘reasonable sufficiency’. Proposals for area defence or in-depth defence were put forward that would have meant drawing down nuclear weapons as well as conventional offensive capabilities, such as bombers or massed tanks (though evidently some are needed for defensive purposes). It is worth asking whether Putin would have invaded Ukraine had he realised that Ukraine would put up such an effective conventional defence.

In terms of crisis management, that is to say intervention in intractable conflicts, the aim is to end such wars by dampening down conflict and reducing the incentives for violence rather than through victory or a single top-down peace agreement. Central to this goal is the establishment of legitimate and inclusive political authority and a rule of law. Human security interventions are always civilian led and involve a combination of civilian and military actors. The tasks of the (external) military in these circumstances could include; protecting civilians from attack and creating a safe environment in which a legitimate

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19. 2021 State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen.
20. NATO 2022 - Strategic concept.
political authority can be established; monitoring and upholding local peace agreements and ceasefires as part of multi-level peace building involving civil society, especially women; establishing humanitarian space through corridors and safe havens that allow for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and arresting war criminals. A similar approach was adopted by the British in Northern Ireland or the EU-led anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, which combined the arrest of pirates with non-military measures such as the introduction of fishing licenses on the coast of Somalia.

This is very different from counter-insurgency and counter-terror where the goal is victory over an enemy. In Afghanistan, for example, the goal was the destruction of the Taliban, al Qaeda and later ISIS Khorasan, rather than the security of Afghans. This meant continuing attacks that legitimised the insurgency as well as allying with corrupt commanders who undermined the legitimacy of the Afghan government. It also marginalised the civilian leadership of the international intervention, notably the United Nations Special Representative.21

The second basket, economic, social and cultural co-operation needs to be given equal importance. There has to be co-operation even with authoritarian regimes on climate change and pandemics. There needs to be an alternative economic and social approach in contemporary war zones in order to generate legitimate livelihoods as an alternative to the criminalised, violent and fragmented war economy as well as a cultural approach emphasising civic alternatives to ethnic and religious sectarianism. In the case of Ukraine, for example, measures would need to include much greater state investment in infrastructure and social provision, as well as the introduction of progressive taxation (currently income tax is flat rate) and debt cancellation as a way of increasing domestic employment and production and financing the war effort.24 At present unemployment is at 35% and wages are falling – a situation typical of intractable conflicts where people often have no choice but to turn to violent and/or criminalised sources of revenue. This has to be reversed if Ukraine is not to degenerate into the social condition typical of intractable conflicts. Such a shift in economic policy in economic policy is also required more widely as part of the energy transition. The idea of a Green New Deal implies both greater state intervention and more emphasis on social justice.

There is also a need to recalibrate sanctions on Russia and indeed other areas of the world where sanctions apply. Economic sanctions are an important non-violent way of expressing disapproval. But the blanket application of sanctions often affect the population rather the elites (who have many ways of evading sanctions) disproportionately and this may consequently have counter-productive polarising outcomes. Sanctions on oil and gas are very important. Indeed reducing fossil fuel dependence can be viewed as a tool for starving petro-states and countering wars.

Finally human rights and the spread of rights based international law or what Teitel calls Humanity’s Law is a crucial component of human security.25 This might include such measures as the widening of membership in the International Criminal Court, the establishment of special tribunals to address war crimes or crimes against humanity, and the extension of universal jurisdiction. Consideration should be given to climate crimes.

Conclusion

The high price of oil and gas is not just about the Ukraine war. It is a symptom of the exhaustion of the post-World War II model of development and also associated with other ‘morbid symptoms’ such as authoritarianism and intractable conflict. Oil was the core factor of production for the post-World War II model of development and cheap oil was a condition for continued economic prosperity. Now the condition for renewed prosperity and stability is a transition to renewable energy and, above all, energy efficiency. But this transition is likely to be turbulent and requires a shift to a different set of international political arrangements.

Failure to act on climate change would very likely lead to human extinction. Yet the kind of inter-state war that, in the past, brought about fundamental political, economic and social transformation would, if fought today, also lead to human extinction. Paradoxically, Putin’s nuclear threats, deliberate gas leaks, and cavalier behaviour towards nuclear reactors draws attention to the dual existential challenge we face. So the current transition is both about addressing climate change and about ending war.

This essay has focussed on potential changes in the European Union and NATO that could lead to a shift away from national security postures, based on the assumption of inter-state war, towards a human security approach that would involve a rights based rule of international law. These changes provide a possible model for other areas. There are parallel developments in the African Union and in Latin America. But there are still terrifying conflagrations in the Middle East, the deepening of autocracy in India and China, and the risk of similar types of war on their borders. The global application of human security is inextricably linked to the challenge of global action on climate change; both are very difficult.

Vanessa Nakate • UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador, climate activist

The imperative of climate justice

Laurence Tubiana: You mentioned many times in your speeches that your convictions that something must be done came from your childhood. Where do your perspectives on climate come from?

Vanessa Nakate: When I think about the first time I got interested in environmental issues or when I start studying about the climate crisis, I remember the year 2016 or 2017. That is when my father was the president of the Rotary Club in Bugolobi. During his presidency, I remember he organised a mission of planting trees across different communities in Uganda. That was the very first time when I saw something related to the environment in my family. But this experience is not really what led me to start striking. At that time there were no climate strikes yet. I remember appreciating what was being done and the trees that were being planted. But I never got involved actively. But then, later in 2018, I started to do research on the challenges that people in my country, Uganda, were facing. That is the moment I started to understand how climate change impacted our lives. Realising it was a challenge, I decided to do something about it. By the end of 2018, we were seeing the climate strikes that were started by Greta Thunberg in Sweden. That’s how I was inspired. I held my very first climate strike in the first week of January 2019.

What are the most evident signs of the climate crisis in your country? What seemed to you so striking that you could not ignore it anymore?

In Uganda deforestation is a very big issue because it impacts communities in a very profound way: for so many people it is a source of income, schools depend on wood for cooking. But what really awakened me were the disasters happening especially in the Eastern part of Uganda: landslides and floods in the areas of Bududa, of Bundibugyo. Of course, I had seen these catastrophes on the news before. Most of the people in Uganda have probably heard about landslides in Bududa. But then, there is really no one telling you that this is a crisis that needs to be addressed.

In the current geopolitical context, how can we overcome the situation where on one side Europe is asking for more gas and oil because of the Russian war in Ukraine and on the other side the climate crisis is pressing?

First, many countries in Africa are facing a very huge challenge: lifting people out of poverty, including energy poverty. Millions of Africans have no access to electricity. There is a real pressure on African states. That is why activists are repeatedly stressing the need for countries in the Global North to provide the urgently needed climate finance for vulnerable nations. For us to have a just transition, climate finance needs to be sent to the communities that are at the frontline of the climate crisis, to support mitigation and adaptation, but it should also aim to help people escape energy poverty. Leaders in Africa are saying that we need to give people access to electricity, but we don’t have the finance to support renewable access at the local level. We are seeing countries in Europe invest in fossil fuels infrastructures across the African continent. So instead of giving finance for renewable energy, finance is being given for fossil fuels. That is the challenge that we need to address. It is important to note that to lift Africans from energy poverty, oil and gas are not the solution: we see the case of Mozambique or Nigeria: people did not gain access to energy or electricity because of the oil and gas extraction.

How can we prevent that, what we identified as a solution, is not perpetuating the injustices we have seen in all economic systems based on the extraction of coal oil and gas? For example, strategies for moving away from fossil fuels in transportation, rely on electric vehicles, which depend on the extraction of many materials and rare-earth.

Indeed, I have talked about this whole excitement around electric vehicles without considering the impact on the environment. The impact can be even larger and include child labour or child abuses, violation of the rights of women that carry up the mining. I think what people need to understand is that not all climate action is climate justice. We need to apply the concept of climate justice, in whatever we think is a solution. Even when one wants to bring up solar infrastructure in a village, or in a certain community, people must be consulted. They need to understand who is going to benefit from the solar panels. There is a need to bring people into the conversation at all levels, to include them into climate action. And that’s why I think we need to talk about climate justice. When counting on electric vehicles, we need to understand at what expense we are getting those vehicles. Who is suffering so that someone can drive, and what can be done to stop the suffering? Can they be manufactured in an environment...
At the global level, regional emissions inequalities are at the heart of climate negotiations, touching on issues related to development, transition and the Loss and damage funding as well as liability: historically, North America is responsible for 27% of total carbon emitted since 1850, followed by Europe (22%) and China (11%).\(^1\) Yet it is the poorest countries, with few resources for adaptation and the lowest emissions of greenhouse gases – sub-Saharan Africa is responsible for 6% of total emissions – that suffer the most from the effects of global warming.

1. Lucas Chancel, Who’s really polluting? 10 points on inequality and climate policy, Le Grand Continent, 8 June 2022.
The vulnerability of a country is calculated by the ND-GAIN Country Index of the University of Notre Dame. This index assesses a country's vulnerability by taking into account six vital sectors: food, water, health, ecosystem services, human habitat and infrastructure. The score for each sector is calculated from three variables: the exposure of the sector to climate-related or climate-exacerbated hazards; the sensitivity of the sector; and the adaptive capacity of the sector to cope with or adapt to the impacts of climate change. Map: Groupe d'études géopolitiques. Source: ND GAIN Index, World Bank.

The colour of the polygons indicates the vulnerability of the country to the effects of climate change. The darker the shade, the more vulnerable the country is.
where there is no abuse or violation of rights of women and children? What may look like climate action in a certain community may be a climate disaster in another one.

**What is the development model for the African continent that you defend?**

Decades of fossil fuel extraction has not helped the 600 million (and rising) people in Subsaharan Africa who do not have basic electricity access. The fossil fuels extracted are exported to rich countries, with most of the profits going to foreign companies. Renewables located near the point of use have been shown to be far more effective at expanding energy access to rural areas than building out transmission lines for gas-fired power. They also do not cause environmental harm such as air pollution in the communities they are built near.

**What role could Europe play in this project?**

Europe has a huge responsibility in the environmental transition of African countries. In the context of the war in Ukraine, what European leaders should aim is to support the transition to renewable energies, not the transition to other sources of supply: we need to move away from fossil fuels, full stop. We don’t need to move away from Russian fossil fuels to fossil fuels from Africa. Europe is struggling with energy prices at the moment, but that does not mean that European countries can further exploit Africa for its gas reserves. What is going unreported in Europe is that Africa is struggling with high energy prices too. High oil and gas prices have curtailed energy access in African countries. Instead of more self-serving investment in extracting our resources, Europe needs to invest in clean energy. From governments to multilateral development banks to private finance—we need the resources to make this transition happen.

**How should Europe position itself in relation to China’s ambitions on the continent?**

China is trying to invest in infrastructure in African countries. Europe needs to do the same but it can help by leading the green transition. We are not getting enough of the right investment. Money is flowing in from abroad to support fossil fuel infrastructure, but Africa only receives 2% of the world’s investment in renewable energy, despite having 39% of the potential for renewable energy generation.

**Do you think that there is a need for direct access to finance for communities? For the moment, everything goes through governments. Do you think that communities, if they had access to direct finance, could choose decentralised renewable energies?**

I remember when I was at COP26 in Glasgow last year, someone said that change actually happens at community level and not at the COPs. When you come to really think about what is happening in communities, you realise how much change is underway thanks to the work of grassroots projects. I know that many activists, especially in Africa, are running different projects to support their communities for example in terms of access to water, electricity, sanitation, educational projects for women and girls, and so on. The challenge is indeed the access to the much-needed resources, to really scale up these projects. If the initiatives led by activists were supported, especially financially (but also in terms of technical support for example), I think we would see a lot more transformations much more rapidly. There is a need for money or access to finance for the communities which are currently doing tremendous work with very little resources. They can do much more if they are given more resources.

**60% of the African continent is under 25 years old. What is the role that youth will play in this socio-environmental transition?**

Youth can and will play a significant role in the transition. But they need to be educated to do so. Millions of girls still don’t receive full primary education in Subsaharan Africa. Even more don’t finish Secondary school. Educating girls has been shown by Project Drawdown to be one of the most effective ways of reducing the impact of climate change—empowering girls economically and in their communities helps make them more resilient to extreme weather, reduces their reliance on subsistence agriculture, teaches them skills that can help in times of crisis, and builds a new generation of workers that can lead the transition to clean energy. Youth can power this transition, but they need to be educated first to do so.

**Can you speak a little bit more about your idea of education and the Green School Project? What are you trying to achieve?**

It is really about helping people understand how education and climate are connected, especially when it comes to girls’ education and women empowerment. We know how in so many communities girls and women are disproportionately affected by the climate crisis because of the nature of their responsibilities: providing for their families, means working on a farm, collecting water. So many times, women and girls are at the frontline when disasters happen: crops are dried up, farms are destroyed, they have to walk long distances to fetch water. As climate disasters escalate, many girls drop out from school, many are forced into marriage. I believe that if we want to talk about the climate crisis, we must support and ensure every girl is in school, and every woman is empowered. We know that of the hundreds of actions we can do to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, one of the most
Effective solutions is education, because it contributes to increasing the resilience of individuals, communities, and reducing inequalities that so many girls and women face. Today we know more about the connection between education and the climate crisis. That is one of the things that we have been working on, to raise this awareness about how the two go hand in hand. When it comes to the Green School Project I started it in 2019. It consists in installing solar panels, and eco-friendly wood stoves in schools in Uganda. The main objective is to help drive the transition to renewable energy, especially for those in rural areas, and to help schools reduce their consumption of firewood. As I mentioned earlier, a lot of trees are cut down for firewood. Teachers understand the impact of cutting down trees, but students cannot study when they are hungry, there is a need for alternatives. So far, we have done installations in twenty-nine schools.

**How does it work for people? Are young people talking about it in their groups, families, or communities? How do you see it? This idea of having clean cooking, clean stoves, is a very long story. People were not adopting them because they didn’t find them useful. Do you see a change or a bigger appetite to move forward with these solutions?**

At the start of the project, we first go and speak with the headteacher, the teachers and the students. We ask for their permission to implement and develop the project, so that we are not just dumping solar panels on their roofs. There must always be dialogue. There is always a lot of excitement, especially in the rural areas because students can see the ongoing process from the beginning until the very end – how solar panels supply energy, the construction of the stove on the ground of the kitchen. Some of the schools we worked with don’t have electricity at all and there’s this joy of students that can finally read with lights in their classroom, early in the morning if they want to. Teachers can have an extra-class in the evening too. Then, we usually go back to the schools we read with lights in their classroom, early in the morning. We have received really good feedback, especially on how it has reduced the use of firewood and hence the expenses. We also had some head teachers from schools not included in the project calling us because they had the testimonies from schools using eco-friendly wood stoves. I would say that more people understand the impact.

**What are you expecting for COP27? Experts talk about the African COP, but how can we have the best result possible?**

First, I would start by saying that climate change is more than weather, more than statistics, more than data points. Climate change is about people. So, when we talk about the African COP, it is important to know that an African COP should be more than the fact that it physically takes place on African soil. An African COP has to be about the African people who are suffering, who are on the frontline of the climate crisis. I think that there are so many issues that need to be addressed, as we head to COP27. Issues such as loss and damage. We know climate change is pushing so many communities, so many people in places where they cannot adapt anymore. We cannot adapt to lost cultures, lost histories, lost islands. This is what the climate crisis is doing. It causes loss and damages in communities across Africa, across the Global South. These are the experiences that need to be told, the voices that need to be heard. Then, there is a need to demand and provide climate finance for mitigation and adaptation. But in addition, there is also a need for a separate fund for the loss and damage which is already happening. That is the responsibility of the countries in the Global North. A hundred billion dollars was promised but not delivered. Right now, it is important for people to know that those hundred billion dollars is no longer enough for the communities on the frontline of the climate crisis. These are the issues that really need to be addressed at COP27. These are the stories that need to be communicated. But who is going to tell these stories?

**Is the COP the right space for these voices to be heard?**

For so long Africa has been on the front lines of the climate crisis, but not the front pages of the world’s newspapers. For now, the COP is the one of the only spaces where these voices are being heard, therefore it is an important one. However, it is not delivering the results we need. We cannot rely solely on it to achieve the outcomes we want. Governments and businesses need to start taking responsibility themselves to speed up the green transition.

**Looking more specifically at your experience as a climate activist, what are the best ways to talk about climate change today? What narratives to adopt? What visions of the future should be proposed?**

Everything is related to the climate crisis now. In Africa, the energy crisis, hunger, debt and of course extreme weather are all being exacerbated by fossil fuels extraction and climate change. We need to explain to people the connections that are causing instability in our lives. But the solutions are also connected. Universal education is a solution to protect people from the climate crisis, but also for development and improving lives. Clean energy reduces our emissions, but it also means cheaper, reliable energy, without the health impacts of air pollution. We need to explain this better. We are not doing this well enough, and some people fill the silence by saying that more fossil fuels are what is needed to solve our problems.
Global recompositions
Where should we land after Sharm el-Sheikh?

The use of eco-grazing, above the salt marshes of Guérande.

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Inclusive Multipolarity

Introduction

In just two years’ time and despite the US midterm results, European leaders could plausibly be contemplating a second Trump presidency on one side, and an increasingly assertive and inward-looking China on the other. While the climate crisis is becoming impossible for any leader to avoid outright, it is fair to assume that such a scenario would be bleak for collective climate action, and for multilateralism in general.

The mere possibility of this outcome clarifies the path forward for European leaders today. Europe’s pivotal role between the US and China has never been more important, and in fact, compels Europe to consider its role and reach far beyond this “G3”.

It is Europe’s job to create conditions - a broad path dependency - which helps to hold China and the US accountable to their climate commitments, as well as facilitate a functioning multilateral system writ large. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has further darkened the geopolitical map from Europe’s standpoint, amplifying the need for a more assertive and cohesive European voice on the world stage.

The two challenges are connected, bound as they are in macroeconomic policy and energy diplomacy. European governments and the EU are adjusting to Russia’s imposed energy crisis, using the pre-existing European Green Deal (and the emergency RePowerEU plan) as their organising principle. This approach is also, by far, the most advanced institutional and bureaucratic toolkit in progressing the Paris Agreement, setting goals of reaching net-zero by 2050, a 57% reduction in GHG by 2030 (upgraded from 55 at COP27), and a detailed set of adequately funded sectoral packages to get there. Without this framework, the potential impact of Russia’s energy warfare on European solidarity would likely have been even more severe.

This points, too, to Europe’s necessary leadership role: leaning into its first-mover commitment to decarbonisation and finding new ways to punch at its own weight in the process. It must do so quickly, lest a crisis - today’s in Ukraine, or another tomorrow - finally succeed in fragmenting European unity, leaving China and the US with fewer guardrails against their worse instincts on the international stage.

Europe and the new non-alignment

If Europe does not want to be marginalized by entrenched “G2” tensions and an increasingly multipolar world, it must become the bridge to a more functioning global decision-making system in this context of multi-polarity. This much follows on paper. But Europe is evaluating the gap between its rhetoric and the depth of the resentment it has engendered around the world in recent years. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, far from isolating the Kremlin, has in fact exposed a dynamic of non-alignment in the international system.

Broadly, it is European leaders who find themselves more isolated on the global stage than they expected. Successive votes at the UN General Assembly in condemnation of Russia’s aggression have seen China abstain or oppose (although, by October 2022, this trend indicated a growing isolation of Russia on the ‘narrower’ issue of Ukraine’s territorial integrity). Major democracies like Brazil, Indonesia, India, Senegal, and South Africa have hedged in their position on the war. By hosting delegations and undertaking high-level visits, Russia has competed with EU and US overtures to other regional blocs, intensively courting members of the AU and ASEAN.

Despite the unspeakable civilian suffering in Ukraine, much of the world is wary of taking sides. This owes to a perception of European double standards: Ukraine is far from the only conflict or crisis in the world today. Russia’s vast leverage over energy and commodity prices, and Europe’s uneven diplomacy on the likes of Covid-19 vaccines, debt, migration and climate finance have also brought us here.

“Non-alignment” offers governments avenues to boost their autonomy in foreign and energy policy. Indirectly, this reduces pressure on Russia and allows it to pursue an
Europe as a bridge to a new multipolar reality

Nonetheless, Europe should rise to the global climate finance challenge in any way it can. For starters, while it is not European countries’ responsibility alone to meet the still-failed threshold of US$100 billion in climate finance – which advanced economies remain US$17bn short of, according to the OECD – the contrast with its rapid ability to mobilize pandemic and Ukraine-related domestic spending is very dimly viewed by governments in need around the world, illustrated in the tensions surrounding the G20’s failure this summer to agree a climate communiqué. Although the Bali Leaders’ Summit, in November 2022, managed to overcome these differences, Europe must continue to make every effort to increase the volume and quality of climate finance, as a trust and credibility-building signal to the most vulnerable countries. COP27 only highlighted how persistent these tensions are.

Europe can also keep ramping up the establishment of ‘Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JET-P)’ with key partners. The prospect of an US$8.5 billion finance deal for South Africa’s energy transition out of the coal sector, supported by European governments together with the UK and the US was one of the high points of the COP26 in Glasgow. It was also a crucial signal of intent within the G20, many of whom still propose vastly inadequate NDCs despite representing 80% of global emissions. Since the announcement, the road to finalizing this agreement has looked bumpy, not least because South Africa’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, has been an outspoken proponent of non-alignment, going so far as to blame NATO for Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine and proposing counter-resolutions at the UN General Assembly seeking to exculpate Russia’s actions from the major humanitarian crisis it has engineered. In parallel, the South African authorities have raised doubts over the structure of the finance and the pressures it could place amid existing fiscal constraints. Despite these headwinds, the partnership appears to be progressing, with South Africa publishing its JET-P investment plan in August this year. More recently, the agreement of a second JET-P with Indonesia, announced at the conclusion of their G20 presidency, shows that this is a viable platform for negotiations between donors and beneficiaries, based on high standards and mutual accountability, with public and private finance mobilised to the tune of US$20 billion to transition Indonesia’s power sector out of coal. Co-led by the United States and Japan, together with Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, and the United Kingdom, it is a promising blueprint to deepen partnerships with countries in the G20 and beyond, especially those exposed to the commodity market volatilities triggered by the Kremlin.

Under Germany’s G7 presidency, donor governments have entered discussions with other governments including India (holders of the G20 presidency for 2023), Sénégal and Vietnam. These countries are all non-aligned on the Ukraine issue. A concrete and well-financed rapprochement with these governments in energy cooperation - all regional leaders and potential key players in the green transition - would be positive on all counts, and points to a way forward for European diplomacy.

But the most crucial and necessary institutional challenge to European governments relates to reforming the Bretton Woods institutions and making them fit for the scale of the climate crisis. The good momentum on the issue of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) achieved under the leadership of the Prime Minister of Barbados, Mia Amor Mottley, was a highlight of COP26 and COP27 and must be maintained. As key members and shareholders of the IMF and multilateral development banks, European governments can increase their lending and encourage ways to operationalize the IMF’s Resilience and Sustainability Trust mandated to release SDRs for countries climate finance needs, as well as ease the terms upon which these funds may be released to MDBs and spent.
thereafter. European member states of the IMF could further push for the “V20” group of climate vulnerable countries to become an official grouping at the IMF, replicating the type of dynamic which made of success of the COP21 negotiations. Here again, the G20 Leaders summit in Bali saw a very welcome announcement by President Macron of a special summit in the summer of 2023 to help bring forward the Barbados “Bridgetown Agenda” as part of a broader debate on new financing tools in our international finance architecture. This offers promising progress for climate vulnerable middle-income countries in particular who face growing risk of debt distress from climate shocks.

New EU-China channels for times of crisis

The Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act, which passed this summer, has restored some of the US’ credibility on climate action. This looks to create ample new incentives for the net-zero economy on both sides of the Atlantic, although the largesse and opacity of IRA subsidies have also fuelled concerns that they could hinder the competitiveness of European net-zero industries.

Nonetheless this “rapprochement” risks causing Europe to further neglect EU-China channels on climate action. Most significantly, trade runs the risk of becoming a stumbling block in EU-China climate diplomacy. This is bad news, as it is difficult to envision an effective global transition to ‘net-zero’ with these two major economic blocs shutting the doors to each other’s markets.

The European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) provides an illustration of how trade policy can impact climate diplomacy, but points also to a pragmatic way forward to align geopolitical blocks on the essential issue of decarbonizing heavy industry. The decision to implement a CBAM in the EU originated in the recognition that its Emission Trading System (ETS) is less effective than originally hoped to trigger emission reductions in its industrial sector. The proposed ETS reform will phase out the allocation of some free emission quotas, which implies charging the concerned industries for all their emissions instead. The result would be an immediate additional cost on those industries, putting competitors outside the EU at a sudden advantage. What seems fair from the EU climate policy perspective - a ‘tax’ at the border to offset a new ‘tax’ on emissions within the EU - was immediately portrayed by EU trade partners, China included, as trade protection in guise of climate action.

Some EU policymakers argued that trade partners could implement similar carbon pricing policies to avoid paying the full CBAM cost when selling their industrial products in the EU. This is an overly simplistic view, overlooking that countries have the right to adopt mitigation policies of their choice, and China’s own approach illustrates this diversity (with its own version of an ETS that applies mostly to power generation, coupled with a different framework of incentives and regulations on energy intensity or total energy use).

Ultimately, the tensions surrounding CBAM in China show Europe must improve its efforts at communicating its intension: it is about clarity on carbon content and taking us towards net-zero, not dictating the way other countries decarbonize, or indeed about punitive tariffs.

The CBAM’s silver lining is its effective technical contributions to the mammoth task of decarbonization. Its implementation will entail a proper evaluation of the greenhouse gas content of traded commodities, including aluminium, cement, electricity, fertilisers, iron and steel (the European Parliament has gone into the trilogues with a proposal to extent scope to hydrogen and polymers). This is an issue that all major industrialised countries must tackle at once as they need to monitor their own industry’s progress towards decarbonization, regardless of the policy tool used for that purpose. Increasingly, public and private procurement for buildings or cars will shift to demand lower-carbon cement, steel or aluminium and standards will emerge to ensure the environmental integrity of these products.

The opportunity exists for a global approach to these GHG measurement and certification systems, and the EU and China can help advance the global effort in that space, as two major trading blocs with high climate ambition - and very similar challenges in the decarbonization of heavy industry.

In this sense, and if applied, it could be a useful instrument towards mutual accountability and transparency of carbon content: a key trust-building tool for climate action.

Infrastructure investment is another area where greater trust-building is needed. On paper, there is ample scope for enhanced cooperation between China’s Green Belt and Road, Europe’s Global Gateway, the US’ Build Back Better World, and the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment initiatives, helping these global infrastructure spending envelopes be cleaner and more complementary. The current discourse around these respective ventures is solely adversarial, when the priority should be to re-centre the conversation on recipient countries’ immediate needs, as well as the macro-financial need to mobilize quality, large-scale investments towards the Paris Agreement goals. While this sounds like a faraway goal today, there are nonetheless notable green shoots in the form of bilateral partnerships, for example between China and France, to fund a range of infrastructure projects, mainly in African countries, to the (modest) tune of EUR 1.5 billion.
A better relationship on trade and investment would, in a functioning international system, further entail a better EU-China dialogue on debt, and a functional multilateral response to debt in general. At any rate, a new and concerted approach to debt relief and restructuring is necessary, and creditors know it. China’s August 2022 announcement of debt relief to 17 countries may indicate a willingness to engage in greater debt diplomacy. The recent debt relief agreement reached between China and Zambia was also a positive sign. The negotiation, co-chaired by China and France under the aegis of the Club of Paris, is evidence that spaces for constructive discussion are possible. This is something European governments can encourage, as more countries face burning debt crises pushed by the high commodity prices aggravated by the Russian war, which climate shocks could aggravate further, as was the case with Pakistan’s floods: conservative estimates place at a cost of 2% of GDP. With an IMF deal reached in recent months in Sri Lanka, there is an obvious test for the international community to respond to the volatile situation in the country - whose government is also highly indebted to China - as it faces a widespread food security crisis triggered by its depleted finances. The terms of the IMF deal require further restructuring negotiation between Sri Lanka and its bilateral creditors, including China, Japan and India. As in the case of Zambia, European governments can take a key role to facilitate these discussions under the aegis of the Club of Paris of sovereign creditors.

The Brussels effect – and the line to Beijing

Ultimately, Europe’s greatest source of leverage with China and beyond is in the case of still possessing - for now - the largest single market area. The norm-setting power this confers is significant, and one Europe can do more to assert. The EU has exerted soft power for years in areas such as appliance efficiency, vehicle emissions and many other critical sectors. When it comes to the energy future, this soft power advantage may plausibly extend to other technical areas, including EV standards, and in accelerating the worldwide pace of exit for the internal combustion engine (ICE), on the impulse of Europe’s targeted 2035 phase-out. As German chancellor Olaf Scholz’s recent landmark speech highlighted, Europe also has an opportunity to lead in emerging areas including energy storage, hydropower, wind, solar and hydrogen.

Today Europe is also exploring the extent of its ‘harder’ commercial power and how it may wield it in the advancement of climate ambition. If the CBAM was borne out of domestic necessity and the prior design of the ETS, the development of deforestation-free value chain legislation is a significant and visionary development, which has created space for dialogue with China as it seeks to ensure the sustainability of its timber imports. The Commission’s proposed directive for corporate sustainability due diligence is likewise significant. By further raising the ambition of the trade and sustainable development (TSD) chapters in its trade agreements, Europe can encourage trade partners to adapt to the EU market’s increasing ambitions in creating environmental, social and climate constraints. Lula’s election in Brazil promises to inject a new dynamic into the Mercosur negotiations - keeping in mind that, as past Mercosur deliberations have shown, the European Parliament is not minded to compromise on the environmental integrity of trade deals proposed.

This brings us to the most obvious obstacle to deepening the EU-China climate track. Potential areas for multilateral collaboration notwithstanding - to which could be added positive new agreements with China’s support at WTO, including on plastic pollution as well as ending fishery subsidies - the suspended trade and investment talks between the EU and China show that the relationship is in a difficult place, having previously been driven by Angel Merkel in her final weeks as Chancellor, and then-holder of the EU Presidency. From the Commission to the Parliament, adversarial rhetoric is commonplace, and China’s tacit - though ambiguous - support to Russia has evidently damaged scope for dialogue even further. This has also fuelled dynamics of non-alignment vis-à-vis Europe and Ukraine. The barbs and finger-pointing swapped between EC Vice President Frans Timmermans and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs following the failed G20 climate talks in late August show how far we have come since the relationship on climate action which European and Chinese officials had developed during the Trump presidency. Olaf Scholz’s decision to visit China in the autumn - at odds with the prevailing views among European leaders, as well as within his own coalition - is difficult to parse along any trend other than the imperative to walk the world back from nuclear tensions. Suffice to say it exposes the persistent challenge of maintaining European unity in its “balancing” role.

Europe must also anticipate the likely fallout which come with heightened scrutiny: when Europe’s climate ambition falters - for example, by authorizing long-term fossil fuel investments within its emergency drive to diversify from Russian oil and gas - it can always expect such actions to be seized upon by opponents of climate action, including in China. The inclusion of gas in Europe’s sustainable finance taxonomy - despite conditions and constraints on its use - was also enough to send an unhelpful (and widely publicized) signal, particularly as China’s own taxonomy excludes gas and LNG.

10. Delegation of the European Union to the People’s Republic of China, EU-China Workshop on Deforestation and Sustainable Supply Chains held in Beijing, 11 April 2022.
Back in September 2020, when President Xi Jinping announced China’s aim to be carbon neutral by 2060 and an emissions peak before 2030, the EU was already showing its capacity to help lift large-emitters’ targets: while this announcement was first and foremost a reflection of China’s domestic commitment to climate action, the EU’s prior Green Deal unveiling gave China the opportunity to find a key partner - and EU leaders as interlocutors - with whom they could have a clear line of communication in the lead-up to this major breakthrough. It is also reasonable to infer that the timing of China’s announcement in the lead up to the 2020 US presidential elections was also a diplomatic hedge on its outcome: shoring up its climate leadership in tune with Europe’s own stated ambitions was valuable, in order either to outflank a second Trump term, or pre-empt a renewed climate impetus and rapprochement with Europe under a Biden presidency. Ultimately, the credibility of Europe’s climate action should incentivize climate action at large, regardless of whether that incentive is competition or cooperation.

Conclusion

For Europe, the challenge is to balance asserting its commercial power, projecting its climate ambition, and investing critical topics where dialogue can continue to be ‘compartmentalized’ - on issues such as climate, infrastructure, debt, and more. As daunting as this sounds, this highlights Europe’s inherent bridging power and potential to leverage the best out of both parties. Just as daunting: Europe’s missteps, particularly in relation to energy policy after Russia’s invasion, will be the strongest argument put forward by opponents of climate action at the pace compelled by science.

Failing this challenge, European climate diplomats, scientists and other experts will find themselves increasingly unable to shore up their allies and counterparts in China and the US, who remain even more exposed than Europe’s to opponents in their domestic political settings. This is not a far-fetched threat. It bears reminding that after House Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August, all bilateral climate cooperation between the two governments were frozen even down to the lowest working levels, until their re-establishment at COP27.

This type of diplomatic posture, combined with punitive sanctions in areas of trade and technology (from photovoltaic panels to semiconductors, as the US have demonstrated) presages the permanent threat of further breakdown in China-US relations, which could set the world on course for a protracted and painful fallout: normalizing non-cooperation in a fragmenting geo-economic order, all while climate impacts intensify. This may drive further fragmentation, absent a concerted effort to use collective action - or peer pressure - in order to deliver on the Paris Agreement’s intended momentum.

A final source of European bridging power lies in moral leadership. EU leaders including Frans Timmermans’ successful championing at COP27 of a “Loss and Damage Fund”, channelling years of political momentum from representatives of the most vulnerable countries, shows Europe playing a role that few in the advanced economies can. In providing the additional impetus to enshrine loss & damage within the multilateral process, Europe has enacted a tectonic political shift in favour of vulnerable countries, creating an emerging opportunity to build and reinforce climate justice across our institutions. Even in the final hours of COP27 negotiations, the Fund’s mandate - now a reality - was not a given. Europe can be a security anchor for the world in the new climate reality. Acts like these show why.
The position of many African, Asian, and Latin American countries concerning the war in Ukraine shows a desire not to align themselves with Europe or the United States, which seems to turn Russia, China, and Western countries against each other. But this new non-alignment cannot be explained in political terms alone: it was also very strongly expressed in Glasgow at the COP26 on climate change in December 2021, and was further strengthened at COP27 in Egypt, when a number of countries from the Global South, such as Senegal as well as India, not only demanded that the developed countries keep their promises of financial support from the North to the South, to help them cope with the catastrophic socioeconomic consequences of climate change and inequalities in accessing financial markets, but also, more broadly, that the zero-carbon economy that is being built does not again become a way of confining them to the role of extractive economies, and that, on the contrary, it is an opportunity to rebalance the structure of global value chains and the distribution of power in this new stage of globalization.

These demands for a rebalancing of the global economic system are not new; they were expressed by the Non-Aligned Movement 50 years ago,1 without any link to environmental issues being made at the time, despite the fact that they were being discussed at the Stockholm Conference at about the same time. Shortly afterwards, the effects of the 1973 energy crisis and the industrialized countries' economic response policies put these demands on the back burner, with international economic relations further reinforcing the centrality of fossil energy resources and the economic power of the countries producing these energies and not that of all the countries of the South.

Beyond the demands for financial support, is it credible to seek a new international economic order?

Why do these demands for a rebalancing have an entirely different impact today, especially in relation to Europe? The countries that are not aligned, but that are not yet an organized movement, have at least two major grounds on which to base their position in negotiations. First, several of them, especially in Africa, have resources that the European Union does not have, whether for the carbon-intensive economy that still prevails today (which has been made very visible by the gas diplomacy practiced by several European leaders) or for the low-carbon economy of tomorrow, where the crucial role of electrification of applications requires, for at least a decade alongside the rise of a circular economy for critical materials (rare metals for batteries, for example) – a rapid rise in imports of these materials to Europe.

Second, Western countries, and Europeans in particular, need to find allies in international negotiations, a role that the newly non-aligned countries are not ready to play as mere auxiliaries: without promising any strategic exclusivity, African countries are asking, for example, for proof of a rebalancing in the consideration of Southern countries’ needs, in order to believe in the “partnership between equals” that was sought at the summits between the African and European Unions. This rebalancing should concern the method of dialogue as much as the concrete effects of the implementation of new investments in the service of a trajectory of industrialization: they should therefore allow Southern countries to retain more value, innovation capacity, and jobs for their rapidly growing workforces, at a time when the largest economies are talking about relocating these same jobs back to their own regions.

International environmental negotiations therefore provide a key vantage point for better understanding what the non-aligned countries of the South are expressing and demanding beyond the unfulfilled promises of climate financing that were very loud at COP27 – which is why they are doing it with such force today – and to what extent this can open up an opportunity for the European Union, in order to avoid being crushed between rival superpowers, to profoundly overhaul its relations with these non-aligned countries.

To shed light on this subject, we will examine four interrelated trends that are shaping the field of international cooperation on sustainable development, and for which the war waged by Russia in Ukraine has sharpened the contrasts: the essential yet insufficient role of the G20,
the inevitable implementation of a zero-carbon economy, the continuation of international environmental negotiations, and the breach of trust between Southern and Western countries concerning the resources available to achieve possible economic convergence. Where these trends intersect, multilateral institutions continue to play a decisive role, particularly in the area of sustainable development. This is particularly strategic for the European Union.

**The G20 at a time of conflict between great powers**

While the economic and geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States had been seen as structuring tensions, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has placed the focus on brute force and the undermining of borders and international rules, with Europe seemingly crushed in this game between great powers. At a time when cooperation seems more necessary than ever for a sustainable recovery from the Covid-19 crisis, this war is significantly hindering one of the absolutely central forums for global economic cooperation, the G20. Following the Italian G20, the Indonesian presidency of the G20 was expected to be crucial to the success of negotiations on the use of the IMF’s special drawing rights for sustainable recovery in developing countries, especially as the fallout from Russia’s war in Ukraine further adds to their economic fragility by driving up food and energy prices on international markets. Western countries ran the risk of being perceived as blocking key discussions on IMF and World Bank intervention reform by demanding the condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a precondition for any technical or political document. Fortunately for them, the G20 summit in Bali, in the absence of Vladimir Putin, made it possible to take a big step forward in these essential discussions for the countries of the Global South. But, as we will see later in this text, the discussions held at the same time within the multilateral framework of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change at COP27 also required European and Western countries in general to position their support for this initiative in a different context that is more visible to all of the poorest and most vulnerable countries not represented in the G20.

Additionally, the Indonesian presidency of the G20 was also expected to make progress on the mutual understanding between developed and developing countries on the forms of global trade regulations that are compatible with reducing inequalities and achieving ecological transformation. But today, the strategic economic thinking of the major G20 powers seems to be focused as much on the return to domestic markets, the relocation of supply chains within countries (re-shoring) or in friendly countries (friend-shoring), and the relocation of industrial jobs as it is on a more regulated and fairer globalization. This reflects the fact that security of supply is becoming a central issue in these strategic discussions: the transformation of globalized value chains is therefore being increasingly discussed from the perspective of security, and not just economic competition, even though they are also being transformed not only by official and relatively realistic relocation strategies, but also by technological developments that are increasingly substituting technical capital for manpower, as well as by the underlying trends towards decarbonization of the economy.

Here again, comparatively speaking, concrete negotiations on climate change, which deal with the energy transition and international investments in the countries of the Global South to this end, are putting new forms of partnership and value chains to the test, which anticipate the economic relations of tomorrow. They therefore impose on European actors as much as they allow them to demonstrate both symbolically and concretely how they intend to deal with their partners in the Global South in this matter that is so central to Europe, which is the reconfiguration of the energy system and its access to resources, which is as much at the heart of its economic project as its sovereignty and security.

**The momentum towards a zero-carbon economy challenged but also strengthened by the priority given to energy security**

The COP26 in Glasgow confirmed the global momentum towards a zero-carbon economy as the goal of modernization, of which the European Green Deal is one of the most emblematic, concrete achievements, closely followed by the carbon neutrality commitments of the world’s major innovative economies: China, South Korea, Japan, as well as Joe Biden’s United States, and especially key states such as California within that country. What has the impact of the war in Ukraine been on this ambitious drive, which is based above all on the convergence of expectations? One of the key dimensions is European dependence on Russian gas. The recognition of the risks linked to this dependence reinforces the European Union’s long-term vision that the Green Deal’s decarbonization targets are also about the security and autonomy of a continent that is particularly poor in fossil resources. It is important to note that this war is placing European ecological transition policy – and therefore the Green Deal itself – at the heart of national political debates, whereas European action in this area had been confined to debate among experts.

However, five points of vulnerability must be noted, as the urgent political decisions required in a war economy must absolutely avoid setting up irreversible measures that are incompatible with transition and sovereignty objectives in the medium and long term. The first point to consider is that the political debate on food security and the transformation of the European food system has led
to a collision between short-term responses and long-term issues: on the one hand, there are the short-term needs of countries in the Global South which are structurally importers to access food markets, to which the responses in terms of aid must be urgent and financial, and those of the European livestock sector, which will be the hardest hit by price increases on raw materials, and on the other hand, the need to stick to the 2030 targets of the "Farm to fork" strategy, which are key drivers for structural changes that will reduce Europe's dependence on imported animal feed and nitrogen fertilizers produced from fossil fuels. The decisions of the G7 and the European Council, driven by France, highlight the need for short-term intervention, but should not undermine the European food system's structural transformation.

The second point of concern is that rising energy and food prices in Europe will require the implementation of emergency solutions to support the poorest households. Again, these measures should help, where possible, to reduce household dependence on fossil fuels (e.g. by supporting access to energy efficiency or heat pumps) rather than weakening the economic signals favoring fossil fuels over non-carbon fuels. The forms of social assistance and compensation implemented throughout the Union will obviously be at the heart of national political debates on purchasing power: if properly framed, they should be able to contribute to political mobilization in favor of the Fit For 55 package's core measures (particularly in terms of energy taxation or social funds for the climate); however, translating them into policy remains extremely difficult, and risks undermining European decisions rather than demonstrating their consistency.

The third point of concern is that the energy security angle often skips over the issues of energy efficiency and reducing demand and focuses solely on energy source substitution. For the time being, it seems that issues of sobriety are nonetheless managing to enter discussions across the political spectrum, preparing public opinion for possible rationing measures for energy in particular. While a clear distinction will have to be made between emergency rationing measures and medium-term demand management, citizens, civil society, businesses, and public authorities will be responsible for drawing lessons from this experience for more sustainable and preferred changes in our lifestyles.

Furthermore, the fourth point of concern is a more uncertain international dynamic. The American fossil fuel sector is looking at the European need for alternative energy sources to Russian gas as an opportunity to massively boost its production, despite the rather poor carbon footprint of liquefied natural gas exports. The war' consequences for Chinese energy policy are not very visible from the outside, even though support for low-carbon energy seems to be an inevitable feature of the modernization of this huge economy.

Finally, a crucial last point is that while large European and international companies remain committed to contributing to carbon neutrality in the long term, strategies for concretely implementing this ambition may still be overly reliant on large volumes of negative emissions or offsets through voluntary carbon credits, which are supposed to compensate for excessive residual greenhouse gas emissions. This creates a new impetus for carbon finance projects, in particular those based on changes in land use: these could be seen as a potential opportunity to trigger the structural transformations necessary for the agricultural and economic development of Southern countries, but their proliferation also poses a very high potential risk for the food security of local populations concerned and for biodiversity. The report entrusted by the UN Secretary General to a group of high-level experts chaired by former Canadian Environment Minister Catherine McKenna specifies that voluntary carbon credits, which must have high environmental integrity and include benefits for both biodiversity and the development of local communities, will not compensate for unfulfilled decarbonization efforts and must be accounted for through separate accounting.

European and Western economic circles seem to be beginning to doubt the feasibility of keeping the average global temperature below a 1.5°C increase over pre-industrial levels. The difficulties of achieving carbon neutrality, which are necessarily challenging by the standards described in McKenna's report, could also sway the scale or speed of change in these companies. But many of them, particularly in Europe, have also already invested in the decarbonized economy as a necessary driver of growth (such as the transition to electric vehicles in the automotive sector), thereby cementing the zero-carbon economy as at least one of the key trends in economic relations in the world of tomorrow.

What are the concrete consequences of continuing and expanding multilateral environmental negotiations?

Despite a much lower level of media attention than the war in Ukraine, the whole of 2022 was also marked by very intense activity in multilateral environmental negotiations, particularly on the ground. These negotiations lead both to the launch of new negotiations and to the identification of critical blockages.

The United Nations Environment Assembly, in its 5th session, agreed to launch two new negotiations that should be concluded by 2024: a new treaty on plastics, and a science-policy platform for addressing chemicals, waste, and pollution. While these new negotiations re-
The race to be carbon neutrality

The operational translation of the declared political will of the main contributors to global greenhouse gas emissions to reduce their carbon footprint is uneven. While the three main polluters (China, the United States and the European Union, Graph g) have already adopted targets for achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 or 2060, with intermediate targets for 2030, the strategy of other major polluters remains much more uncertain. In total, according to the United Nations, more than 70 countries representing 76% of total global emissions have set targets to achieve carbon neutrality.

International cooperation is key to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement. In a changing geopolitical context, the climate emergency requires coordinated action to facilitate the development of standards, the deployment of technologies and the financing of adaptation and mitigation in the most vulnerable countries.
In 2022, the acceleration of the fight against climate change appears assured. In Europe, the energy crisis caused by Putin’s war creates opportunities for a rapid deployment of renewables. Sobriety becomes an act of resistance. In the United States, the adoption of the Inflation Reduction Act (graph i) gives concrete expression to the Biden administration’s climate ambitions, at the risk of a trade conflict with the EU. International cooperation is vital, but the method used has an impact on domestic job creation, business competitiveness and international trade.

**Fridays For Future around the world**
fect a very accurate analysis of the importance of these issues for the preservation of global ecosystems, they also appear to be overly optimistic about the time needed to create new multilateral institutions, especially given the slow pace of the negotiations on biodiversity in the high seas (BBNJ). The risk is therefore great that these multilateral negotiations will not only signal agreement by the entire international community, including Russia, on the importance of preserving the environmental commons, but that they will become bogged down without having a significant impact on the sectors and public policies concerned.

There is therefore a risk of a major disconnect between the will to continue negotiations and the ability to reach concrete agreements. This risk also reveals two major structural tensions between the world’s major regions. The first structuring tension is that for several major powers, such as Russia and China, the pursuit of environmental negotiations is acceptable so long as they are limited to the purely technical and excluding any political dimension, particularly in terms of human rights and the place of civil society. In contrast, negotiations on biodiversity are experiencing the rise of a growing front of actors and countries who support the importance of the political and technical role that indigenous peoples and local communities must play in order to truly protect biodiversity. And we are seeing more and more concrete examples of how the rights granted to citizen movements, civil society and indigenous peoples are no longer incantations but real levers for transformation. In Latin America, for example, the Escazu Agreement on participation, information, access to justice and the rights of indigenous communities in environmental matters has come into effect. In Europe and other regions, legal action by civil society is one of the levers that can be used to make the international commitments of States a reality. European actors strongly support the inseparable nature of action for ecological transformation and the functioning of democratic institutions. A likely stumbling block in some of these future negotiations, it is also a rallying point that Europe can offer to other regions of the world.

The potential for alliances and rallying is exactly what is at stake, given that the most striking incident in the recent environmental negotiations was the insistence with which Southern countries, and in particular the African group, chose to mark the end of the biodiversity negotiations in the spring with by emphasizing the discrepancy between their financing needs and the promises made by developed countries in this matter, just as they did with regard to climate financing. This is the second structuring tension, which is expressed in relation to the environment and reveals a deeper breach of trust, as we have seen above, and which will be discussed in the last section of this article.

Why, then, are multilateral environmental negotiations the focus of so much investment by European countries; why must they receive the full attention of geopolitical analysts? Quite simply because what is at stake is the setting of key standards that could define tomorrow’s economic champions and economic relationships within value chains, well beyond critical materials and energy resources. This is illustrated by the battle over defining sustainable agriculture and food, highly visible at COP27, yet already in 2021 in the form of a report by the USDA criticizing the European Farm to Fork strategy for its economic effects in Europe and around the world: through sometimes barbed exchanges, European and American experts are competing, before the rest of the world at United Nations conventions on climate or biodiversity, to ensure that the prevailing model of agriculture is either carbon-optimized and compatible with vast, specialized spaces and the forms of value extraction through economies of scale and massification used by the United States agri-food industry or, on the other hand, a model that aims to protect biodiversity and the quality of water and soils as much as the climate, and that presupposes profound transformations of business models and large production zones by focusing on re-diversification, which is not only a source of quality improvement but also of resilience. Besides this “food diplomacy”, we could also mention the efforts to define green hydrogen or green steel, which are radically decarbonized. All these definitions and concepts debated among experts, which are ready to move towards forms of standardization or regulation, cannot be reduced to specifications of production or processing techniques: they also bring into play, in a much more profound way, the division of power to prescribe, create value, and innovate and thus, ultimately, the division of jobs and income among the various actors within sectors and among the major regions that are interconnected in the global economic system. This is especially the case with regard to forms of investment and the institutional and contractual arrangements that underpin them.

**Repairing trust between North and South through climate negotiations?**

Although COP26 in Glasgow was a success in terms of the commitment to carbon neutrality, it was also a resounding failure in terms of reaching the target of $100 billion per year in financial support from the North to the South, which was supposed to begin in 2020. Added to this was the warning of the most vulnerable countries about their inability to cope on their own with the damages linked to the effects they are already experiencing as a result of climate change: in making claims for reparation of ecological debt, these Southern countries are also pointing out, more broadly, the shadow that the colonial era casts over the global economic system’s current structure, whose value chains are controlled by the richest countries.
When India indicated in Glasgow that beyond the promise of 100 billion per year, it is 1,000 billion per year that this country spends on climate matters, or when Gabon indicated in Geneva during the preparatory negotiations for COP15 that rather than the 10 billion currently under discussion, it is 100 billion per year that Southern countries need, two things must be understood. Firstly, the countries mentioned above are increasingly distrustful of the financial promises made by OECD countries, and Europe in particular, whereas it is clear that the United States is the furthest away from fulfilling its part of these climate funding promises. Second, and more importantly, the countries of the South have highlighted a striking gap between their investment needs and their own financing capacities: they are subject to the pressure of a rapidly growing workforce in the coming decades, which will require an investment trajectory for an unprecedented form of rapid industrialization that will provide jobs and income at a time when industrial jobs are being whittled away by technological progress, successive and prolonged crises are bringing these countries to their knees, and climate change is causing them to be hit by more serious and more frequent disasters. These countries also point to the huge gap between the funds mobilized by Northern countries for their own recovery and those they mobilize to support recovery in the South.

One of the key reports discussed at COP27 was the one produced by British economist Nicholas Stern, African economist Vera Songwe, and Indian economist Amar Bhattacharya, on the massive need for scaling up development and climate finance. This report underlines the difference in magnitude between the promise of 100 billion dollars per year and the immense needs of Southern countries for climate action, both in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation, as well as in terms of dealing with the catastrophic impacts that have already occurred: the need for financing is estimated at 2,000 billion dollars per year, of which at least 1,000 billion dollars should come from public or private financing from Northern countries.

Faced with these amounts, which may seem excessive, the same report indicates the need for a profound reform of not only the use of the IMF's special drawing rights, as already put on the G20 agenda, but also, more broadly, of the treatment of debt and of the mandate and forms of intervention of the World Bank, the multilateral banks linked to it, and the IMF itself. Who other than these institutions created at the end of the Second World War would be able to allocate such sums to the countries concerned? Wouldn't the deep and prolonged crisis affecting countries that were previously emerging economically also be the last chance for these institutions – whose governance is still dominated by Western countries – to prove their relevance and effectiveness?

The Prime Minister of Barbados, Mia Mottley, has reached out to these institutions and to the G7 countries with the creation of her Bridgetown Agenda which aims specifically at this reform of Bretton Woods, guided less by the issue of justice in governance (which could be dealt with later) than by the justice in the effects it could have to avoid a major economic decline of vulnerable countries, including the least developed countries, but also the lower-middle-income countries.

If this reform was discussed and moved forward at the G20 in Bali, it was also at COP27 that the French President was able to officially commit, before all the countries gathered by this multilateral body, to support the Prime Minister of Barbados to achieve this reform as soon as possible, in other words, for the spring meetings of these international financial institutions based in Washington.

But more broadly, as we have seen, the countries that have not aligned themselves are also calling for a different governance of economic relations that are rapidly changing, of power relationships, and the distribution of value and jobs in value chains that are actively undergoing reconfiguration. Where is this governed? It is probably not a matter of trade policy or tariff regulation, discussed at the WTO. Perhaps it is more a matter of the rules governing international investment, framed by international agreements linked to the WTO or dispute settlement mechanisms, such as those China has just set up in the framework of the New Silk Road to challenge the dominance of the mechanisms established by Western countries. However, these generic investment rules do not define to what extent the various operators can be considered innovators and creators of value, or merely suppliers of raw material. China made no mistake by focusing the China-Africa cooperation forum not on the issue of infrastructure financing, but on that of productive investment in Africa.

This is indeed the key issue at stake in many of the specific institutional arrangements discussed during climate negotiations, and in particular in the transformation of energy systems, in both the North and the South. For example, the German strategy of importing green hydrogen on a large scale was widely criticized and discussed during a workshop organized by the Ukama dialogue platform between European and African think tanks, which aims to bridge the gap between the needs of ecological transformation and those of structural economic transformation on both continents. In Europe's vision, how can the zero-carbon economy of tomorrow make room not only for the economic sovereignty of the European continent but also for African economic actors as drivers of innovation, industrialization, and therefore, massive providers

4. See the text by Avinash Persaud in this issue, p. 99.
of employment for the African continent’s young people? How can Europe guarantee that, in the current geostrategic turbulence, it will not try to confine Africa to a purely extractive model of raw material producers? What these debates between experts5 reveal is that conditions for rebuilding trust in this regard are clearly being discussed around European development policy — renamed “international partnerships” in its trade policy — but also much more concretely in investment decisions and contractual arrangements between public and private operators on the two continents. One example is by choosing to support not only the export of hydrogen from renewable energy sources produced on the African continent, but also by ensuring that the hydrogen is used primarily to develop the industrial sector locally.

European actors are rightly focused on setting up concrete and effective mechanisms with dual benefits for socio-economic development and the climate, such as the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) signed with South Africa in Glasgow, and are seeking to set up new ones with a few key countries, such as the one announced at COP27 with Indonesia. In this context, it is essential that the notion of justice reflects not only the priority attention given to employment issues in the planned transformations of energy systems and economies of countries as a whole, but also the conditions for negotiating these partnerships, which must be rooted in Southern countries’ needs and, above all, the concrete forms of investment that the involvement of a public donor from the North makes it possible to guarantee, thereby ensuring that economic operators in the South and their trajectory of industrialization have their rightful place.6 This year Europeans are sending conflicting messages regarding the development of gas infrastructure, something that has been widely noticed and commented on by African heads of state, such as the Nigerian president:7 while European public financial actors such as the EIB or the AFD have announced that they will no longer finance infrastructures linked to fossil fuels, gas terminals are nevertheless being developed in Europe and subsidies for the use of gas are being put in place to help European consumers cope with soaring prices, sometimes with no extra care to discourage a shift away from fossil fuels. It is therefore a high-risk discussion that has begun and that COP27 will have allowed to advance without finalizing it. Either the JETPs are an opportunity to demonstrate a new, more just way of building investments and value chains between the two continents, or they confirm the radical criticism of Southern countries of what they call the hypocrisy of the Europeans.

Despite the current focus on the war that is happening on European soil, Europe must continue an extremely active dialogue with the least developed and most vulnerable countries of the South, and not only for the purpose of countering China, as in the Indo-Pacific dialogue, but in the service of rebuilding concrete strategic partnerships, allowing Europe and its partners to avoid being crushed between the rivalries of Chinese, Russian, and American powers. In this respect, environmental multilateralism is an inevitable step, but also an opportunity to demonstrate new ways of negotiating and new ways of building economic partnerships.

In order for this partnership to be viewed as sincere and based on trust, Europe must continue to show that it is truly listening to the demands, views, and needs of its partners, even when taking them into account seems difficult: calls for reparations, calls for taking into consideration the post-colonial legacy, highlighting European contradictions in the treatment of recent wars in Iraq, Libya, Yemen, or Ukraine, these must be heard... because what these countries are also expressing is the need to concretely test the sincerity of European commitments in implementing concrete partnerships for Southern countries to meet the targets of the 2030 Agenda, as much in terms of climate as in prosperity.

This does not mean, on the contrary, that Europe should not clearly assert its position and its values, particularly in terms of democracy and human rights, both for their intrinsic value and as an instrument to support the necessary transformations: without the possibility of a political dialogue open to civil society and counter-expertise, there can be no credible path of investment to achieve economic prosperity while respecting the planet’s limits. We therefore need to show that Europe’s offer in this area is not a conditionality or a brake on the mobilization of investments, but rather a pledge of long-term viability and sustainability of investments, and therefore a pledge of stability, predictability and attractiveness for investors.

Is the massive access of Southern countries to global financial flows facilitated rather than hindered by the demands of governance and democracy, as well as environmental and social impact? Is the reconfiguration of global economic relations made even more unjust by the transition to a low-carbon economy, or is it instead an opportunity to concretely demonstrate new power relations in value chains? It is absolutely essential, and quite strategic in the current geopolitical context, that European actors and their many allies in other regions continue to use multilateral environmental negotiations to tip the balance in the right direction for the prosperity of non-aligned countries as much as for that of Europe and for the protection of global environmental public goods.

7. Chiamaka Okafor, Climate Change: Western countries are hypocrites, can’t dictate to Africa – Buhari, Novembre 2022.
Opening the breach: Politics of The Post-Carbon World

During the climate summit which took place this past 22nd and 23rd of April, and which was meant to signal the United States’ return to post-carbon diplomacy, the various leaders who took the podium were able to put their best talking points to the test.¹

Joe Biden described the climate challenge as the opportunity for the United States to once again become competitive in a “clean energy” future (by which he meant low carbon), and his envoy, John Kerry, added, “No one is being asked for a sacrifice, this is an opportunity”. Decades of disqualifying environmentalism as a burden on both workers and business owners have paid off: in order to pave the way for a future below 2°C of global warming, a rhetoric of technological possibility and economic opportunism is sweeping everything up in its path. For her part, Jennifer Granholm, the Democratic government’s Secretary of Energy, recycled one of the most well-known metaphors of the Cold War by announcing that open markets and green tech innovations were this generation’s “moon shot”.² The historical echo is obvious. As early as the 1940s, American economic diplomacy was making grandiose claims that technological and scientific cooperation would be able to save the world from hunger and war, and that the Manhattan Project’s “Endless Frontier” and the space program² theorized by engineers like Vannevar Bush would open technological possibilities to the point that poverty and fear would soon be distant memories. The Biden administration explicitly acknowledges these historical references by calling its research funding bill the “Endless Frontier Act”.

During the same summit, the Director of the International Energy Agency, Fatih Birol, somewhat dampened the mood: “I will be blunt. Commitments alone are not enough. We need real change in the real world. Right now, the data does not match the rhetoric, and the gap is getting wider and wider.”³ But this does nothing to change the political paradigm that has been in place for several months now. The recovery required by the Covid-19 crisis (or at least after the Covid-19 crisis in the North) is accelerating the integration of climate imperatives into the regulation of the world economy. It is now clear that entry into politics of the Anthropocene is not at all based on reconciliation with nature and living beings or on promoting post-materialist values. Instead, it is taking the form of a reinvention of productivity, a new pact between labor and markets, and technological cooperation that is supposed to guarantee global security.

The significance of this reformulation of the ecological and climatic imperative must be appreciated. The political culture born of the environmentalist movements of the 1960s and 1970s, which adopted certain themes that were critical of industry already used in the 19th century, highlighted the pathologies of overexploitation and overconsumption, of the alienation of humans from their environment, and of the race for power in the quest for growth. Half a century later, the outcome of this environmentalism is ambiguous. In one way, it produced the key players in the fight to impose the issue of the ecological risks and limits of modern development. Rachel Carson, Vandana Shiva, Chico Mendes, and many others have collected data on environmental threats all while forging the central political concerns of the green movement. But in another sense, environmentalism failed to address the fundamental problem it posed, which is the tension between the aspiration for emancipation and how it fits within ecological limits; or to put it another way, between social security and environmental security. A social coalition based on the answer to this dilemma has never been in a position of strength in the game of parliamentary or revolutionary politics.

This is certainly the reason that this political culture is currently in the process of being eliminated, or at least relegated to the edges of the political debate. Ecologists on the ground are obviously doing essential work at the local and regional level on targeted issues such as forest use, biodiversity and wildlife conservation, and agroecology. But it is absolutely astonishing to note that the central theme of both Northern and Southern green movements – in other words, the critique of productivism and its abuses – is being completely reversed by current climate policies. Because the critique of productivism seemed to be an obstacle to the realization of their aspirations for the vast majority (an in particular the working classes trapped

1. This text was first published by le Grand Continent on 14 June 2021.
in the industrial paradigm), this critique has been deactivated, so to speak, to make way for an opportunistic, and, in fine, productivist environmentalism. The preservation of a habitable oikos and the internalization of planetary limits by the most powerful actors in the international community is taking the form of a reinvention of productivity. Fossil fuels are singled out as the enemy to vanquish, and emissions reduction objectives are formulated in a cautious manner thanks to the “net zero” accounting artifice which leaves the possibility open for compensating for excessive emissions. The stage is then set for what Biden, Kerry, Granholm, as well as Chinese climate negotiation leaders describe: the creation of enormous transition markets, and the implementation of political support mechanisms designed to ensure that the social acceptability of this industrial redirection is not compromised. The French Gilets Jaunes are on the minds of all governments, anxious to achieve the transition without losing their legitimacy, if not by consolidating it.

**No more talk: the environment as a geopolitical battleground**

The social sciences have often described the way in which the most powerful actors manage to appropriate the criticisms made of them by redefining the terms and implications of this criticism. Here, such a movement is clear: while the questioning of the productivist model made the creation of a green future conditional on the construction of human interdependence ties freed from the capitalist imperative of profit and accumulation, 21st century climate policies use the quest for profit as a lever for reorientation. And behind profit, of course, hides the preservation of power structures linked to the superiority of what Aykut and Dahan have called incantatory politics: a technological and political gamble whose outcome is to be determined without access to fossil resources found beneath the earth's surface, to the extent that the relaunching of a technological international cooperation typical of the post-war era, is an ambiguous step in the modernization process. The common objective of the large powers consists of maintaining the energetic intensity of industrial societies all while doing away with what had been the basis of this since the 19th century. George Bush's statement at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, “The American way of life is not negotiable”, seems to have triumphed: it is only once the technological conditions of a decarbonization without loss of growth, without fundamental changes to lifestyle and social relations are met that the response to the climate challenge began – at the price of passing from 350 to 415 ppm of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere. In truth, energy intensification could never before be considered without access to fossil resources found beneath the earth's surface, to the extent that the relaunching of a post-carbon modernization looks like a sleight of hand, a technological and political gamble whose outcome is totally uncertain. The idea long defended in the rather small circles of ecomodernism, is now implicit in the currently forming development mode.

8. https://thebreakthrough.org
The uncertain gamble of green modernity

After more than half a century of questioning the modernization process, after the existential crises of the Second World War, after the epistemological and moral jolts caused by the realization of the extent of ecological damage, modernity is still not dead. We could even say that it is being reborn exactly where it should be dead and buried: in the creation of a response to the climate challenge. At a moment when it seemed impossible to move forward, and the future looked like it would be a rather tragic negotiation with the collapse of an intellectual and economic paradigm, the dream of modernization is regaining strength. It is no longer even a matter – as Ulrich Beck said in the 1980s – of creating a careful, reflective modernity⁹, but of triumphantly transforming failures into opportunities. It is a matter of transforming the prospect of a planetary crisis into a source of creativity, in order to once again surmount the obstacles that nature loves to place in the path of homo sapiens.

The clearest impasse that this paradigm risks running up against is, of course, the still excessive environmental cost it will present to the Earth-system. Even assuming that CO2 emissions stabilize at levels compatible with minimal damage, the productive effort required to create the new infrastructure required will not be pulled out of thin air. Global electrification, which involves the rolling out of new smart grids and the generalization of batteries in vehicles and transport systems, entails transferring the extractive load of fossil resources to other minerals such as lithium, graphite, and cobalt.¹⁰ The petrostates that developed in the Middle East and Latin America during the period of decolonization and The Great Acceleration are being profoundly destabilized⁰ while new mineral booms are reshaping the fate of Ecuador and Bolivia.¹¹ Here again, the continuity with the old world is clear: there is a clear ecological and political halo around these new supply chains and new methods of production, and this provides arguments for those who want to add to the problem of the carbon budget the problem of a more general resource budget.¹² Greenhouse gas offset systems also raise technological and geopolitical questions: Can we count on geoengineering and, if so, through what model of governance? How much agricultural land will be swallowed up to ensure the biological storage of industrial emissions? The method of food security has been added to the climate dilemma, adding yet another dimension to these already complex issues.

Despite these constraints and uncertainties, the principal geopolitical actors have already prepared the ideological basis of their future reorganization.

Following a phase of “dirty” development that was necessary to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, China is envisioning the coming decades as a reconciliation with the biosphere in the form of symbiotic sovereignty that has its roots in ancient philosophy. Biodiversity and land protection measures are a part of the creation of a national narrative in which the quest for prosperity will reconcile both social and ecological relations. The developmentalist state is calling itself into question in order to give the appearance of a responsible leader on the international stage at the same time it is laying the groundwork for high-quality production methods that respect the unity and harmony of nature. Xi Jinping’s declaration at the April 22nd summit is a striking example of eco-soveriegntism⁴. We can see elements of deep ecology, which glorifies the sublime natural and the respect it commands, as well as clear ecomodernist elements which present the future of development as integrating ecological norms into the productive regime through technological innovation, and, of course, strategic elements which present China as a guarantor of climate justice, meaning the right for less advanced nations to develop. All these elements connected together show a concern of embodying an anti-imperialist universalism, a universalism that is not expressed in the so-called “Western” terms of human rights.

For its part, the United States is also in the process of giving shape to their historical philosophy. This is much
easier for us to comprehend, since it is largely rooted in the history of the 20th century, the New Deal, Roosevelt, and the war effort. The bet made by Biden and his team of a transition that protects both investors and workers (“win-win”), that aims to break up the “fossil coalition”\textsuperscript{15} that carried Trump to power by bringing large segments of capital and labor to the side of the climate fight, evokes the discourse of national unity in the face of the crisis, of the mobilization of means and intelligence, and of the honest worker in the face of an absolute enemy. The success of this bet is still very uncertain because it depends on the capacity of Republican opponents to react in the internal political game, and, of course, on the immediate effectiveness of these proposals on the scale of a four-year term.

The strategic rivalry between the United States and China therefore stems from the fact that their plans have many points in common. They are entering into competition for the same economic and political benefits, which come from the great climate transition. But they don’t just share an industrial reorientation plan: they also necessarily share the uncertainties of this bet, meaning the risks that its failure would entail. This could be because the decarbonization process is too slow, because it runs up against unsurmountable ecological barriers, because it does not generate enough social hope, and therefore is not very motivating, or because it is immediately buried by the fossil coalition’s renaissance. In a scenario where political decisions are both overtaken by the Anthropocene and hijacked by opposing social forces, the entire ideological and regulatory edifice of the capitalist transition collapses, and with it all hope for the future. For in this case, there would be no Plan B.

This is why two questions must keep us awake at night. First, are we really trapped by this historical outlook? Does the reinvention of a post-carbon productivity and modernist thrust necessarily confirm the perspective of a lesser ecological evil? Secondly, does the European Union have the means to build itself around a narrative similar to that proposed by the US and China?

**The political breach: working with and against green capitalism**

Let us start with the former. The geopolitical and social chain of events of post-carbon arrangements is presented to us as a necessity because it is deeply connected to certain ideological beliefs and inertia inherited from the past. I attempted to highlight them in *Affluence and Freedom*\textsuperscript{16} by describing how nature and territory had been viewed as limitations to be overcome within the framework of a political rationality designed to stimulate the conquest of productivity. Paradoxically, it is this pact that is still at work in the development of current climate policies, perhaps at its most effective, since it could allow millions of workers to be reintegrated into an economy that is up to the challenges of the anthropocene. However, everything seems to be done so that collective emancipation cannot claim self-limitation as a condition. Everything seems to be done so that we don’t have to ask ourselves the political question about the forms of freedom that are born from the increase of productive forces. But how many more boundaries can we push back on before the modernist machine burns itself out for good?

Some certainties have nevertheless been put to the test these past few months in ways rarely seen in the recent past. The anxiety caused by the Covid-19 crisis has allowed certain taboos related to debt, state intervention, and apparently intellectual property rights to be lifted. The fear motive has helped to unlock protective mechanisms that had been considered counterproductive for some 40 years. And the convergence of this health crisis with the climate crisis, of which it is in some respects only a small-scale rehearsal, reinforces these mechanisms for containing the crisis: if it is a matter of rebuilding an economy capable of absorbing shocks and once again offering a historical perspective of progress, then we might as well kill two birds with one stone and develop a post-Covid economy that is also climate-friendly.

We are therefore justified in wondering if, among the protective mechanisms put in place in the wake of the Covid-19 crisis, liberation from an energy intensive economy could find a place. If we must retain the theoretical and political possibility of another restructuring of the social pact, different from the American and Chinese variations of ecomodernism, it is not only because the prospect of a green capitalism is insufficiently radical at the level of ideas, and because it safeguards most power relations as they currently exist. This is undoubtedly the case, and it was already the case with social democracy, the post-colonial developmentalist state, or any political arrangement established after a major crisis. The specific problem posed by perpetuating the growth-based development mode into the 21st century is the disconnect between the forms of life, desire, and justice that it has produced, and the material constraints it runs into. This is where degrowth thinking will always be absolutely right, whatever one thinks of their strategic approach, their anti-modernism, or even the choice of the term “degrowth”: the material flows that underpin the world-economy are disproportionate, they are not sustainable. From this perspective, the creation of a green capitalism seems like a process of psychological denial. We are all saying to our collective self, “I know, but still”. Given the choice between a reorganization of productivity promising that little or nothing will change about our lifestyles — and I
am referring here to lifestyles of the industrial North – all while saving the planet, and a questioning of the ideological and practical schema of productivity that demands we live differently in order to increase our chances of saving Earth and probably of increasing global justice, the most people will choose the first path rather than the alternative because they perceive the second as an uncertain undertaking. This stems not only from the inertia of decision-making and power infrastructures, which need continuity to make incremental changes, but also from the inertia of social structures and collective desire.

But we do not necessarily have to view the choice between green capitalism and voluntary self-limitation as an ideological divergence. Rather, we must see in these models two possible futures that have a dynamic relationship. What we must try to imagine is what is politically and socially possible with the current gamble on decarbonizing capitalism. We can approach this perspective in two ways.

1. First, this process has a dampening effect on social and political creativity. The acceleration of the energy transition occurs without major social and ecological damage, it creates greater support for the political elites deemed responsible for diverting the meteorite, and it preserves the possibility, at least for the wealthiest people on this planet, of living under the same material model as in past decades. The cult of freedom can be seen in the access to individual electric modes of transport that are still inexpensive, and the sphere of individual and domestic existence remains imperative to ecological and territorial constraints. The management of energy demand is done mainly through the development of more efficient machines, and subtle incentives limit the rebound effect. Elon Musk and the entrepreneurs of the electric revolution are glorified, and the prevailing value system of neoliberal regulation of capitalism is safeguarded. Metaphorically, the curve is taken without needing to brake, without the political elites fundamentally questioning themselves. Once we round the bend, the world wakes up from the climate nightmare saying, “Was that all it was?”

2. In a much more realistic scenario, the development of climate policies goes hand in hand, more or less voluntarily, with more profound social changes. The elimination of fossil fuel lobbies would change the landscape of power relations within the economy and would allow a more accurate understanding of the role of science in society to be restored; the industrial effort of the transition would alter the balance between labor and capital, tending to favor the former; urban design would change to integrate new forms of mobility and to make energy savings possible; supply chains, particularly in the agricultural sector, would become shorter, and the link between producers and consumers would become closer; the adoption of electric transport technologies will help society to integrate new time constraints and relationship to space into its behavior; legal responsibility towards future generations will help to limit the corruption of the public sphere by the market, while the countries exporting critical minerals organize their equivalent of OPEC and force us to a certain sobriety. Capitalism is not dead, but a series of lateral efforts – whether intended or unintended – are reshaping social relations and the anthropological profiles that populate Earth.

In this second scenario, the practical and institutional necessities of decarbonization are not closing the door of history by installing a hegemonic and all-purpose development mode, a final step in the stages of economic growth described by Rostow in the 1960s. On the contrary, they lead to a deepening of the collective reflection on the links between productivity and emancipation. There is no doubt that the great structures of modernity will be transformed, but it is not yet clear whether these changes will contribute to suppressing the desire for change (or, if we want to put it in a positive way, to securing a socio-economic formula that works well no matter what) or, on the contrary, to stimulating it. But in the second hypothesis, we must be ready to conceive of and articulate together the new aspirations that emerge when societies, lured by the first hint of the new freedoms that are offered to them, decide to not be satisfied and ask for more.

From this standpoint, the degrowth movement’s error was presenting the drastic limitation of consumption levels as an absolute precondition for any desirable future, as if the physical observation were enough to bring about a historical movement and a realignment of social interests, as if it were enough to see the problem to overcome it. Within this framework, the inevitable change in energy regime would be conditional upon an ideological revolution that for the moment is not only beyond the grasp of our social systems but is also counterproductive because it is far too uncompromising and therefore easily criticized for its impracticality. But it could, however, be that the required culture and institutions for this self-limitation are not so much the initial condition of this change as their progressive effect. The few examples given above allow us to imagine that certain social and cultural consequences of green capitalism will open the door to new material and social arrangements, which in turn will generate new ideas, new interests. The universe of total production, as Bruno Latour says, is not abandoned following the sudden and dogmatic realization of its evils, but in the course of a progressive integration process of norms of
existence brought about by a socio-historical beginning, which is green modernization.

This is not simply about new ways of living, of the superficial modification of urban landscapes and diet, but a series of transformations that affect all dimensions of coexistence, from law to the balance of power, from modes of production to employment dynamics, from representations of science to forms of legitimacy. However, once this new policy of productivity has been set in motion, with all the ensuing consequences, it is possible that people will start to ask for more. After having tasted the benefits of a socio-economic regime freed from its most destructive and alienating characteristics, perhaps a majority will want to continue down this path, even if this is not the scenario envisioned by the leaders of green capitalism. This is the fundamental ambiguity of the Green New Deal’s projects. They can be understood as instruments for maintaining the status quo, for re-legitimating a capitalism that has become responsible and sustainable, or as a deeper transformative impulse. This is both the weakness and the strength of this platform: its strength because in principle it is able to unite political actors driven by very different interests and ideals, from the most trivial profit to the most demanding social revolution; its weakness because this unifying policy is partly built on a misunderstanding. Between the Biden team’s use of certain elements of the Green New Deal to rebuild U.S. economic diplomacy and the progressive movements seeking to harness the transition’s potential for social and racial justice, there is a great divide. For in the second, more challenging option, a hypothesis of democratic and sustainable socialism emerges. This hypothesis can be expressed ex cathedra as the natural consequence of principles of justice, or as a philosophy of ecological history, but it is more likely to come about from a domino effect of changes that give rise to others, and which eventually work their way up to the national government.

Given the uncertainty about the historical development of climate policies, the possibility remains of new forms of politicization of society.

It could very well be that the means used to save capitalism from its own ruin, from its own contradictions, will lead to overcoming the apparent fatality of a now universal eco-modernism, based on the electrification of those same needs, and on the transfer of the extractive burden of fossil fuels to other minerals. In this hypothesis, the task of the environmental and social justice movement is not to oppose green capitalism and its lies head-on, as if it were a matter of life-and-death conflict and a matter of truth. Rather, it would consist of identifying, in the mechanisms of decarbonizing the economy, the levers that would allow us to re-politicize needs, to redefine the role of the State and its elites, and to make another mode of development, another mode of organization, desirable for the greatest number of people. The task would be to exploit the breach created by reinventing productivity (and in particular the power given back to workers and technicians in a more labor-intensive economy) to make them the basis of a more exacting socio-ecological demand. The principled opposition to green capitalism certainly satisfies theoretical aspirations, which are legitimate in and of themselves, but they only have a secondary strategic role. The real challenge lies in the ability to understand what erodes the desire for capitalism within society, which in turn weakens the mechanisms that fuel the legitimacy of the quest for growth. From this point of view, the political response to the material deadlock of modern economies no longer appears as utopian, or as the abstract construction of an ideal removed from collective experience (if only that of a cutting-edge minority), but as a social tendency concretely at work in practice.

The hypothesis of a European transformation

To conclude, we can consider the second question, concerning Europe. The uncertainty between the soporific or, conversely, the unintentionally regenerative potential of green capitalism varies greatly from one region of the world to another17. The United States and China have real capacity to mobilize vast resources and territory to create a decarbonized growth economy. This is primarily due to the geo-ecological characteristics of these two political formations, both of which benefit from vast, extractive heartlands that are either under their own jurisdiction or through various neo-imperialist processes. Between the Appalachians and Alaska on the one side and the pioneer frontier of Central Asia on the other, are the necessary resources for a politically conservative decarbonization. In fact, it is not unreasonable to wonder whether the very definition of the “net zero” objective is not an echo of the geo-ecological opportunities shared by the world’s two major powers, both of which are continental empires with sparsely populated and geologically rich spaces at their disposal that enable strategic resources to be extracted and vast territories to be reforested in order to recreate carbon sinks.

When it comes to Europe, things look very different. From a geographic and physical standpoint, Europe is the only economic power in the world (perhaps with Japan as well) that has arrived at a state of demographic near-saturation or, in any case, one that has very few empty spaces. The fact that Norway – one of the continent’s rare countries that has within its borders such a large ecological margin – is not in the European Union is certainly not an accident: it would not be reasonable to put such an asset into the communal pot. Bereft of the colonial territories that made up a good portion of Europe’s past wealth, is now merely the metropolitan heart of a former maritime empire that had its own extractive margins. The free mar-

17. See Adam Tooze, Chartbook Newsletter #17 Realism & Net-Zero: The EU Case, March 2021.
ket and technological advantages gained before the war allowed it to not become completely stunted, but the potential of that scenario remains, given that the ecological and territorial constraints are being directly felt in the old continent, which is also the small continent. It would certainly be risky to state that Europe is condemned to degrowth by its morphological characteristics, but it is no doubt at least predisposed, or perhaps even encouraged to.

In order to avoid framing the issues only in neo-Malthusian terms, which would compare demography and territory in a narrow-minded way, we must instead reflect on the historical link between socialism and growth, or between sharing and braking. In France in recent years, François Ruffin has helped popularize the seemingly idealistic slogan “Fewer possessions, more connections”, which calls for scaling back our consumption patterns in the hope of rejuvenating social solidarity. But is this really that naïve? As we know, the partial socialization of the economy was made possible after the war by increased productivity and access to cheap resources (which were at least made so by the externalization of risks). In other words, Western Europe’s social model maintains a deep connection with growth, a connection that has its roots in Enlightenment progressivism and the Marxist theory of production. The welfare state’s crisis subsequently anchored in the dominant political representations the idea that this social model had to bend to competition in order to safeguard its conditions of existence, and this is how neoliberalism was able to present itself as the savior of welfare. But the question of the relationship between socialism and productivity can be looked at in reverse. By defining a collection of inalienable social rights, a set of social relations can be defined that is beyond the reach of the law of the market, even when the latter presents itself as a vehicle for growth. In other words, in one case, economic socialization depends on the conquest of productivity gains and comparative market advantages, and in the second case, the market is obliged to occupy the space that emerges once rights and infrastructure have been substantially defined and guaranteed “whatever the cost”.

The slogan “Fewer possessions, more connections”, or George Monbiot’s “Private sufficiency, public luxury”, can then be taken as political guides without requiring the population’s abrupt conversion to voluntary simplicity and Gandhi’s precepts. More simply, they are the result of a practical constraint imposed on socialism: insofar as it can no longer be conceived of as a side effect of the economic sphere’s expansion (the productivist paradigm of profit-sharing), it is redefined as a principle of limitation, as a political will that brings about a change in the economy’s dimension. This reversal of the hierarchy between growth and redistribution can be seen, for example, in the introduction of car and appliance sharing networks, in the development of recycling, repair and renovation, which prevents new objects from being added to the market and the accumulation of waste, in public health policies that limit avoidable pathologies, and of course in tax systems that prevent the creation of excessive and ecologically costly private fortunes. There are many examples that prove that sharing may not lead to economic acceleration, but on the contrary to the optimization of material and resource flows.

In a context where Europe has little chance of enjoying the biggest benefits of green modernization as Beijing and Washington envision it, as well as not having a pressing need for growth for development purposes, the scenario of unlimited post-carbon economic growth is – more so than any other part of the world – a risky gamble. We must therefore view Biden’s modernization prophecies as much as Xi’s symbiotic development from a distance: the “infinite frontier” is not available to us, and we certainly do not need it.

It would be better to look at the stationary economy predicted by J. S. Mill in 1848, or at the idea of the “economic problem” becoming obsolete as imagined by Keynes in 1930. The decarbonization of the world economy will be a test for Europe, in which its attitude towards the future will be defined. The imminent transformations of our economic and technical environment may produce what the “great acceleration” did in the 1950s: a depoliticization of existence, absorbed in the outlet of consumption and an apparent social peace. But they can also bring about a re-politicization of needs, of time, of space, which cannot be reduced to the upper classes’ demand for a better quality of life.

Europe, which lacks a founding narrative that is able to replace the myths of imperial universalism and the free market, could find the beginning of an answer to this lack in these transformations. One can reject the idea that Europe was the birthplace of modernism, but there is no doubt that it was the first to link modernity and energy intensity. Perhaps it is now time to put Europe at the forefront of another political proposal, one that is less reliant on the mindset of conquest that prevailed when it was thought that the Earth was infinite, a mindset that is now obsolete.
I. International trade and the environment: a complex and debated relationship at the theoretical level, though certain principles now seem to be established, if not recognized

Since the 1990s, when environmental issues – and in particular climate change – began to occupy a prominent place in international affairs, the relationship between environmental protection and open trade has been the subject of theoretical debates at the economic and political levels, from which we can infer some principles.¹

Economic debates

In terms of economic science, there are three broad schools of thought when it comes to the issue of global warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions.

The first one emphasizes the harmful effects of the opening and growth of trade on the climate. They are attributed to the effects of scale, to the lack of adequate or homogeneous quantification of environmental externalities, and to the resulting displacement of production.

The effects of scale are those linked to emissions due to the growth of international trade, whether in transport or in the make-up of trade (which includes a relatively larger share of high-emission sectors: steel, aluminum, cement, animal production).

To the extent that environmental externalities are only minimally taken into account, as in the case of transport, or in an overly heterogeneous way between trading partners, decisions based on skewed cost-benefit ratios lead to biases in choices of location, imports, or exports which can lead to an increase in trade due to the segmentation of value chains, which increases environmental impacts. This also results in the displacement of production and relocation to less restricted areas, with subsequent carbon leakage, particularly for the most energy-intensive industries. This can be measured through the carbon footprint of a country’s consumption by adding the carbon footprint of imports to that of production, which is often substantial.

In contrast, the second school of thought emphasizes the positive effects of international trade on the environment. These are due to the effects of specialization, the spread of technology, and well-being.

The effects of specialization are those traditionally attributed to the international division of labor: under the effect of increased competition resulting from the opening of markets, producers specialize where they have comparative advantages, whether in terms of natural resources or specific expertise, resulting in efficiency and productivity gains. This also leads to a better allocation of production factors, including resources that can be depleted or are fragile, such as water resources. This is also true for early adopters who, ahead of other producers, reduce their negative environmental externalities and thus build a competitive advantage in the hope that "greener" production will become the rule in the future.

Another classic advantage attributed to open trade is the spread of innovation and progress in technologies – in this case green technologies – and the possibility of prioritizing so-called "environmental" goods and services when reducing barriers to trade.

More indirectly, there is the effect on well-being that comes from the aforementioned favorable impact of an international division of labor on productivity – and therefore on growth – which leads the populations that benefit from it to integrate quality of life parameters, including the environment, into their choices as consumers or citizens once they are freed from the constraints of satisfying basic needs.

A third school of thought synthesizes the two previous ones by measuring the effects highlighted on both sides as precisely as possible and comes to the conclusion that the results vary considerably from sector to sector, or from country to country, and depend on the hypotheses formulated concerning the appropriate levels of environmental constraint. This is the case, for example, for "producing locally", whose benefits are not always as obvious as they seem. More broadly, this perspective repositions the trade-environment relationship within a much broader set of concerns, that of the ecological transformation of the systems of production.

¹. This paper is based on the work of the two authors published in the “Greening Trade” series of the Jacques Delors Institute.
While it is not possible, from the point of view of economic science, to resolve the matter of the positive or negative effects of international trade on the climate, this approach takes into account the debate in the economic (and demographic) field as a whole and puts forward the theory that the role of international trade is only marginal when compared to the significant transformations that the ecological transition requires as well as the necessary revolutions in production and consumption systems, whether in terms of decarbonization or the transition to a “circular economy”. These issues must therefore be given priority, and the modalities of international trade must be adapted, downstream as it were, to these new conditions of production and consumption. For example, in the energy sector, renewable energies are, by definition, better distributed and require less international trade than fossil energies.

We can also connect this more “neutral” approach to the theories which state that trade barriers in the name of the environment would more often than not be more costly in terms of efficiency losses than beneficial in environmental terms, since they are mainly played out at the domestic level and not at the international one.

**Policy debates and institutional factors**

Economic debates on the trade-environment relationship coexist with several international debates that are more political or ideological than scientific in nature and that concern both North-South relations (and the related conditions of competition) as well as international governance as resulting from the 2015 Paris Agreement.

North-South relations are marked by a historical legacy that is as burdensome as it is inescapable, and which is found at every international meeting where the trade-environment nexus appears: the CO2 emissions stock is to be cut in the industrialized North, and the consequences in terms of climate change or biodiversity loss have a proportionately greater impact on the less industrialized countries. Given these conditions, questioning the openness of trade in the name of the environment, whose main beneficiaries over the past several decades have been the countries of the “South” appears to be a sleight of hand in their eyes. Worse, this subject raises suspicions of “green protectionism”, which echoes the debates that have accompanied political decolonization in the past, and which is still often unfinished in economic terms.

Hence the extreme reluctance of developing countries to become involved in discussions about a new connection between environmental protection and the opening of trade.

This also explains why the “South” pays little attention to the argument that, in the case of trade measures designed to protect the environment, it is no longer a question of protectionism (in the sense of protecting producers against foreign competition), but of a legitimate exercise of precaution (in the sense of protecting the population and the planet from the effects of environmental degradation).

In a way, the symmetry of this position can be found in the “North”, with the argument of “environmental dumping” in the name of the aforementioned phenomena of competitiveness differentials due to less restrictive environmental systems.

Another political and institutional dimension of the trade-environment relationship at the international level stems from the well-known shortcomings, which we will not discuss here, of an international governance system that remains, by the will of States, based on national sovereignty in the Westphalian sense of the term. In this case, one of the effects of this theory is to restrict the responsibility for consistency and arbitration between the environment and trade to the national level, with the inevitable differences that arise at the international level, given the spectrum of collective preferences between countries with heterogeneous situations, interests, and values.

An additional difficulty lies in the compartmentalization, among the various areas of international life, of issues in relation to each other, insofar as inter-state arrangements (treaties or institutions) are dedicated to particular issues and are the responsibility of different authorities. For example: World Trade Organization (WTO) on the one hand and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) on the other. In order to remedy this, we need a matrix of preferences granted at the international level, a sort of collective utility function that would facilitate the management of global public goods, starting with a few major principles.

A third institutional determinant is the revolution that the 2015 Paris Agreement represents in terms of the nature of international arrangements as they have been constructed since the Second World War. This revolution is clear if we compare this agreement to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. In Kyoto, a binding agreement in all its provisions was reached between a limited number of countries and thus had a fixed impact on the emissions of a limited number of countries; a kind of “menu” approach. In Paris, a nearly universal voluntary agreement with a potentially much greater impact was reached, though its impact on global warming was poorly defined, apart from the statement that it would limit the increase in temperature to “well below 2 degrees” and was based on Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The advantage of this approach is that it has more participants, which is essential, and that it is likely to grow in strength as the political pressure to decarbonize increases. The disadvantage is
that it is an "à la carte" approach, where each participant chooses both the level of commitment and how it will be implemented.

A few principles

Out of the debates mentioned above, we can infer a few constant principles which, although not recognized internationally, now seem sufficiently agreed upon to establish a framework within which to construct a new relationship between the preservation of the environment and the opening of international trade, including at the European level. Four of these principles are proposed here.

The first concerns the role of international trade in preserving the environment, and primarily in the fight against global warming: most of the transformations necessary for the ecological transition lie in domestic production systems, with international trade playing an accompanying role, whether positive or negative. But the negative effects must be corrected, starting with emission-intensive sectors. This is all the more true if we add to domestic emissions those linked to imported goods, the dynamics of which have accompanied the multi-localization of production over the past several decades.

The second is the need to reintegrate environmental externalities into market pricing so that the resulting changes in relative prices produce the necessary reallocation effects in the international division of labor, for example in modes of transport.

The third is to take into account the effects on all trading partners resulting from the necessary changes in relative prices, and thus to establish the necessary forums for discussion at the international level, bringing together both environmental and trade-related mandates and expertise.

The last principle, that of equity, requires that the relative positions of producers in emissions and in trade take into account the differences in capacities resulting from different levels of development. This is one of the rare areas of agreement between WTO and MEA principles, although they are expressed differently: "special and differential treatment" on the WTO side, "common but differentiated responsibilities" on the MEA side.

II. The heterogeneity of States' decarbonization policies and the measures they implement affect the conditions of their trade. This explains their use of a range of new measures designed to reconcile trade and the environment, which generate even more friction as they are only partially regulated by international law.

Although the handful of principles suggested above appear to be sufficiently accepted to serve as a framework for trade policy reforms and measures designed to better link trade openness and environmental protection, they do not in any way provide operational instructions which remain the discretion of the States party to the Paris Agreement, and the same is true for most Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs).

Indeed, assuming that the long-term decarbonization objectives of these economies are shared and reflect a willingness to cooperate, as is now provided for in international agreements, their timelines and means of achieving them are left to the individual will of States for the reasons already mentioned.

The result is a wide variety in levels of ambition, policies, and instruments, the overall consistency of which is by no means guaranteed, with consequences for international trade that can create tensions, unless ways of coexisting with different regimes are found, which raise legal and institutional problems, many of which remain to be resolved at the international level.

Multiple heterogeneities in decarbonation policies and their instruments

In terms of climate, the freedom given to countries to choose the modalities of their decarbonization results in strong heterogeneity, which is added to the differences in emission volumes between countries, whether measured in total or per capita, and which span a very large scale: more than 15 tons per capita in the United States, compared to nearly 10 in Europe, 7 in China, and only 3 tons in India. These differences are undeniably due, at least in part, to each country's degree of industrialization and development.

There is heterogeneity, first of all, with regard to both ambitions and trajectories. For some (EU, US), peak emissions are in the past and emissions are declining; for others (China, India), they are expected to peak around 2030 and to increase sharply between now and then. Some timelines for decarbonization have been set at 2050 (EU, US), others at 2060 (China), and others remain undetermined. References to starting points vary from country to country, as does the precise definition of "net zero" or "carbon neutrality".

Secondly, there is heterogeneity in countries' ability to mobilize the resources needed to complete the decarbonization process, whether in terms of financial resources for investments in transformation, particularly in the energy sector, or the availability of technologies, for example for photovoltaics.

Last but not least, the range of instruments used to
decarbonize production systems is heterogeneous.

The most popular instrument among economists is to put a price on CO2 so that the markets for goods and services internalize the environmental damage caused by emissions. This is a solution that is as ideal as it is utopian in its version of a common global price generalized to all production. Hence, prices that are differentiated both in their sectoral coverage and in their levels. There are two extremes: on the one hand is the EU, which has made this its main instrument through the ETS, and where the price is currently around 85 euros/t, and on the other hand is the US, which is resistant to any direct increase in the price of goods or energy and prefers to use other methods, except at the sub-federal level, such as in California. There are also many intermediate situations, such as China, which has an ETS with modest sectoral coverage and a price of around 10 euros. In total, it is estimated that about 20% of global production is currently covered by such an instrument.

Many other tools are used in varying proportions by public policies to influence and accelerate decarbonization. To name a few, in decreasing order of coercion: consumer taxation, technical regulation of the chemical composition or carbon footprint of products, emission standards, public procurement, subsidies, labeling. There are also private initiatives by economic actors, producers or distributors, who wish to demonstrate more virtuous behavior, generally grouped under the term ESG (environment, social, governance)

All these methods have one thing in common: they impact the relative prices of factors of production linked to the environment, modify the comparative advantages of producers and countries, and therefore impact trade at the risk of causing friction.

**Significant consequences for the conditions of international trade**

When trade measures based on environmental protection throw the previous conditions of competition out of balance, the question arises as to their consistency with international trade rules.

The problem does not exist when trade-restricting provisions are provided for in MEAs, such as for protected species (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora – "CITES"), or hazardous chemicals (the 1987 Montreal Protocol and the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants). But these cases are not common, and the 2015 Paris agreement does not contain them. It is relatively easy to resolve when these provisions are included in bilateral or regional agreements through which the partners agree on specific conditions, such as in Chapter 20 of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) Agreement, or Chapter 24 of the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), which is focused on the environment.

In other cases, the WTO provisions apply and must be considered in the event of a dispute.

These provisions include principles and rules whose scope has been defined by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism in case law that has evolved over time.

The principles: the Marrakesh Agreement that established the WTO in 1994 stipulates in its preamble that trade openness must allow for “optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development”.

**Rules:**

- Article XX GATT/WTO provides exceptions for certain restrictive trade measures to protect human health, animals and the conservation of exhauster natural resources.
- The agreements on technical barriers to trade (TBT) and on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) establish the conditions under which trade-restrictive measures are admissible or not.
- The agreement on subsidies, which regulates those that distort competition and prohibits them from being made conditional on local content obligations.

Since 1994, there has been an abundance of case law, which has gradually evolved in a direction that is more favorable to the measures in question (except for local content) as the environmental issue has emerged in the international system.

To summarize – and at the risk of simplifying – a trade measure aimed at protecting the environment by establishing a barrier to trade is now compatible with WTO law under certain conditions that must be assessed on a case-by-case basis:

- Its impact on trade must be proportional to the environmental damage it is supposed to combat;
- It must not discriminate in favor of national products (not be a "means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination").
- It is compatible a priori without further proof if it is based on an internationally recognized precautionary standard.

Although this "corridor of compatibility" has been substantially widened over the last 30 years, it has not...
disappeared and many proposals to widen it further have emerged. This could be done either by establishing a more clearly defined link between trade openness and environmental protection, through renegotiating or reinterpreting WTO rules. Or by expanding the use of environmental exceptions. Or by reinstating the “green waiver” for subsidies that applied from 1995 to 1999 and that has not been extended. Or by renegotiating local content. Or, in a restrictive sense, by regulating fossil fuel subsidies or by integrating the environmental dimension into the disciplines on agricultural subsidies based on the recent precedent concerning fishery subsidies.

All in all, a new configuration of international trade disciplines that is more favorable to environmental protection is not out of reach, but given the diversity of environmental policies and collective national preferences in the assortment of incentive or constraint measures and their consequences on trade, such an undertaking is more a matter of the complex management of different coexisting systems than of the collective organization of convergence through cooperative harmonization.

In order for this to happen, four conditions would have to be met that are currently absent: the first is a standardization of the price of CO2 and of the sectors covered by these prices, which would avoid carbon leakage and level the playing field in this respect; the second would be the establishment of international standards for the portion of decarbonization that falls under product regulation; the third, which is institutional, would establish a common space for international environmental and trade agreements; and the last would give greater prominence to environmental precautions as distinct from trade protectionism by recognizing that protecting the planet from environmental risks is more legitimate than protecting producers from foreign competition.

III. In these circumstances, the European posture becomes particularly important because of its leadership in both environmental and trade matters; especially since the 2019 European elections that gave rise to the Green Deal.

If all the roads of the countries participating in international trade lead to zero carbon, as all roads lead to Rome, their vehicles, as well as their speeds, differ and merge together at the risk of various traffic incidents and new tensions in a world that has no shortage of them. In these circumstances, the European posture takes on particular importance because of the Union’s specific characteristics. In this case, the EU is a true leader – which is not often the case – because of its environmental ambitions, its commercial openness, and its market power.

Greater ambitions

Compared to the rest of the world, the European Union is a zone of high political pressure concerning environmental issues. It is insufficient for environmentalists, excessive for conservative forces, but stronger than elsewhere. So much so that it is the envy of leaders from other continents who would like to have similar support.

This political reality, while not expressed in the same way or in the same format in the Union’s 27 member states, has been steadily gaining ground since the 1990s. It received a new boost during the European Parliament elections in 2019, which resulted in the Green Deal. The result is new environmental ambitions in terms of decarbonization, preservation of biodiversity, product quality and water quality. This also gives rise to a form of ecological planning under the leadership of the European Commission, with regular benchmarks or assessments, such as the -55% emissions target for 2030 on the way to carbon neutrality in 2050, along with interim targets, which give greater credibility to targets that are otherwise distant and therefore less binding in the eyes of public opinion or economic actors. From this point of view, the Union presents an image of earnestness to the outside world. This credibility is also nurtured by the regulatory developments underway or already announced which have a high international profile, as was the case in the past for REACH (on the chemical composition of products) or now for the end of internal combustion engines as of 2035, or the traceability of cultivation or production methods (which must be free of deforestation).

Greater trade openness

Compared to other entities of comparable economic size, the European Union has more trade with the rest of the world, both in exports and imports. The EU economy is more dependent on exports than the US economy. Its ratio of (extra-European) exports to GDP is 15%: it is almost twice as dependent on exports as the United States, whose ratio of exports to GDP is 8%, and almost as dependent as Japan, whose ratio of exports to GDP was 15.6% in 2020. It is a major trading partner for many countries. It is the largest trading partner for both imports and exports for 61 countries, and the largest trading partner in terms of imports from the EU for 21 countries. And while it is true that China has recently taken the lead in a growing number of areas, this statistical reality will be tempered in the future as China adds more domestic value by developing its economy, and therefore imports comparatively less as a proportion of its GDP than in the past.
Greater market power

Considered by some as a vulnerability in a geopolitical context that has been rocked by, among other things, Russia’s war against Ukraine and the U.S.-China rivalry, Europe’s trade openness is, on the other hand, a strength, a lever at its disposal to “green” its international exchanges, first and foremost through its imports, because of the size of its economy and the depth of its market. Europeans are not as rich as the Americans, but there are more of them, and they are fewer in number but richer than the Chinese for several more decades.

This gives them market power over the norms and standards of their trading activities, the effects of which have been seen in the past, as in the case of the GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation). By importing products, Europeans export their standards, and this market power increases as other countries adopt European standards, as is the case for non-EU European countries with significant economic weight. From this point of view, the course of desired divergence (or accepted alignment) that Great Britain, which shares the EU’s environmental ambitions, will take with Brexit could significantly alter the situation.

As a result, there is also an important responsibility in terms of coordinating legal trade systems, whether they be bilateral treaties or the multilateral system at the WTO.

In short, because of the Green Deal, the European Union is in a position to exert a major influence on the rest of the world by “greening” its trade policy in the name of greater consistency between environmental protection and trade openness. However, this statement must be qualified because it is not (yet?) accurate for the agricultural sector, which is very important not only for the European budget, through the financing of the CAP, but also for international trade. Despite the ambitions set out in the “Farm to Fork” Communication, Europe is still struggling to put them into practice because of resistance from the relevant lobbies.

IV. A range of new European measures to better link trade opening and environmental protection

The Green Deal has brought about a paradigm shift in the principles and practice of EU trade policy.

Previously, the European Union tended to limit as much as possible the inclusion of what academic literature refers to as NTPO (non-trade policy objectives) among its objectives. Respect for human and social rights (as defined in international law, in particular in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Convention on Human Rights, and the International Labour Organization agreements) were, until recently, the only elements clearly and firmly tied to European trade instruments in the form of conditionality, whether in bilateral trade agreements or in the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for developing countries.

By giving its environmental objectives a new place of priority in the hierarchy of its trade opening conditionality, the Green Deal has, since 2019, led to a reform of European trade policy. It is currently reflected in the discussion within the institutions of new measures proposed by the European Commission and in a range of initiatives that will affect the Union’s trade either directly (trade measures at the border) or more indirectly (regulatory measures for application “beyond the border”). In the future, it will also have to take the form of global initiatives, which are more difficult to bring to fruition, but which should benefit from European leadership in due course.

This new panoply is available at three levels: unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral.

Unilateral measures

If the CBAM (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism), has become the symbol of the Union’s trade policy reform, it is not the only new instrument to use the power of the European market as a lever for better protection of the commons, namely the climate, forests, ecosystems, natural resources, oceans, and biodiversity. Other measures are also at different stages of the European legislative process: proposal by the Commission, deliberations by the member states in the Council, which acts by majority in these matters, deliberations in the European Parliament, and finally, reconciliation of the positions adopted by each of the two chambers in a Commission/Council/Parliament trialogue.

The European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)

Long treated as a challenging legal-technical fiction by the academic world, the CBAM is on its way to becoming a European reality. The legislative process leading to its adoption should be concluded before the end of 2022. It should then come into force for an initial three-year pilot phase. Its purpose is to align imported goods with the European carbon price under the emissions trading scheme in order to avoid carbon leakage. It will result in a gradual reduction in the free allocations currently enjoyed by the highest emitting industrial sectors (cement, steel, aluminum, electricity, chemical fertilizers) under the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and in a charge at the border equivalent to the average price paid by European industries per tonne of CO2 emitted. In the institutional game, the European Parliament has – as is often the case – has shown itself to be the most ambitious institution. Under the initiative of its rapporteur, Mohammed Cha-

2. See Lamy, P., Pons, G., Leturcq, P., GT3 - A European Border Carbon Adjust-
him, in June 2022 the Parliament succeeded in adopting a position that strengthens the scope of the CBAM by extending its application to three other sectors (polymers, organic fertilizers and hydrogen), by taking into account indirect emissions (known as "scope 2") in addition to emissions resulting from production processes alone, and by proposing the creation of a centralized body at the European level to ensure the mechanism's management. This ambition was countered by concessions concerning the postponement of the date when free allocations will be completely phased out from 2028, the date initially proposed, to the end of 2032, and the inclusion of a provision providing for export rebates, whose legality in the WTO and compatibility with the CBAM's climate objective are more than questionable. It remains to be seen whether they will survive the final stage of the triilogue. Indeed, they risk compromising the relatively favorable reception that the European initiative has received so far. So far, the Commission's proposal has elicited moderately hostile reactions at the international level. The United States is taking a different route to carbon neutrality than ETS/CBAM, but has shown a willingness to find common ground with the EU. China (which has an ETS covering energy production) and India, on the other hand, have not hidden their hostility. The EU has engaged in discussions with its trading partners that are particularly affected by the products subject to the CBAM, which have helped to explain the purpose of the measure and to allay fears. The CBAM is currently limited to industrial products covered by the ETS. The agricultural sector is therefore not included. If, however, a price is put on the carbon emitted by agricultural practices in the EU, then a carbon border adjustment mechanism for these products will have to be adopted, and we can expect defensive reactions from developing countries that depend heavily on this type of export.

As part of its biodiversity strategy and the first steps of its "Farm to Fork" agri-food strategy, the European Commission launched an initiative in November 2021 to address the deforestation embedded in European imports, which according to the WWF are responsible for over 16% of tropical deforestation. As the expansion of agri-food operations is responsible for more than 90% of deforestation, the regulation focuses on trade in food products considered to carry a high risk of deforestation: cocoa, coffee, palm oil, soybeans, beef.

The regulation goes beyond what is considered to be illegal deforestation in other countries, and represents, in this sense, a major advance and a unilateral instrument that has an extra-territorial effect. Specifically, the regulation sets new market access conditions for a limited list of sectors: to be free of deforestation, and to be legally produced and to have met a series of new risk management requirements. The European Parliament, in its position adopted in September 2022, proposes -- as is the case for CBAM -- to extend the scope of the regulation. In addition to livestock, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, soy and wood, the Parliament is proposing to include in the scope of the requirements products that contain, have been fed with, or have been produced with the above-mentioned commodities (such as leather, chocolate, and furniture). The Parliament also wants to include pork, sheep, and goats, poultry, corn, and rubber, as well as charcoal and paper products. The Parliament is also proposing to increase the percentage of audits to 10% of operators audited each year. Verification by the relevant authorities would be based in part on geographical origin of the products, whose precise location and connection with the progression of deforestation would be verified using the European satellite system "Copernicus".

The directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence (CSDD)

The Commission's initiative to harmonize the rules on corporate social responsibility has raised strong opposition from some stakeholders, in particular from organizations representing economic and industrial interests at the European level. Corporate duty of care regarding social and environmental issues already exists in certain legislations such as those of France, Germany and the Netherlands. The challenge here is to define common rules for all member states. The Commission's proposal, whose publication has been postponed several times, is currently being discussed by co-legislators. Given the slow pace of the legislative process, there is still some uncertainty as to whether the European Union will be able to bring this project to a successful conclusion before mid-2024, when the current mandate ends. The rapporteur Lara Wolters has taken up part of the proposals published by Europe Jacques Delors for a more ambitious version by proposing to expand the responsibility of companies over the practices occurring throughout their value chains and pleads for the removal of the concept of "established commercial relations" which would have severely restricted the scope of application of the duty of vigilance. It also adds two provisions: the requirement for companies to correct their practices in the event of a violation, and the requirement for deeper and more frequent consultation with stakeholders.

Through constraints placed on economic actors legally based in the European Union and the harmonization of rules within the Union — an essential element in the preservation of a stable and predictable single trading environment for economic operators — the European Union can truly put itself in a position in the coming years to remedy a significant part of the human rights, social, and

environmental abuses that occur along the value chains of products consumed in the single market. However, it will have to be accompanied by significant strengthening of the capacities and budgets of national market surveillance authorities in order to avoid loopholes and maximize the impact of this new legislation.

**Bilateral trade agreements**

Whereas the environmental clauses in the Union’s trade agreements were relatively unbinding in the past, the Green Deal reform is based on a different strategy developed in June 2022 by the Commission which provides for a series of measures – halfway between cooperation and sanctions – that will seriously strengthen the effective application of the agreements’ environmental protection provisions. To only name a few, these are the integration of the trade and sustainable development chapter into the general dispute settlement mechanism, and therefore include the possibility of sanctions for violation of these provisions and the adoption of a “tailor-made” approach to environmental issues depending on the partners concerned, to name just a few of the points mentioned in the announced action plan.

These provisions are in addition to the pre-existing ones, which have been strengthened concerning the need to couple trade agreements with environmental impact studies that involve civil society and local authorities in the negotiation and monitoring of the agreements.

The EU-New Zealand agreement, whose negotiations were concluded in June 2022, is the most ambitious trade agreement ever negotiated on sustainable development and climate. In addition to incorporating the trade and sustainable development chapter into the general dispute settlement framework, making the Paris Agreement a “core provision” (thereby making their voluntary commitments binding between the parties), and including a list of environmental goods and services that benefit from additional trade preferences, the EU-New Zealand agreement introduces innovative chapters on trade and gender as well as trade and indigenous (Maori) peoples’ rights.

At this stage, one of the main uncertainties concerns the willingness of some partners to reopen negotiations to integrate this new approach into agreements already negotiated but awaiting publication and subsequent ratification. This is the case for the modernization of the EU-Chile agreement and for the controversial agreement negotiated between the EU and Mercosur countries. The election of Lula, a president whose policies are committed to the fight against deforestation, should re-launch the political process on the European side for the vote and ratification of this agreement. The European Commission has announced that it will propose an appropriate instrument by the end of 2022 to strengthen the trade and sustainable development provisions of the EU-Mercosur agreement. Once the instrument is on the table – and if the agreement’s opponents are satisfied – a vote in the European Parliament and ratification at the member state level could take place in 2023. If this happens, the EU-Mercosur agreement would become the largest bilateral trade agreement in the world, covering a market of more than 750 million consumers.

**At the multilateral level: new global dynamics to develop**

Although the European Union has been firmly committed to the reconciliation of trade and environment since 2019 at the unilateral level and, to a lesser extent, at the bilateral level, it has so far been less bold at the multilateral level.

There are several reasons for this cautiousness, which is mainly due to the concern to not alienate developing countries.

The first has to do with the past: the unfair regimes of colonial trade have been only slowly, and sometimes incompletely, erased; the Union is often considered, like the United States, to have protectionist tendencies in agriculture; in these circumstances, the possibility of working towards a new division of labor in the name of environmental protection which is unfavorable to countries of the South is never far off, as has already been noted.

The second is due to differences in the capacity of countries to move towards less carbon-intensive production systems or those less unfavorable to biodiversity, while the responsibility for these situations lies with those who are now creating new barriers to trade. This is not to mention the discussion on “loss and damage”, which is also connected to the past and of which we saw the beginnings during COP 27 in Sharm El-Sheikh.

The third is the recent deterioration of the global geo-economic and geopolitical context with its accompanying East-West and North-South tensions, hence the concern not to deepen antagonism.

The last one is due, as we have already explained, to the absence of a multilateral forum that would bring together the protagonists on both sides.

Nevertheless, the European Union could show more initiative and signal to its global partners that it is acting in good faith and that it is attentive to the difficulties that its new measures create for certain countries. In this sense, the EU could, for example:

- assume leadership of the coalition of trade ministers for climate that was created during the last ministerial conference at the WTO
advocate more energetically for the “trade and environment” committee to take up the new measures that it is implementing or planning, even if it means facing questions or criticism in order to respond to them

propose the creation – as proposed by Europe’s Jacques Delors – of a WTO comparability forum mandated to examine CBAM-type border measures with the collaboration of UNEP, UNDP, OECD, IMF and the World Bank

suggest that future negotiations on disciplines governing agricultural subsidies take into account their effect not only on trade but also on the environment; to do so, it could build on recent progress at the WTO on fisheries subsidies

launch a “trade-environment” financing initiative for developing countries to support their efforts to ensure that their exports meet the new environmental criteria with which they must, or will in the future, comply, including in implementing the decisions of the COP 26 in Glasgow to end deforestation by 2030. Within such a framework, the EU could allocate the revenue generated by the establishment of the CBAM instead of paying it into the EU budget.

**Conclusion**

The European posture which, following the Green Deal, made it a pioneer in attempting to find a better balance between open trade and environmental protection, exposes it to the rest of the world. The positive side of this is that it has taken a leadership role in an unavoidable ecological transition. There is also a negative side: the criticism of international partners whose economic interests are affected by this. The EU’s position would probably be less uncomfortable if it were to equip itself with a true green diplomacy, of which the trade aspects would be one element among others. This is one of the initiatives recently launched by Europe’s Jacques Delors in Brussels.
What is the state of the environmental and ecological situation in Brazil after Bolsonaro’s term?

The legacy of the Bolsonaro term is the destruction of environmental and climate governance. You can see it through the increasing rate of deforestation. The institutional framework has completely collapsed. Lula’s administration will have the huge challenge of restoring Brazil’s international and national credibility even though the society fully supports environmental measures and the Amazon’s protection.

What do you think should be the most pressing measures to be adopted by Lula?

We need to completely review our strategy regarding deforestation and climate change more broadly. The involvement of the public sector will be crucial.

I truly believe that the trajectory of environmental policies and environmental governance in Brazil will be totally different than it was in the last 50 years. In 1973, Brazil established the first institutional framework for environmental protection. Bolsonaro’s style of governance completely reversed this step by step process. He contributed to the erosion of relationships between the national, federal governments and transnational institutions. The bottom line is that during the past four years, Brazil’s democracy has been under threat. We now have the task of bringing civil society and scientific institutions together. We need transparency and credibility and ambition to manage this agenda by looking towards the future, not back to the past. We need to design and build institutions to face the enormous challenges that lay ahead.

Lula has the opportunity to review Brazil’s strategy from scratch and to propose something new: a common vision, common objectives, common interest to make sure that we can move forward without any further setbacks.

In terms of international cooperation, now that Lula won the elections, are we heading towards a trade agreement between the EU and MERCOSUR?

Brasil used to have good relations with all the international actors. The European Union is part of this set of partners. We had a very good bilateral relation with the European Union and individually with European countries such as Germany, for example.

What Brazil needs in my opinion is open dialogue. We need to have a discussion on international trade agreements, especially the one with Mercosur, that we have been discussing for twenty years. I’m confident that the new Brazilian government will reestablish the political grounds for the dialogues and multilateral actions that we need, particularly in terms of cooperation on fighting climate change. There are currently two agreements: the political one and the commercial one. I’m confident that the Brazilian government will take the necessary steps in such a way that we can have this trade agreement.

Will the war in Ukraine affect these prospects?

The war in Ukraine is very complex and sensitive, but based on what I have been discussing with partners like France, there is an interest in moving forward. Brazil is a country of peace. We are part of a set of 15 countries that have relationships with all other countries in the world. I do believe that Brazil and the European Union must come together. Of course, the war changed our perspectives but I’m confident that in spite of the war and more generally the unusual situation of having a high intensity conflict in Europe in the 21st century, we will be able to find an agreement. We must also address the impacts of the war on food, climate and energy security, and the diversity of geopolitical arrangements.

I’m confident that the bilateral relation between Brazil and the EU is strong enough to manage these issues. According to the discussions I had, both sides are interested in coming together and moving forward. More broadly, we need to address together the impact of the war in developing countries: it is unacceptable what is happening in Africa.

The war in Ukraine is not the only point of possible tensions. How will Lula’s government position itself in relation to the discussion on the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism?
I am not sure what will be the position of the new government. However, we believe in bilateral understanding not unilateral decisions, because the degree of transparency and credibility that we need to build at global level is not possible without trust. I do believe that Brazilian society wants to put climate back at the top of the agenda. We are going to address deforestation issues. It is in our own interest to have, for example, production of beef without deforestation.

On the other hand, it is very important for the international community to be aware of what is happening in Brazil, how supply chains are interlinked, we need to have more coordinated answers: international trade must not allow or be a catalyst for illegal deforestation. It’s absolutely unacceptable that someone can buy products that come from illegal procedures. We need to have a process, to decouple activities, and not only for international committees but for our national consumers too. We have the technologies, we have the private sector’s commitments, now we need traceability as we did in the past for example with soil monitoring. I hope that Lula’s government will make this one of the top priorities.

How can Brazil and more generally Latin America overcome the tension between addressing climate change and difficult socioeconomic situations that may require to rely, at least in the short run, on fossil fuels?

Latin America has a variety of situations and realities. Central America is absolutely different from South America. South America has two big challenges. First, Amazon’s protection. President elect Lula is right to emphasize the importance of coming together around the Amazon. We already have the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization, which means that the institutional framework is there. A step forward would be to address cooperation at the presidential level, not only to the level of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs. We need to politically upscale the existing institutional processes.

Then, you are right to emphasize, we need to decrease emissions while dealing with short term perspectives. To be able to do that, we need to come together politically and understand where we stand. Next year we will discuss the question of reforming the Bretton Woods institutions and it is very important for us to understand the new role of multilateral development banks. In Brazil we have a powerful national development bank.

What does this mean exactly?

We need to connect the dots, we do not have time to buy. Common actions and solidarity in terms of climate, food security and education may be at the center of this process. It is unacceptable that in a country such as Brazil, we have food security problems, as we are one of the most important food exporters in the world. This is also the case for Chile. We have in South America, and particularly in Brazil, in terms of natural resources and biodiversity, alternatives to address this multitude of crises. Chances are, next year will be even more difficult. So we need to come together, and starting from our environmental and climate concerns and considering the crisis that is coming next year, have a dialogue and make sure we are aligned. This is my hope: that Latin American countries will consider this diversity of realities and come together to promote sustainable development which could also strengthen our democracies. But how do we mobilize a common political vision? Finding innovative partnerships is one of the biggest political tasks in the years to come.

Is the environmental agenda an opportunity to catalyze more South-South relations?

When we go into an alliance, it’s very important to understand how this decision will allow us to move forward with the green transition, on subjects as precise as climate finance for example. In this context, South-South cooperation is particularly important, because we need to land this political will in an institutional framework. We can develop tools to translate our political views and get quick gains for local people. So it’s very important to have common tracks to come together and consider different realities based on the commitments we have. We also need to understand the impacts of different realities and how to put this in practice. In order to change our realities we need scalability. This means that we need to promote institutional conditions, not only in the public sector but also to bring private sector and civil society closer and closer to the commitment to a long term vision.

So when you go into the Amazon region in Brazil, we have a big challenge, how do we discuss infrastructure, if we want to promote inclusiveness and well-being for our society. How do we discuss the lack of digital infrastructure? Everything is interconnected: the lowest rates of Human development index in Brazil are exactly in the Amazon. So it’s very interesting to see how we can combine our challenges regarding education, public health, with Amazon’s protection. We need to go into the core of societies’ problems to promote security and development. Based on international criteria, all these countries are middle income countries. But when you get into the Amazon region rates and indexes show that we are just low income countries.

The international community doesn’t see this because we have such fix criterias. So we need to bring these realities to international forums, to unlock some procedures that will bring private funds. It’s not on a small scale that we are going to solve these challenges.
Breaking the Deadlock on Climate - The Bridgetown Initiative

"Let us be honest with ourselves", opined the head of delegation of a wealthy country at a pre-COP meeting I attended on how to mobilise US$4 trillion a year for climate mitigation. "Finance isn't the problem; if every country had all the finance they need, it would not be the answer to climate mitigation." At this point, I realised that we live on top of each other, sharing the same Earth and its greenhouse gases, but we also live worlds apart. How could he surmise that finance wasn't the most significant part of the problem? He sat opposite me, and next to him was the head of delegation from a large developing country who looked at him equally puzzled. I quickly checked the cost of borrowing in the two countries they represented. The Government of the rich country was borrowing ten-year money at 1.4% per annum, while the developing nation was borrowing at 11%. Some of its neighbours were borrowing at 20%. Private sector borrowing rates are the Government rate plus a premium, so the cost of capital of a privately funded renewable energy project in the rich country would have been close to 4%, and in the developing nation, 15%. At 4%, finance isn't the problem. The regulatory and tax regime may matter more. At 15%, it doesn't matter what your regulatory and tax regime is. There are few if any profitable projects. Finance is by far your biggest problem.

Today, developing countries represent over 60% of current greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs). Rich countries say, in some tension to Paris' recognition of common but differentiated responsibilities, that there is no solution to climate mitigation that does not involve developing countries doing more and faster. In the capitals of the developed world there is excited chatter of using new technologies and private finance to transition developing countries out of coal, oil and gas. But the differential cost of capital between countries means that cajoling them to commit to hitting net zero soon doesn't make sense because most countries would be making unfunded commitments. Elsewhere, government officials could be sacked for doing that.

People who live in countries with a low cost of capital nod sagely when you bring this up. We need risk-mitigation in the developing world they say. This is a sophisticated way of saying that the responsibility lies with high-risk countries (almost all poorer and often smaller) who must make more effort to lower risks. Grants and loans are available to them to pay professionals, often from low-risk countries, to provide technical assistance on the importance of policy certainty and transparency, fiscal discipline, institutional strengthening and a range of other obvious risk-reducers. This reminds me that the fox knows many things, but the tortoise knows one big thing. The US, Italy, Greece and Japan have some of the lowest risk-premia and lowest long-term interest rates in the world; yet some of the highest debt levels. And their politics is not, shall we say, humdrum.1 What defines whether a country has a low cost of capital is whether its currency is accepted as a safe asset internationally - not the myriad of things that may be mitigated. The major international safe asset currencies are the dollar, the euro, the yen and the pound. The role of history and convention in making a global safe asset is a discussion for another time.2 The point for now is that risk mitigation is almost always a good thing but almost no amount will bring down the rate differential sufficiently. Any solution to global climate mitigation must involve better directing and leveraging international safe assets for global climate mitigation.

The Global Climate Mitigation Trust

We propose to break the deadlock over climate finance with a $500bn Global Climate Mitigation Trust seeded with IMF Special Drawing Rights. SDRs are the right of one IMF member to borrow a quantified amount of Central Bank reserves from another, effectively at low overnight interest rates, currently at 2.4%. These reserves, collectively amount to US$12.7 trillion. There are already two SDR-funded IMF Trusts, the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust and the recently established Resilience and Sustainability Trust and there are almost USD$1 trillion of SDRs. The vast majority are held by countries who do not need them.3 SDRs are the cheapest way to seed this Trust but not the only way. Those unwilling to rechannel their unused SDRs could instead offer pre-commitments by development finance corporations, guarantees or even

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1. To have such high debt levels and such low interest rates is quite a feat of fiscal indiscipline as the other countries with high debt levels partly got there by the compounding of high interest rates.
3. SDRs are allocated in proportion to IMF quotas which are related to GDP so that the largest economies have the largest quota.
paid-in capital. The Trust would use $500bn of SDRs and similar instruments as security to borrow overnight at least US$500bn, spread over the SDR constituent currencies to reduce currency risk, and keep rolling over this borrowing. The Trust could then break up the borrowed $500bn into tranches of different sizes to be on-lent to qualifying projects that the Trust approves on the basis of how much and fast they reduce global warming per each dollar the Trust invested. The Trust lends directly to projects and not to governments which is a critical difference from the other IMF Trusts. These loans would become an asset of the Trust and a liability of the project, critically taking climate mitigation off government balance sheets.

Projects would have to pre-qualify using proven technologies and processes and high environmental, social and governance standards like those embedded in Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JET-Ps). The Trust could fill the yawning financing gaps revealed by JET-P planning and consultative processes. For instance, a JET-P project that converts an electricity generator from coal to solar with a US$25bn funding gap, including the social impact costs to the workers and their communities could bid for USD$25bn of nearly 2.4% money on the basis of the climate impact. This would incentivise private savings to find the right technologies and best social impact methodologies to transition the dirtiest processes wherever they may be. This gets us out of a country-by-country squabble. It incentivises the most efficient mix of economic adjustment, climate-impact, technology and private savings, and leverages the impact of each public sector dollar by five to tenfold. This US$500bn Trust of 2.4% money for climate mitigation projects could draw in USD$2.5 to USD$5trn of private savings into climate mitigation and social and economic transformation. This is how we go from billions to trillions without heaping debt onto stressed government balance sheets. There is no other plan with this scale.

More concessional finance to climate-vulnerable countries to build resilience

While it is not always so, much climate mitigation and in particular the all-important energy, transport and agriculture transformation, generates revenues. With the help of our Global Climate Mitigation Trust then, mitigation can be funded primarily by the private sector. However, much climate resilience and adaptation does not have a revenue stream and can only be financed by the public sector. I have reached this understanding through much counter efforts. Given how little fiscal space developing country governments have we would love the private sector to do resilience too. There is much resistance to this conclusion from those who believe in the omnipotence of private capital. I can’t count how many times people outside developing countries have said that ‘resilient seeds’ proves me wrong. The cold reality is that the biggest ticket items in resilience costs are defences against sea-level rising, salinity intrusion and floods, more resilient road and bridge infrastructure and water conservation. Most hard-core climate resilience and adaptation costs cannot be shifted to a private sector or third balance sheet. It rests on government balance sheets where space is limited, cost of capital is high and as a result too little adaptation is being done. Loss and damage are rising exponentially as a consequence.

The solution is concessional finance to Governments from Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). Concessional finance means finance on better terms than those available commercially. For developing countries, the most extensive spread is between what a developing country’s Government can borrow at and the rate that a country with an international safe asset for a currency, like the United States or Euro-area, can borrow. The rating agencies give these reserve currency issuers a AAA-credit rating given they have many other options than default and so they enjoy the lowest borrowing rates. For developing countries, concessional finance could mean borrowing at the overnight borrowing rate for AAA borrowers with ultra-long-term repayment and a minimum spread for administrative costs. Even then, I recognise that there are no free lunches, so the extent to which countries can take advantage of the low borrowing rates of reserve currency issuers is not unlimited. Today, MDBs offer very concessional funds only to the poorest countries, those with a GDP per capita of less than USD$1253 per year, where 900 million people live or 12% of the world’s population. This is a crude cut-off. For a start, 62% percent of the world’s poor live in “middle-income” countries where around 5 billion of the world’s population live.

During Covid, some middle-income countries that were particularly badly hit, such as Barbados and Bahamas, were granted temporary access to concessional borrowing to finance Covid-related costs. Major MDB shareholders have said they would likely repeat this in the wake of a climate disaster. But that does not make good economic or investment sense. A number of empirical studies conclude that every dollar spent on better resilience today saves four to seven dollars in a climate disaster. Better to give limited, not temporary, access to concessional borrowing, limited to climate-vulnerable countries and their investments in climate resilience.

Broader eligibility for concessional funding must not mean a fight for resources between the most vulnerable.

4. The SDR constituent currencies are the same safe assets plus the Chinese yen. Because of its diversity, the basket provides a reasonable currency hedge.
The cake needs to be expanded. Critically, MDBs can borrow an additional US$1 trillion at AAA rates to on-lend to developing countries without anyone having to write a cheque if only three things happen:

1. They raise their risk appetite in ways recommended and outlined by the G20’s Independent Review of Capital Adequacy Framework of the Multilateral Development Banks.8

2. They include the nearly US$1 trillion of callable capital (capital promised in the event of trouble but not paid-in) in their risk frameworks to determine their borrowing room.

3. They should be allowed to hold rechanneled SDRs to provide the liquidity to expand their borrowing and on-lending.

An excellent place to kick start this three-pronged programme of additional lending would be for five countries or more to work with the IMF to rechannel their SDRs to the African Development Bank to expand its lending capacity. Who will be part of the first five?

**Two critical changes to the international financial architecture**

If we shift climate mitigation off the balance sheets of governments through the Climate Mitigation Trust and lower the cost of climate adaptation through increasing lending by MDBs and widening windows for concessional finance, we would achieve much. But climate-vulnerable countries would still experience a debt crisis before they can adapt and the rest of the world mitigates. To avert that, we critically need two more pieces of the climate finance architecture.

However much of the new debt is concessional and the private savings are in the form of equity; the world will still be adding more public and private debt to fund climate mitigation and adaptation. And the whole world starts off this debt-laden journey with excessive debt levels because of Covid.9 Moreover, debt levels are only half the story. The other half is the level of interest rates, which are rising rapidly as developed economies tighten monetary policy in the face of inflationary pressures. Even when the inflation fight is won we are witnessing a normalising of interest rates that will leave them significantly higher over the next decisive decade for climate than during the last decade.10 To this worsening financing environment, we must add the increased frequency and size of climate-related disasters. In a few hours, a climate disaster can wipe out 200% of the GDP for small states, as with Dominica in 2017, or 10% for large states like Pakistan in 2022. Disasters on this scale require Governments to divert substantial resources to relief and recovery. There is a way to address this, but it is not through even more debt arranged in an emergency when debt repayment is compromised. Nor is it through insurance-like instruments like cat-bonds, parametric insurance or the insurance elements of the recently proposed ‘Global Shield’. This is because climate change is an uninsurable event.

Commercial insurance works by pooling and spreading losses. This works well where the incidence of loss is uncertain and those who think they are vulnerable but are not experiencing a loss still want to be part of the pool; where the losses are uncorrelated with other losses; where the risk of loss is reasonably steady over time so an insurer can spread the risk through time; and where those who are causing the risk pay more than those who are victims; incentivising a reduction in risk. Climate change is none of those things. The incidence of loss and damage from the climate crisis is increasingly known, and so many will choose not to be part of those risk pools. As we crash through critical cascading points of temperature increases, climate-related losses exponentially increase in size and correlation with previously uncorrelated losses. Anyone selling climate change insurance will give up or go bust. Anyone buying it will face intolerable and rising premiums until the insurer goes bust or withdraws just as they need the coverage. And because those who contribute the most greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere are not bearing the greatest losses, it will mean the innocent victims of climate change will pay for the loss and damage caused by others: it is victim pays, just in instalments.

1. Natural Disaster and Pandemic Clauses

The first part of a solution is Barbados-style natural disaster and pandemic clauses in all debt instruments, from those held by multilateral or official agencies to those held by private creditors or even Chinese state-owned enterprises.11 These are not insurance instruments; the lender is no worse off if a natural disaster occurs. They are net-present-value neutral in the terminology. The clause suspends debt service for two years when an independent agency declares a natural disaster of a certain threshold has hit and extends the instrument’s maturity for two years at the initial interest rate. This automatically provides enormous liquidity when countries most need it without having to pay the cost of crisis liquidity, negotiate conditional arrangements and increase debt levels. If all developing countries had these instruments in their sovereign debts during the pandemic, it would have released one trillion dollars of liquidity12 to devote to

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10. For why, see, ‘The Great Demographic Reversal: Ageing Societies, Waning Inequality, and an Inflation Revival’ by Charles Goodhart and Manoj Pradhan.
11. The developers of these instruments are Sebastian Espinosa and David Nagoski of White Oak.
12. This estimate is based on data presented in, “Born Out of Necessity: A Debt Standstill for COVID-19”, Center for Economic Policy Research; Policy Insight
whatever they needed to spend it on, from healthcare to employment-protection schemes. At the time, excluding China, they could only spend half of that. In the case of Barbados, the current largest issuer of these instruments, it releases liquidity of around 17% of GDP in a crisis. No other instrument comes close. Contingent credit lines from MDBs, often conditional in eligibility and expenditure, are usually capped at 2.0% of GDP and are additional debt.

One question raised is if everyone has these, will it create a systemic risk for creditors? This is where the net-present-value characteristic of the instrument is essential. A holder of these instruments could at any time swap or strip the clause with a life-insurer who could reverse the effect of the clause at only an administrative cost because they would be giving up liquidity they do not need, in return for long-term income which they do.

(ii) Reconstruction Grants

The liquidity offered by the natural disaster clauses helps them to respond appropriately at the time. Still, ultimately there is an underlying cost to reconstruct what has been lost in a disaster, be it homes, infrastructure and livelihoods to institutions, communities and intangibles. The remaining missing instrument in our climate finance architecture is loss and damage financing. The moment of an enormous disaster is not one for increased debt. Over fifty per cent of the increased debt of many climate-vulnerable countries is a result of the loss and damage associated with natural disasters. If this goes unaddressed, it will sink them before they can adapt. Climate-vulnerable countries passionately believe that wealthy nations broke a promise on loss and damage financing offered to gain their support for the Paris Agreement. The Warsaw Mechanism for loss and damage lies empty nine years later. Many feel fobbed off by the offer instead of a Santia-go Network of technical assistance offered to countries that could teach the world a thing or two about managing disasters. A precipitous walk-out by climate-vulnerable countries is possible if there is no movement on loss and damage.

Grants are even more scarce than concessionary finance. Still, I believe that within the climate finance architecture proposed here, where we have addressed mitigation, adaptation and liquidity with appropriate instruments, if we focus on the most significant losses in the most vulnerable countries, we can define loss and damage in a tight enough way to be financed by grants.

We propose that when an independent agency declares that a climate event has taken place and loss and damage are over 5% of GDP, an automatic payment is made to the Government to pay for reconstruction. Global budgets have little room for fiscal transfers and there is little scope today to increase the cost of living. So we propose a funding mechanism with similarities to the Oil Pollution Compensation Fund managed by the International Maritime Organisation. Producers of fossil fuels would pay a levy linked to the carbon content of fuels that will start at zero. The levy would rise automatically as the fuel crisis subsides. For every ten percentage point decline in oil and gas prices, the levy will increase by one percentage point. If oil and gas prices return to their pre-covid levels, this will generate over $200bn per year. The markets expect oil and gas prices to fall back, partly because of the increasing switch to renewables and the declining energy intensity of the economy. And while the market is prone to short-term manipulation and events, these unwind.

Conclusion

We are hurtling to 1.5 degrees of global warming. Inadequate mitigation requires increasing adaptation. Insufficient adaptation is leading to substantial loss and damage. We are at a critical conjunction. There is no longer any space for delay. But action will not be delivered through the trapdoor of history. We must make it happen. The scale of the investment required to mitigate global warming is beyond the capacity of rich governments, far less developing countries. The private sector will have to play a major role - maybe three-quarters of climate financing must be done with private savings. The main obstacle, especially in developing countries where some of the most significant opportunities for mitigation now lie, is the cost of capital. This has prevented progress and caused multilateral efforts to descend into a dangerous dispute over who should be doing more. Our US$500bn, SDR-backed Global Climate Mitigation Trust sidesteps the squabble. By offering 2.4% money to any project wherever it is as long as it reduces global warming much and fast, we incentivise private savings to match the right technologies to the places where the most and fastest mitigation can occur. The US$500bn Trust should mobilise US$2.5 to US$5 trn of private savings, mostly in developing countries where the current cost of capital is a high multiple of this funding and off governments’ balance sheets.

The past failure to mitigate climate change has baked-in 1.2 degrees of warming and created enormous climate adaptation needs between the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn. This is where temperatures will rise to the most intolerable levels, and sea levels will increase the most through thermal expansion and the Earth’s spin. Climate related loss and damage in this band around the equator is three or four times greater than elsewhere.
Because of the absence of revenue streams, most climate adaptation needs to be funded by governments. Climate vulnerable countries must be offered concessional lending to invest in climate resilience. To ensure this does not crimp lending to the poorest countries and the pursuit of other sustainable development goals, MDBs must expand their overall lending by at least US$1 trillion. They can do this without anyone writing a big cheque, through just three things: increased risk appetite, recognition of existing callable capital in risk frameworks and using SDRs to back additional borrowing from the capital markets. The African Development Bank’s capital replenishment is the right opportunity to expand capital and lending through rechanneling unused SDRs.

Without these changes to eligibility and lending at the MDBs, adaptation has been scarce and so loss and damage are rising exponentially. Over the next decade climate-vulnerable countries need a mechanism of direct and quick grants when a climate disaster hits. With climate mitigation funded by the Trust and adaptation by expanded MDB lending, these grants can be focused on reconstruction costs.

A reverse levy, which rises by one per cent for every ten per cent decline in fossil fuel prices, could fund over $200bn per annum\(^\text{16}\) of reconstruction grants annually without adding to the current cost of living.

There is a universal recognition that announcing burgeoning producer profits in gleaming corporate headquarters while losses and damage pile up in vulnerable countries that burn the least fossil fuels, is untenable. For too long have climate-vulnerable countries waited for a mechanism to address the loss and damage of climate change. Without it, there will be a debt crisis. And a debt crisis will inevitably lead to reduced spending on public health, housing, education, and welfare, quickly spawning a development crisis, increasing pressures for regional and international conflict and migration. And that frontline will come to you if it has not already. We live worlds apart; but also on top of each other.

\(^\text{16}\) Author’s estimated based on recent average prices and production of oil, gas and coal, for the underlying data see, US Energy Information Administration Short ter energy Outlook, Global oil markets, December 6, 2022.
Down to Europe

The use of eco-grazing, above the salt marshes of Guérande.

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"I am interested in Europe as an ecological problem."

What is Europe to you?

I am not an expert on Europe, but I try to differentiate between Brussels-Europe — meaning the post-war system that linked European States — and what, in my opinion, represents 98% of what we report on Europe in the media and opinions, and this is the Europe that interests me. This other Europe could be Renan’s Europe for France or even Heimat-Europe for Germany, in the good sense of the word. I get/understand from this a metaphysical, anthropological Europe which is a common space, a cultural commons. I probably would not have made this distinction ten years ago. But today, given the current geopolitical situation, with a Europe that is surrounded by enemies, it is even more important to be critical of Brussels-Europe and have a passion (not necessarily love, but a passion) for Heimat-Europe.

In the last part of your recent book, Down to Earth, you conclude in an almost laudatory way, saying that Europe has succeeded, thanks to an "incredible assembly", in making the link, the "overlap", between national interests. Are you referring specifically to the European Union as an institution?

Yes, because I am interested in Europe as an ecological problem. The questions we are asking ourselves are those which go beyond borders or scales, and we must ask ourselves in which framework we can approach them. As it turns out, only Europe — this time European Union-Europe — was able to come up with obviously cobbled together and a bit precarious, but very significant, mechanisms for superimposing interests that had in the past only been national.

Do you think that the European Union has been able to overcome this contradiction that you mention in your book, that between the local and the global?

No, absolutely not. I have written about a long article in a geopolitical review on this very subject.° Obviously, Europe invented the notion of global. There is a Chinese global and there have been as many globals as there have been conquests. But the interesting element in Europe’s case is that it invented a model of the global which in a way turned against itself, through world wars, decolonization, followed by decolonial thinking and the provincialization of Europe, and which today is coming back with the immigration question.

And so, if there is a place where all the problems, where the blurring of all scales — local and global — arise, it is in Europe. It is the historical responsibility of Europe for having invented this strange element, a perception that it tried to impose on everyone, and to now “uninvent” it, to find other formulas to move away from this Imperium mundi, which does not exist, but which Europe itself has created. Peter Sloterdijk has written a very nice book on this subject, Si l’Europe s’éveille, which asks the question “what can we do with Europe right now?”. Europe cannot be small, that is the problem. It has been provincialized, but it cannot be small, because there is the problem of having invented this global system, which is now being disrupted by the ecological crisis. There is therefore a real philosophical problem of redefining not a European mission, which would make no sense, but a European responsibility.

The European question today is almost inseparable from the question of borders. Are you in favor of eliminating borders?

No, I am for increasing borders. It is an illusion to think of Europe as superior to nations. It is not that there are no borders, it is that there are, in addition to national borders, overlapping borders due to immigration and the ecological crisis, and it is clear that the question of borders as identity is not the same thing as borders as attachment. We must distinguish between identity, which amounts to putting up barriers and assuming that we can manage on our own — in other words, what is happening in Italy at the moment, which is inventing a world that we know full well does not exist — and the question of attachments. If Italy were to describe its attachments, they would obviously never fit within the confines of Italy. This does not mean that we transcend borders, but that we think of ourselves as attached, as intertwined, which are

1. This interview, conducted by Louise Eymard and Tristan Dupuy in June 2018, was first published by le Grand Continent on January 30, 2019.
2. The German word Heimat, which cannot be translated as such, refers to a sense of belonging, to the homeland, to the place where one feels at home.
not at all the same things.

And so, the problem is that machine-Europe, the European Union-Europe, has been taken over by political scientists who have imagined that there were either nation states, or a superior structure, or the model of Empire. But there is an entirely different definition of having borders: that of having attachments. These are things you care about, and these things that you care about are not isolated with walls around them. There are a thousand tensions and entanglements between these different issues. That's the whole challenge of this shift: to move beyond this space of European invention, to the concrete space that I call the "terrain de vie".

Nevertheless, confining these intertwined issues in strict categories of thought and representation may seem necessary for any form of governance...

My question is not about the ideal organization for European Union-Europe; my interest is in the definition of an existential belonging, such as Heimat or Patric. This does not offer any guidance on the practical organization of institutions. There is no solution to this problem at the moment because we are in the middle of a conservative revolution. It is not a structural problem; the problem is existential. Europe is threatened from an existential point of view, from both outside and from within. Faced with an existential threat, we must think about priorities: what does it mean to make the understanding of Europe as a territory exist for each of us? What really surprises me with regard to questions about Europe is that when we talk about Europe, we only talk about Brussels. And yet we live in a Europe that has a completely different substance.

But can the European Union really coexist with this "Heimat-Europe" of belonging? Is the European space, in the way you understand it, threatened by Brussels and its model of governance?

What I am trying to do is simply to place the Brussels government within a larger whole, which is an existential matter for it. The criticism of Brussels-Europe leads to a reflection on institutional reforms that are incomprehensible to the general public. Independent of questions related to the Union's reforms, there is an existential Europe that is being attacked by the United States, abandoned by Brexit, and let down from within by countries that themselves are inventing nation-states that never existed – reinvented nation-states. The reason for the brutalization of public life is that people know that it does not exist. What is Italy on its own, separated from the European Union? It doesn't exist. Besides, in a context of ecological crisis, no nation-state exists. Yet we need its protection; this is the great contradiction. We must draw out – and this is the end of my book – those forms of belonging that are based not on identity but on attachments. That is to say, on what allows us to survive.

What can you tell us about the mobilization methods that must be put in place to move towards this third "attractor" that you talk about in your book, this path that offers a new axis of representation that is freed from the right/left, conservative/progressive schema, which, according to you, is no longer suitable for dealing with the ecological crisis?

Like everyone else, I'm at a bit at a loss when it comes to the mechanism. It's very complicated to have political positions because interests are impossible to define as people no longer vote for their interests because they don't know what their interests are. In order for there to be interests, there has to be a world that can be described in a somewhat material way. There can be no interests if there is no world, and because of the ecological crisis and globalization, our interests are fluid. There are Brexit subsidies, but you vote against Europe: your opinions are floating around in an off-the-grid way somehow. I am not a political scientist. I am approaching this question as an enlightened amateur, but, in my opinion, the main problem is the abstraction of the description we have for the conditions of life, because we have forgotten about the ecological crisis that is redefining the entirety of belonging and the question of how many are we, where are we, who are we with, and what are our means of subsistence? These are absolutely fundamental questions, which are basic geopolitical questions upon which we are re-projecting the only two models we have: either globalization, which says that we no longer have borders, or conversely the idea that we must return to national states that did not exist before. Orbán's empire is a new creation, which in fact never existed; there is no "eternal Hungary". We therefore have two complete fictions: either people without lands who seek them, or lands that have no people.

Should the ecological question be depoliticized? Should it become an epistemological issue or an ethical and moral issue?

We must do away with ecology. We have made ecology a part of politics and it has not worked. We must talk about politics, period. In politics there are living beings that are interconnected, who have converging or diverging interests, and this is what we must discuss: the politics of the living. We could have parties if we could manage in an extraordinary way to re-describe the interests and positions of individuals. At that point we would have aggregated grievances to have parties with agendas and platforms, as we had before. If we had this before, it was because we shared the idea of modernization, apart from
some questions of distribution. When there is no longer a common world, parties no longer exist. They will be re-formed the day we have returned to a certain degree of pixelation of political issues, on an almost individual scale.

On this topic, you use the example of the French Revolution’s "cahiers de doléance" in your book.

This is a situation that fascinates me because it created the French people, who understood themselves in describing their attachments and injustices. And this is what interests me about the second Europe: if we describe the Europe of attachments, there is not a single individual in France who is not European, who is without attachments. It is obvious that we are not globalized, but universalized. Everyone has a network of attachments and these clearly extend beyond borders.

But we also need – and the notion of attachment expresses this in a way – security and protection. But borders do not provide security and protection. Borders are like the Great Wall of China: it has never stopped anyone from crossing it. In order for there to be parties, there must be grievances, and in order for there to be grievances there must be interests, and in order for there to be interests there must be a world which can be described.

The anti-capitalist left’s agenda seems unthinkable at a time when so many people vote conservative or far right. If we cannot say to those who vote for the National Front: “Yes, you are right to want security and protection, and yes, you are right to want attachments and belonging, but please describe your attachments and belonging, and let’s see what it looks like”, then all parties are anti-European. And they are all inventing nations, like Orbán’s Hungary, which doesn’t exist economically without means of subsistence. This is the present drama: it is the brutalization of today’s politics that lets people know that the models offered to them are impossible, while simultaneously they feel that globalization is coming to an end.

Does the global make the world impossible to describe?

The global leads us astray. As soon as we shift to the global, we are lost, because it aggregates everything and we can no longer see a way to get our hands around it. Politics is about getting your hands around it, but in order to do that you have to be able to describe things in practical terms. As soon as you ask people to describe situations, it opens up possibilities to act and redefine connections; that is politics. But if you are caught in the abstraction of a return to the national state, which does not exist, and the global, which also does not exist, to make people talk is to cause them to despair. When the left tells people that they have to be anti-capitalist, what can they do with that? It is the denial of the climate situation that structures this entire political situation. Today people are told at once that globalization has become impossible because of the ecological crisis and also that it is therefore necessary to return to the nation-state, while knowing full well that this is impossible.

My question is this: what can we say today to people who ask – with good reason – for the protection of a national state when that state does not exist from the point of view of their actual interests and attachments? Can we say to them something besides “you are populists, you are neo-fascists who want to go backwards, and all you can hope for is that economic development continues”?

Could you explain what this “third attractor” is that you refer to?

The third attractor, if I can describe it clearly, would attract a lot. It has been widely explored by ecologists. It is made of life forms. It is not simply a space in the geographical sense, it is seized by new legal mechanisms, by people who work on the commons, on alternatives to property rights. It is traversed by all possible and imaginable activists. It is highly populated but has no political orientation. In short, everyone is aware that we are moving towards another mode of belonging.
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