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A Conversation With Thórdís Gylfadóttir, Foreign Minister of Iceland

What is your view on the European elections and the new cycle in European politics that is about to begin. It seems the scenario that is at play is more complex than simply stating the center is holding. How would you characterize the political mood in Europe? 

We are seeing a more united Europe — but also a more divided one. 

As I see it, the main focus now is on security and defense. That is the main challenge — and will be the main issue in the next term. It also means priorities will have to be adjusted accordingly. That can be a source of tension when budgets become stretched. It also means we need a more realistic and pragmatic approach to politics, a new reality. This goes beyond the EU, it is also about NATO.

For Iceland — a NATO but not an EU country —  the challenges are the same: protecting a system based on common values and rules that have guided our democracies and our way of life. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is putting that to the test and under great stress. You mentioned the European elections, it is clear there is social discontent within a part of society and polarization worries me because our system is based on consensus and common understanding. That’s why I refer to a more united Europe but also a more divided Europe because adapting to this new reality will require enormous efforts, constant engagement, a degree of unity that we have shown we can accomplish but maintaining that momentum is going to be difficult. It is crucial we insist to our own societies that this is not just about Russia and Ukraine, it’s about us too. That it is in our own interest to defend the rules-based order for the future.

Is Europe capable of exercising hard power? We have two wars at our borders and  a return of great powers and military might, which is a completely different scenario to the soft power that the EU has favored in recent decades based on trade and economic partnerships.

The EU can and should. It is a matter of political courage and setting the right order of priorities. Having said that, you cannot deal with the question of security without a strong economy and competitiveness. This to me is a central issue. To be credible, you need a strong economy behind strong language. We are not a member of the EU, but being a member of the single market through the EEA, for Iceland, it matters greatly that the EU does well. It is in our national interest. The third point is unity — and we can see it is becoming harder.

Strengthening the defense capabilities, and Europe’s competitiveness require massive investments… 

That is why we have to make a convincing case to our societies. Take defense spending; this is our best insurance. We have to be prepared. At NATO level it is obvious already. Allies know that, they get it and, while it is true some are at a different level in terms of getting to 2%, the mindset has changed. I’m not saying it is easy. It takes time, it can be scary, there is a cost, but we have to be clear: NATO is not about just buying tanks, it’s about protecting the system we say we want to protect. Russia will not stop. We will need that deterrence and to continue our efforts in making our societies more resilient against those that seek to undermine democracy and the rule of law. I am happy with the fact that Mark Rutte will become the next NATO Secretary General. He is experienced, pragmatic, he is trusted and I was pleased the process went smoothly. I look forward to working with him.

As you mentioned economic power as a prerequisite for hard power, the EU could adopt further tariffs on China. The US has done so already. And Beijing could retaliate. A trade war is back on the political horizon. Countries like yours risk getting caught in the middle of it.  How will you respond? 

Iceland is not an EU country, but we are part of the single market, and that is what we rely on. We cherish the single market. But we also have our free trade agreements. We have 34 free trade agreements with 43 partners. That is also hugely important for us. We can do those independently, and we do them through EFTA — and then we have the single market. Our hope is that any strategic decisions the EU may take don’t affect the single market.  

But what if the single market becomes more political, a tool to implement a part of the strategic agenda of the EU? That will certainly affect your country. 

The questions you raise are partly foreign policy, partly industrial policy, economics and I’d even say domestic policy. I like the Letta report. It is excellent work, food for thought and it should open a debate. I think countries have to take this debate domestically as well. The single market is extremely important and we see that the lines are getting blurred. Our concern is that any fragmentation within the single market could become a negative development for the EU and EEA Countries alike. If we say we don’t want fragmentation that means a country like Iceland will have to adapt to or influence that development.  

In the most extreme scenario that could mean pushing a choice on EU membership: and we have seen a no can become a yes when the right conditions are applied. We can think of Sweden and Finland, for example, and their decision to join NATO. Do you contemplate such a scenario?

What we have now is the EEA agreement extending the single market to Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein. This agreement has a majority support in Iceland. Those who want to join the EU, support the EEA agreement. And those that do not want to join the EU, also support the EEA agreement. That’s the majority of the country. The EEA agreement unites Iceland because we see what it has done for our economy and our prosperity very clearly. We have to cherish that and that means we will have to keep good cooperation with the EU and the European Commission. Our working relation with Ursula von der Leyen has been good, we’ve had some differences surely, but overall our understanding has been good. From personal experience, I have invested a lot in having these connections and relations and I would argue our cooperation has only increased since the war in Ukraine started. My perception is we will continue to have this strong support for the EEA agreement but we have to nurture the debate about how it may develop in the future.

One of the key themes in European politics is what to do with the hard-right. It is a real dilemma for the European center right when it comes to both policy and governing. How do you envision this space evolving?

I want to be clear on this point: there are values that cannot be compromised and there are statements that cannot be normalized. I do not want to generalize as political sensitivities vary greatly by country so it would be wrong to make a general statement on this issue. But when you look at the European elections, my political family — the EPP — got a strong result in an election that was supposed to see the far-right bite into the center. Compared to the rest, we resisted this wave. And that tells you there is a space for a pragmatic right that is capable of reading the room.  

The risk at times is we become too fixated with goals, some of which carry a large economic cost and are not credible in terms of the timeline and how we get there. Take climate, this is coming from someone who believes in climate solutions, new technologies and science, but we need a realistic approach. I hope the next term will be that of pragmatic solutions. If we don’t, I worry we will ultimately be pushing voters away into radical politics. And that would be a mistake in my view. 

There seems to have been a degree of paternalism when it comes to voters and big policy items, with the idea that they wouldn’t understand the complexities or the trade-offs. Is this anger partly to blame on politicians being condescending?

I would agree. That’s why I stress the need to adapt and be flexible and pragmatic. 

However I don’t believe those  who promise easy solutions to complex problems have a better answer or are part of the solution. History shows it doesn’t work like that.  

You mentioned the need to maintain unity for Europe to be successful. When it comes to Ukraine, the European Union but also non-EU countries like yours have taken unprecedented steps to integrate Ukraine into a common narrative on top sanctions and weapons. The war is ongoing — but what kind of future do you see for Ukraine? 

To me it is completely obvious where they belong.  

They are fighting for their lives and their future within the EU. When it comes to NATO, like I said before, NATO is not just about weapons. It is about values. In my view, Ukraine belongs in NATO.  

If we were to make an educated guess, will Ukraine be a full-fledged member of the EU and NATO in 10, 20 years from now?

I really hope so. I think it is possible if they continue to reform. But it will also depend on our political leadership and our courage to follow through. If we mean what we say, then we should find creative solutions to get there. When we say: Ukraine has to win and Russia has to lose. When we say: Ukraine belongs in the EU and NATO. I truly hope we mean it. There’s also the larger question about the future of transatlantic cooperation. And Ukraine is an integral part of that puzzle for Europe. 

On that point, you touch upon a very delicate subject and one that is particularly frustrating for the Ukrainians: the idea that the West and NATO say they want Ukraine to win but worry about the implications of a defeated Russia. That is clearly the elephant in the room.  

Historically, wars have ended with winners and losers and in the broader strategic context Putin has already weakened Russia significantly. In my mind, the most important thing is for Ukraine to win back what belongs to Ukraine. If Russia left the country tomorrow and retreated, the war would end. In that sense, I don’t think we should worry too much about what may happen to Putin’s Russia. We should prioritize what is happening on our front. They decided to invade a sovereign country. And their internal politics is something Russia has dealt with in the past and will have to deal with in the future. Historically, this is something we have not been able to influence. Why would this time be different? This is not something we should overthink especially if that leads to paralysis when it comes to us supporting Ukraine. 

There is an alternative scenario — partition and a frozen conflict. Ukraine could be split up. The fighting stops but the menace remains. What happens if Ukraine is forced into an agreement against their will?

We should remind ourselves of our own words. We have said for more than two years that you cannot alter borders by force. Russia is waging a disgusting war against Ukraine. And the world is watching. If they see this is something that will be tolerated, that is dangerous and goes in detriment of our own security and our own interests. Which is why I go back to my initial point. Ukraine is not just fighting for itself, it’s also doing our fight to uphold the international rules-based order.

 But do you consider this scenario as we head into the US election? 

Others are looking. The US knows that. And I know they think of that. Again, if we mean it when we say a sustainable peace for Ukraine is a fair peace, our priority should be to give them what they need to reach that destination. And of course then we can talk about the politics, and the political process at the negotiating table, but before they get to the negotiating table, Ukraine has to be confident it will be able to decide for itself. We can get into a lot of what ifs about the endgame but, in my view, we should stick to our basics: a sovereign country has the right to defend itself and choose for itself. And that also goes for the open door policy at NATO.

The world is also watching what is happening in Georgia. A country caught in a similar conjunction. You recently visited Tbilisi as the people protested against the foreign agents law. A video of you, accompanied by the Baltic foreign ministers, went viral on social media.  Politics is also about symbols. Why was it important to you to be there?  

It was important for me to be on the ground, to get information and hear from the people involved directly. We met with the speaker of the Parliament, the President, the Foreign Minister, the opposition and NGOs. These conversations were useful. The trip was organized as a Nordic-Baltic initiative, at very short notice. We took this trip as friends of Georgia. This is an independent, sovereign country. That is clear. Our goal wasn’t to interfere, but when you know that 80 percent of the population wants to join the European Union, and they’re protesting peacefully and in such big numbers unafraid, you have to support them. That’s not something you can ignore either and I would do it again.  

It was a powerful image. That has political value too.

When the Baltics were in the process of regaining their independence, Iceland was the first country to recognize them as independent states from the Soviet Union. At the time it wasn’t as clear, and there were voices suggesting perhaps it wasn’t the right timing, or it could provoke the Soviet Union, but we still did it. The Baltics recognize that and remember it. Our foreign minister at the time visited Vilnius at a critical moment. And looking back, it was the right decision. The Lithuanians still remember it. In difficult times you want your friends to be there.  

Going back to Georgia, is this about a law or is there something much greater at play? 

It’s much bigger than the law. It’s about the European perspective and the aspirations of a majority that wants to get closer to Europe and share our values as Europeans. Iceland is not a member of the EU so I am not going there to discuss enlargement or the path to joining the EU because my country is not involved in those discussions. But that isn’t the point. This is about your place in the world and where you stand in terms of values. There are big consequences depending on where things go in Georgia. 

There is also the war in Gaza. Josep Borrell, the top European diplomat, recently said he worries Europe is perceived by the international community as having a double standard when it comes to the situation in Ukraine and that of Gaza. Do you worry about that too?

I understand why some of our partners would say that and I would not dismiss their concerns. That would be wrong. But I fundamentally disagree with the idea that the horrible situation in Gaza is the same as the war in Ukraine because they are not the same. Very few things in history are black and white, but in the case of Ukraine and Russia, it gets pretty close. If Russia decided to lay down its weapons and pull back from Ukraine, the war would end. I am not sure if Israel laid down its weapons in a war that we should stress started because of a horrific terrorist attack, the conflict would be solved because the core of the situation remains: how can two people co-exist peacefully and safely. At this point, we should focus our efforts in achieving a ceasefire and work towards a roadmap that can actually create a two-state solution that allows for both Israel and the Palestinians to live peacefully together. A final point on the idea of double standards:  to me it is clear that international law  also applies to UNSC resolutions, that need to be respected in every case. 

Do you still see value in international forums such as the United Nations? The criticism being these institutions have become powerless.  

I do, although some of these meetings can be very formal, very scripted, I personally like the informal part of the work better simply because I find it more useful. I think sometimes part of the problem is we don’t talk to each other enough. We speak but it is not a debate. You walk around and you have your speech and events you have to attend, but we’re not really talking to each other and listening. I do think we would benefit from having more informal set ups. But that is not the fault of the institutions.

Given the  news cycle and the need to be constantly present and have that viral moment, has diplomacy become a performative act rather than a channel to fix problems?

The reality is sometimes you have to catch the public opinion’s attention. You need social media to reach an audience. Having access is also good for democracy. At the same time, to be a good diplomat you need to do the work, you need substance. To do the work and have substance, you also have to have conversations and meetings that you can’t really talk about. Then you get criticized for not sharing enough, or people think you’re not doing the work, or you’re not sending the right message. The truth is some issues cannot be treated like a performance. The danger is that getting exposure can make you egocentric. So then it all becomes about your image, but many times, for the good of the cause, you have to put your personal popularity aside. You have to be ready to do that as a politician. Otherwise, become an actor.

Politics can be hard, yet you would assume it is clear to everyone that there is a line that separates criticism from violence. Is social media erasing that line?

I do worry about it. I don’t know how much of it is caused by social media or whether social media is just a reflection of an atmosphere. It is true we have seen violence and threats against democratically elected politicians happen before. We can have many different theories for it and debate about the causes, but if you say it’s not a problem and it comes with the job, to me that is a problem. Also, there is no question freedom of expression is a right. But what about bots? Fake accounts? AI that is doctored to present a situation in a way that is not what actually happened? That’s not freedom of expression, it’s manipulation. Should we tolerate that? I find that an interesting question.  

You are 36, you serve as foreign minister of Iceland and you’re a woman. How do you approach politics being a woman?

It depends how you frame it. It’s not the same asking how I deal with being away from my family than asking me how I understand  leadership as a woman. That to me is a fair question. If I didn’t talk  about being a woman in politics  I would feel almost guilty of not paying enough respect to the women that took the fight before  I did. I am certain I wouldn’t lead the way  I do if they hadn’t come first. I wouldn’t talk the way I do and express myself in these terms if they hadn’t created the space so I could. I am very conscious of the fact that female  politicians who came before me had to deal with criticism that they didn’t really fit in, or they had to lead in a certain way to be taken seriously, or somehow ask for permission. Also when I look at gender equality more broadly, we’re not there yet. I say this coming from Iceland which ranks among the top countries. But we are not there yet.  As for me, to answer your question, I allow myself to follow my instincts when it comes to leading. And  I  know part of that is shaped by the fact that I am a woman. I don’t know how  I would do it if I was a man but I feel very  comfortable allowing myself to follow my instincts as a woman because that clearly shapes how you view issues and understand the world. 

In Europe, there are established names like Ursula von der Leyen and Christine Lagarde and new faces like Kaja Kallas and Sanna Marin. There is also Giorgia Meloni, who smashed the glass ceiling in a country that is objectively more conservative, yet she is divisive. Is the credit a woman gets conditioned by ideology?

Of course it is, definitely. Is that fair? No. I would assume that very progressive feminists  would say Meloni achieved it because of the fights they took before her so she should embrace that type of feminism. That is probably right up to a point. Then again I can only reflect on my experience.

Have you ever encountered sexism in your politics? 

I became a minister when I was 29. At the time it was more about my age than being a woman. And that came as a surprise. I knew what my age was and I knew what experiences I had. I looked at it as a positive and I didn’t pretend to be an older man. When I campaigned to be the deputy leader of my party, I did the same. When I became foreign minister, which is a bigger stage, I kept this attitude. I also fundamentally disagree with the idea that soft power isn’t as effective as hard power. I think — I know — it works. You can lead and you can influence with that approach. There is demand for more diverse leaders. Not just based on gender but also experience and background. Take Finland with Sanna Marin or Estonia with Kaja Kallas. I am convinced smaller states can bring huge value to the  table because we can say and do things that bigger states cannot because of their position. We should play a bigger role.