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A Conversation With Thierry Breton

Donald Trump’s victory is unambiguous. On January 20th, he will be back in the White House. How should Europe react?

Not only has Donald Trump won the election, he has won the popular vote and the Republicans have gained control of the Senate as well as, potentially, the House. If this data is confirmed, he will be in a position to govern fully, unlike in 2016.

Donald Trump has a rather brutal vision of power, but he embodies a true type of leadership — whether we like it or not. Kamala Harris failed to embody this kind of leadership in the eyes of the American people.

The timing is also such that the United States will be changing its president — and the whole democratic institutional architecture that goes with it — at almost the same time as European institutions are changing theirs for the coming five years. As a consequence, we in Europe need to adapt very quickly to this new state of affairs.

But we also need to be honest.

During the campaign and until very recently, most of the people I spoke to in the European institutions were betting on Kamala Harris and the Democrats winning — this included the European Commission, the Parliament, the Council and even many capital cities. That was the mainstream view.

Did you share this view?

Personally, I wasn’t convinced. The renewal of our institutional cycle was designed with a certain continuity in mind. This is completely different; we’re entering a period of fracturing.

Is the Union ready to navigate this broken world?

I sincerely do not believe that our institutions were prepared for such a resounding success by Donald Trump, which has the potential to destabilize Europe, our institutions, the Parliament, the Council, and the Commission.

The first question we must ask ourselves — and it is not for me to answer it, as it is for legislators alone to do so — is whether our institutional architecture will allow us to stand up to a fully functional American administration that is determined to engage in power relations, including with the Union.

Donald Trump’s vision of Europe is a bit of a caricature. He treated the Union as a “mini-China” during his campaign. He wrongly considers Europe to be an unreliable ally of the United States. He believes that we are exploiting American power, without sufficiently repaying what that power provides in terms of military support or security architecture, which he sees as being insufficiently reciprocated. He has a rather negative, transactional view of his relationship with our continent.

What is your understanding of his worldview?

During the campaign, he expressed a rather negative and transactional view of our continent — which I deplore, of course — but when you put all these elements into perspective, it points to a potentially radical change in Europe’s position in relation to the United States.

Once again, the question must be: who will represent us in managing this relationship given this new dynamic? Trump doesn’t view European institutions in the same way as the Democratic administration did. For him, there is only one person in Europe who can be trusted — Viktor Orbán.

You recently met with him in Budapest.

I went to see Viktor Orbán three weeks ago and we spoke one-on-one for almost two hours. We took stock of a number of issues, because Europe is made up of 27 member states, and if you’re interested in Europe, you have to talk to everyone — even if we don’t always agree with each other’s positions.

Did you discuss the possibility of a Trump victory with Orbán?

Yes, we spoke about this possibility, and in a very frank way. He told me very clearly that he believed that, in Trump’s eyes, he would be a privileged European counterpart. And that, as far as Europe is concerned, many things will have to go through him from now on.

This risks becoming a reality that we need to be prepared for simply because, whether we like it or not, this is what is likely to happen: Orbán will now be one the entry points for Europe to the White House.

Is this just a narrative that Orbán is putting forward? It seems surprising that the prime minister of a relatively minor country should suddenly become the sole point of contact for the Washington administration — rather than the leaders of the European institutions…

And yet this is the reality we must be prepared for. When Trump wants to talk to Europe, he won’t speak first to the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, or the President of the Council, Charles Michel (soon to be Antonio Costa), or the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola. He will speak to Viktor Orbán.

Until now, many member states have shied away from meetings in Budapest, even though Hungary currently holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. But at this week’s Council, apart from Pedro Sánchez, who is obviously required to deal with the tragedy in his country, there won’t be a single head of state absent — they will all be there. This new dimension has been fully assimilated. Once again, this does not mean that the relationship with Trump will go through Orbán alone. Other leaders will be able to find their way into this relationship such as the French President, the German Chancellor, and even the Slovak Prime Minister, Fico, Giorgia Meloni, or Geert Wilders in the Netherlands. 

It’s still hard to understand how the presidency of the Commission could accept such a scenario without engaging in a power struggle…

I’m simply saying that, from a political point of view, the call will go to Orbán first if Trump wants to talk to Europe. That may come as a surprise, but it’s up to us to adapt to the new realities of the world. We know that relations between the Commission and the Biden administration were very smooth and very close. We were all aware of the strong relationship between Björn Seibert, President von der Leyen’s Head of Cabinet, and Jake Sullivan, Joe Biden’s National Security Advisor. They had a deep working relationship, especially during the crises we’ve been through. But the Democrats will no longer be there. We also know that Trump likes to change everything, to shake things up. The methods will also change, and as we will need to continue to have smooth communication and relations with the United States, we will have to adapt to this new situation.

Do you think a trade war between the USA and Europe is inevitable?

Before discussing a trade war, we need to take into account what was said during the campaign. It’s important to hear what was said and to prepare — while at the same time hoping that a trade war can be avoided, because this never benefits anyone.

The Union can structure itself to be strong and have real leadership. We need to develop a power dynamic that works in our favor. We now know Donald Trump’s transactional approach, and we must act in the same way. This is an essential element in transactional thinking. President Trump respects only one thing: the power dynamic.

Does Trump’s victory make it more likely that the Draghi report will be implemented?

Mario Draghi describes all our weaknesses and everything that needs to be done to accelerate the transitions we have undertaken and the Union’s competitiveness, which is losing momentum compared to the United States in particular. But in order to increase competitiveness, resources are needed — in other words, financing. There is no other solution — whether we like it or not — than to have access to public-private financing.

Public investment can come from either own resources or the budget. But we need to stop deluding ourselves. Everyone knows that own resources or the European budget will never enable us to raise the amounts recommended by the Draghi report. We therefore need a second component, which is obviously the elephant in the room: common debt.

In order to implement the ambitious plans outlined in the Draghi report, I see no other solution than to have access to common debt, which will enable us to immediately free up resources.

We can’t wait ten years. But it is possible. I’m in a good position to know this because, during Covid, we argued for this solution with Paolo Gentiloni, before President Macron and Chancellor Merkel threw all their political weight behind convincing all the member states of the need to have this common debt. They succeeded. We need to find this kind of political leadership once again — and soon.

One thing has changed considerably since 2020: France and Germany are politically weaker. Who could play this role in Europe now?

When faced with an existential threat — and this is once again the case for Europe — the only way to keep moving forward is to do so together. And that requires strong leadership. This is what Europe needs.

It’s not for me to say who should provide this leadership, but I do know that this is the way things work. Without leadership, we would never have been able to develop semiconductors, vaccines, increase our defense capabilities, or implement the recovery plan.

Can Ukraine still win the war following Donald Trump’s election?

The only solution to Vladimir Putin’s unspeakable aggression on Ukrainian territory is strong support for Kiev. This support has three essential components: firstly, military support, of course; secondly, financial support; and thirdly, humanitarian support for the millions of refugees who have had to flee the country.

On all three fronts, the United States and Europe have spent virtually equal amounts. The support has therefore been shared equally. But we must be very honest, the fatigue is palpable. It was felt even before the U.S. elections, by both Democrats and Republicans. A segment of public opinion is beginning to show signs of weariness, including among the Union’s largest states. Donald Trump has announced that he wishes to reduce his support for Ukraine. We shall see. After all, there is often a gap between intention and reality. The question that will very quickly arise for Europeans — and which I have no answer for — is this: if American support were to decrease — which I obviously don’t want to happen — what could and what would we want to do? What would the European response be? That’s the main question we will have to answer.

And what is that response?

Clearly, discussions will need to be held. They will have to be conducted with the necessary leadership at the level of the 27 member states.

This implies the ability to mobilize everyone. With Donald Trump’s election, this ability will have to be strengthened further in order to maintain the unity of the Union. This will be crucial, especially if Europe has to quickly decide what position to adopt if American support dwindles.

Do you understand President Zelensky’s concern?

Yes, it covers two fronts. The arms deliveries pledged by member states must obviously be increased. It is also crucial for Europe to increase its production capacity in all areas, not only for itself, but also for its allies. I must repeat: Europe truly has its back to the wall. It is essential that we maintain strong support and a significant presence because Ukraine is part of our continent. We’ve devoted a great deal of effort to it — now is not the time to let up on the pressure.

What can the Europeans do if Trump decides to call Putin, then Zelensky, to propose a peace treaty under pressure without consulting us?

The fact that you are asking this question indicates that this scenario is not out of the realm of possibility.

Those who are in charge today — which is no longer the case for me — must be prepared for this situation. What Europe’s citizens can expect is for the Union’s institutions to start formulating a response that is in our shared interest.

The French have been talking about “strategic autonomy” since at least Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber in the 1960s. Do you think we’ve talked about it almost too much to be truly credible?

Sometimes those who do the most talking, also do the most work. We have greatly advanced the idea of European strategic autonomy. For example, the creation of a sovereign satellite constellation, such as IRIS, to provide connectivity for our armed forces and, more generally, for our entire continent, is a concrete achievement.

In the beginning, there was no budget assigned for it. But we rose to the challenge. We also succeeded in developing our strategic autonomy with regard to vaccine production, even though we initially had no capacity in this field. In the space of about ten months, we became global leaders, proving our ability to respond with strategic medical autonomy for Covid-19 vaccines. Likewise, if we now have 67 semiconductor plant projects in Europe, where before there were none, it’s thanks to the efforts made with the European Chips Act. This isn’t lip service; these are concrete facts.

Furthermore, we have successfully implemented five regulatory packages to structure an information and digital space that protects our values, our fellow citizens, our children, and our businesses. Through the DGA, the DSA, the DMA, the Data Act and the AI Act, we have worked to ensure our strategic autonomy. In terms of defense, though we remain dependent on NATO and the Americans, we have increased our ammunition production capacity from 500,000 shells a year to over 2 million. This has been possible because we have worked together to reinforce our strategic autonomy.

Is this enough when Russia has entered into a war economy and is now producing over 3 million of them?

We must keep up the momentum. It’s like riding a bicycle: if you stop pedaling, you fall. We mustn’t stop to once again discuss things in vain, or draw up yet another “white paper”, “grey paper” or “green paper”. We need to move ahead with the initiatives already in place.

During his victory speech, Trump thanked Elon Musk, referring to him as a “super genius”, adding “we must protect our super geniuses”. What are your thoughts?

The fact that Elon Musk is a very successful entrepreneur is obvious. It would be absurd to not recognize this.

Is this a mea culpa?

Not at all. I held discussions with all platforms — sometimes firmly— whether it was Meta, Google, TikTok, Temu, or X. It is sometimes necessary to remember that even if certain messages are broadcast in the United States or elsewhere, they can also have repercussions in Europe, where we have regulations in place.

For example, prior to the discussion between Donald Trump and Elon Musk, I felt it was necessary to carry out regulatory stress tests alongside technical stress tests; this is not about controlling speech, which is free in Europe and the United States. The DSA does not regulate speech itself, but it does ensure that messaging in Europe is not amplified to the point of creating tsunamis of fake news or other waves of speech that our laws prohibit.

Was it your role to publicly clash with Elon Musk?

My role was to educate, so that all regulated platforms in Europe could be prepared for their responsibilities with full knowledge of the facts.

I had no resentment towards anyone. My role was to discuss the matter with all players before applying the law where necessary. I believe that my successors will continue down this path.