«In Ukraine, we are in a boxing ring—this is the 10th round» A Conversation with Tymofiy Mylovanov
Maria Tadeo
Grand Continent EU Correspondant19/11/2024
«In Ukraine, we are in a boxing ring—this is the 10th round» A Conversation with Tymofiy Mylovanov
Maria Tadeo
Grand Continent EU Correspondant19/11/2024
«In Ukraine, we are in a boxing ring—this is the 10th round» A Conversation with Tymofiy Mylovanov
President Joe Biden announced the United States will lift restrictions on long-range missiles hitting Russian targets in its territory. What do you make of this announcement? Is it a reversal of policy?
I’m not sure it is a complete reversal of policy.
First, if reports suggesting their use will be restricted to the Kursk region are true, it is clearly not a reversal of policy, but rather a PR package and public relations stunt. What we need is to be able to hit locations where Russia is launching missiles from, where they hold their aircrafts and weapons. If this is limited to Kursk, allegedly to hit North Korean troops, it sounds a little bit silly. Often Ukraine and its supporters can be very jubilant about these announcements only to find that they have overestimated the actual deliverables.
Then, if this is truly hands off, I find it strange that we would announce it to Russia before Ukraine can act on it. Moscow will now be in a position to move back some of its depots before we can hit them. My impression is that the US still feels obliged to inform Russia so that there is no surprise. In the past, Russia knew that F-16s jets were coming, that HIMARS, Patriots and Abrahams were being delivered. I find it very interesting that the US feels this obligation when Russia violates international law every day.
There is also the question of timing. How quickly can we proceed and under which conditions?
I would like to know more about these three points before saying it’s a policy reversal. I worry that it might not.
Assuming that Ukraine is given carte blanche, or some form of freedom of action that it hasn’t had before, is it too late to make a difference?
If Ukraine had been given all this, even a part of it, two years ago when the Russian front was collapsing in Kharkiv and Kherson, we would not be having this discussion today. We would be back to the de facto borders of 1991 or 2014 and we would be talking about peace or we would have forgotten this war.
The attempt at de-escalation has only encouraged Putin to prolong this tragedy.
Vladimir Putin has not yet reacted publicly to the announcement, but his entourage has already signalled that this is a provocative escalation. What is the Ukrainian view?
What escalation? They are sending 30.000 people a month to fight in Ukraine — they are being sent to be killed by their own people. If they could recruit 50.000 to be killed, they would. What escalation? Send another 100 missiles? They sent 200 on Sunday. And they would send 500 if they could. What is next — an attack on a NATO country or the start of a nuclear war because Ukraine has got long-range missiles after three years of war? They have used this rhetoric time and time again, and the only thing that actually happens is that it paralyses the West.
President Biden is leading the Western response, but he has just over two months left in office. How do you think the Trump administration will respond to this rhetoric once it takes office?
Trump will not be paralysed. He’s unpredictable, Putin knows he does not play by the usual rules and that’s bad for Russia. It is bad for China, it is bad for Iran. At least in the short term. He will be tough and decisive — that was lacking in the Biden administration. Is that good for Ukraine? I think it is, because the status quo was bleeding Ukraine to death.
The US administration is about to change – and so will the German government, if the polls are correct. Would this change be good for Ukraine?
I will respond by highlighting recent German actions: Olaf Scholz called Putin to demand de-escalation, and Putin responded by firing almost 200 missiles and drones at Ukraine. This is the diplomatic equivalent of a middle finger. The call was a bad idea, it made the German chancellor look weak. His position is well known: no Taurus missiles for Ukraine. CDU candidate Friedrich Merz looks more hawkish on Russia, which could be positive. The only thing I would say is that a change is needed. The current approach of fighting with both hands tied behind our back is not working — either for Ukraine or for Zelensky. We are entering the third year of the war and this new leadership will have a different approach to power. I’m not saying all these changes will be positive for Ukraine, I hope they are, but everyone wants change.
President elect Trump has indicated that he wants the war to end quickly. President Zelenskiy has also signalled an understanding that the end will come sooner under a Trump presidency. What is your assessment?
Things are moving fast and there is indeed an expectation that the war can be stopped quickly. I am more sceptical. We tend to overestimate the ability of those in power. My expectation is that the negotiations will drag on for months in search of bargaining power, and that the process will be very fragile. Putin is very good at this, pulling people back and forth, changing things at the last minute, derailing talks and blaming everyone else. He will negotiate in the hope that someone will make a mistake. Russia wants a dysfunctional agreement, it’s important to understand that, and possibly a veto in the future. He tried that with the Istanbul agreements two years ago. As for Ukraine, it is still using the rhetoric of the Victory Plan. I think we should use the rhetoric of the Peace Plan, which is more appealing to Trump’s MAGA base.
My point is: we should focus on security guarantees.
What do you think these guarantees would look like? It is by no means clear that Ukraine will receive an invitation to join NATO under Trump.
A peace agreement is about incentives and the dynamics it creates. Does it remove the incentives for Russia to attack Ukraine again because the price will be too high, or does it increase the incentives because the price won’t be high enough?
First of all, it’s about weapons for Ukraine. We have built a large army, probably the strongest in Europe in terms of combat, but it needs to become stronger in the future. That means training, technology, production and a committed rate of funding. For me, it is not so much an invitation to NATO as it is putting boots on the ground. If that happens, Ukraine will be safe. If that doesn’t happen, Ukraine will not be safe. People may not be ready to say this because they are afraid, but anyone in their right mind would know and understand that this is the solution. You have to have non-Ukrainian troops, we can call them peacekeepers, but they have to be physically located in Ukraine.
I imagine a West Berlin scenario for Ukraine. Russia knew that an attack on West Berlin wouldn’t be an attack on Germany, but on the Allied troops stationed there — and that would be a declaration of war. This internal deterrence was the only thing that stopped the Soviet Union from taking over West Berlin.
Finally, we need to stay in good shape. That means a stable political system, a stable economy and closer ties with the European Union.
Is EU membership non-negotiable for Ukraine?
Russia will try to replicate in Ukraine what it is currently doing in Georgia by supporting these soft alternatives to the EU. Anything that’s not a path to Europe will make us a Russian province. We have to get out of the neighbourhood. We have to become Europeans.
Is there anything that would make Ukraine walk away from the negotiating table?
Disarmament and formal, legal recognition of the occupied territories as Russian. That would derail everything procedurally for Ukraine.
It is very important that everyone understands this. The Constitution of Ukraine proclaims the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is imperative that this is upheld. The only alternative is to amend the constitution. Therefore, should an agreement be sought with territories that are no longer considered Ukrainian, this would require a change to the constitution, or it would be considered high treason. The individual or individuals responsible for signing this ratification would be accused of treason. It is unlikely that anyone would commit treason, not only due to the moral arguments, but also because they would be aware that they would be prosecuted in the future.
This means that the only remaining option is to amend the constitution. However, Ukraine, like any other democratic nation, has established safeguards to prevent hasty changes. This is to ensure that the parliament is not unduly influenced by external parties to relinquish the country’s sovereignty.
De facto it is one thing, but if we speak about legal recognition, Ukraine cannot do that.
The conversation has shifted now very quickly into territorial concessions in exchange for security guarantees. How do you reconcile the two?
The idea that this is all about territories it’s part of a Russian narrative. These territories are destroyed, burned to the ground, all mined and covered in explosives. Rivers are polluted, the wildlife is gone.
It is rather about the people. The fighting was so intense on the frontline, there are few people left. But some stayed, because they couldn’t move, or they were scared, such as the elderly. This is a profound humanitarian tragedy. Ukraine doesn’t want to give up territory because we have to protect our people.
But realistically, Ukraine must work politically and diplomatically to take back the territories. It must also build a stronger army. Then wait for an opening. History shows us Russia can collapse very quickly. It may take 10 or 30 years. Putin has spent a lot of money buying destroyed villages. I don’t know what he has achieved for Russia, but I don’t think there is a future for Russia under Putin. For Ukraine, we have to be smart and strategic.
Do you perceive a change in mood among Ukranians?
We are in a boxing ring. This is the 10th round. We are covered in blood, but still fighting. We are in a lot of pain. If we were abandoned, we would continue to fight. Ukrainians will not just succumb to Russia.
But we must also think about what happens after the fight is over.
President Zelenskiy will have to make difficult choices. He was a hero at the start of the war, but he will also have to adapt to this new political context. Will the Ukrainian government be able to adapt to the Trump presidency?
We have seen President Zelensky change.
He came to office as a Russian-speaking centrist who believed there was value in talking to Moscow. He very quickly learned that wouldn’t work and became as radical as the previous administration. These are the facts. He is a quick learner and he can adapt. I think he is exhausted.
There will be elections—we are a young democracy—and people will have a voice. There are alternatives and people will decide.
I don’t want to comment on the Ukrainian elections because we are not there yet, but people will want someone who will lead them to prosperity after the war.
Whether that is Zelensky or there is a better alternative, the people will decide.
Could elections lead to a pro-EU and a pro-Russian candidate running against each other, as happened before in Ukraine? Some say this could make things worse as the country rebuilds.
Ukraine will need space — and I hope the Trump administration will provide it — for a fair and proper election without much influence from Russia – even if I am sure they will try their best.
I hope it won’t matter that much. I can imagine a situation where a candidate sells a narrative that is in the interest of Russia. That means slowing down the integration process with the EU, suggesting the US isn’t that friendly either, and that we have our own path. No one will say he is pro-Russian — but it is the Russian narrative and it’s a vulnerability for us.
The military will matter too. They have moral authority and could support or even put forward a candidate. There will also be a civil society and business camp. Oligarchs are not what they used to be, but there is new money from industry, agriculture, high-tech and defence. All will have views on the candidate. If the military and an important part of civil society form a camp, they will certainly win, and the focus will be heavily on security.
Was this war, with all the destruction and pain it brought, worth the sacrifice?
This is our independence war. We stood up to Russia. If we hadn’t, they would have taken Kyiv with their tanks, changed the government, called a fake election and put someone in charge who would do Putin’s bidding. We would have had decades of darkness.
Enlightenment never reached Russia, and it would have disappeared from Ukraine. The reason why all this horror, this tragedy, so many people who lost their lives, happened is because we refused to surrender. Russia wants to swallow us up, with violence, with brutality. We have seen what happened in Chechnya, it was crushed to the ground, we see what Russia is doing in Georgia and Moldova. We resisted on a much larger scale. Russia threw everything on the battlefield to destroy Ukraine as a nation, and it failed.
We are going to have a generation that has been shaped by war. In some ways, I have experienced it myself, it can make you a better person, it can make you more empathetic to others. But it will also come with post-traumatic stress and serious mental and physical health problems.
We have a duty to this generation: to make Ukraine a place where they can thrive, in a country that upholds the values we say we are fighting for.
I would just say to our partners that the new world is going to be much more militaristic, and it will be for the next two to three decades. Don’t be afraid of terrorists and dictators. They are not as powerful as you think.
citer l'article
Maria Tadeo, «In Ukraine, we are in a boxing ring—this is the 10th round» A Conversation with Tymofiy Mylovanov, Nov 2024,