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A Conversation With Ruben Brekelmans, Dutch Minister for Defense

As we enter a year marked by a new political cycle and new threats, what should be the priority for the European defence?

The military threat coming from Russia is growing. Moscow has turned into a war economy and the Russian army has been able to deploy a large number of soldiers, consistently producing more weapons at a faster pace. 

In the Netherlands, our analysis tells us that even in the case of a ceasefire in Ukraine or an ending to the war, Russia would need just one year to have those troops operational again and deploy them somewhere else. This means that after a potential ceasefire they could put hundreds of thousands of soldiers on the border of a NATO country and carry out military exercises. Letting that happen would be a dangerous scenario for the world. With Russia, we should always be prepared. 

If we look at their military programs and the pace of military production, they are not just looking at Ukraine. Russia poses a threat to all of Europe.

It is very clear that we have to build up our collective defense. It is imperative. The question then becomes how to turn this new reality into a new goal. This will be a difficult political discussion in the Netherlands and Europe.

The NATO Secretary General suggested that the new target will end up somewhere north of 3%. The European Defense commissioner recently said he expected that as well — and President Trump may push for a higher number altogether. How do you anticipate these talks will go?

In the Netherlands, we had elections last year and all parties agreed they would commit to 2% of GDP defense spending. This target was in every manifesto. Then, we took about six months to form a government and agreed that the 2% target is the minimum. That is what we have budgeted. We can have a discussion about how to raise it but the fundamental question remains: how do we fund it? 

Do we raise taxes or cut costs from somewhere else? Our situation is not unique in Europe. 

To go from 2% to 3% for us would mean an extra 10 to 12 billion euros each year, which is substantial. This is not a simple discussion and we have to reach an agreement within the government and the Parliament. 

Within NATO, you have to reach consensus among 32 allies who have different visions and interests. At this stage, it is hard for me to predict the outcome of the NATO Summit and it is also hard to predict what the target will be or the timeline. But what is clear is that it will require difficult political choices.

Trump has signalled he wants sanctions on Russia to stay on the table seemingly as leverage to push peace talks and so far there has been no indication that the White House will reduce its military assistance. Is this a positive sign? 

Yes, especially after the declarations and speculations during the campaign and in the weeks prior to the inauguration about what Donald Trump would or would not do. There is a difference between talking about and talking to: what is important now is that we stop talking about what the new administration may do and actually talk to them. 

When it comes to security, but also our economic interests, we are closely interconnected and we will have to work together.

Nonetheless, there were serious concerns during the election campaign that President Trump could reverse Biden’s supportive policy stance on Ukraine. Have these early signals reassured you that won’t be the case?

There is no indication at this point that President Trump will radically change course on Ukraine. We must stop speculating about what the US may or may not do and start talking directly to the new administration. That is what the NATO Secretary General is doing and I think that is the right approach. 

We have to look at our common interests and the common challenges that we face. I’m confident that is the best way to find joint solutions.

At Davos, President Zelensky argued that Europe is not pulling its weight when it comes to security. Can you understand where his frustration is coming from? Were you surprised by his tone?

We are clear that we need to strengthen our military. From the point of view of what an army requires for combat, we are well aware of our strategic dependencies. We should do more not just in terms of quantity but also in terms of quality by establishing which capabilities we want to be able to provide for ourselves as Europeans.

Zelensky is very realistic. Ukraine is in a difficult situation on the battlefield. He is fighting a war every day and, when he weighs up what he needs and what we can actually provide at the moment, it is logical that he thinks the United States is still needed. It is also true that we have provided billions in assistance to Ukraine and that we have been extremely clear that we want Ukraine to emerge victorious from this war. 

Just as the discussions about Ukraine must include the Ukrainians, the European security architecture will be discussed with Europeans sitting at the table. The war is being fought on Ukrainian territory but it also poses difficult questions for Europe — it is not easy to bring 27 countries together and establish a shared position — it takes time.

I understand there is urgency, but I would not downplay either the very significant contribution that Europe has made and continues to make. 

What should Europe’s priorities be?

We need an open strategic autonomy. 

When it comes to the military, we should be able to produce much more and much faster in Europe, but we have to look at things pragmatically: if we want to have a well-equipped army, we need the US, the UK, Norway and other partners on board to be ready now. Our industry is not big enough and is not producing fast enough.

We can look at the example of the weapons systems that we have today — the Patriots are produced by American manufacturers. If we want more Patriot systems and more Patriot missiles for our army because our internal assessment tells us so, we simply cannot do it without American companies onboard. The same happens with NASAMS for instance, a Norwegian system.

A number of large European defense companies have clearly signaled they would like to see a European preference when it comes to procurement and long-term contracts…

Our challenge is to reconcile the needs of different countries. 

For Patriot missiles, we were able to bring together four countries and set up a production line in southern Germany. That meant an extra 1,000 units. That is a great example of what we should be doing. What worries me is that we are turning this conversation, which should be about how to guarantee our security, into a debate about whether we should have another big European fund: who pays, how we spend it, who is eligible and so on… It is going to be a long conversation, mostly about money. We do not have time for these discussions. As a minister, the most important thing for me right now is to get a lot more of these capabilities, and to get them quickly.

I can give long-term guarantees, but I am not convinced that a contract from a single country is enough for a manufacturer to set up a new production line or build a new site. The Netherlands is a relatively small country. In my view, we can do much more together, and the focus of our efforts should be on identifying priorities and pooling demand to create scale, rather than getting stuck in these long conversations about funding and who gets what contract. We don’t have time for that.

European preference is not a requirement for you? 

I am not against it per se. But I have to look at things in the most efficient and pragmatic way. We are 27 different countries with different systems and different preferences. If you look at EDIP — the European Defence Industry Programme — it is 1.5 billion euros. That is basically nothing compared to the needs we face, and yet we have been discussing what to do about it for months. There is still money in the recovery fund that we could use more efficiently. My worry is that these debates are distracting us from the goal we all share: to produce more.

Member States have limited fiscal space. Aren’t you afraid that if we don’t spend money to produce more in Europe and create jobs here, we will end up with extremely difficult fiscal conditions and no defence industry, still dependent on the political mood across the Atlantic? 80% of the aid going to Ukraine is funding the American defence industry, creating growth and jobs. Why not aim to create the same conditions here? 

Of course we are strongly in favour of creating much more production capacity and jobs within the EU, but the reality is that we cannot realize this without external partners (US, UK, Norway etc.). 

If I look at our Dutch military, for example our air force, various weapon systems are produced by or interconnected with American manufacturers. We need to keep them on board and encourage them to invest in production capacity within Europe. This creates win-win situations in our Trans-Atlantic relationship. Given the rising Defence budgets, it is much better for everyone to grow the pie than to increase the price of the pie.

The European Commission is expected to publish its White Paper on the future of European defence this spring. What elements are you pushing for from the Dutch perspective?

Our position is that we need to stimulate European production but it has to be fast, efficient and open. We should not send a signal to our partners — be it in the US, the UK or Norway — that European defense means closing Europe to them. That would be a bad signal.

We are very strong in the maritime domain, space is important for us and so is air defense. We will underline those areas to the Commission 

As we expand our military, a number of environmental regulations stand in our way. To give an example, the Netherlands is a small country and when we try to expand sites either for defense but also building houses into new areas, we run into environmental directives.

As we are looking to introduce exemptions we often find that the European directives are the norms posing the biggest challenge

This is something that needs to be addressed. One option would be to introduce exemptions on a European level to some of these environmental directives for the particular purpose of defense planning.

To grow an army, you need to be able to recruit. There is a debate about reintroducing conscription – an important cultural change brought about by the war in Ukraine. What has the Dutch experience taught you?

In the Netherlands, the Army is very popular. For us, the challenge is to absorb new recruits rather than find them.

We have introduced a voluntary programme called Service Year. The aim is that for a year you get to know the army and at the end of the year you are offered to stay in the army. Our target was that a third of the young people who participated in the programme would choose to stay. At the end of the year, we found that 80% decided to stay. About 60% are full-time and the other 20% are reservists. If you look at the number of vacancies, they are in the low hundreds and we have five to ten times more applicants for some positions. 

We need to grow our army, but we also want to do it efficiently. That means looking at costs. We need to be more innovative and work with the private sector. Overall, we are talking about modernising our army in terms of numbers, but also in terms of technology and training. 

Grow, change, train: these are the three pillars. Ultimately, we are building armies for a new era.