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The Dual Equilibrium Doctrine: A Conversation with Stéphane Séjourné

A majority of Europeans say they are concerned about Donald Trump, who never misses an opportunity to criticize the EU or question the very foundations of transatlantic relations. As our Eurobazooka poll shows, in some countries such as Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands, a clear majority of citizens consider him an “enemy.” How can Donald Trump’s political approach to Europe be described today: is he a strategic adversary or simply a temporary rival?

The Europeans have often guaranteed a positive transatlantic relationship — on defense, economic, and trade issues — even when the United States has changed its approach.

If I am to take the comments of the White House and certain members of the new administration at face value, Europe is no longer really an ally in their minds, but rather one of the world powers with which the United States wants to maintain a balance of power.

Their vision of Europe is changing — for the United States, we are just one continent among others. 

This is a real change.

In concrete terms, what does this change mean for the Union’s strategic positioning?

This means abandoning a certain naivety and not blindly relying on US support: the US will not always be willing to come to Europe’s rescue. In terms of trade relations, this means becoming more ambitious in our quest for independence and therefore accelerating our sovereignty policy.

How does this policy of reducing dependencies fit in with opening up the EU, given that Member States have the largest number of free trade agreements in the world?

I am seeking to maintain two forms of equilibrium. 

The first is between openness to the outside world and sovereignty. We must continue to sign trade agreements — ones that are more targeted (particularly with regard to raw materials), more pragmatic and less dogmatic. We are no longer talking about major agreements such as Mercosur, which took 20 years to negotiate.

At the same time, it is essential that we reform our customs system. Today, the EU does not have a unified system capable of accurately tracking what enters and leaves the continent.

The second area of equilibrium concerns the internal market. We must remove internal barriers with a view to openness and simplification, in keeping with a liberal approach. But this must be accompanied by a Buy European Act, establishing European preference in certain strategic markets.

It is this dual equilibrium that we must achieve — openness to the world and protection of our external borders; internal openness and a preference for Europe.

This new economic equation will enable us to face a more protectionist and hostile world, to preserve our jobs and our economies.

These are the two objectives we must achieve. It is not one or the other — it is one and the other.

How is the democratic crisis in the United States and around the world redefining the equilibrium in relation to the rule of law, and what are the implications for Europe?

The best way to defend our model is to be on the offensive at home. Not only on the issue of values and the democratic model, but also on our economic models and our decarbonization strategy.

We have two options in the current context: either we adapt to a new model that is being imposed on us, or we consolidate our own model. In order to defend our interests, it is clearly preferable to opt for strengthening.

A counterattack then?

Yes, and we will counterattack.

How?

This means standing firm on matters of values. 

To come back to the American issue, the United States is a great liberal democracy. It has checks and balances, and the strength of this model also lies in its structure and institutions. We see this in the executive orders issued by Trump, which were intended to bypass certain checks and balances. 

The burden of maintaining American democracy falls on the Americans. It’s up to the opposition to guarantee checks and balances. The United States is founded on the ability of its people to determine their government, to vote, to have free elections, and to be an economically open continent. 

On our side, we must show that there is still a path to growth and prosperity built on this foundation, especially the rule of law. We must strengthen in Europe.

European public opinion has clearly expressed its feelings towards Trump. In the latest Eurobarometer survey, 80% of respondents said they were in favor of retaliatory measures against US tariffs. Could this pave the way for a new, more intense and less frosty phase in the process of European integration?

Europe cannot only be built as a reaction to the transatlantic relationship.

We must, of course, bring the ongoing discussions on tariffs to a successful conclusion. But we must also continue to pursue trade agreements with other countries.

This is the approach we will maintain throughout our term.

The approach we are advocating today consists of following a strategy of sovereignty, which implies in a way de-risking for the transatlantic relationship. This means achieving diversification in both economic and defense matters, even if the latter is a more sensitive issue.

We must also recognize that we are not in a balanced power relationship with the United States: Donald Trump is looking for “win-win” solutions. For him, this means that the United States must win twice, and we must lose twice. He wants to show that he is capable of winning victories against the world and against his partners.

The European model is completely different: rather than winning political victories — which, incidentally, are often not economic or trade victories — we seek to cooperate and find consensus.

We have a cooperative model — not an aggressive one.

What purpose does the Union serve if, like the United Kingdom, it accepts 10% tariffs without a response?

The paradox is that we criticize the methods used by the United States but, for political reasons and because of the symbolic status of the two continents, we want to do the same thing.

There will be a response, but it will be guided by European economic interests. We must distinguish between political victory and economic pragmatism.

If there is no agreement, will the EU retaliate?

If we have to retaliate, we will.

But we have to be smarter than the Americans.

For example, if we look at the aerospace industry, the finished product that is the Airbus aircraft cannot be subject to unfair competition from Boeing to the tune of 10% simply because we decide not to retaliate.

In this context, there is a real economic interest in doing so.

But on other issues, there may be an interest in not doing so, particularly when it comes to complex value chains, where retaliation could affect jobs or the fabric of our relationships, including with other countries.

Will the Union be ready to activate its anti-coercion instrument?

This may be part of the discussion.

For now, we are still discussing the scope of the negotiations rather than considering possible tariff levels. 

This was the approach pushed by the Americans. We had two options: refuse to engage in dialogue, accept the tariffs and retaliate; or engage in constructive discussions.

Europe’s interest clearly lies in the second option, which can preserve economic value for our businesses.

How do these discussions fit into the Commission’s broader strategy, including with regard to China?

We are at a turning point where the world is becoming increasingly protectionist, with many countries seeking to diversify their supply chains, secure access to raw materials, and consume and produce locally.

These discussions with the United States are accelerating the transition to a new European equilibrium: on the one hand, a necessary openness to the world and to trade agreements; and on the other hand, the strengthening of the European internal market, the removal of intra-European barriers and the protection of the Union’s external borders.

Just as our economic strategy cannot be viewed solely through the lens of transatlantic relations, our relationship with China cannot be dependent on the United States.

Can the Union build a truly win-win partnership with Beijing?

First, we must reduce our dependencies in strategic areas — but this is a de-risking strategy, not a decoupling strategy.

We are currently drawing up a list of 17 critical raw materials that we believe we risk becoming more than 65% dependent on China for by 2030. We will then review our policies from 2030 onwards to accelerate this process.

Furthermore, we must protect our market, particularly in light of European production standards, which differ greatly from those in China. E-commerce is a good example of this: every year, 6 billion small parcels pass through European customs without their standards really being checked.

It is therefore urgent to speed up customs reform, set up a common database, strengthen border protection, and standardize inspection procedures. It is unacceptable that two European ports would apply such vastly different levels of vigilance — one rejecting one package in 2,000, the other one in 2 million. These discrepancies reveal major flaws in the European border control system, which we must urgently address.

Do you believe that an agreement based on market access and job creation in Europe is possible?

A second issue concerns the rebalancing of our trade relationship with China.

We need to significantly reorient our policy towards Beijing. If Chinese players want access to the European market — representing 450 million consumers — then a number of necessary technology transfers must be imposed in areas where Europe has fallen behind, but where China is at the forefront, such as batteries.

We must also recognize that the European market is a growth market for Beijing. To access it, a number of conditions must be met: the value chain must be European, as well as components and production. Part of production must be carried out in Europe and not solely be imported from China.

If we look at a concrete example such as the automotive industry, are you concerned that instead of seeing a genuine transfer of technology that will benefit business and employment in Europe, European countries will find themselves relegated to the role of mere assembly sites?

If Chinese cars are to be sold in Europe — which in itself is not a problem — they must also be able to be produced in Europe, with European components, high-quality jobs, and a European value chain.

Our market cannot solely be a market for importing or assembling Chinese components.

Our future doctrines will therefore need to include very specific criteria for European production. This is already reflected in the text of the strategic dialogue on the automotive industry.

Is this not also a matter of dependency?

I would say that it is also a question of safety and security. 

On the one hand, it is a question of economic security. Having European production is essential because we rely on integrated value chains, which depend in particular on the production of raw materials such as steel. Stimulating demand in these sectors is therefore key to preserving a strategic value chain.

On the other hand, it is simply a question of security. Electric cars are, by their very nature, connected. This means that they can be deactivated remotely — from Austin for a Tesla, from Shenzhen for a BYD — by companies that are not subject to European law. Once these components are widely used in vehicles on our roads, this will become a real problem.

That is why we must require European components in vehicles and ensure that their interface is controlled from Europe. This also requires a paradigm shift.

More concretely, what strategy should be adopted regarding the tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles imposed by the European Union in 2024 and the price commitments proposed by Beijing?

For the moment, these tariffs are in force to re-establish a level playing field. However, a comprehensive agreement may be necessary.

The aim is not to examine each sector separately, as has too often been the case. We must now adopt a holistic view of the European market. In trade negotiations, we must consider the overall economic equilibrium, not just individual sectors.

What strategic objectives should Europe pursue at the next EU-China summit? Do you see any possibility for joint climate commitments that could have an impact on the preparations for COP 30?

China is now leading the way in the electrification of its economy and could soon achieve a level of decarbonization in its energy mix comparable to Europe’s.

This progress is not driven by ideological or dogmatic considerations, but by economic factors. This shows that the decarbonization of our economy, as well as the rules we set during the last Commission term — which we are striving to preserve despite strong political pressure in the European Parliament — also meet economic and strategic objectives.

In our dialogue with China, there is common ground to be found on electrification and the transformation of the energy mix.

What’s more, we can see the influence of the European model: the acceleration of decarbonization in other economies has often been driven by access to the European market. This shows the Union’s strength.

In this context, US pressure to break with China is neither in the Union’s interest nor in line with its current strategy.

A key element of Europe’s decarbonization strategy — as well as its industrial protection strategy — is the carbon border adjustment mechanism, which will take effect in 2026. How will this fit with China’s accelerated decarbonization efforts?

Indeed, for Europe, this raises the question of redefining what we mean by European production — it can no longer be based solely on sustainability or decarbonization criteria in trade, since decarbonized energy mixes are increasingly converging.

Protecting the European market can therefore no longer be based solely on the fact that our energy mix is cleaner than China’s: a preference for European production must become a criteria in its own right.

The same applies to taxonomy, which had a dual purpose: to support our technological sovereignty and to finance the transition. We must therefore go further, particularly by adding a “Made in Europe” dimension to green financing.

What are the EU’s key expectations for the NATO summit that begins today in The Hague?

I am convinced that we will only make progress on defense issues if we are able to reach a defense and security treaty at some point in the future, which could potentially include the United Kingdom.

Even targeted measures already struggle to achieve consensus in the field of defense. How would a new treaty better meet current needs?

I am convinced that, beyond our institutions and the Commission, a new collective agreement will be necessary, underpinned by a shared political will among those states that wish to strengthen European security guarantees.

The first signs of this can already be seen. Last spring, during the initial meetings held in Paris and London, the participants — the British, as well as the Finns, French, Germans, and Italians — expressed a common desire to build something new.

In order to develop a credible European industry and secure adequate funding, a new political framework is needed. This should be based on groundbreaking agreements on security guarantees, which must include the issue of nuclear deterrence — whether by the United Kingdom or France — in order to determine how this could become an additional means of protection.

Too often, our thinking on defense has focused on tools. Today, we are facing a kind of impasse: recurring budgetary arguments, financial trade-offs, difficulties in coordinating joint programs, the absence of a structured European market, and persistent uncertainty surrounding procurement criteria and European preference in defense matters.

Could this new treaty become a reality with 27 members, or are you considering other formats?

For some states, these discussions must be seen as complementing NATO — as a second line of defense.

Those interested in this option want to first understand what it will specifically bring them in terms of security. However, the tools themselves offer no guarantees: neither the budget nor capabilities are sufficient to be credible.

What Europeans are looking for are new guarantees for collective security. This has to be a political choice. This means coming up with a new way of helping each other, based on renewed capabilities, new synergies, and innovative diplomatic tools.

We need to use our political capital to lay the groundwork for a new agreement. What do we want to do with our armies? How can we deploy them together? What role can French and British nuclear deterrence play at the European level? How can we ensure the long-term protection of our eastern borders, which are first and foremost Europe’s borders? Can we consider them to be a shared general interest? And what budget are we prepared to allocate to them?

If we remain focused solely on the tools, the counterarguments will always prevail. This is the main obstacle facing some advocates of European defense: they focus on resources, mechanisms, structures, etc., without first ensuring that there is political agreement — a goal, a direction.

Without this common foundation, there can be no consensus.

What would this mean in terms of concrete benefits?

In terms of defense, the priority is to implement concrete measures that benefit countries that are waiting for new security guarantees — and that need them.

But we must also take into account those countries that already have significant resources and feel less exposed —such as France and the United Kingdom. In this case, it is a matter of guaranteeing their sovereignty.

It is imperative that countries which are not signatories to any potential accord cannot hinder the capabilities, technologies, or deployment of defense industries.

If we do not give their defense industries assurances that this sovereignty will be fully respected — by guaranteeing access to raw materials, the stability of European markets, and protection against any foreign interference that could hinder technological development or international cooperation — then the entire structure will be weakened.

We need a comprehensive agreement.

By “non-signatory countries,” are you including members of the Union?

No, only third-party countries.

With regard to governance of the Union more broadly, what concrete steps do you have in mind to simplify decision-making and make it more transparent and faster?

Faster, for starters.

Flexibility and adaptability have never been part of the EU’s DNA. But this is also its strength: the stability of its rules and the predictability of its standards can make it much more competitive today.

But we need more flexibility, both in practical and structural terms.

Progress is possible. The simplified “omnibus” legislation, for example, gives us more room for maneuver in the face of rapid changes in the geopolitical context, particularly the economic context. Sending one piece of legislation to Parliament per month means that measures can be adopted within three months.

This is what we did recently on automotive fines. Others will follow — on ETIs, defense, agriculture, technology, etc. This method improves our responsiveness without sacrificing democratic standards.

There remains the structural question: how can we reconcile democratic deliberation and efficiency? Joint decision-making procedures are slower, but this longer timeframe is part of our equilibrium. We must embrace it — while at the same time modernizing it.

I am in favor of reforming European structures. Today, the highly compartmentalized organization of the Commission limits the overall vision. Commissioners must have a global ambition, but they are assigned narrow areas of responsibility. We must move away from this segmented approach and give everyone back full political responsibility.

The Commission’s proposal on the new Multiannual Financial Framework is expected in July. How do you see the next two years of negotiations? Without own resources or new borrowing, around €20 billion per year will have to be allocated to repaying the NGEU recovery plan.

The paradox is that everyone is focused on their own budget or line items, but very few are talking about the overall amount of the future European budget. In my opinion, this is where the main issue lies: we need to move toward a politically and financially sustainable system that stabilizes the budget closer to 2% than 1% of European GDP.

We are facing a growing number of challenges and it is imperative to put in place a stable budget that is commensurate with these new requirements. Otherwise, we will have to make painful choices, with the risk of having to abandon certain priorities, which could, over time, fuel rejection of the Union.

It is therefore necessary to open a clear debate on two fronts: on the one hand, on own resources; on the other, on debt repayment. Will these new resources be used for repayment? Should the debt be repaid or simply rolled over? These questions remain open.

An initial proposal for budgetary architecture will indeed be presented in early July. The overall amount has not yet been set, but we must move forward on own resources with a pragmatic approach that maximizes revenue without increasing burdens on member states.

How?

I have proposed the creation of a European ESTA. The €20 or €25 that an American tourist would pay to come to Madrid, Paris, or Berlin does not hinder mobility and could directly contribute to the EU budget. It would be a resource that causes no pain and has no fiscal impact on European households and businesses.

More generally, we need to identify new sources of funding that are independent of national contributions, especially as the trade agreements we are signing are leading to a gradual reduction in customs revenues.

The share of the budget contributed by member states cannot be the only one to increase. In France, we are already seeing objections to the amount of the national contribution. It is therefore essential to devise a mechanism to increase the budget in other ways.

That is really the key question.

There is also a question of flexibility in this regard. Today, budgets are set for seven years and prepared three years in advance, which means that the budget currently under discussion will continue to have an impact until 2035.

Without greater flexibility in the preparation and execution of the budget, the Union will be ill-prepared to respond to future crises.