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A Conversation with Anders Fogh Rasmussen

How do you assess the outcome of The Hague NATO Summit?

I am very happy about it. In some ways, the communique is better and stronger than I had expected. In particular, at the very beginning, it is stated that all allies are committed to Article 5 — and it is called an «ironclad commitment». It abandoned the uncertainty that has undermined the credibility of the defense clause, so that’s a very important statement. 

Moreover, all allies have signed up to the 5% target by 2035. 

While personally I would have liked a tighter timeline, I think it is fine that all allies are committed and with no exemptions —  including Spain which will have to live up to that target as well. 

Certainly there is a very clear statement of support for Ukraine and I think the formulation implies that the US will also continue its military support for Ukraine. These are the reasons why I’m very satisfied.

How would you define the transatlantic relationship today?

A tense relationship. The Hague Summit has eased some of the tensions, but there remain some, for instance on trade. 

Can military allies be at trade war with each other?

It is a good question. In the NATO treaty we also have Article 2. 

It is less well known than Article 5, but in Article 2, it is stated that the allies will try to solve trade disputes peacefully and they will increase economic relations between allies. 

To declare trade war against Europe is in contradiction with Article 2 of the NATO treaty.

In that respect, Trump and the US do not live up to their obligations according to the treaty. 

But it is for the European Union to address that issue. I do hope that the EU will take a firm stance and through pressure on the United States achieve a good final trade agreement with the United States — not only a tariff agreement, but a general trade agreement.

Are the US and Europe strategically aligned?

The wording in the communique was underpinned by a public statement from Trump before the meeting where he said «we are with you all the way» ; and after the meeting where he said «I’m supporting all this. If I didn’t, I wouldn’t be here.» 

So we are still allies, but it does not change the fact that Europe must be able to stand on its own feet.

We must be able to defend ourselves. You can call it «European autonomy» or «to stand on our own feet», but it is the same: we will have to invest much more in our own security.

Beyond trade, there is also a territorial question: the US wants to annex Greenland. As a former Prime minister of Denmark, do you react to this interference operation?

From a NATO perspective, it could be handled just like the occasional dispute between Turkey and Greece. The Secretary General has an important moderating role in that. So far, we have solved those disputes peacefully. I think the same would go for a dispute on Greenland. 

But I do not think we will reach that stage at all. 

Why?

Firstly, in the US, Greenland is not a big issue: it is in the head of Trump, but in Congress, there is no majority for a military action against Greenland. 

Secondly, the Greenlanders do not want to be part of the United States.

Everybody saw the contrast between the very cold reception to Vice President Vance in Greenland and a very warm reception of President Macron. 

Was this visit a strong signal?

Yes, President Macron’s visit to Greenland sent a signal to the US that Europe stands united behind Denmark.

One could wonder: why do not seem preoccupied.

I am calm.

Why?

Be it about international security or – about strategic interest in critical minerals, the US can get it as they wish already. 

What do you mean?

We have a defense agreement between Denmark and the US dating back to 1951. 

Within that framework, the US is invited to expand its military presence in Greenland.

Actually, we would welcome it. 

During the last three decades they have reduced the military presence and we would welcome more American military presence in Greenland. 

When it comes to extraction of critical minerals, we have for a long time encouraged the US to invest more in Greenlandic mining, but so far without any success. They could just invest much more in mining in Greenland. 

So they can get it as they wish militarily and also economically.

Yet, Trump wants more: he seeks land grab.

Well obviously the Americans will never seize this territory.

But don’t you think there is a serious risk that he acts? How is Denmark preparing?

There is no ongoing discussion between Denmark and the US on governmental level about that particular issue. 

As long as it’s an idea in the head of Trump without backing in the US Congress, I think we can be calm.

In a broken world, do you think that alliances are a merely European concept now?

I think Europe actually serves as an excellent and very positive example of the benefits of collective alliances.

We created NATO to ensure security in the North Atlantic region — that is North America, the Atlantic and Europe. So far, it has been the most successful peace movement in generations. We have secured this part of the world. 

We created the European Union as an instrument to prevent war on the European continent. Once again, it has been a great success. 

Collective, multilateral organizations can actually serve as a peacekeeping instrument. I know that many people in the Asia-Pacific region look to Europe as an example of what could and what should be done to preserve peace in the region.

Now that the 5% target has been agreed on, how do we make sure that an increased budget is concretely translated into an increased security for the European? 

The only way here is to reinforce our efforts to acquire critical enablers that we are lacking in Europe. We have to reduce our dependence on America. 

For instance, when it comes to space, the US has 250 satellites, the Europeans only 50.

When it comes to strategic airlift, we have a lot of troops in Europe, but we can’t move them — we are dependent on American transport capacity. So we have to acquire transport planes. We have to be able to do air-to-air refueling while fighter jets and transport machines are flying. We should be able to suppress enemy air defense systems. We should acquire drones and counter-drone systems and, in general, step up when it comes to electronic warfare. 

Last but not least: if we envision a minimal U.S. presence in Europe, then we will also have to discuss our nuclear capability. In that respect, I welcome the indications of President Macron that France might consider putting its nuclear capacity at the disposal of Europe.

There is a broad range of requirements that need to be fulfilled to make sure that the 5% translate into an increased capacity.

On the nuclear issue, a conversation emerges in Poland and in Germany — the beginning of a debate at least — on the possibility for these countries to develop their own nuclear weapons. Are you worried?

The countries you mentioned have signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 

This means that their nuclear neighbours, such as France, also have the responsibility to preserve the NPT. In other words: it is clear that if France and the UK refuse to put their nuclear capacity at the disposal of the whole of Europe, of course it will fuel the discussion on the acquisition of the nuclear weapons elsewhere.

Many countries are now reflecting on it as they have seen that, at the end of the day, it may be that the possession of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee of their security. 

Do you think we could witness proliferation in Europe and see major European countries withdrawing from the NPT?

We are not there yet.

I hope France will answer the call by showing a willingness to locate — if needed and if wanted — nuclear weapons on German soil, Polish soil, or somewhere else. That has to be discussed carefully, of course.

What do you think of the proposal by the Baltic countries, Finland and Poland to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention to put landmines along the frontier line with Russia?

I understand these countries.

How likely do you think a Russian move, ground invasion in the Baltic region is? 

Destabilizing operations are already taking place. But according to several Intelligence agencies in Europe, Russia will be capable of attacking a NATO country by the end of this decade. 

This is why the timeline for reaching the 5% target should have been tighter. 

Now we give 10 years — I would have preferred five years. It will be reviewed by the end of this decade, in 2029, so if the situation is very serious at that time, I think that could be the wake-up call. 

The fact is that today Russia invests more in defense than the rest of Europe altogether. Despite the fact that the Russian economy is of the same size as Italy.

It is embarrassing.

They are a war economy and we are still thinking in a peacetime way — when it comes to investments, tender rules, delivery terms. All that delays the invention of new weapons, the purchase of new weapons, the deployment of new weapons.

We really have to speed up.

Are you confident that the Europeans can deliver on their continuing support towards Ukraine given that Russia might want to take advantage of the transatlantic divide?

After the NATO Summit, it seems clear to me that the US will continue its support for Ukraine.

We shouldn’t forget that the value of the European support for Ukraine is bigger than the value of the US assistance. Having said that, we should keep in mind that value is not the whole thing here: the capacities that the US delivers are much more sophisticated and advanced than what we do in Europe. So we still need American support. 

If the Americans were to withdraw —  even if I don’t think they will — we have no choice. We will have to replace it as fast and as well as we can.

Can we do that by today’s standards?

Yes and no.

No, because the capacity in the European defence industry is too small.

Yes, because if you are threatened, you will have to make new inventions, you will have to think creatively — so far the Ukrainians have demonstrated an impressive strategic creativity.

Should we take inspiration from the Ukrainians?

Absolutely — and I would suggest going even further. Instead of relying on heavy European defense industries, we should invest directly in Ukrainian defense industries. 

They have a very skilled young generation when it comes to the use of new technology. By investing directly in Ukrainian industries, we can achieve much more for less.

We should also attract much more private investment to European defence companies. 

In that respect, it’s really embarrassing that the so-called ESG rules prevent private investment in defense. Hopefully leaders will decide at the next European Council that private defense investments are both needed and in full accordance with these rules.

When we look at the recent polls, there is sort of a political momentum: the majority of Europeans think that Trump is a threat and that we should «buy European» on our defense. Yet this strong demand still lacks a real political offer. How to politically seize this moment?

We are living a very dangerous, historic moment: we should look at it as an opportunity. 

Sure, people prefer to invest in better education, better elderly care, better childcare, etc. 

But given that we need to invest in defence, I think it would be much more popular to spend money on European technology, investing in European defense companies. 

There is no way around this: we have to reduce our dependence on the US.

In the short term, it will be quite a challenge because today 80% of weapons and ammunition purchased in Europe comes from outside Europe. Most of it — from the US. 

When it comes to defense, weapons, and ammunition, Europe must learn to produce for itself: it is time to speed up.