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A conversation with Commissioner Kubilius 

Are Russian incursions into Polish, Estonian and Romanian airspace a provocation or a test of resolve?

With Russia, every provocation is a test of resolve. 

When 20 drones enter the Polish airspace, that is no mistake.

It is a clear provocation with the objective of testing how strong our anti-drone defense is on the Eastern flank.

NATO reacted quickly and effectively, sending aircrafts immediately into the sky to destroy these drones. Our air defense is ready, strong and capable of defending us against enemy airfighters, even missiles. 

But to deal with drone incursions, we need to develop further capabilities. The radars we use to detect missiles are not enough, because drones fly lower and it takes a different type of technology to detect them. This is an area where we can learn from Ukraine. They have developed new technology; radars, acoustic sensors, interceptors, even machine guns to shoot them down from the ground more effectively. 

We need to get better at this and I am pushing for it. 

You say NATO acted effectively. At the same time putting fighter jets in the sky to shoot down cheap drones isn’t cost effective. 

This is a learning process for us too and this is why we need specific capabilities and that is exactly what we are going to do with our proposal to build a Drone Wall along the member states bordering Russia. 

Fighter jets are indeed meant for a different mission. Ukraine offers a good example for us. They have developed tailored-made, anti-drone technology that is effective and has been tested to great success in battle. 

But it should be clear to Russia that we will respond effectively to defend our member states and their airspace, which is a matter of sovereignty — that is clear to all of us. 

President Trump suggested the incursion into Poland may have been a mistake. Are you confident the US will protect NATO territory against aggression? 

As I mentioned before, when you have that amount of drones flying into another country’s airspace the entire night, I don’t believe that is a mistake. It is not an incident. What Russia’s motivation may be – we can speculate, but that is not the point. 

As for the United States, that is a broader and more complicated question. I do believe the US will participate in the defense of NATO territory and play its part in our collective plans. The question is: what is our defense plan – and how do we respond to aggression? 

I would argue that we need to work on a new mandate because ultimately, what does aggression mean? Before, it used to mean tanks rolling into your territory, combat jets fighting in your sky, that is the start of an invasion. NATO would be called and article 5 would be triggered. 

But  what if it isn’t tanks, but 100 drones, 200 drones? How do we respond to that? Is that below article 5 and what would our reaction plan be? 

I believe the nature of war has fundamentally changed. Ukraine proves that. There are elements of classical warfare, but there is also a new way of waging war. This is why we have to look at classical defense, but also new capabilities. 

We need to be prepared on the ground, in the seas, in the sky and even space, which is also an important part of my portfolio in which Europe has shown it is much more competitive than many assumed, works better together and I’m proud to say can even compete with Starlink systems. 

What constitutes aggression in 2025? What is the threshold?

That is not for me to decide alone, this is a decision that involves the different member states and NATO. But as defense Commissioner, what I can say is that we need a new mindset. 

A missile attack would be an aggression if we apply the old playbook, but let’s not ignore the fact that a single drone attack can be as lethal. If your territory comes under attack from 100 drones, you are going to be hit, it will cause damage and it can kill. Just because these are drones, not a missile,  it shouldn’t mean it’s not as serious. If we allow that to happen, the Kremlin will be emboldened. Each time, they’ll say “oh sorry, that was a mistake”.

That is dangerous. It’s not a traditional occupation and it’s not a traditional way of fighting. But we don’t want to be in that gray zone. So in my view, we have to be prepared for every scenario and, I insist, leave the old playbook behind. We need a new mindset for this new world. 

In this new world, that could also mean retreat from the United States. Independently of the Trump administration, which NATO accommodated with a new 5% spending target and flattery, what should Europe do to ensure it can defend itself on its own terms? 

The president of the Commission has talked about “independence, independence” and I can only agree. We have talked about Pax Europea and that is the way forward. The US has indicated, for a long time now – it is not just Trump — that it will shift its priorities and sees a strategic need for greater American presence in the Indopacific with China in mind.  As a result, they have also indicated that we will have to take care of our security to a much higher degree. Our assumption that America would always be present, as the main guarantor of peace in Europe, does not apply the way it did before. We have to look at this rationally, not emotionally. 

If this was a marriage, it doesn’t mean that we are heading for a chaotic divorce. In fact, one of my mantras as Defense Commissioner is that we should not compete with NATO. We must strengthen the European pillar of NATO, but we should not be in competition. We need to raise funding, use our industrial policy and the tools that we have alongside the member states, but this should not mean a chaotic split. To say Europe should take care of its defense is a manifestation of a new reality. The idea that we could sit back, enjoy the peace dividend and not spend, is over. 

But that is our responsibility. I don’t view this as a dramatic statement, but the logical conclusion of the context that we are in. And, since you refer to the NATO summit, the end result  was not just a commitment from the Europeans, the United States said it also committed to NATO collective defense.. 

How do you avoid a chaotic split?

We need practical agreements with the Americans. 

To replace all the capabilities that the US is currently providing, for us it will take time. So we need to build our industry, ramp up production and  there needs to be a clear plan on how we intend to replace some of these capabilities. 

In some cases — take long-range capabilities like HIMARS, for example — our industry is not producing enough or fast enough. We will still need to procure them from the US in the short term, but in parallel shall build our own industry. What is important is that we don’t have any gaps. 

You mentioned a new Pax Europea, what does that entail? 

It means strength and deterrence, but it should also be accompanied by democratic ideals, an inspiration. We have to be strong enough as Europeans to deter aggression, but we should also offer a vision of progress and democracy. 

Some argue Putin invaded Ukraine because he feared NATO expansion, or he believes Ukraine could one day join. I disagree with that view. This is a regime that only thinks in terms of survival. Putin only cares about his survival. An independent, democratic, Ukraine anchored in the West posed a danger to Russia because it would bring about questions for the Russian people. Why is Ukraine becoming more developed? Why is Ukraine more prosperous and doing better than us? The answers to that question represent a threat to the regime. 

In what way?

Putin is terrified of Ukraine’s democratic success. I do not believe in the theory that Putin aims to be Peter, the Great, and that is his motivation. I believe he is scared of the mirror effect comparing a prosperous, independent Ukraine and Russia. 

This is why I look at Pax Europa as strength, but also as an aspirational democratic project. My view is that enlargement of the Union represents an opportunity. Not only in terms of security, since Ukraine is now the most combat-experienced army on European soil, but also a common, democratic project. Russia fears that politically as much as it fears strength. We have to accomplish both. 

Underpinning those aspirations, is the question of financing. In order to accomplish these goals, Europe must have the necessary financial resources. Do you support eurobonds for defense? 

The short answer is I don’t think it’s necessary at this stage. But let me give you a longer answer.

If you look at the pledges that member states have made, the commitment of 5% which has been agreed under NATO — where 3.5.% will go to hard defense capabilities, at least — and the instruments we have presented as the Commission, I do not believe the central issue is a lack of resources. 

Most of the contribution will come from member states, that is true, but if you run the numbers, we should average 3% defense spending from 2028 to 2035. This 3% means an additional 600 billion euros per year. During a seven year period, that means 4.2 trillion euros. You could argue some of this funding won’t go just into buying weapons, but the bulk of it will go into hard defense capabilities. 

My assumption is that this is a substantial amount. 

The problem that I see is two-fold. We need a clear picture to understand what is the aggregated demand, because it has to be cohesive, and whether we can frontload some of this financing. 

We are talking about 4 trillion euros total, but it is also true that the big numbers won’t begin to show up until later. And we need this before 2030. 

The issue, therefore, isn’t additional resources, but mobilizing the capital sooner? 

Correct, that is my view. I trust member states when they say they will spend and make good on their pledges, because everyone understands security now is absolutely essential.  

The question isn’t funding, it’s what I like to call the financial engineering to make this available sooner. I can’t tell you exactly how this will look like as we have now only entered, for example, on the next MFF. Europe tends to be good at finding creative solutions, so can we frontload? That is the central question, rather than Eurobonds, at this point. 

Beyond the funding, how do you ensure future military spending will be cohesive and interoperable?

The industry is very fragmented. Mario Draghi pointed that out in this report. It is clear that member states will do the bulk of the buying, and we do not aim to replace them, but it needs to be cohesive. We have to incentivize joint procurement and joint development to overcome this fragmentation. We have already laid out some instruments, like the SAFE, ASAP and the EDIP, for example, but more can —- and should be done. 

But we have to be honest too: it is not always easy. There is still a national instinct, politically, defense is still mostly seen as a domestic matter and our armies operate in that traditional fashion. As I keep saying, this new context calls for a new mentality. 

We don’t want to replace the member states, and we understand there is a level of secrecy among NATO for reasons that are valid, but I do believe that the Commission can be helpful in procuring, standardizing and just maintaining a level of commonality because, often, our problem has been inconsistent buying, not so much lacking funding, if we were to become more involved in defense.

We have to use our financial firepower and our industrial policy to incentivize member states. 

Would you agree with Commissioner Stephane Séjourné when he suggests a European Union of Defense requires a new defense treaty? 

In terms of what Commissioner Séjourné is saying, we are already taking care of what l like to call “material defense” readiness. That means production, development, procurement, tanks, artillery, drones. But I see a big issue when it comes to institutional defense readiness. 

If Americans withdraw from Europe, we will need to organize ourselves differently within NATO. When we talk about a Russian threat, ready to test us by 2030, the question that emerges is one of a new defense architecture. My task is to plan for a Union of Defense. And I have always been clear that it should include Ukraine because it is battle ready, it is tested in combat and — de facto — it is already integrating itself within our industry. 

It will be beneficial for us to incorporate the Ukrainians, but also countries like Great Britain, all of Europe working together. That would be a good base and could clear the path for new instruments to develop a European industrial plan for defense in line with what Commissioner Séjourné is saying. 

I see that as a possibility. 

Should therefore third countries like the UK be able to participate in European schemes on equal measure? That premise has created political tensions within the Council. 

Negotiations are ongoing, not just with the United Kingdom, but also Canada, in terms of the access they will get to SAFE loans and under what conditions. But I’d like to stress one point. 

When you say European programmes, this goes beyond funding. To me, this is multipurpose. It is surely about the defense industry, but also joint efforts, training, cohesive capabilities, and that is de facto already happening within the Coalition of the Willing, which is a true joint effort. 

There is too much fragmentation and my view is we should further integrate. There is also an issue that is extremely important — that is having the freedom to use the weapons that we buy, using our taxpayer money, and are procured outside of the European Union in the way that we want.

You are referring to the “kill switch” – the idea that the US would retain a form of control on the arms they sell to third countries. 

Yes, and I have told them directly. 

I have told them about the issues that the ITAR regulations, which control exports of defense equipment, create. This is what is known as design authority. When Americans argue that we create problems for American firms entering the European market, I like to respond that this regulation is creating even more problems for us. 

If we spend our money — and granted it is the member states who will do most of the buying — we should use these weapons in the way that we think it’s most appropriate. ITAR is becoming a problem for American producers. I’ve been very clear about this. If you follow this logic, it is sensible to say that the design authority should stay in Europe. And this is how many European firms are pitching their products to European governments – no China, no Russia, no ITAR.

Does that explain why countries like Denmark recently announced a 10 billion euro contract of entirely made in Europe contracts? 

I believe it’s a combination. 

There is a question of design authority, which gives you the capability to use weapons the way you want. But separately, there are also messages coming out of the United States that could accelerate this process. If you listen to Elbridge Colby, the undersecretary of the now Department of War, he is saying publicly that US priorities are shifting, some capabilities will stay in the US and future procurement to third countries could be limited. He has said this clearly: there is a deficit in the US and weapons should stay in the US. In that sense, we have to organize ourselves differently. So it is probably a combination of these factors. 

Even when a clear European preference is expressed, there are tensions among member states as to what this preference should look like. Recently, we saw this tension play out between France and Germany over the Future Combat Air System. How can this be resolved?

This issue isn’t new.

When the Steel and Coal Community was created, there was an attempt to create a European defense community going as far as having a European army. This was not ratified in France at the time. And the idea was put to rest. This largely explains the fragmentation we see today. But if we say we want to create a real, and fully integrated, European defense union, we will need to see real political willingness to do so. This is why I insist leaders and defense ministers should talk about not just national defense, but European defense. 

If you look at the way we operate in space, we do a much better job of working together in collective programmes. But I see signs that things are changing, especially because our industry can see that big contracts will come and there is large aggregated demand. There are clear benefits in working together and scaling up. If South Korea is producing more than we do collectively, then that means something is not working

So you believe there will be more consolidation and joint ventures in Europe? 

I believe so. 

We are not mandating consolidation, this is happening organically. The same goes for joint ventures. We are not telling member states what they should buy either, but the industry coming together shows there is an appetite to do more — together. It’s a matter of scale and cost efficiency. 

The US recently announced it will refer to the Department of Defense as the Department of War. China held a large military parade earlier this month in a show of force to the world. Yet, Europe often seems uncomfortable with the idea of war. It prefers to talk about conflict and threats, readiness and security. Should Europe put on a show of force too – and does it start with military compulsory service? 

As the European Commissioner for Defense, my role is not to decide whether member states should introduce compulsory military service. 

But perhaps it could be useful.

A very interesting social phenomenon happens in countries where there is compulsory military training. If you look at Finland, the number of people who say they are willing to defend their country — even die for their country — is much higher than in other countries. I’m not suggesting that is the only reason, there is also history, experience and the perception of threat. 

The European Union was designed as a peace project, but the context around us has changed. And that is a reality. As I mentioned earlier, we need a new mindset. That begins by talking about European defense, not just domestic security. 

What does that entail? 

We need a new narrative, but we are taking the right steps. It is not for nothing that we now have a Defense Commissioner, that our leadership has made defense the utmost priority and that we are designing – and deploying – a whole set of new tools in that direction. Our intelligence services are going public and are more outspoken about the Russian threat, and that is a good thing. There is more work to be done in explaining to Europeans — I’m talking about citizens — that this threat is real and we have to be prepared. The European Union, our values, that is an idea worth defending. 

If I look back a year ago, I am encouraged by what I see. But we now need to be faster in ramping up our production and mobilizing effective capital.