Resisting the Empire of Fossil Fuels: A Strategy For COP30 in Lula's Brazil

The state of multilateral climate action

COP30 in Belém at the end of this year is an opportunity to rebuild momentum in the global fight against climate change and show that multilateralism can still deliver. Despite growing urgency and escalating impacts, the climate crisis has slipped down the global agenda, seldom mentioned by world leaders at major summits like the UN General Assembly. Under President Lula, Brazil has bucked this trend, emerging as a leading voice on climate action. Now, as host of COP30, it has the opportunity and the platform to foster the diplomatic, political, and financial conditions to put the world back on track for the critical decade ahead.

Brazil embodies both the dire consequences of climate change and the economic potential of climate action. Floods are now costing it entire points of GDP, forest fires are exacerbating inflation, and droughts are diminishing the productivity of its agricultural sector. The costs of floods in Rio Grande do Sul, and fires in the Amazon and Pantanal have tipped Brazil into a (small) budget deficit this year. ¹ And, of course, it is home to the Amazon rainforest, the largest remaining tropical forest — critical to both global climate stability and biodiversity. But the Amazon is nearing a tipping point, with potentially devastating consequences for Brazil, the Amazon basin, and the entire planet. ²

Nowhere exemplifies or understands the deep links between climate action and democracy better than Brazil, a megadiverse and vibrant (but threatened) democracy itself. Political shifts decisively alter the trajectory of its greenhouse gas emissions. The evidence is clear cut: when the far right holds power, as in 2019-2023, emissions rise.  When the progressives are in power, they decline. The contrast between President Lula’s track record and Jair Bolsonaro’s, his anti-democratic predecessor — could not be starker. 

Brazil enjoys strong relationships across geopolitical divides: trusted by the Global South, engaged with both the West and China, and a key member of the G20 and an expanding BRICS (which it is chairing this year). For Lula’s government, COP30 is an opportunity to position Brazil as a global leader at a time when progressive leadership is in short supply, and to demonstrate that, for all its shortcomings, multilateralism remains essential for solving global challenges. As a middle-sized democracy navigating the US-China rivalry, Brazil has a fundamental interest in defending this system.

Of course, the return of Donald Trump makes a difficult task even more complex. Within hours of taking office, he withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement for the second time, even as Los Angeles continued to burn, at huge economic and human cost. 

Trump’s temperament is unpredictable, but some assumptions are-unfortunately- safe. His administration has no interest in reducing carbon emissions. While other countries lean into the energy transition, the US will double down on fossil fuels, promoting them aggressively at home and abroad. ³ Multilateralism and its core institutions are seen as scams to weaken the US and strengthen its rivals. Climate finance schemes will not just be ignored but actively undermined. Some cities and states will continue to pursue climate action, consistent with the wishes of millions of Americans and businesses. But in the next four years, the US administration will be at best disengaged from, and at worst actively disruptive to, global efforts to tackle the climate crisis.

The main victim of President Trump’s rejection of reality will be the US itself.  Significant international progress was achieved during his first presidency, even without US leadership. Today, the case for other countries to stay the course is even stronger. Countries now recognise that their future prosperity is closely tied to their ability to transition to abundant clean energy and the technologies that enable it. This is spurring a revival of industrial strategy, and an intense race to secure a slice of rapidly expanding green industries. Renewables are booming worldwide, with global capacity expanding at a remarkable pace, consistently exceeding analysts’ forecasts.

Through President Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act, the US has reaped significant benefits from the growth of clean technologies, which the International Energy Agency expects to be worth $2tn by 2035. ⁴ The sudden change of direction will not halt global economic momentum, but it will deprive Americans of its benefits and cost the US its leading position in a key strategic arena.

Rebuilding political momentum

There is no denying, however, that we are at a low point in the climate political cycle — a winding path of highs and lows that has nonetheless gone in the right direction over time. Those who want to get back on track must be clear-eyed about the reality of the situation today and the reasons that explain it.

The essential challenge for the Brazilian COP30 presidency is to find a way to get participants engaged and put climate change back at the top of the global agenda. During our preparations for COP21 a decade ago, the French presidency focused on identifying the forces driving and obstructing ambitious climate action — the basic strategy being to amplify the positives and mitigate the negatives. Clearly, the conditions that made the Paris Agreement possible ten years ago have changed. But there are still powerful arguments to be made today, that the Brazilian presidency can harness to inspire and mobilise participants.

Fundamental — but underappreciated — is the fact that the global climate movement remains strong. The suggestion that people have stopped caring is simply untrue: a survey of 130,000 people across 125 countries — representing 96% of global emissions — found 89% support stronger climate action. ⁵ Many political and business leaders have misinterpreted valid concerns about the fairness of transition policies as a rejection of climate action itself. In France, for instance, 79 percent believe ‘it is the poorest who pay for the climate and energy crisis while it is the richest who are responsible for it’. ⁶ They have a point: globally, the wealthiest 1% emit as much as the poorest 66% combined. ⁷ Even in economies with lower historical and per capita emissions, there is a significant gap between the emissions of the wealthiest and those of the broader population. Policymakers should not be surprised that introducing ill-designed, regressive climate measures on top of these stark inequalities leads to backlash.

Brazil can use its presidency to put justice and people back at the heart of the collective response to the climate crisis. The tragedy of recent COPs is that they have excluded the most powerful driver of climate progress: mass mobilisation. In Baku and Dubai, civil society and NGOs were effectively shut out, silencing the voices that have historically pushed governments to act. Brazil can reverse this trend.  Brazil’s climate minister, Ana Toni, herself from civil society, has pledged to make “mobilisation” a central theme of COP30, with plans already underway for a Global Citizen’s Assembly and to hold an ‘Ethical Stock-take’.

Brazil should challenge the world to confront the fact that the climate crisis is no longer a distant threat — it is already upon us. The impacts of climate change are now hitting us hard. Heatwaves, hurricanes, and floods are leaving a devastating trail of lives lost and economies disrupted. The crisis is becoming impossible to ignore — even for those inclined towards denial. 

The insurance and reinsurance industries are becoming increasingly vocal about the costs of inaction, despite the pressures on the financial sector to keep a low profile. Aon estimates that natural disasters caused $368 billion in economic losses globally in 2024, surpassing $300 billion for the ninth year in a row. ⁸ Only 40% of these losses were covered by insurance, and the ‘protection gap’ will widen as premiums rise and insurers retreat from high-risk areas. The debate now playing out in California and Florida — over who pays as the insurer of last resort — will only grow louder as climate impacts worsen. The insurance industry cannot afford to remain neutral on fossil fuels. If it continues to underwrite and invest in the sector driving the very disasters it is paying out for, it will find itself in an increasingly untenable position — caught between mounting claims, rising premiums, and growing pressure from regulators, policyholders and the public.

The importance of leading by example and having a plan

A successful COP Presidency requires more than just the ability to listen to all sides and a commitment to multilateralism — it demands strong and energetic leadership. 

Countries are due to submit their updated climate plans (so-called Nationally Determined Contributions) this year. Waiting passively to receive whatever commitments nations choose to make, at their own pace, will not be enough to drive the collective increase in effort needed at this critical moment. Brazil must harness its influential and well-connected diplomacy to actively push countries to submit ambitious and actionable NDCs, thereby building momentum and a pressure discouraging weak commitments. Prioritising engagement with major emitters — particularly G20 countries, which account for 80% of global emissions — will be essential. Brazil should also enlist the support of climate-ambitious partners like the EU and the UK to drive this effort, recognising that it cannot and should not shoulder this responsibility alone.

No country can credibly claim international leadership without first leading by example at home. Brazil was among the first nations — alongside the UK and the UAE — to submit its updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), pledging to cut net greenhouse gas emissions by 59% to 67% by 2035, relative to 2005 levels. While the upper end of this target is positive, the lower end falls short of what is required for Brazil to contribute its fair share of the necessary global emissions reductions. The government’s priority now must be to properly implement the NDC, informed by meaningful consultations with the private sector, cities and states, and civil society. By aligning its ‘Plano Clima’ with the Finance Ministry’s Ecological Transformation Plan, Brazil can attract the investment it needs to realise its green industrialisation ambitions, including its ‘powershoring’ strategy to foster industrial hubs based on access to abundant, affordable renewable energy (91% of Brazil’s electricity is generated from clean sources ⁹ ).

Brazil’s government has signalled that it wants COP30 to focus on “implementation” and getting “back to basics.” Instead of pursuing grand announcements, the emphasis will be on practical solutions to overcome the barriers to achieving objectives already agreed upon in past negotiations. This pragmatic approach is sensible. In recent years, the legitimacy of the COP process has suffered from the perception that it generates more rhetoric and promises than tangible results.

But implementation is not just a technical exercise. It is deeply and intrinsically political. Success depends on navigating the complex distributional politics of climate action — who bears the investment costs, how the benefits are shared, and how power dynamics shape decision-making. An “implementation COP” cannot sidestep these realities. Navigating them requires a clear strategy, identifying the key areas where progress is necessary and politically feasible. We have suggestions for how the Brazilian presidency can move the dial on some of the big issues — finance, fossil fuels, and forest.  And we highlight a more fundamental challenge: reforming climate governance to shift the balance in favour of those most vulnerable to the climate crisis, and those most willing to act.

Climate finance: time to think outside the box

The negotiations on the new climate finance goal (NCQG) in Baku were painful and acrimonious. 

India criticised the final agreement — which fell far short of what is needed — and it only passed after earlier walkouts by many of the ‘least developed countries’ and ‘small island developing states’. ¹⁰ The amount eventually agreed — $300 billion per year for developing countries by 2035 — is widely acknowledged to be insufficient. ¹¹ Recognising this would not be a sustainable outcome, negotiators agreed to the “Baku to Belém roadmap”, a new process for getting to the $1.3 trillion per year by 2035 that is seen as necessary.

COP29 was doubtless not helped by external factors, including anticipation of  Trump’s presidency and a badly organised presidency. But the poor result reflects more fundamental harsh realities. Despite strong moral and selfish arguments for providing climate finance, the willingness of developed countries to significantly increasing grants or transfers to developing nations is limited, at best. Even traditional overseas development assistance (ODA) has been cut or redirected in many high-income countries. We should keep making the argument, but must be clear-eyed about what is possible at a time of limited fiscal headroom, austerity, and widespread cost-of-living concerns in developed countries.

Simply put, there are no miracles available in the current economic context. Brazil and other leading countries on climate finance are rightly pushing reforms of the international financial system to address the much higher cost of capital for green projects in developing countries and to ensure that the mandates of the World Bank and the IMF truly reflect the realities of climate change. And they are rightly trying to find solutions to the crippling debt and liquidity crisis preventing many developing countries from investing in their future. These efforts are an extremely important piece of the puzzle. But they will not alone close the considerable gap between $300 billion and $1.3 trillion annually.

Bold new policies are needed to mobilise additional public resources, and there is a strong case for progressive taxes on carbon-intensive activities and extreme wealth. 

Such taxes could generate significant revenues while extending the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” to industries and individuals. The revenues from such taxes could help high-income countries increase the amount of climate finance provided to poorer, more vulnerable nations. For developing countries, they would secure an additional source of predictable revenue, enabling them to allocate resources to climate investments without diverting funds from other pressing needs. A $5 fee per tonne of CO2 on the extraction of fossil fuels in 2024 would generate an estimated $216.2 billion per year, while a global minimum tax on billionaires equal to 2% of their wealth would generate an estimated $200-250 billion per year. ¹²

Under President Lula and Finance Minister Haddad, Brazil has significantly advanced the agenda on global tax justice, having made it a priority of its G20 presidency.  It could push climate solidarity levies to critical mass by putting them at the heat of COP30’s finance discussions.

The presidency has political momentum to work with, as the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force — chaired by Barbados, Kenya, and France — now includes 17 members, with a good balance of countries from both the North and South. The taboo on cooperation around taxation is eroding in the face of new economic and political realities. The importance of such levies was widely recognised in the negotiations in Baku, highlighted by the UN Secretary-General in his opening speech, and increasingly reflected in financial press coverage. ¹³ The Financial Times, in an editorial ¹⁴ , endorsed polluter-pays taxes as a means to fund climate action. The Baku to Belém roadmap presents a vehicle and an opening to translate this momentum into serious consideration of the role such levies can play in helping to close the gap between $300bn and $1.3tn.

Forests in focus: a COP in the Amazon

Under President Lula, Brazil has made great strides in reducing deforestation and reversing the damaging policies of his predecessor, Jair Bolsonaro. ¹⁵ The choice of Belém as host city underlines how serious Brazil is about using COP30 to make international progress and develop new solutions on forest protection, sustainable land use, and food system emissions. Yes, there have been concerns and criticisms about the choice of Belém. It does indeed present genuine logistical challenges. But this misses the point: President Lula wants to show the world that the Amazon is not just a global public good, the “lungs of the planet,” or a large collection of trees. It is also a home to people: those living in the forests, particularly Indigenous communities whose way of life is profoundly impacted by deforestation. But also, the millions who live in large, relatively poor cities like Belém and Manaus. Hosting COP30 in the heart of the Amazon will force the world to see it for what it truly is. 

This is a courageous decision.

Staging a COP in a heavily forested and highly agricultural country will shift the dynamics of the debate. It will call the bluff of many of the actors in the voluntary carbon offset market, which claim to be part of the solution while offering those fighting deforestation derisory prices for carbon credits. Voluntary carbon markets may have a role to play, but their own track record shows they can only ever complement real investment, not replace it. What is needed is not a system that lets polluters buy their way out of action (four out of ten carbon credits are used by fossil fuel companies) ¹⁶ , but serious financing for large-scale efforts to fight deforestation and biodiversity loss — ones that genuinely respect the rights and livelihoods of those who live in and near forests.

The Tropical Forests Forever Facility (TFFF), launched in 2023 at Brazil’s initiative, offers a promising alternative model for preserving standing tropical rainforests — the priority, from an economic, climate and biodiversity standpoint. ¹⁷ It aims to compensate countries fairly for their stewardship of tropical forests, with an emphasis on the close involvement of indigenous and local populations. Unlike many existing nature-based solutions that rely on grants or smaller-scale funding, using innovative financing mechanisms to raise significant private capital for every dollar contributed by donor countries.

The TFFF has the sophistication to clearly distinguish between ‘avoided deforestation’, afforestation (the planting of new trees) and sustainable forest management — which voluntary carbon markets too often treat as interchangeable despite their vastly different environmental implications. If well implemented, it could be a gamechanger. Questions remain about how the environmental mechanisms and economic model it funds will work in practice. COP30 is an opportunity for Brazil to work with partners — particularly other tropical forest nations — to work through how exactly the money will be channelled to those who need it on the ground, on ensuring sound governance and equitable benefit-sharing.

Food systems have proven to be one of the hardest sectors to decarbonise, despite being particularly vulnerable to climate change. As Brazil — an agricultural powerhouse — knows all too well, this is a vast and complex topic with many economic and political sensitivities. The Brazilian presidency would be well advised to pick its battles. One practical area for improvement at COP30 is the development of stronger certification regimes. These frameworks verify whether agricultural practices meet sustainability standards, providing a market signal to encourage more climate-friendly production methods. Certification for crops, such as soy and coffee, is relatively advanced, but standards for livestock — especially cattle — are far less developed. An agreement to raise certification standards for cattle to the same level as those for crops is not unrealistic and would make a real difference. Setting a higher international baseline would also provide a strong basis for mutual recognition agreements within clean trade and investment partnerships between countries (such as the new model promised by the European Commission).

The fossil fuel fight back

At COP28 in Dubai, countries finally confronted the main cause of carbon emissions and climate change: the combustion of fossil fuels. They agreed, in the “UAE Consensus”, to transition away from fossil fuels, alongside commitments to triple global renewable energy capacity and double energy efficiency by 2030. ¹⁸ This was hailed by many as a breakthrough and a diplomatic triumph for the UAE. For now, however, its impact has been mostly rhetorical.

Although renewable energy capacity is growing rapidly worldwide, it is so far supplementing, rather than replacing, carbon-intensive energy sources. Recent IEA data shows that fossil fuels met two-thirds of new energy demand in 2023. ¹⁹ After a brief period of (supposed) alignment with the energy transition, fossil fuel companies are going back on their commitments to curtail future oil and gas expansion and shift investments towards clean energy. They are once again raising their demand forecasts (at odds with the IEA’s expectation of peak oil before 2030) ²⁰ and expanding exploration and capital investment budgets for decades to come. This is a gamble that, despite the growing risk of stranded fossil fuel assets, the energy transition will be slower or more uneven than previously thought.

Fossil fuel’s renewed confidence owes to several factors. Record profits following the energy price spikes caused by Russia’s war in Ukraine have given it financial security, political influence, and restored a degree of respectability. It has cast itself as integral to energy security — an absurd claim, considering fossil fuel dependence was the root cause of Europe’s energy crisis. In the United States, President Trump unapologetically champions “drill, baby, drill,” while the energy-hungry AI and tech sector (with whom he has formed an unlikely alliance) pushes a strategy of “energy abundance,” in which gas-generated electricity is to play a key role. ²¹ The fossil fuel industry has long advocated a significant role for carbon capture and storage (CCS) — a delaying tactic rather than a serious proposal, given the IEA’s estimate that reaching net zero emissions through direct air capture would require more electricity to operate than total electricity demand today. ²² Today,  no longer content with just promoting unworkable solutions, the industry is once again actively pushing back on the very idea that its emissions are a problem

At COP29 in Baku, many powerful voices made no attempt to hide their contempt for the UAE Consensus agreed only a year earlier. The president of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, called oil and gas a “gift from the gods” ²³ ; the secretary general of OPEC made similar comments. ²⁴ A small minority of countries — clearly experiencing “buyer’s remorse”– have been trying to water down the language ever since Dubai, including at COP29 and the UN Summit of the Future.

A structured dialogue on the barriers to the energy transition

Much of this resistance is the usual cynical lobbying by those who profit enormously from the fossil fuel economy. But the reality is that, for many developing countries, fossil fuel revenues remain a lifeline, and the fiscal implications of transitioning away from them are serious. They cannot be dismissed or taken lightly, and must be handled carefully, and progressively.

Take Colombia, for which fossil fuels account for around half of its exports, two-thirds of final energy consumption, and 3-6 percent of GDP. ²⁵ Its government recognises this is not just an environmental problem but also a risky overdependence on a single commodity, and has made efforts to phase down its production, including stopping new permits for oil exploration and drilling. But these have so far triggered nervous reactions from the currency and debt markets and credit rating agencies, adding to the economic pressures the country faces. This creates an exceptionally difficult trade-off: balancing the imperative of climate action and securing the country’s long-term future against the need to maintain immediate fiscal and macroeconomic stability.

Indonesia, which at COP29 laudably announced its ambition to phase out coal within just 15 years ²⁶ , will face many of the same fiscal obstacles, and a broader set of political economy and social challenges that even highly developed countries with advanced state capacity find difficult to manage.

COP30 is an opportunity to address these structural barriers in a systematic way, by convening a dialogue of fossil fuel importers, exporters, and industries on both the production and consumption sides. Such a dialogue could address the entrenched politics and fiscal dependence that opponents of the transition exploit to delay action. It could help break the perpetual “chicken-and-egg” dilemma between the demand and supply sides of the equation and address the additional risks of being a “first mover”.

Concretely, the dialogue could broker an agreement to generalise the approach now taken in some Brazilian states, such as Espírito Santo, of hypothecating oil royalties to help fund climate adaptation and the energy transition. And it could foster consensus for a wider set of policies for gradual economic diversification and broadening countries’ tax bases, to help them reduce their dependence on fossil fuel revenues in a sustainable and equitable way.

The last three COPs — all hosted by fossil fuel producers — were missed opportunities to hold a more sophisticated discussion of this kind. 

Brazil — itself the fifth largest crude oil exporter ²⁷ — is well placed to do what its predecessors did not. For now, it is neither a frontrunner in the transition away from fossil fuels nor a blocker. By any reckoning, it will not be the producer of the last barrel of oil. If the transition proceeds purely on economic logic, that will be Saudi Arabia — which enjoys the lowest production costs. If the transition is organised equitably (as it should be), it will be a country in Africa. Brazil’s choice, therefore, is either to be the passive follower of a slower transition — from which it will not particularly benefit — or an active shaper of an accelerated phase out. Indications from the presidency are that it wants to be the latter, and sees a key role for COP30 in helping to make it happen. For this, Brazil deserves a lot of credit. In these circumstances, nobody would have blamed it if it chose to focus its energies elsewhere.

Belem+10: reforming a system under strain

Rightly or wrongly, Brazil’s presidency will have to reckon with the fact that many climate progressives are losing faith in the international climate governance system. Some prominent voices, frustrated by slow progress and the ability of a minority to stall action, are questioning whether the consensus-based, highly procedural format is fit for the urgency of the crisis. ²⁸

These frustrations are understandable, but well-meaning critics must not forget that the multilateral nature of the system is what makes it legitimate. The Paris Agreement was only reached because all countries, including those most vulnerable to climate change — such as small island developing states — were given a say over their own destiny, which would never have had if climate negotiations were weighted by economic power or emissions. Nonetheless, some reform is called for, and the jolt of the US’s withdrawal can be the impetus to enhance and restore the voice of those most affected by the climate crisis.

An important change would be to give a formal role to cities and regions in the climate governance process. “Subnational” actors are on the frontlines of fighting climate change and often provide a critical safety net when national governments fail to act. This was evident during Trump’s presidency, when cities and states across the United States pledged to continue cutting emissions despite federal inaction, and similarly in Brazil under Bolsonaro’s anti-climate government.  One way to formalise their role would be to include them in the global stocktake, which occur at five-year intervals (the first concluded at COP28), allowing their efforts and progress to be recognised and their challenges to be addressed. This must be accompanied by cultural change to systematically include subnationals in national climate policymaking, including NDCs. Although there has been progress in this regard, cities, regions and devolved governments are still too often afterthoughts — left to implement plans they have not been sufficiently consulted on.

There is also a pressing need to strengthen accountability for voluntary pledges made by the private sector at COPs. Too often, the platform is used to make ambitious promises with little scrutiny over whether they are fulfilled — an opportunity to burnish green credentials without real consequences for failing to deliver. These commitments are frequently vague, difficult to measure, and disconnected from national climate plans. The rules governing such pledges must be tightened. Being given a platform at COP should be made conditional on regular and transparent reporting of progress, with clear benchmarks for assessing delivery. Where relevant, these voluntary initiatives should be directly tied to or integrated into countries’ NDCs, ensuring they are subject to the same scrutiny and accountability as government commitments. Additionally the experience and knowledge of the private sector should be streamlined in the different processes of implementation of the Paris Agreement.

In parallel, new mechanisms are needed to strengthen the interaction between COPs and the Paris Agreement with International Financial Institutions (IFIs). While institutions such as the IMF and World Bank have made real efforts to align their operations with the goals of the Paris Agreement, this could be made much more effective if COPs were given the authority to ask them to report formally on their actions to align with Paris agreements objectives. Just as the G20 provides mandates to institutions like the Financial Stability Board, the COP process should be able to ask IFIs to scale up climate finance, adjust lending frameworks, and ensure their operations deliver on the commitments made under the Paris Agreement.

Brazil’s proposal to establish a Climate Change Council (CCC) under the UN could play an important role in addressing the broader challenge of coordination and implementation. As President Lula outlined at the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the CCC would help bring together the fragmented landscape of different actors and processes to align more effectively with the goals of the Paris Agreement. ²⁹ Modelled on the UN Human Rights Council, Brazil envisions the CCC being created through a UN General Assembly resolution in 2026.

Of course, any reform that prioritises ambition and accountability over the ability of laggards to obstruct progress will face fierce resistance. Those who benefit from the current system’s inertia are unlikely to give up their ability to stall action without a fight. But if Brazil, working with key partners like other emerging countries and Europe, is willing to lead this charge, COP30 could leave a transformative legacy. Beyond being remembered as Paris+10, it could mark the start of a “Belém+10” era — one that, a decade from now, is seen as the moment when the system evolved to meet the urgency and scale of the climate crisis. And the start of a remontada — a comeback for unity, fairness, and a people-driven mission to get the world on track.

1. Diego Viana, «The Economic Consequences of the Rio Grande do Sul Floods», Hampton Institute, 7 July 2024.
2. Orla Dwyer, «‘Unprecedented’ stress in up to half of the Amazon may lead to tipping point by 2050», Carbon Brief, 14 February 2024.
3. President Trump’s nominee to lead the National Energy Council told Congress that the United States will lose the “AI arms race” without fossil fuels: Matthew Brown, Jennifer McDermott et Jack Dura, «Doug Burgum, Trump’s pick for public lands boss, questions reliability of renewable power», AP, 16 January 2025.
4. The US saw a record $71bn worth of clean energy investment in the first three months of 2024 alone.
5. Andre, P., Boneva, T., Chopra, F. et al. Globally representative evidence on the actual and perceived support for climate action. Nat. Clim. Chang. 14, 253–259 (2024).
6. Jean-Yves Dormagen, Comprendre le nouveau clivage écologique : données inédites, le Grand Continent, 7 November 2023.
7. Richest 1% emit as much planet-heating pollution as two-thirds of humanity, Oxfam, 20 November 2023.
8. Climate and Catastrophe Insight – Aon
9. Brazil | Ember
10. Dharna Noor et Damian Carrington, «Cop29 climate finance deal criticised as ‘travesty of justice’ and ‘stage-managed’», The Guardian, 24 November 2024.
11. «COP29 UN Climate Conference Agrees to Triple Finance to Developing Countries, Protecting Lives and Livelihoods | UNFCCC», UNFCCC, 24 November 2024.
12. «Scaling Solidarity: Progress on Global Solidarity Levies», Global Solidarity Levies Task Force, November 2024.
13. Secretary-General’s remarks to World Leaders Climate Action Summit at COP29, ONU, 12 November 2024.
14. FT Editorial Board, «The path to global carbon pricing», The Financial Times, 22 September 2024.
15. «In one year, deforestation and conversion falls 30.6% in the Amazon and 25.7% in the Cerrado», WWF, 7 November 2024.
16. Kenza Bryan, «Shell dominates carbon credit market as clean energy spending scaled back», The Financial Times, 29 January 2025.Kenza Bryan, «Shell dominates carbon credit market as clean energy spending scaled back», The Financial Times, 29 January 2025.
17. «At COP16, five countries commit to Tropical Forest Finance Facility», Présidence de la République du Brésil, 31 October 2024.
18. «Outcomes of the Dubai Climate Change Conference – Advance Unedited Versions (AUVs) and list of submissions from the sessions in Dubai», UNFCCC.
19. «World Energy Outlook 2024», IEA.
20. «Slowing demand growth and surging supply put global oil markets on course for major surplus this decade», IEA.
21. Amanda Chu and Jamie Smyth, «AI set to fuel surge in new US gas power plants», 13 January 2025.
22. Emmanuel Guérin and Laurence Tubiana, «Don’t be fooled: CCS is no solution to oil and gas emissions», 4 December 2023.
23. Fiona Harvey, «How ‘world’s first oil town’ is wrestling with fossil fuel legacy», The Guardian, 29 July 2024.
24. Valerie Volcovici and Alison Withers, «OPEC Secretary General tells COP29 oil is a gift from God», Reuters, 20 novembre 2024.
25. «Why the international community should back Colombia’s post-fossil fuel plan», Climate Home News, 17 November 2024.
26. A. Anantha Lakshmi, «Indonesia’s ambition to quit coal hinges on policy reforms», The Financial Times, 14 January 2025.
27. Brazil – Oil and Gas
28. «Global climate leaders want COP29 to succeed but call for urgent overhaul of the process», Club of Rome, 15 November 2024.
29. Speech by President Lula at the 3rd Session of the G20 Leaders’ Meeting: Energy Transition and Sustainable Development, 19 November 2024.