America’s Withdrawal (Again) from the Paris Agreement: A Challenging New Era for the Global Response to Climate Change

President Trump has (again) moved to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement.  The global community, therefore, faces the challenge of mitigating climate change without American leadership or engagement – at least from the federal government. While this political reality makes the commitment to net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050 ¹ harder to achieve, it cannot be allowed to become an excuse for inaction. ² Planetary boundaries loom, ³ including most prominently the risks associated with the build-up of GHGs in the Earth’s atmosphere. ⁴ The Sustainability Imperative ⁵ thus remains a fundamental policy requirement for humanity to thrive in the 21^st century going forward – with the central element of this mandate being the need to achieve deep decarbonization of economies across the world. 

At the same time that global cooperation on climate change is at risk because of America’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the Trump Administration’s domestic strategy of disinvesting in climate science and undoing the existing policy incentives that support the U.S. clean energy transition poses an even greater threat to collaborative efforts. All of this comes at a moment when the world faces the growing reality of rising sea levels, increased intensity and frequency of hurricanes and typhoons, as well as changed rainfall patterns, which climate science has now clearly demonstrated translates into shifts in agricultural productivity and more droughts (and wildfires) as well as floods. In the face of the ever-more-clear need for action, the Trump Administration’s sweeping dismissal of climate change as a problem threatens the complex ecosystem of individuals and institutions working both within the United States and across the world to respond to the multiple challenges climate change presents. The tens of thousands of people involved in the climate change ecosystem—whose work is now being undermined—provide the foundation of rigorous data, sound science, policy analysis, technological creativity, and financial resources required to mitigate GHG emissions, promote resilience and adaptation, and incentivize investments – both public and private – in the transition to a clean energy future.  

This article assesses the potential impact of the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement in light of the second Trump Administration’s hostility towards efforts to address climate change and its non-cooperative approach to international relations more generally. It argues that the ripple effects stemming from the Trump Administration’s disregard for the threat of climate change are likely to have wide-ranging and long-lasting impacts on the global community’s ability to respond effectively to climate change. But we also note that, even as President Trump moves to expand fossil fuel production and achieve U.S. “energy dominance,” many American states, local communities, business entities, and civil society organizations are offering a counterweight to the Trump Administration’s stance on climate change. They continue to move the United States toward a sustainable future, albeit at a slower pace, because of obstacles created by President Trump. Likewise, the retreat of Trump’s federal government from playing any constructive role on the global climate change stage creates new opportunities for leadership from other countries, organizations, and individuals.

I – Withdrawing from the Paris Agreement and Choosing Non-Cooperation

Climate change is an inescapably global issue as GHG emissions anywhere affect everyone everywhere. Such challenges, sometimes referred to as global public goods, require international cooperation. ⁶

One of the triumphs of the last 80 years has been the creation of international institutions to facilitate diplomatic and multilateral solutions to address global problems. After a disastrous first half of the 20^th century, during which non-cooperation led to two world wars and exacerbated the effects of the Great Depression, leaders from around the world came together to create a new international order that sought to ensure cooperation in the face of shared challenges. And while the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank, IMF, and a structure of rules for international trade embodied in the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) have not been without shortcomings, they have strived to promote peace, security, and shared economic development.

Over the past 35 years, as the threat posed by climate change crystallized, world leaders launched the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to promote cooperation on climate science and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to guide the global policy response to the build-up of GHGs in the atmosphere. Again, these efforts to promote collaboration have moved with fits and starts, but real progress has been made in recent years toward a clean energy future and a sustainable global economy. President Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and lack of interest in engaging on climate change issues both domestically and multilaterally throws a wrench (or maybe a grenade) into this fragile machinery.

President Trump’s strikingly non-cooperative attitude toward international relations is not limited to climate change. For example, his zero-sum approach to trade has disrupted global commerce with tariffs and economic threats not seen for nearly a hundred years. ⁷ In addition to rupturing the Bretton Woods international order, ⁸ President Trump has shown similar disregard for longstanding security arrangements (challenging the underpinnings of NATO), fractured relations with traditional U.S. allies (including America’s closest friends, such as Canada), and, at times, violated principles of comity in his treatment of foreign leaders.

President Trump’s breaking of norms, disregard for international law, and disinterest in traditional diplomacy dramatically exceed anything American presidents have said or done over the past century. ⁹ His policies have been accompanied by a wrecking ball approach to institutions – both at home and around the world – that he views as constraints on his exercise of power. Of relevance in the climate change context, President Trump has overseen the destruction of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) ¹⁰ and sweeping cuts to America’s foreign assistance programs. ¹¹ Likewise, the Trump Administration has withdrawn entirely from a number of international organizations (including the World Health Organization, the UN Human Rights Council, and the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) and is holding back funding from others such as the World Trade Organization, UNICEF, and Gavi (the Vaccine Alliance).

From the point of view of many observers, President Trump’s first months in office have yielded an astonishing record of self-destruction of much of the soft power and diplomatic credibility ¹² built up by the United States over the past century. How much long-term damage President Trump has done to America’s place in the world remains to be determined. But it is already clear that the Trump presidency marks a new era of U.S. foreign policy.  

Simply put, President Trump has no interest in the major tenets of international relations since WWII. The Trump Administration appears to be rejecting the principles put forward by the leaders, such as John Maynard Keynes, Jean Monnet, and Cordell Hull, who built a world order where sovereignty is respected as a foundational principle for peace and security, power is constrained by law (even while recognizing that international law is halting in its creation and limited in its application), and cooperation is promoted as critical to managing interdependence and achieving shared goals. Indeed, President Trump seems to reject the very concept of global public goods and the need for collaboration to successfully respond to worldwide challenges, such as maintaining international financial stability, addressing climate change, and combating pandemics. His new foreign policy seemingly brings an end to the post-World War II structure of U.S. leadership and cooperation on international issues and instead ushers in a transactional era where immediately available benefits to America are of paramount importance. ¹³ And one might argue that President Trump’s assault on science and expert-based policymaking goes even further, threatening the longstanding view – dating back to French Enlightenment thinkers such as Rousseau, Voltaire, and Montesquieu – that government action should be grounded in science, reason, and democratic governance. ¹⁴  

Any analysis of the implications of the American withdrawal from the Paris Agreement must therefore be understood in the context of this broader retreat from international cooperation, particularly on global challenges. There is no denying that this fundamental break with the world community will make a successful response to climate change harder to deliver. Non-cooperation from the United States will affect prospects for continued GHG emissions reductions not only over the next few years while President Trump is in office, but potentially for many years thereafter. 

II – Attacking Climate Science and Policy Domestically 

The Trump Administration has backed away from a range of climate change commitments undertaken by prior U.S. presidents, both domestic and international, with a flurry of executive orders, new legislation, and agency rulemaking. ¹⁵ In summary, these actions have spanned: (1) cutting foreign assistance budgets; (2) slashing the budgets and staff of America’s scientific agencies and largely eliminating the federal government’s climate science programs; (3) reversing policy incentives for the clean energy transition; and (4) targeting state and local climate change policies that run counter to the President’s agenda.

The Trump Administration has dramatically trimmed or eliminated climate change-related programs across a wide range of U.S. agencies and departments. These cuts include shuttering USAID, rescinding $4 billion in pledges to the Green Climate Fund, and proposing deep cuts to the budget of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which has long provided climate information to scientists across the United States and around the world, including data on climate change impacts, tools that track floods and fires, and programs that gauge slow onset events such as sea-level rise. ¹⁶ Likewise, the EPA’s Office of Research and Development, which analyzes dangers posed by pollution and manages an extensive array of climate change grants to fund private companies and universities, is being shut down. ¹⁷ In addition to shrinking or ending climate science programs across federal agencies, ¹⁸ funding for climate research at major U.S. universities has also been impacted, ¹⁹ which promises to undermine another element of America’s contribution to the global climate science knowledge base. 

The Trump Administration has also shut down government websites that housed climate change impact data and dismissed all of the nearly 400 contributors to the 6^th National Climate Assessment – a report mandated by Congress. ²⁰ Instead, the U.S. Department of Energy released a report titled “A Critical Review of Impacts of Greenhouse Gas Emissions on the U.S. Climate,” developed by just five scientists (all of whom are, according to media reports, climate change skeptics). This review concludes that global warming appears to be less damaging economically than commonly believed and that aggressive mitigation strategies could be more harmful than beneficial. ²¹ A barrage of negative reactions followed the release of this report, with mainstream climate researchers noting that the DOE authors cherry-pick their data, ignore evidence that does not comport with their views, and downplay the effects of climate change in a manner that finds little support among the vast majority of climate scientists. Several scientists whose work was cited in the DOE report have, moreover, denounced the DOE analysis and indicated that their research has been taken out of context and their conclusions mischaracterized. ²²

Since taking office, President Trump has dismantled the prior Biden Administration’s clean energy policies and programs through unprecedented use of executive orders as well as the passage of the “One Big, Beautiful Bill” (OBBB), a sweeping statute which scales back clean energy investments and tax credits originally enacted by the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in 2022. ²³ These investments – covering wind and solar power, electric vehicles, batteries and other energy storage technologies, heat pumps, clean hydrogen, and more – were crucial elements of the U.S. gameplan for delivering its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement, which (as updated in 2024 by the Biden Administration) aimed to reduce economy-wide GHG emissions 61-66% below 2005 levels by 2035. ²⁴ The OBBB not only phases out the tax credits for wind and solar power projects, as well as for electric cars, but also reverses course and promotes a fossil fuel energy future for America. In fact, the legislation mandates oil and gas lease sales in Alaska as well as other parts of the country, delays a fee on methane leaks, and provides a tax break for the production of metallurgical coal. ²⁵

In what amounts to a 180-degree policy shift, President Trump’s Declaring a National Energy Emergency and Unleashing American Energy Executive Orders declare a “National Energy Emergency” and authorize federal agencies to bypass environmental regulations to expedite fossil fuel production, accelerate the approval of new liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities, and promise coal-fired power plant exemption from air quality rules if they continue to operate. ²⁶ In addition, President Trump directs the EPA to eliminate the use of a social cost of carbon metric in federal regulatory decision-making. While many of these actions have been challenged in courts across the country, the Trump Administration is proceeding with its plans.

President Trump has also challenged basic principles of American federalism in targeting state and local policies on climate change and clean energy. In his Executive Order on Protecting American Energy from State Overreach, the President directs his Attorney General to bring legal challenges to state and city-scale actions that may stymie his administration’s energy policies. ²⁷ The Trump Administration has specifically targeted state climate change superfund statutes, ²⁸ New York City’s congestion pricing system, and California’s electric vehicle rules. ²⁹ Each of these interventions is being litigated in court.

Across the agencies of the federal government, the new Trump leadership team has followed suit with broad-scale commitments to reverse course on past policies. The EPA Administrator, for example, has announced that his agency will review the legality and continued applicability of the endangerment finding, which enabled President Obama’s EPA Administrator to declare that greenhouse gases (GHGs) were a threat to public health and welfare. This 2009 finding, based on a significant docket of scientific analysis, represents the legal predicate for federal action under the Clean Air Act ³⁰ – and thus provides the foundation for regulations to address climate change. In another example of federal agencies reversing course, the now Trump-dominated Securities and Exchange Commission is walking back from the climate-related corporate disclosure rules advanced by the Biden Administration. ³¹

Together, the actions taken by President Trump have dramatically changed the foundations of climate change research and policymaking in the United States – and deeply disrupted the interconnected web of federal, state, local, and private sector entities working on climate change mitigation and adaptation in the United States. This disruption will reverberate across the world. 

III – Understanding the Cascading Impacts of President Trump’s Actions on Climate Change

The implications of President Trump’s about-face on climate change cannot be understated. Arguably, the bigger risk to long-term global cooperation on climate change stems not from the act of withdrawing from the Paris Agreement and international cooperation, but from the rejection of climate science, unprecedented efforts to undermine the emerging clean energy economy, and disregard for climate change policymaking both domestically and internationally. The Trump Administration’s dismissal of federal climate scientists, policy experts, and civil servants, elimination of climate change-related foreign aid, claw back of clean energy funding, and efforts to repeal the endangerment finding at the EPA have put the United States into uncharted policy territory. While some of the Trump Administration’s actions may be reversed through court challenges or softened by political opposition, the uncertainty created by the Trump Administration’s climate change policies has already produced further ripple effects. 

1 – Private Sector Risk

Uncertainty about regulatory frameworks and the loss of government funding has triggered private sector hesitancy regarding new investments in America’s energy transition. Major financiers, who had signaled a willingness a year ago to pour billions of dollars into clean energy projects, now face a very different policy landscape. Even where potential clean energy projects do not need government subsidies to be economically viable, the risks associated with a constantly shifting regulatory requirements could threaten private sector action. 

In a similar vein, the thousands of companies that made GHG emissions reduction pledges in the wake of the Glasgow Climate Pact are now being forced to rethink their climate change commitments. And while many corporate leaders have decided to stay with their energy transition plans and the business model adjustments this entails, others have softened their targets or slowed their investments in climate change-related projects. In sum, the Trump Administration’s shift of gears has dulled the incentive for clean energy business innovation and capital deployment across the United States, with spillover effects that extend across the globe.

2 – Consequential Second Term

In its first six months, the second Trump Administration has had deeper and wider-reaching impacts on the climate change ecosystem than were seen in the entirety of President Trump’s first term in office. The U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement for a second time will fundamentally change the negotiations occurring at the annual Conference of the Parties, as the United States’ technical and negotiation expertise will not be present in this new era of American non-cooperation on climate. But beyond the negotiation rooms, the dismantling of climate science and policymaking will have a serious impact on global efforts to combat GHG emissions for years to come. With the United States second only to China in annual emissions, President Trump has implemented policies to reverse course on America’s path to a net-zero emissions future, which will affect the global community’s ability to keep within reach the goal of no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius of warming. 

IV – Key Actors Continuing to Advance Solutions

Despite the Trump Administration’s policy reversal and disengagement from the international climate change process, America must not be counted out entirely. Climate change leadership has now emerged from state and local government officials, business leaders, and significant parts of civil society. ³² Moreover, as noted above, the Trump Administration’s expansive assertion of Presidential authority faces numerous legal challenges from state attorneys general, local officials, affected businesses, and NGO advocates.

1 – Non-federal action 

In a wide variety of settings, governors, mayors, and non-governmental group leaders have come together to reiterate their commitment to the Paris Agreement’s goals. America Is All In ³³ represents a coalition of state, local, and non-government actors who are continuing to take action to reach net-zero GHG emissions by 2050 and build resilience in the face of climate change impacts. This movement includes Climate Alliance (a coalition of 24 Governors pursuing clean energy action), Climate Mayors (a network of 350 mayors taking action on climate), businesses, and other stakeholder groups. ³⁴ Individual states have also announced they will continue and defend their policies. California announced, for example, that it would continue with its cap-and-trade GHG program despite legal threats from the Trump Administration, ³⁵ and the State of New York continues to promote its Climate Change Superfund law that would hold major GHG emitters accountable for the harm that they have caused. Likewise, Connecticut and Rhode Island have vowed to complete the 80-percent-constructed Revolution offshore wind project in the wake of the Trump Administration’s withdrawal of federal support.

At the same time, think tanks, philanthropic organizations, and environmental groups are still moving forward with their climate change advocacy and policy efforts. Bloomberg Philanthropies and several partners, for example, committed to donating the funds required to cover the U.S. portion (approximately $7 million) of the UNFCCC’s budget after America withdraws from the Paris Agreement. ³⁶

2 – Legal challenges

Across the board, lawsuits are being filed to challenge President Trump’s actions on climate change and energy, including federal government firings, freezes on appropriated foreign aid, paused clean energy projects, and the pausing of existing IRA investments, to varying degrees of success For example, environmental groups are suing over the shutdown of climate change tools and webpages. ³⁷ A federal appeals court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction over a case involving the freezing of billions in EPA grant funding. ³⁸ Offshore wind developers and the Attorney Generals of Rhode Island and Connecticut in the United States have sued over a stop-work order to an offshore wind project. ³⁹ Earthjustice, representing a coalition of farmers, sued the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for purging climate change webpages – they won their lawsuit, which meant USDA had to restore the webpages that provide resources on conservation, climate adaptation, and rural clean energy projects. ⁴⁰ The Trump Administration has also taken unusual steps in attacking state efforts to pass laws that would require fossil fuel companies to pay – such as bringing legal actions against Hawaii and Michigan to block those states from suing fossil fuel companies. ⁴¹  

In the first Trump Administration, over 350 lawsuits were filed related to climate change. ⁴² The Natural Resources Defense Council alone sued the first Trump Administration 163 times, with a nearly 90% success rate. ⁴³ Whether this track record will be matched during the second Trump Administration remains to be seen. On the one hand, many of the second Trump Administration’s actions seem to many lawyers to be further outside the bounds of the law and thus more open to legal challenge. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has shifted significantly to the right (as a result of President Trump’s first term appointees) and now seems more willing to give the President the expanded executive powers that he seeks.   

3 – Congress

In the wake of President Trump’s actions, many have looked to Congress to act as a check on his use of executive power. But this traditional brake on Executive overreach has not emerged. Congressional Republicans, who control both the House and Senate, have largely supported President Trump’s agenda – even at the expense of traditional prerogatives of the legislative branch such as the power to set tariffs. Nevertheless, the separation of powers argument might re-emerge with the Congress acting as a source of greater checks and balances on the President’s authority in the months ahead. For example, there have been some in Congress who seem ready to reassert the Congressional power of the purse, a Constitutionally derived authority to control government spending and taxation. ⁴⁴ During the drafting and negotiations for the OBBB, for example, several Republican Senators introduced amendments that removed proposed taxes on solar and wind projects and extended the availability of tax credits for renewable energy projects launched by 2027. ⁴⁵

4– Private sector

Despite the signals from the Trump Administration that climate change actions in the business world are discouraged, the U.S. private sector remains large and diverse – and focused on the requirements for long-term success in the marketplace. Significant parts of the business and finance communities, therefore, continue to promote clean energy deployment and adaptation. Across America, solar power and battery storage projects continue to be built – and renewable power is expected to account for 81% of new power generation added to the U.S. grid in 2025, though the impact of recent policy and regulatory changes remains to be seen. ⁴⁶ Studies suggest that coal, natural gas, and oil consumption will continue to decline in the coming decades, as renewable power generation rises and more people use electricity to power their cars and heat their homes. These trends seem unstoppable, even in policy scenarios where the Trump Administration rolls back pollution regulations. ⁴⁷

With a commitment to the long term, many clean energy investors are still moving projects forward. ⁴⁸ On Wall Street, environmental, social, and governance (ESG) screening continues to be seen as a vital tool among the many investors who seek greater alignment between their values and their portfolios. ⁴⁹ Likewise, the push for greater corporate sustainability persists despite headwinds. As some financial institutions have exited net-zero groups and some companies announce they are not on track to meet climate targets, other companies are highlighting that the work continues. ⁵⁰ The broader trend towards ending externalities ⁵¹ – and making polluters stop their emissions or pay for the harm they cause – also remains in place, and advocacy and litigation against the fossil fuel industry continues across jurisdictions. ⁵²

5 – Global ambition 

Even with the United States absent, the global community seems poised to keep the climate change ball rolling forward. In mid-2025, for example, the European Union and China affirmed their commitments to submit updated 2035 Nationally Determined Contributions “covering all sectors and all greenhouse gases” ⁵³ before COP30. Other nations are similarly making clear their intentions to maintain the momentum toward a sustainable future.

The annual COP meetings will continue to convene governments and non-governmental participants to discuss climate change policy options both inside and outside of the formal negotiation process. In 2025, COP30 in Brazil may offer early signals to how President Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement has affected global cooperation on climate change action, especially as nations announce their plans for updated NDCs under the Paris Agreement. The commitments, and subsequent implementation of these commitments, in NDCs will set the course for global action in the years to come ⁵⁴ . As other countries drive forward climate change action under and outside the Paris Agreement, the strength of the mitigation, adaptation, and financial commitments without the United States will be tested.

Conclusion 

President Trump has damaged critical institutions that promote climate change science, analysis, and policy cooperation at home and abroad. Built over many decades, these structures will not be easy to replace or rebuild. 

Looking forward, however, the Trump Administration’s actions present an opportunity for policymakers to assess existing global cooperation mechanisms and offer theories for reform in service of tackling global, multigenerational challenges. For example, at the intersection of climate change and trade policymaking, one now finds growing interest in exploring how a reconfigured trade system might help to ensure that: (1) clean energy technologies get disseminated across the world at speed and scale, and (2) sustainability standards are met so that no country nor any company can achieve competitive advantage in global markets by under-performing on its commitment to reduce GHG emissions or other fundamental sustainability obligations ⁵⁵ . In this regard, the Villars Framework for a Sustainable Trade System ⁵⁶ – developed by a global network of researchers, policymakers, and academics – offers a menu of ideas about how the WTO might be regeared to become a force for sustainable development.

Similarly, opportunities exist for others (countries, organizations, and individuals) to propose creative ways to reimagine global governance and improve the performance of international organizations. Creative thinking on this front has already emerged from a number of sources. ⁵⁷ This might also be a moment to review the track record of the UNFCCC and the global climate change regime with an eye toward enhancing international climate change collaboration. Leaders with fresh eyes might be asked to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the Paris Agreement – and advise on what elements of the structure launched in 2015 are working and how they might be further developed, but also what shortcomings have emerged and what might be done to address them. 

Ultimately, the immutable truth is that climate change presents an existential threat to the future of the human species. A successful response requires galvanizing transformational action at the global scale. In the best of circumstances, such collaboration would be challenging, given the diversity of people, governments, and priorities across the world. The dislocating pace of change in many societies as well as deep political divides have magnified this challenge. But the world community has no choice but to try.  And if the United States under President Trump plans to fiddle while Rome burns, others will have to get to work to put the fire out.

1. See generally Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on its Third Session, Held in Glasgow from 31 October to 13 November 2021, U.N. Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/10/Add.1 (Mar. 8, 2022) [hereinafter Glasgow Climate Pact].
2. See Sue Biniaz, COP 30 Must Not Cop Out, Just Security (July 3, 2025), (arguing that Parties to the Paris Agreement should focus on 2035 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), including the ambition found in submitted NDCs).
3. Johan Rockström & Matthias Klum, Big World, Small Planet: Abundance within Planetary Boundaries (2015); Katherine Richardson et al., Earth Beyond Six of Nine Planetary Boundaries 9 Science Advances(Sept. 13, 2023)
4. Global Energy Review 2025, IEA (2025)
5. David A. Lubin & Daniel C. Esty, The Sustainable Imperative, Harvard Business Review (May 2010)
6. Inge Kaul et al., Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21^st Century (Oxford University Press 1999)
7. Fareed Zakaria, Trump’s tariffs are undermining the peaceful, prosperous world order, The Washington Post (Aug. 1, 2025); Emily Kilcrease & Geoffrey Gertz, Tell Me How This Trade War Ends, Foreign Affairs (June 9, 2025)
8. Daniel C. Esty, Remaking International Trade for a Sustainable Future: Toward an International Trade Organization for the 21^st century, Quebec J. of Int’l Law (forthcoming 2025)
9. James M. Lindsay, First 100 Days: Trump’s Foreign Policy Disruption is Just Beginning, Council on Foreign Relations (Apr. 29, 2025)
10. Emily M. McCabe, U.S. Agency for International Development, An Overview, Congress.gov (Mar. 14, 2025)
11. [1] Sean Michael Newhouse, House sends bill to rescind billions for foreign aid and public media to the White House, Government Executive (July 18, 2025)
12. [1] See, e.g. RobertO. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The End of the Long America Century, Foreign Affairs (June 2025); Carlos Garcia-Soto, Reversing climate progress: consequences and solutions in the wake of U.S. policy rollbacks, 4NPJ Climate Action (2025)
13. Ravi Agrawi, Trump is Ushering in a More Transactional World, Foreign Policy (Jan. 7, 2025)
14. [1] See e.g., Jean-Jacques Rosseau, The Social Contract (1762); Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (1748), original title: De l’espirit des lois; Francois-Marie Arouet (Voltaire), Letters on the English (1733)
15. Climate Backtracker, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law
16. NOAA’s budget plan for 2026 would “close all NOAA labs,” including those instrumental in improving hurricane forecasts and other climate change impact modelling. See Jeff Masters, Cuts to NOAA increase the risk of deadly weather tragedies, Yale Climate Connections (July 7, 2025). See also David Schechter, Trump administration’s proposed NOAA cuts threaten decades-long CO2 data collection, scientist says, CBS News (May 12, 2025).
17. Rob Stein, Trump Administration shuts down EPA’s scientific research arm, NPR (July 20, 2025).
18. Alex Guillen, White House Says Trump meant EPA will cut 65 percent of spending, not staff, Politico (Feb. 26, 2025); Brad Plumer & Austyn Gaffney, Trump Administration Cuts Research Funding, Claiming It Creates ‘Climate anxiety’, N.Y. Times (Apr. 9, 2025); Christoper Flavelle et al., NOAA Is Told to Make List of Climate-Related Grants, Setting Off Fears, N.Y. Times (Feb. 10, 2025); Silencing Science Tracker, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law.
19. For example, NOAA cut funding for a program with Princeton University. U.S. Department of Commerce, Ending Cooperative Agreements’ Funding to Princeton University, Press Release (April 8, 2025)
20. Valerie Volcovici, US dismisses all authors of National Climate Assessment, email says, Reuters (Apr. 29, 2025)
21. Climate, U.S. Department of Energy. See Climate Working Group, A Critical Review of Impacts of Greenhouse Gas Emissions on the U.S. Climate, U.S. Department of Energy (July 23, 2025).
22. Contrarian Climate Assessment from U.S. Government Draws Swift Pushback, Science.org (Jul. 30, 2025), . See also Scott Waldman & Benjamin Storrow, DOE reframes climate consensus as debate, E&E News (July 21, 2025), (“Much of the report is based on the authors’ own disputed claims, research funded by the fossil fuel industry or assertions made by groups opposed to climate regulation. Some of its primary assertions were debunked years ago.”)
23. The Inflation Reduction Act(IRA) expanded tax credits for solar and wind power and battery storage, as well as supported the development of clean hydrogen, carbon capture and storage, and more. It also accelerated the adoption of electric vehicles through tax credits for the purchase of EVs and provided tax incentives for energy efficient investments. It drove over $100 billion in clean energy investments and was considered the largest investment in clean energy in American history. See also One Big Beautiful Bill Act Cuts the Power: Phase-Outs, Foreign-Entity Restrictions, and Domestic Content in Clean-Energy Credits, Frost Brown Todd Attorneys (Jul. 4, 2025)
24. FACT SHEET: President Biden Sets 2035 Climate Target Aimed at Creating Good-Paying Union Jobs, Reducing Costs for All Americans, and Securing U.S. Leadership in the Clean Energy Economy of the Future, The White House (Dec. 19, 2024)
25. Brad Plumer, A Bill That’s Big for Fossil Fuels, Not So Beautiful for Clean Energy, N.Y. Times (July 3, 2025)
26. Executive Order No. 14260, 90 Fed. Reg. 15513, 15514 (Apr. 14, 2025
27. Executive Order No. 14260, 90 Fed. Reg. 15513, 15514 (Apr. 14, 2025
28. Trump Administration Sues New York and Vermont Over Climate Superfund Legislation, Vinson & Elkins (May 2, 2025)
29. Laurel Rosenhall & Lisa Friedman, Trump Blocks California E.V. Rules in Latest Move to Rein In the State, N.Y. Times(June 12, 2025)
30. Trump EPA Kicks Off Formal Reconsideration of Endangerment Finding with Agency Partners, EPA Press Release (Mar. 12, 2025)
31. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Votes to End Defense of Climate Disclosure Rules, Press Release (Mar. 27, 2025)
32. See, e.g., Sarah Wesseler, Can states and cities lead on climate under Trump?, Yale Climate Connections (May 12, 2025)
33. America Is All In is the second generation of the “We Are Still In” campaign, which began in the first Trump administration. America Is All In
34. U.S. Climate Alliance; Climate Mayors
35. Jeva Lange, California Vows to Defy Trump, Re-up Cap-and-Trade, HeatMap (April 17, 2025)
36. UN Special Envoy Michael R. Bloomberg Announces Effort to Ensure U.S. Honors Paris Agreement Commitments, Bloomberg Philanthropies Press Release (Jan. 23, 2025)
37. Environmental groups sue Trump administration over shutdown of climate and pollution data tools, TheDailyClimate (April 16, 2025),
38. Claire Brown, Court Hands a Loss to Groups Seeking Billions in Frozen Climate Funds, The N.Y. Times (Sep. 2, 2025)
39. [1] Ella Nilsen, Trump admin sued by developers and two states after stopping work on nearly complete offshore wind farm project, CNN (Sep. 4, 2025)
40. Inflation Act Reduction Tracker, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law ;  USDA Reverses Course, Commits to Restore Purged Climate Webpages in Response to Farmers’ Lawsuit, Earthjustice (May 13, 2025). See also Our Lawsuits Against the Trump Administration, Earthjustice (Aug. 21, 2025), (noting the lawsuits where Earthjustice has had success against the Trump Administration)
41. Karen Zraick, Hawaii Announced a Climate Lawsuit. So the Government Sued Hawaii First, The N. Y. Times (May 1, 2025)
42. Korey Silverman-Roati, U.S. Climate Litigation InThe Age Of Trump: Full Term, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law (June 2021)
43. Here’s How NRDC Is Fighting Back Against the Trump Administration in Court, NRDC (July 8, 2025)
44. Cate Edmondson, Republicans Fretted Over Ceding Spending Power to Trump. Then They Voted to Do It, N.Y. Times (July 17, 2025), (offering examples of Senators, such as Lisa Murkowski, who opposed a spending package for President Trump’s foreign aid and broadcasting cuts)
45. Valerie Volcovici, Republican senators seek to change Senate bill clean energy tax, improve tax credits, Rueters (June 30, 2025)
46. Solar, battery storage to lead new U.S. generating capacity additions in 2025, U.S. Energy Information Administration (Feb. 24, 2025)
47. Benjamin Storrow, Brian Dabbs, Clean energy transition will persist under Trump, analyses say, Politico (Apr. 16, 2025), (citing U.S. EIA and Bloomberg NEF energy outlooks).
48. Michael Copley, America’s clean-energy industry is growing despite Trump’s attacks. At least for now, NPR (Mar. 12, 2025)
49. See, e.g., Joe Makower, No, corporate sustainability is not dying, Trellis (July 15, 2025), (“Most companies are not abandoning climate action. According to PwC’s 2025 State of Decarbonization report, while 16 percent are reducing their commitments, 37 percent are strengthening them. The number of firms setting climate targets is nine times higher than five years ago.”)
50. See, e.g., Joe Makower, No, corporate sustainability is not dying, Trellis (July 15, 2025), (“Most companies are not abandoning climate action. According to PwC’s 2025 State of Decarbonization report, while 16 percent are reducing their commitments, 37 percent are strengthening them. The number of firms setting climate targets is nine times higher than five years ago.”)
51. E. Donald Elliott & Daniel C. Esty, The End Environmental Externalities Manifesto: A Rights-Based Foundation for Environmental Law, N.Y.U. Env’t L. J. (2021).
52. See, e.g., Climate Litigation Databases, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law
53. The Way Forward After the 10^th Anniversary of the Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Joint EU-China Press Statement on Climate (July 25, 2025)
54. Supra note 2
55. Daniel C. Esty, Jan Yves Remy & Joel Trachtman, Regearing the International Trade System to Deliver a Sustainable Future, UNU-CPR (2025).
56. Joel Trachtman et al., Villars Framework for a Sustainable Trade System, Remaking Trade Project (2023), available at: https://remakingtradeproject.org
57. Stephen Heintz, A Logic for the Future: International Relations in the Age of Turbulence (2025); Jonathan S. Blake & Nils Gilman, Children of a Modest Star: Planetary Thinking for an Age of Crises (2024); Kim Stanley Robinson, The Ministry for the Future (2020); See also the UN University’s Centre for Policy Research’s Reimagining Global Economic Governance series of publications