“…it should be recalled that the Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present‑day conditions, and in accordance with developments in international law, so as to reflect the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights, thus necessitating greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies…” ¹

International and regional human rights bodies, including courts, are increasingly tasked to address or adjudicate whether governments have taken adequate mitigation and adaptation measures to address climate change ² Systemic climate change litigation – legal challenges for failing to combat climate change – has surged globally since the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 by 196 (now 195 ³ ) States ⁴ . As of April 2025, more than 3,000 climate-change cases have been identified in at least 55 jurisdictions, before international or regional tribunals and domestic courts ⁵ , and their number is expected to increase.

Since the United Nations (“UN”) Human Rights Council recognised the link between climate change and human rights in 2008 ⁶ – a connection later reinforced by other UN Treaty bodies in 2019 ⁷  – courts have been increasingly called upon to adjudicate climate change related claims from a human rights perspective. Individuals, who generally lack access to transnational tribunals reserved for States ⁸ , have been invoking international human rights instruments to challenge the effects of climate change on their fundamental rights.

Despite some initial scepticism toward a human-rights based approach to climate change litigation, ⁹ and the lack of explicit provisions in the Paris Agreement linking climate change to human rights, ¹⁰ judicial responses have steadily expanded. Today, human rights violations rank among top three prevailing causes of action in domestic and some international climate change cases.

I –  The revolution of Verein KlimaSeniorinnen?

Between September 2020 and January 2021, three climate change cases – Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland, no. 53600/20, Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others, no. 39371/20, and Carême v. France, no. 7189/21 – were brought before the European Court of Human Rights by individuals, including members of vulnerable groups such as elderly women and young people, who considered their governments’ efforts to combat climate change insufficient. In the first case, the applicant was also an association of elderly women, along with four of its individual members.

On 9 April 2024 the Grand Chamber of the Court delivered a near-unanimous judgement in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen. ¹¹ Notably, it ruled that the applicant association had standing to act on behalf of its members and bring the case before the Court. However, at the same time, it declared the complaints of the association’s four individual members inadmissible due to a lack of victim status.

The Court further found that Switzerland had violated the right to private and family life under Article 8 of the Convention by failing to implement and effectively enforce mitigation measures necessary to safeguard individuals within its jurisdiction from the adverse effects of climate change on their life and health. It also found a violation of the right of access to a court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the Swiss courts’ failure to provide convincing reasons for refusing to examine the merits of the complaints about inadequate implementation of climate-change mitigation measures under the domestic law.

The case of Duarte Agostinho and Others was declared inadmissible for failure to comply with the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of Portugal, and for lack of territorial jurisdiction in respect of the remaining respondent States ¹² . The Carême case was declared inadmissible for the applicant’s lack of victim status. ¹³

Climate activists and legal experts largely hailed the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen judgment as groundbreaking, reinforcing the connection between climate change and erosion of human rights on the international stage, and marking a turning point in climate change litigation. ¹⁴

However, some reactions in Switzerland and beyond were far less enthusiastic. The judgment was denounced as an example of excessive judicial activism with critics accusing the Court of inventing a new right not based in the Convention and of breaching the principles of separation of powers and subsidiarity. ¹⁵ Calls even emerged in Switzerland ¹⁶ – and fuelled the existing ones in the United Kingdom ¹⁷ – for withdrawal from the Convention.

The negative perception of Verein KlimaSeniorinnen judgment was rooted in a general opposition of the respondent Government to the very idea of the Court’s taking up the issue at all, a view which was reflected in their observations in the case:

“… the system of individual application under the Convention [is] not the appropriate means to [put pressure on the authorities to address climate change] given, in particular, the principle of subsidiarity. The democratic institutions in the political system of Switzerland provid[e] sufficient and appropriate means to address concerns relating to climate change, and a “judicialisation” of the matter at the international level [will] only create tension from the perspective of the principle of subsidiarity and the separation of powers. In any event, the Court [can]not act as a supreme court for the environment, given, in particular, the evidentiary and scientific complexity of the matter.” ¹⁸

Similar concerns were echoed by all eight third-party intervening States. ¹⁹

To address and perhaps, alleviate such criticisms, and to reaffirm that the Court’s legitimacy hinges on its “strict adhering to adjudicating the direct wrong to individuals and non-meddling with the government’s policy in a broader sense” ²⁰ , it may be useful to provide a nuanced interpretation of the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen judgment, taking also into account the inadmissibility decisions in Duarte Agostinho and Carême.

II – Understanding the three climate change cases

Before addressing the admissibility of the application in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, the Court made several preliminary findings. First, it recognised that climate change is an empirically established fact and that its major drivers are anthropogenic, that is, caused by human activity. ²¹ Second, it established that climate change poses a serious current and future threat to the enjoyment of human rights, a conclusion supported by the solid body of scientific evidence, recent international legal developments and domestic legislative standards. Third, the Court affirmed that the States are aware of these risks and capable of taking effective measures to address them ²² . Their actions in that field are therefore subject to the Court’s scrutiny. ²³

The idea that the Court’s competence, as a regional human rights judicial body, cannot, in principle, be excluded ²⁴ from matters traditionally within the domain of national parliaments and governments, remains the least acceptable among the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen’s sceptics and legal “originalists” who favour a strict reading of the Convention. Concerns about judicial overreach in climate change litigation predate this judgment and coincide with the surge in the climate-change litigation in 2015 ²⁵ . However, critics of Verein KlimaSeniorinnen tend to overlook some key principles.

The Contracting Parties to the Convention have agreed and committed to a system of collective enforcement of human rights ²⁶ . The Court’s supervisory (and compulsory) ²⁷ jurisdiction operates within the framework of subsidiarity and margin of appreciation enjoyed by the States ²⁸ . Moreover, while the “living instrument” doctrine necessitates dynamic interpretation of the Convention in the light of the present-day conditions ²⁹ , it too has its limits. ³⁰

Some of those limits concern the Court’s role as an international tribunal and may be described as “functional”. Others are procedural and substantive restrictions imposed by the Convention on the Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate claims brought before it. The following analysis will examine how the Court navigated these constraints in the cases at hand. 

1 – Functional limits to the Court’s adjudicatory function

A Subsidiarity

Subsidiarity remains the cornerstone of the Convention system and the functioning of the Court ³¹ . In Verein KlimaSeniorinnen the Court reaffirmed its long-standing position that, in matters of policy, “the national authorities have direct democratic legitimation and are in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate the relevant needs and conditions” ³² and reiterated its substantial deference to the national authorities, including the domestic courts, whose scope of review may be considerably wider than its own. ³³

In Duarte Agostinho, the applicants, relying on the Court’s seemingly flexible and non-formalistic approach to the exhaustion of domestic remedies ³⁴ , argued that they were not required to have exhausted such remedies because either no effective remedies were available in the respondent States or special circumstances existed absolving them of the exhaustion requirement ³⁵ . The Court assessed the remedies available within the Portuguese legal system and concluded that at least four remedies existed, including the possibility of bringing an actio popularis. It further found no special reasons for exempting the applicants from the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies. ³⁶

In Verein KlimaSeniorinnen the Court also reaffirmed its reluctance to act as a “fourth instance” court and substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts unless that is rendered unavoidable by the circumstances. ³⁷

B Separation of powers

Separation of powers is another functional constraint on the Court’s ability to adjudicate climate-change cases. In Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, the Court emphasized that in a democratic society the judiciary plays a complementary role in combating climate change and its adverse effects. It made clear that judicial intervention, including its own, cannot replace or provide any substitute for the action which must be taken by the legislative and executive branches of government. The Court also explicitly reaffirmed the limits of its competence under Article 19 of the Convention which mandates it “to ensure observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties”. ³⁸

At the same time, the Court underscored that “democracy cannot be reduced to the will of the majority of the electorate and elected representatives, in disregard of the requirements of the rule of law” stating that “the task of the judiciary is to ensure the necessary oversight of compliance with legal requirements”. ³⁹ The idea that “a judge may oppose the democratic majority when the democratic system itself is brought into danger and may intervene when the breach of a fundamental right violates democracy”, ⁴⁰ takes on particular significance under the Convention system. It means that when a State’s policy is alleged to adversely affect life, health or well-being of an individual or a group of individuals, thereby affecting Convention rights, such policy also becomes “a matter of law having a bearing on the interpretation and application of the Convention”. ⁴¹ Under Article 32 of the Convention, such matters fall within the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction. As the body tasked with overseeing compliance of democratic actors with their legal obligations toward individual applicants, the Court has the authority and duty to assess the admissibility of such claims and, if required, to rule on the merits. 

In Verein KlimaSeniorinnen the Court has thus consistently exercised self-restraint and avoided interventionism. ⁴² However, it also demonstrated that that judgement is about upholding the rule of law in as much as it is about the climate change. It reaffirmed that it would defer to the member States’ policies as well as to domestic courts’ findings so long as they represent a rational and responsible action to address the current and future challenges posed by climate change, in full compliance with the requirements of the Convention. In this context, the Court reiterated that States retain a wide margin of appreciation in selecting the means to fulfil their positive obligations. However, given the scientific evidence regarding the urgency of combating the adverse effects of climate change on human rights, the margin of appreciation afforded to the States as to whether to act or not is reduced. ⁴³ The Court, acting within its mandate under Articles 19 and 32 of the Convention, plays a role in defining the contours of their obligations. ⁴⁴ Its oversight ensures that the rights under the Convention remain practical and effective rather than theoretical and illusory ⁴⁵ , and that the victims receive appropriate redress.

2 –  Procedural and substantive jurisdictional limits 

In addition to the above-described functional limits to the Court’s ability to interpret the Convention in light of societal developments, the three climate cases have confirmed that, despite the unprecedented nature and gravity of the issues raised, climate change litigation remains subject to the same procedural and substantive jurisdictional constraints imposed by the Convention that apply to all cases before the Court. These include (i) the existence of a victim status (jurisdiction ratione personae) and inadmissibility of complaints brought in general public interest (actio popularis) and (ii) the scope of rights protected by the Convention (jurisdiction ratione materiae).

A Victim status

According to VereinKlimaSeniorinnen, to claim victim status under Article 34 in a climate-change case, individual applicants must demonstrate that they were “personally and directly affected by the impugned failures” by the State to combat climate change. This requires “a high intensity of exposure to the adverse effects of climate change” and a “pressing need to ensure the applicant’s individual protection, owing to the absence or inadequacy of any reasonable measures to reduce harm” ⁴⁶ .These criteria have been described as “stringent” and likely “prohibitive” for individual applicants ⁴⁷ , and the Court itself acknowledged that threshold for fulfilling them is exceptionally high.

However, these demanding criteria, together with the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies as reaffirmed in Duarte Agostinho, are designed to strike a delicate balance between two competing objectives: on the one hand, ensuring the effective protection of Convention rights, and on the other, respecting the principle of subsidiarity and preserving the separation of powers. This balance is particularly important in cases where the line between issues of law and questions of policy and political choices may not be evident. ⁴⁸

This approach effectively precludes actio popularis and, arguably, safeguards the Court’s docket ⁴⁹ from frivolous complaints. It also limits the possibility of bringing applications by “future” or “potential” victims, such as, for example, the applicant in Carême. ⁵⁰ At the same time, in full observance of the right of individual application, the approach leaves room for recognising direct victim status in situations of exceptional vulnerability. Applicants who can substantiate significant adverse effects arising from a State inaction or insufficient action on climate change, may still have their complaints examined, if they complied with the exhaustion requirement. ⁵¹

Under Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, forming or participating in a climate-focused non-governmental organisation (“NGO”) or association which meets certain criteria ⁵² can be a strategic way forward for affected individuals to reach a regional human rights tribunal, given complex administrative obstacles commonly encountered in climate change litigation. ⁵³

change litigation. While granting standing to the association of aggrieved applicants but denying victim status to its individual members have been criticised as a “paradox” ⁵⁴ and an unclear ⁵⁵ move which allowed some form of actio popularis or even introduced a new de facto admissibility criterion (because specialised NGOs will first filter potential applications before sending them to Strasbourg) ⁵⁶ , it nevertheless represents a fair and pragmatic compromise.

On the one hand, it prevents the Court from being flooded by an exponential number of individual applications from anyone who may claim to be affected by the climate change, thus avoiding excessive judicial interference in State-driven policy choices. On the other hand, it avoids denying justice to those who, like the four individual applicants in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, may not meet the victim status threshold for climate cases ⁵⁷ and who would otherwise be left to navigate the complexities of climate litigation, including those at the domestic level, on their own.

At the same time, concerns whether such associations have standing before domestic courts ⁵⁸ and, by extension, whether they can satisfy the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, merit a separate discussion. However, as the Court observed, in the vast majority of the thirty-eight member States it surveyed, environmental NGOs are entitled to bring environment-related cases to courts. ⁵⁹ Most importantly, the Court held that granting standing to Verein KlimaSeniorinnen was in the interests of the proper administration of justice given that the Swiss Federal Supreme Court had left the question of the applicant association’s standing unresolved. ⁶⁰

B Scope of the Convention rights

The material scope of the rights protected by the Convention and the resultant limits on the Court’s jurisdiction became another contentious issue following Verein KlimaSeniorinnen. The Court’s finding that Article 8 encompasses a positive obligation of a State ⁶¹ and a corresponding right to effective protection from serious adverse effects of climate change has been criticised as amounting to “the creation of a new right” ⁶² and an example of judicial overreach. However, the Court did not radically depart from its well-established jurisprudence on policy matters, environmental protection, or the margin of appreciation afforded to States.

In its judgment, the Court validated internationally recognised scientific findings on the impact of climate change on human rights. It cautiously refined its case-law to reflect this reality, ensuring that its approach is aligned with the most recent scientific knowledge, relevant international and domestic developments, and the broader trend toward “greening” of human rights. ⁶³

As “a judicial body tasked with the enforcement of human rights”, ⁶⁴ the Court could not ignore these legal and scientific developments. Its response was measured and consistent with its established role in assessing the States’ obligations under the Convention in light of the present-day conditions.

III – The influence of the three climate cases on international and domestic climate justice

In 2021-2022, shortly after the applications in VereinKlimaSeniorinnen, Duarte Agostinho and Carême were lodged, fourteen other climate change cases were brought before the Court. ⁶⁵ Five of those cases were declared inadmissible, five were struck out at the request of the applicants, and four of them are still pending.

Around the same time, other notable but less-straightforward climate-related developments also emerged. These included applications by eleven climate activists who had been convicted for protesting governmental inaction on climate change by removing the portraits of the President of France from several town halls. ⁶⁶ On 5 December 2022 the notice of these applications was given to the French Government, and they are currently pending before the Court

Furthermore, in February and April 2024, the Court received – and rejected – two environment-related requests for interim measures brought by eco activists, including an NGO. ⁶⁷

Two months before the judgment in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen was issued, the Supreme Court of New Zealand had overturned the Court of Appeal’s 2021 decision to strike-out a climate change case on the grounds that it was not amenable to judicial review. The ruling allowed the case to proceed to trial, where the country’s obligations under international human rights law would be examined. ⁶⁸

Shortly thereafter the Court handed down its Verein KlimaSeniorinnen judgment that has, predictably, quickly found its way into judicial reasoning within and beyond the Council of Europe Member States. For many courts and claimants, it has become a guiding authority in climate litigation.

In Poland, for instance, a group of five claimants inspired by Verein KlimaSeniorinnen appealed a climate change case to the Supreme Court, where the proceedings are still pending. ⁶⁹ Similarly, the European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”) Court relied on Verein KlimaSeniorinnen in its ruling concerning an airline’s obligation to pay greenhouse gas emissions fees. ⁷⁰ Notably, the South Korean Constitutional Court has seemingly refined intergenerational and intersectional perspective established in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, ruling that the constitutional right to a healthy environment of 19 young claimants, including a foetus was infringed by the government’s insufficient emission reduction targets. ⁷¹

While some courts will interpret Verein KlimaSeniorinnen differently and may not necessarily follow its precedent in every case, as demonstrated by the recent judgments from the United Kingdom and even the Court itself, ⁷² its transversal findings have, in general, set a direction for addressing the complaints about inadequate climate change governance, and cannot be ignored.

Conclusion

The growing body of climate litigation, reflected in the Court’s extensive inventory of domestic climate decisions in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, illustrates a clear trend: climate plaintiffs are increasingly turning to courts to fill in perceived or actual regulatory gaps. Courts have become notably responsive to the rapid evolution of climate litigation, and the Strasbourg Court has taken a prominent place in this process.

Unlike some other treaties or agreements establishing international or regional tribunals ⁷³ , the Convention empowers the Court to adjudicate grievances brought by individuals or groups of individuals at an international level, equipping it with necessary tools to examine issues arising from unprecedented circumstances, such as those posed by climate change.

Given the substantial number of environment-related cases the Court has examined and the undeniable reality of climate change, which even its most vocal sceptics may soon struggle to refute, it was only a matter of time before the first climate change case reached the Court’s docket. With its compulsory jurisdiction – which in each case is informed by the findings and views of the national courts – its dynamic yet measured interpretation of the Convention as “a living instrument”, the diverse legal expertise of its 46 judges, its extensive environmental and now emerging climate-change related jurisprudence, and the binding force of its judgments, the Court is well-equipped to identify when States’ efforts to combat climate change have fallen short to the extent that they violate the human rights of those under their jurisdiction. After all, its mission is not different from but firmly aligned with the Council of Europe’s States’ undertakings to protect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

As the European Convention on Human Rights marks its 75th anniversary in 2025 and the execution of the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen judgment remains pending before the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers ⁷⁴ , it can be said with confidence that the strings of “a living instrument” have so far been successfully fine-tuned to modern realities and have withstood stress test of time and history.

1. The Grand Chamber in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, § 434 (citing Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97, § 146, ECHR 2008)
2. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, §§ 215-222, 225, 231, 235-272; see also Francesco Sindico, Makane Moïse Mbengue, eds., “Comparative Climate Change Litigation: Beyond the Usual Suspects”, Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021.
3. The United States withdrew from the Paris Agreement on 20 January 2025.
4. Setzer J and Higham C (2024) Global Trends in Climate Change Litigation: 2024 Snapshot. London: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, p.2; UN Environment Programme, Global Climate Litigation Report: 2023 Status Review, pp. XI-XII; and Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) 2022 “Climate Change 2022 Mitigation of Climate Change”, p. 1376.
5. Climate Case Chart; see also Press-Release of 19 April 2023 of International Court of Justice; Advisory Opinion of 21 May 2024 of International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea; and Request of 9 January 2023 for an advisory opinion of Inter-American Court of Human Rights by Colombia and Chile.
6. UN Human Rights Council’s resolutions 7/23 and 10/4.
7. Joint statement of 16 September 2019 by five UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies.
8. IPCC’s Report 2022, p. 1509.
9. Dimitris Efthymiou, “Climate Change, Human Rights and Distributive Justice”, Finnish Yearbook of International Law, Jan Klabbers, Åsa Wallendahl, Paavo Kotiaho, eds., pp. 110-142, at p. 110.
10. Tim Eicke, Human Rights and Climate Change: What Role for the European Court of Human Rights?, European Human Rights Law Review, 2021, pp. 262-273, at p. 264.
11. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, 9 April 2024
12. Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others (dec.) [GC], no. 39371/20, 9 April 2024.
13. Carême v. France (dec.) [GC], no. 7189/21, 9 April 2024.
14. Sarah Schug, How a Human Rights Case Brought by Swiss Women Could Reignite Climate Policy, The Parliament Magazine.eu, 12 April 2024.
15. Corina Heri, “KlimaSeniorinnen and its Discontents: Climate Change at the European Court of Human Rights”, European Human Rights Law Review 4 (2024), pp. 317-331, at pp. 320 and 326 (with further references).
16. Ibid
17.  Jonathan Sumption, “ECHR’s climate change ruling is its boldest intrusion yet”, The Times, 14 April 2024.
18. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, § 338.
19. Ibid., §§ 366-375.
20. George Letsas, The European Court’s Legitimacy After KlimaSeniorinnen, European Convention on Human Rights Law Review 5 (2024), pp. 444-453, at p. 446.
21. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, § 436.
22. bid, §§ 103-120, 121-272, 431-436, and 542.
23. Ibid, §§ 436 and 451; see also Ivana Jelić and Etienne Fritz, “The ‘Living Instrument’ at the Service of Climate Action: The ECtHR Long-Standing Doctrine Confronted to the Climate Emergency”, Journal of Environmental Law, 2024, 36, pp. 141-158, at pp. 143-144.
24. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, § 451.
25. Laura Burgers, “Should Judges Make Climate Change Laws?”, Transnational Environmental Law, 9:1 (2020), pp. 55-75, at pp. 56 and 58.
26. The European Convention on Human Rights (Preamble); Jelić and Fritz, at p. 148 (with a further reference).
27. Marko Bošnjak and Kacper Zajac, “Judicial Activism and Judge-Made Law at ECtHR”, Human Rights Law Review, 2023, pp. 1-15, at p.13.
28. The European Convention on Human Rights (Preamble)
29.  Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, § 31, Series A no. 26, and Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, § 434.
30. Jelić and Fritz, at p. 147.
31.  Bošnjak and Zajac, at p.13.
32. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, § 449.
33. Ibid, §§ 412 and 450.
34. Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria; see also Mattias Guyomar, “Une Saga Climatique Devant La Cour Européene des Droits de l’Homme”, Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé, 4-2024, at p. 51; for more specific discussion on exhaustion in climate change cases, see Helen Keller and Abigail Pershing, “Climate Change in Court: Overcoming Procedural Hurdles in Transboundary Environmental Cases”, European Convention on Human Rights Law Review 3 (2022), pp. 23-46 at pp. 32-36.
35. Duarte Agostinho, §§ 128-134
36. Duarte Agostinho, §§ 218-228.
37. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, § 430.
38. Ibid, §§ 411-412; Guyomar, at pp. 56-57.
39. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, § 412.
40. Burgers, at pp. 63 and 70
41. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, §§ 450-451, and 454 and see also Robert Spano, “Should the European Court of Human Rights become Europe’s Environmental and Climate Change Court?”, pp. 87-91, at p. 90.
42. Heri, at p. 327.
43. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, §§ 541-543.
44. Ibid, §§ 451, 519, and 544-554.
45.  Ibid., § 545.
46. Ibid, § 487.
47.  Jelić and Fritz, at p. 151; and Heri, at p. 327.
48. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, §§ 449 and 484.
49. Julia Laffranque, “KlimaSeniorinnen – Climate Justice and Beyond”, European Convention on Human Rights Law Review 5 (2024), pp. 433-443, at p. 435; Heri, at pp. 321 and 322.
50. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, §§ 468-471 and 485; Carême §§ 67-71.
51. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, § 488.
52. Ibid, § 502
53.  Ibid, § 489.
54. Letsas, at p. 448.
55. Andreas Hösli and Meret Rehmann, “Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland: the European Court of Human Rights’ Answer to Climate Change”, Climate Law 14 (2024), pp. 263-284, at pp. 267 and 283.
56. Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, “’KlimaSeniorinnen Revolution’: the New Approach to Standing”, European Convention on Human Rights Law Review 5 (2024), pp. 423-431, at p. 427.
57. Corina Heri, “KlimaSeniorinnen, the Prohibition of Actio Popularis Cases, and Future Generations – a False Dilemma?”, European Journal of International Law blog article of 19 December 2024.
58. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, dissenting opinion of Judge Eicke, § 47.
59. Ibid., § 232.
60. Ibid, §§ 53, 523, 618 and 636.
61. Guyomar, at pp. 55-56.
62. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, dissenting opinion of Judge Eicke, §§ 59-67.
63. Heri, at p. 325.
64. Verein KlimaSeniorinnen, § 413.
65. Factsheets – ECHR Press resources – ECHR – ECHR / CEDH.
66.  Ludes et Thonon v. France and two other applications, no. 40899/22 (communicated on 5 December 2022).
67. Viard-Seifert and Others v. France (application no. 6024/24) and Alsace Nature and Others v. France (application no. 11833/24).
68. Judgment of 7 February 2024 (§§ 101 and 169).
69. Press-release of ClientEarth of 28 August 2024.
70.  Judgment of EFTA Court of 9 August 2024 (§ 35). 
71. https://climatecasechart.com/wp-content/uploads/non-us-case-documents/2024/20240829_NA_decision-1.pdf; see also, Aleydis Nissen, Green Court – South Korean Constitutional Court Rules Landmark Climate Judgement, European Journal of International Law blog article of 29 April 2025; and for more insight on intersectional approach, see Irthe de Jong, “Climate Justice Before International Human Rights Adjudicators Why Climate-Related Human Rights Cases Should be Approached with an Intersectional Lens”, 2022 Stitching NJCM-Boekerij.
72. Judgment of 25 October 2024; Cannavacciuolo and Others v. Italy, nos. 51567/14 and 3 others, 30 January 2025
73. Fn 7; see also The UN Environment Programme, Environmental Courts and Tribunals – 2021: A Guide for Policy Makers, at p. 15.
74.  Action Report of Switzerland of 24 October 2024.