Legal Theories of Liability for Climate Harm

This article provides a preliminary examination of perhaps the most complex aspect of the surge in climate litigation, ¹ namely the conceptualisation of liability for climate harm. ²  

The climate for speaking about the climate has changed very significantly in the last few years, and particularly in the last few months. The positions have become deeply polarised, with limited space for genuine dialogue and collaboration, despite the urgency of the situation, once again stressed by the extreme heat and the wildfires in this summer of 2025. Europe, as a continent, has been largely spared from the backlash against discourse about climate change. But the topic of climate liability may well be another matter altogether, if one judges by the clampdown on climate activism and the positions of some States in the hearing of early December of 2024 before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the advisory proceedings on climate change.

A word first about what I will understand here by ‘legal theories of liability’. I use this expression to refer to a normative explanation of why an entity is liable or responsible, under the law, for a specific type of negative outcome: climate harm. I will characterise the terms ‘climate harm’ below. The ‘legal theories’ encompass a wide range of normative explanations, with boundaries difficult to set specifically, given that many legal systems and types of claims are involved.

Yet, however broad, the expression is also intended to exclude a range of legal theories that have been mobilised in climate litigation seeking so-called ‘forward-looking’ remedies, i.e. the requirement for an entity to do better in the future without drawing the consequences of the harm it may have caused in the past. Claims against companies or States for lack of diligence or mitigation ambition, claims for misinformation or greenwashing or misleading investors, and several other types of claims, may raise issues of liability, but they can be distinguished for present purposes from what my main focus is here: legal theories that may ground a tort-like claim for climate harm that has materialised. 

I will structure my analysis in three main parts. First, I will very briefly introduce some empirical elements relating to climate change and its impact. This will provide the necessary context to better understand issues of attribution, causation and the conceptualisation of climate harm. Second, I will identify the main ways in which liability for climate harm has been structured or articulated in legal terms. Third, I will discuss in more detail the issue of liability for climate harm in the context of the advisory opinion rendered by the International Court of Justice on 23 July 2025 on the obligations of States in respect of climate change. ³

I – Climate change from a liability perspective

Let me start with some empirical elements. The fundamentals of climate change will be well trodden ground for most readers. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provides a useful definition of climate change in its Article 1(2), namely “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods”. ⁴ In this definition, we have already two core aspects of any theory of liability for climate harm, namely ‘change’ and ‘attribution’. Both are complex. 

Let me begin with ‘change’ first. Climate change is a highly condensed and aggregate expression, which we need to flesh out to determine which change is deemed to be harmful. The expression “climate change” would normally evoke an increase in global average temperature, or sea-level rise or the increased frequency or severity of certain extreme weather events. But there are many other faces of climate change, and they can be seen at a range of scales, from abstract to highly specific. One can think of floods, wildfires, disease vector redistribution or food crises. Which face we focus on is relevant to understanding and attributing a given ‘climate harm’. There is indeed a difference between interference with the climate system as such, the types of extreme weather events driven by it, a specific extreme weather event, and the specific harm suffered by an entity. What connects the myriad manifestations of climate change together is their complex but common cause, emissions of greenhouse gases, mainly carbon dioxide and methane, from fossil fuel use and land-use change. This link is unequivocal, in the terminology of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). ⁵

Yet, from a legal liability standpoint, the alignment of empirical or scientific attribution and legal attribution, in some cases, may require a fuller causal link, from ‘end-to-end’ or, in other words, from the emissions of a specific entity all the way to a specific injury or loss of another entity. This is possible in the current state of attribution science. ⁶ Empirical understanding of end-to-end attribution follows three, or perhaps four, steps: first, the link between the specific GHG emissions of an entity over a period of time (relevant emissions can follow different scopes 1 to 3) and changes in the global average temperature can be established in the current state of science (through a reduced complexity models); second, the link between temperature change and localised types of impacts (pattern scaling methods – models – are used to generate scenarios linking climate change to regional/local impacts) and/or specific extreme weather events can be clarified (probabilistic event attribution – multi-model and multi-method – according to the protocol of the World Weather Attribution Group ⁷ or ‘storyline approaches’ which plausible causal reconstructions, much like building a factual explanation in a case); third, a specific injury or damage can be linked to the type of event or the specific event (whether through an empirical damage function in the model or through more direct before-and-after reconstructions).

Although end-to-end attribution is empirically possible, from a legal standpoint, it is not necessarily required, at least for some theories of liability. This takes me to the discussion of the legal theories on the basis of which a certain climate-related harm may be attributed to an entity deemed responsible for it.

II – Legal articulation of liability for climate harm

In legal terms, such considerations may be addressed in a range of ways. One frequent approach is to acknowledge that an activity (technically a “transaction”) necessarily carries some undesired side effects (technically “negative externalities”) which must be borne financially (technically “internalised”) by the participants in the transaction (technically the “polluters”) rather than by third parties or the environment itself. Another is to allocate the responsibility for the harm arising from a given activity to the entity that conducts the activity, irrespective of the level of diligence it displays (strict liability). This is another form of internalisation, in that the activity or transaction typically remains lawful and the reparation required is standardised. A third approach is to consider that the conduct or transaction is unlawful and that all the harm resulting from it must be fully repaired. The normative explanations linking the conduct, the harm and the extent of the reparation are more complex in this latter case, because the allocation is much more fact-sensitive. For ease of reference, I will refer to these three broad approaches, respectively, as “cost internalisation”, “strict liability” (or general legal allocation), and “responsibility” (or specific empirical/legal allocation).

The broad policy and legal principle underpinning cost internalisation is the polluter-pays principle, as formulated in a wide range of international and domestic legal instruments. ⁸ To be clear, the polluter-pays principle can be used also in other contexts, including strict liability and responsibility. However, its focus is not to prohibit the transaction but to make participants to the transaction pay (or internalise) the cost borne by third parties. 

This can and has been applied in the context of climate change in a growing number of carbon pricing mechanisms. It is of course very complex to say what the “social cost of carbon” to be internalised is. An entire sub-field of economics is devoted to this question, which is, at the end of the day, a normative one. A 2023 study ⁹ of some 6000 estimates concluded that the social cost of emitting an extra tonne of carbon dioxide has been estimated to as little as USD 9 and as much as USD 525, hardly a base for a clear carbon pricing signal. The World Bank’s State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2024 identified 75 carbon pricing systems (carbon taxes and trading schemes) in operation, covering nearly a quarter of global emissions but setting in their great majority a rather low carbon price which, in all likelihood, it is insufficient to drive the behavioural change needed for a decarbonisation pathway consistent with the Paris Agreement. To put it simply, we are “well below” the cost of carbon that would be consistent with the Paris goal to limit temperature increase to “well below 2C”, and even more so for the 1.5C target.

Moving to strict liability, perhaps the most debated development are the so-called “climate superfund” statutes in US States such as Vermont, ¹⁰ New York ¹¹ and possibly others soon, including California, Maryland and Massachusetts. ¹² These statutes are modelled on the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), ¹³ better known as “Superfund”, which concerns the decontamination of hazardous waste sites. Under the climate superfund statutes, companies which have emitted more than a certain threshold of greenhouse gases (e.g. 1 billion metric tonnes, for Vermont) in a given past period (1 January 1995 to 31 December 2024, for Vermont; 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2024 for New York) are strictly liable to make “compensatory payments” covering a share of the costs incurred by the State as a result of climate change proportional to their share of emissions (estimated by means of “source attribution”). The identification of the “responsible parties” is of course a key aspect. These are defined as entities “engaged in the trade or business of extracting fossil fuel or refining crude oil” which, according to a determination of the regulator, have reached the requisite level of emissions in the reference period. Responsible parties do not include “any person who lacks sufficient connection with the State to satisfy the nexus requirements of the U.S. Constitution”. The volume of payments that may have to be made could reach billions of USD. 

With respect to responsibility, according to one estimate, ¹⁴ as of March 2025, some 68 lawsuits had been filed specifically seeking financial redress for climate harms. Approximately half of all 68 cases concern the fossil fuel industry and most have been filed in the US, followed by Brazil and Indonesia. A range of legal bases have been used in the growing body of climate litigation, but in specific relation to responsibility, as characterised earlier, three main rationales can be identified. I’d like to discuss each of them briefly, before examining a case-study more closely. 

The first rationale relies on a private tort law – or civil liability – framing, which relates to the protection of the interest of the injured party. Whereas this framing is the most basic one, it is complex in terms of causality and attribution. From a scientific perspective, it would require the establishment of what has been called “end-to-end” attribution of a specific harmful outcome to the specific emissions of a given entity. ¹⁵ It must be shown that “but for” the conduct of the defendant, the plaintiff would not have been injured as it was. In such a case, the responsible entity and its contribution to the climate harm have to be identified empirically. Less demanding theories can allocate liability on the basis of the “share” of the problem caused. This can be understood as a variation of market share liability, as initially developed by California’s Supreme Court in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (1980). ¹⁶ In such a variation, the impossibility to identify the specific manufacturer whose product is to blame for the injury is overcome by allocating liability to all manufacturers based on their market share or their share of the contribution to the harm. Some possible illustrations of cases – some pending – where these theories are at play are Lliuya v. RWE (Higher Regional Court in Hamm), ¹⁷ Hugues Falys et al v. Total Energies (commercial court of Tournai, Belgium), ¹⁸ Asmania et al v. Holcim (Cantonal Court of Zug, Switzerland) ¹⁹ or Greenpeace and ors v. Eni (Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) of Italy). ²⁰ In Lliuya, which was decided on 28 May 2025, a German appeals court considered that a claim by a Peruvian farmer, who had argued that RWE’s emissions had contributed to the melting of a glacier near his hometown and therefore had to compensate in part for the adaptation costs, was “plausible and substantial” (schlüssig und erheblich) under German private law (section 1004, para. 1, second sentence of the German civil code (BGB), read together with sections 677 and 812), but it failed on the specific facts of the case. Thus, it set the principle that causation and attribution can indeed be established in a claim for climate harm, dismissing a range of recurrent arguments used by defendants.

Theories based on proportional contribution to the problem can also be deployed for the protection of a public interest. In this public law framing, akin to that of public nuisance, two main theories can be identified. One is a variation of proportional liability but with a focus on a type of impact. This is sometimes characterised as requiring only “general” rather than “specific” causation. Rather than attributing the effects of a specific event (e.g. the July 2024 European heatwave) to a specific conduct, the focus is on linking the increased frequency and severity of heatwaves (or other types of events) to climate change, and climate change to the defendants’ conduct, through their contribution. Possible examples are provided by some 26 lawsuits by counties, municipalities and cities in the US against fossil fuel majors, some of which rely on public nuisance, or Smith v. Fonterra (pending before New Zealand Courts), where the relevance of public nuisance in the context of climate change was specifically recognised. ²¹ The other possible articulation of the theory is even more general. It links the conduct of the defendant to the broadest form of climate harm, namely interference with the climate system itself. Given the scientific and political consensus that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases over time are the cause of climate change, the only aspect that would need to be determined is the extent of an entity’s contribution to climate change as a problem. Possible illustrations could include, again, Smith v. Fonterra, where a new tort of harm to the climate system was argued alongside the torts of public nuisance and negligence; ²² Held and others v. Montana, to the extent that it frames constitutional rights as protecting a stable climate system; ²³ the recognition in the human rights litigation context of a right to a stable climate; ²⁴ and the position of certain States and international organisations in the ICJ proceedings on climate change.

The third basis on which responsibility for climate harm could be established concerns non-linear outcomes or the triggering of tipping points. The question here concerns responsibility for adding the straw that breaks the camel’s back. Here, the straw is of course the incremental concentrations of greenhouse gases from anthropogenic emissions, and the camel’s back is the climate system. A less inelegant way of explaining this non-linear dynamic is the answer given by one of the characters of Hemingway’s novel The Sun also Rises, when asked how he went bankrupt: “two ways” he replies, “gradually, and then suddenly”. The core issue is who is responsible for the marginal tonne(s) of greenhouse gases that tip the system, whether all emitters, or only large emitters or possibly a single emitter or group thereof? This question is wide open and could be approached in different ways, most likely through a strict liability system or through a public law prism focusing on the risk generated by large emitters. Its complexity lies in the possible disconnect between the merely incremental contribution to the problem and the disproportional damage caused by it. Tipping-point litigation has not materialised yet, at least in the form of a liability for climate-harm claim. But it may not be that far, given the increasing recognition of the high risks involved in adding greenhouse gases. 

III – Responsibility for climate harm in the ICJ advisory opinion on climate change

In order to illustrate in some more detail the range of issues raised by establishing responsibility for climate harm, it is useful to make reference to the important advisory opinion rendered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court) on 23 July 2025. ²⁵ Of course, advisory opinions are mere advice, in this case given to the UN General Assembly, which requested the opinion. But the law clarified by the Court is itself binding and the Court’s interpretation will in all likelihood be widely followed by other courts, both at the domestic and international levels.

I will not address the entire set of issues covered by the advisory opinion, but only the specific issue of responsibility for climate harm. I will do so first in relation to the process of drafting of the UN General Assembly resolution making the request, i.e. resolution 77/276 of 29 March 2023 (the Request), with the important caveat that almost every word in that resolution was carefully negotiated. Then I will discuss how the issue featured in the written and oral pleadings.

As a short prelude to the discussion of the resolution, let me mention briefly that there have been many views, often highly critical, about the formulation of the questions. I think that constructive criticism was an important part of the process, although what could be gathered from it was minimal, both because of the major political constraints resulting from the negotiation and, also, because no alternative drafting was ever articulated, except for certain details that, often, were politically out of the cards. In hindsight, what matters is that the formulation of the question achieved the intended outcome.

The Request put two questions to the Court. The second question was initially the only question, and it focuses on “legal consequences”, which is in the terminology of the ICJ a short-hand for responsibility. The first question was added as a “forward-looking” question, and during the negotiations there were attempts at keeping only the first question, about obligations, and discard the second, about responsibility. There is naturally much to be said about all this, but in an effort to remain self-contained, let me note that the arguments developed in the voluminous written and oral submissions were variations between two poles of the spectrum, one emphasising a forward-looking narrative centred around the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement as the sole or main instruments and excluding issues of responsibility, and the other stressing, on the contrary, the applicability of much wider body of international law and the accountability focus of the second question, which expressly relied on the terminology of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. The Court sided resolutely with the latter position, rejecting arguments based on the lex specialis maxim. It concluded that a much wider body of obligations governs the conduct responsible for climate change, understood to encompass both emissions of greenhouse gases and production of fossil fuels, ²⁶ and that the legal consequences of breaching such obligations are governed by the general international law on State responsibility for internationally wrongful act. ²⁷   

The theory of responsibility for internationally wrongful act articulated by the Court largely reflects the submissions of States such as Vanuatu and organisations such as the Melanesian Spearhead Group, the African Union and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States. Like the Higher Regional Court in Hamm in Lliuya v. RWE, the Court did not reach any specific determination of responsibility, but it recognised the principle of responsibility. For present purposes, four main elements can be identified.

The first is an emphasis on assessing a conduct, the characterisation of which was woven into the text of the resolution requesting the opinion (mainly at preambular paragraph 5, in fine, as well as in questions (a) and (b)). What is on trial from this perspective is a conduct by certain responsible entities. The latter are States with large historical and/or present emissions of greenhouse gases or large production of fossil fuels. What the Court called, following the submissions of Vanuatu, the ‘relevant conduct’ ‘encompass[ed] the full range of human activities that contribute to climate change, including both consumption and production activities’ and it ‘is not limited to conduct that, itself, directly results in GHG emissions, but rather comprises all actions or omissions of States which result in the climate system and other parts of the environment being adversely affected by anthropogenic GHG emissions’. ²⁸ Later, when addressing specifically the issue of responsibility, the Court gave examples of what may constitute a wrongful act: ‘fossil fuel production, fossil fuel consumption, the granting of fossil fuel exploration licences or the provision of fossil fuel subsidies … may constitute an internationally wrongful act’. ²⁹ Such a wide and at the same time specific statement is remarkable from the Court, particularly in an opinion rendered unanimously by all 15 judges. 

The second element is the characterisation of the climate harm at stake. In question (b), the type of climate harm at stake was characterised as interference with the climate system as such, specifically “significant harm to the climate system and other parts of the environment”. Underpinning this focus is the fact that the causal link between anthropogenic GHG emissions and climate change is “unequivocal” in the terminology of the IPCC, which reflects both a scientific and a political consensus, given the procedure for the adoption of summaries for policy makers. States naturally also referred to a range of specific impacts, as well as specific injuries, but the broad focus on harm to the climate system was retained both in the question and in the opinion rendered by the Court. On this point, the Court noted that: ‘with regard to obligations under customary international law, the Court observes that the most significant primary obligation for States in relation to climate change is the obligation to prevent significant harm to the climate system and other parts of the environment … which applies to all States, including those that are not parties to one or more of the climate change treaties’. ³⁰ From a ‘torts’ perspective, this is a recognition that the old no harm (nuisance) tort, turned into a broader obligation of care, encompasses a specific tort to the climate system itself. Of course, international law is not common law and, much like in a civil law context, there is no need for the recognition of a specific ‘tort’. But it is nevertheless remarkable that such specification was provided. Read by one of the judges from the common law tradition, Judge Charlesworth, the range of obligations at stake include this type of specific harm, as she noted by reference to the content of the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment: ‘it is important to emphasize that the right has both substantive and procedural features as well as special obligations towards those in vulnerable situations, discussed further below. It includes the right to a safe climate’. ³¹

The third element concerns the need to disentangle, in a complex context such as that of cumulative emissions of greenhouse gases over time from a multitude of sources in many States, the specific contribution of each responsible entity. In this regard, the Court made three important clarifications. First, it is not the emissions themselves but the conduct that generates or allows such emissions which is at stake. ³² Second, although it may be scientifically complex to apportion which effects can be attributed to which State, from the legal perspective such apportionment remains possible under current rules. ³³ Third, it is entirely possible to account for a plurality of both responsible and injured States under existing law ³⁴ ,  and “States other than injured States” (Article 48 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility) may also invoke the responsibility of those States which have breached their international obligations, and they will not need to establish a specific injury to themselves but only harm to the climate system and other parts of the environment. ³⁵  

The latter point leads to the fourth element, which concerns the articulation of the legal consequences. These consequences go well beyond the relationship between responsible entities and injured parties. The extensions rests both on (i) the erga omnes (for customary international law) and erga omnes partes (for treaty obligations) nature of some of the primary rules at stake, including human rights, the prevention principle and the obligations arising under the climate change treaties, a breach of which triggers secondary obligations for third parties and international organisations, and (ii) the broad conceptualisation of those on the receiving end, including States – whether injured, specially affected or particularly vulnerable – as well as individual and collective human rights subjects, present and future. The Court expressly addressed this distinction, and it only noted that it made a difference for the remedies that can be claimed: “while a non-injured State may pursue a claim against a State in breach of a collective obligation, it may not claim reparation for itself. Rather, it may only make a claim for cessation of the wrongful act and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, as well as for the performance of the obligation of reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.” ³⁶

IV – Concluding observations

In closing, I would like to recall the observation I made at the beginning of this contribution. The climate for speaking about the climate has changed very significantly in just a few years and months. Liability for climate harm is likely the most sensitive issue of all in this context. The fact that the International Court of Justice now considers the conduct responsible for climate change as a conduct that, rather than being deemed lawful, must be seen, in principle, through the prism of internationally wrongful acts is very significant. The former exception (unlawfulness of the conduct) is now deemed the rule, and the former rule (lawfulness of the conduct) is now deemed the exception. This is a major change, because the possibility that such conduct may be a tort/unlawful no longer faces a steep upward legal slope. In turn, regulatory approaches such as carbon pricing that assign cost while implying the lawfulness of a conduct become less compelling. Between mere carbon pricing and tort-like liability, strict liability approaches – which include liability caps and do not call into question the lawfulness of the conduct – may arise as a viable alternative despite the polarisation of the discourse about climate liability.

1. See J. Setzer, C. Higham, Global Trends in Climate Change Litigation: 2025 Snapshot (London: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, LSE); M. Wewerinke-Singh, S. Mead (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Climate Litigation (Cambridge University Press, 2025).
2. This is a revised and updated version of my lecture for the fourth edition of the 3VB-NUS Arbitration Lecture, delivered on 13 May 2025. My remarks are made in a purely academic capacity and must be understood as mere observations about a phenomenon that is unfolding before our very eyes, and not as the expression of personal or professional stances.
3. International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change, 23 July 2025, I.C.J. Reports (2025).
4. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107
5. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Synthesis Report of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6). Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers (2023), statement A.1
6. C. W. Callahan, J. S. Mankin, ‘Carbon majors and the scientific case for climate liability’ (2025) 640 Nature 893. For a broader discussion of attribution science as it concerns litigation see M. Burger, J. Wentz, R. Horton, ‘The Law and Science of Climate Change Attribution’ (2020) 45 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 57.
7. See https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/
8. See P. Schwartz, ‘Principle 16: The polluter pays principle’, in J. E. Viñuales (ed.), The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 429-450
9. R. S. J. Tol, ‘Social cost of carbon estimates have increased over time’ (2023) 13 Nature Climate Change 532
10. Climate Superfund Cost Recovery Program, 10 V.S.A. § 596
11. Climate Change Superfund Act, S.2129-B/A.3351-B
12. See California (Polluters Pay Climate Cost Recovery Act, S.B. 1497); Maryland (Responding to Emergency Needs from Extreme Weather Act, H.B. 1438 and S.B. 958); Massachusetts (Climate Change Adaptation Cost Recovery Act, H.B. 872 and S.B. 481).
13. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §9601 et seq. (1980)
14. Zero Carbon Analytics, ‘Companies face financial risks from growing climate damage litigation’, Briefing – Energy and Transport (March 2025).
15. See the previously cited study of Callahan and Mankin: C. W. Callahan, J. S. Mankin, ‘Carbon majors and the scientific case for climate liability’ (2025) 640 Nature 893
16. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980)
17. Lliuya v. RWA, Hamm Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht Hamm), Germany, Case I-5 U 15/17, Judgment (28 May 2025)
18. Hugues FALYS, LDH, GREENPEACE & FIAN v. SE TE, 230.184 – Tribunal de l’entreprise du Hainaut, division de Tournai (3th ch.), Belgium (pending)
19. Ibu Asmania, Arif Pujianto, Edi Mulyono and Pak Bobby v. Holcim, Cantonal Court of Zug, Switzerland (pending)
20. Greenpeace and others v Eni, Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione (Sezioni unite civili)), Case 13085/2024, Order of 18 February 2025
21. See the latest decision in the case, by New Zealand’s Supreme Court, Michael John Smith v. Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd [2024] NZSC 5 (7 February. 2024) (Smith v Fonterra), paras. 143-173.
22. Smith v Fonterra, paras. 71-175.
23. Held and others v Montana, Supreme Court of Montana, case number DA 23-0575, Judgment of 18 December 2024, paras. 20-30
24. Case of Verein Klimaseniorinnen Schweiz and others v. Switzerland, ECtHR Application no. 53600/20, Judgment of the Grand Chamber (9 April 2024), paras. 519 and 544; Emergencia Climática y Derechos Humanos (Interpretación y alcance de los artículos 1.1, 2, 4.1, 5.1, 8, 11.2, 13, 17.1, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25 y 26 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos; 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 y 18 del Protocolo Adicional a la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos en materia de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales “Protocolo de San Salvador”, y I, II, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XVI, XVIII, XX, XXIII, y XXVII, de la Declaración Americana de los Derechos y Deberes del Hombre), CIADH Opinión Consultiva OC-32/25 de 29 de mayo de 2025. Serie A No. 32, paras. 295-297.
25. Obligations of States in respect of climate change, Advisory Opinion of 23 July 2025, General List No 187 (Advisory Opinion)
26. Advisory Opinion, para 94
27. Advisory Opinion, paras 171 and 420
28. Advisory Opinion, para. 94
29. Advisory Opinion, para 427
30. Advisory Opinion, para. 409.
31. Separate Opinion of Judge Charlesworth, para. 9
32. Advisory Opinion, para. 427-428
33. Advisory Opinion, para. 429
34. Advisory Opinion, para. 431
35. Advisory Opinion, para. 442
36. Advisory Opinion, para. 443.