Local elections in Hungary, 9 June 2024

2024 was a significant election year in Hungary, with both European Parliamentary and local elections held on 9 June. The stakes were higher than usual for Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz-KDNP government this time around. For the first time since 2010, a potential challenger emerged on the political scene: According to recent polls, the growing popularity of Péter Magyar and his Tisza Party posed a serious risk to the stability and sustainability of the Orbán government. While most post-election analyses focused primarily on the “Péter Magyar phenomenon” and the 29,60% of party list votes that the Tisza Party received in the EP election, the most important consequences of the local elections were less related to this new political situation due to the Tisza Party’s lack of local implantation. The key question of the municipal elections was whether opposition mayors and council members could maintain and possibly extend their positions and power following their 2019 victory, or if the governing party’s local candidates could regain control of the villages and districts they had lost.

Although citizens’ political preferences clearly correlate across various elections, such as the European Parliamentary and local elections, this analysis will focus more on the general trends in local elections in Hungary. To reflect on the current government-opposition power relations following the opposition’s relative success in the 2019 elections, I will provide an overview along three main aspects. I will (1) highlight the most important campaign issues and unbalanced political resources of the parties, (2) examine how participation dynamic could advance the government party, and (3) map the relationships between party affiliations and the socio-demographic characteristics of the settlements. The latter aspect highlights the most important cleavages across the country at a local political level. The overall purpose of this analysis is to highlight some under-discussed lessons and consequences of the 2024 local election results in Hungary.

Unbalanced campaign conditions

In line with the typical trends of the last 15 years, the Fidesz government’s campaign expenditure far exceeded the expenditures of any opposition parties, particularly with regard to social media campaigning. The government sponsored significantly more posts than the opposition (Political Capital, 2024). In the case of local elections, the government party’s campaign expenditure was partly financed from the municipalities’ and state budgets, which contributed to the disproportionate circumstances. According to reliable sources and judicial cases, voters were motivated to participate in the elections and vote for Fidesz in exchange for bribes (ibid.).

Unlike in the European Parliamentary elections, it was more difficult to identify the campaign themes of parties and candidates in both smaller towns and villages and larger cities. Local campaigns mostly involved displaying a series of candidates’ profile pictures. The general messages were often identical and difficult to differentiate, and the details of policy aims could only be found in street forums or local newspapers. During the campaign period, Fidesz’s message that they are the party of peace and will not collaborate with the EU leadership on the war in Ukraine dominated most communication channels.

The more the better? For whom? Examining voter turnouts

Although voter turnout is usually higher in larger towns and cities in European Parliamentary elections, there is usually no difference in this regard related to settlement type in local elections. However, as the two elections were held on the same day in 2024, we could expect a lower turnout in smaller villages due to lower interest in EP elections. A pre-election analysis by the Republikon Institute suggested that a higher voter turnout could benefit the governing party, Fidesz (Republikon, 2023).

As can be seen on Figure a, voter turnout has increased in every county and the capital city Budapest since the last local elections in 2019. Turnout exceeded 50% across the whole country. The counties with the highest turnout figures were in western Hungary (Vas, Zala, Győr-Moson-Sopron) and Budapest. According to models by the Republikon Institute, this could have benefited the government party across the country. Nevertheless, the urban-rural divide remained visible: in larger towns and Budapest, where opposition parties performed relatively better, the higher turnout did not necessarily translate into gains for the government.

Election results and the distribution of selected socio-demographic variables

To represent and descriptively analyse the socio-demographic characteristics of voters at a settlement level, the maps below show the party affiliations of elected mayors and three other important characteristics: (1) the proportion of dwellings without comfort or emergency, (2) the proportion of unemployed people, and (3) the proportion of people who are Roman Catholic in Hungarian settlements. The first two characteristics identify regions with the lowest socioeconomic status, where it can be hypothesized that support for Fidesz will be stronger. Christianity is also an important element of the government’s communications strategy, suggesting that Christians may be more likely to vote for Fidesz. As Catholicism is the largest denomination in Hungary (see below), the analysis will focus on this religious community. Note that for all three variables, caution is warranted when generalising the settlement-level data analyses to the individual level due to the risk of ecological fallacy.

Figure b presents the party affiliations of the newly elected mayors across all municipalities and Budapest districts. The map shows that the majority of settlements are governed by independent (független) candidates, whereas Fidesz candidates were more popular in the Eastern and North-Eastern regions of the country. However, party affiliations are not always informative in municipal elections, since many candidates officially run as independents while maintaining tight relationships with the governing party – a strategy aiming at sustaining citizens’ trust while securing access to various financial resources (Kovarek & Dobos, 2023). As a result, most independent mayors cannot act independently in practice; they are merely officially nominated as such. The number of settlements and districts where opposition party candidates (ellenzék) won the mayoral seat was negligible compared to the other two categories. The same rule of thumb may apply here too: opposition candidates often run as independents to avoid partisan stereotypes and concerns. For example, the mayor of Dunaújváros, Tamás Pintér, was a Jobbik candidate in 2019 but was re-elected as an independent candidate in 2024.

To compare the distribution of political preferences and basic socio-demographic variables across the country, the proportion of dwellings without comfort on the settlement level are presented on Figure c. It can be seen that the highest proportion of dwellings without amenities are found in settlements on the eastern, north-eastern and south-western borders. In some villages, more than 30% of houses and flats are without comfort, and in some cases this figure can reach 75%. Contrary to expectations, this only partly overlaps with the settlements where Fidesz candidates were elected as mayors. However, it should be noted that biases in indicating party preferences may have influenced the results.

The percentage of unemployed people in a settlement shows a similar pattern to the rate of non-comfort dwellings, since these socio-demographic characteristics are correlaed – see Figure d for details. Once again, we can observe that both Fidesz mayors and high unemployment rates are overrepresented in frontier villages. This could mean that unemployed people voted for Fidesz candidates in the hope that their economic circumstances would improve, or that citizens in employment voted for them because they recognise the disadvantages of a high unemployment rate and hope that Fidesz will provide a solution to the problem. However, several studies point to the relatively low socioeconomic status of Fidesz voters across the country (Scheiring, 2022).

The geographical distribution of Roman Catholic church members present a different pattern. Catholics are by far the largest Christian denomination in Hungary. Having historically shaped the country’s cultural identity, they still representing a significant share of the population despite declining levels of religious practice. As the largest Christian community, Catholic people are expected to form a significant voter base for Fidesz because of the party’s Christian-democratic profile and messaging. Fidesz politicians often emphasize the importance of upholding Christian teachings in various situations in everyday and political life, and most of them follow Catholic teachings and habits. However, this does not seem to correlate with voting for Fidesz, at least not in recent local elections. For example, the high concentration of Catholic communities in the western Hungary is not reflected in the election results.

Several opposition mayors were re-elected, including those of most Budapest districts as well as the mayors of Érd, Hódmezővásárhely, Szeged, Szombathely and Tatabánya. The success of the leader of the Two-Tailed Dog Party (MKKP) Gergely Kovács in the 12^th district, where he defeated the long-serving Fidesz mayor Zoltán Pokorni, was a significant development, as was the victory of Bence Pintér, an independent candidate and former journalist, over incumbent Csaba András Dézsi. However, the number of opposition-led districts and settlements has not changed significantly, and, more importantly, smaller villages are still more frequently led by Fidesz or independent politicians. Overall, despite a few symbolic gains, the opposition failed to expand its territorial presence or convert the momentum of the 2019 results into a broader political advantage in 2024.

Open questions and possible new political dynamics

Two phenomena that will likely impact decision-making procedures and government effectiveness in the upcoming term can be highlighted. First, the far-right Our Home Movement (Mi Hazánk Mozgalom) came second in almost every county council election, meaning that they will be the largest opposition party at county level (the sub-national unit above local municipalities). The party’s political legitimacy was confirmed and strengthened following the 2022 national elections, when it surpassed the parliamentary threshold for the first time in its history and entered parliament.

Second, a new political situation emerged in Budapest, creating a force for unusual political collaborations in the future. Although the former mayor Gergely Karácsony, regained his position in a very tight race involving recounts, winning by only 300 votes against Dávid Vitézy, he lost his majority in the city council due to the unexpected success of Péter Magyar’s party list in Budapest. As a result, he will have to cooperate with representatives of either the Fidesz or the Tisza Party. The effectiveness of the city council in decision-making has definitely decreased, and processes have become more drawn out compared to the previous electoral cycle.

Undoubtedly, the international effects and European perspectives of the local elections are less significant than that of the European Parliamentary elections. However, these two phenomena will likely be decisive in the run-up to the 2026 national elections, the results of which could significantly impact Hungary’s foreign strategies and diplomatic relations.

References

Kovarek, D., & Dobos, G. (2023). Masking the Strangulation of Opposition Parties as Pandemic Response: Austerity Measures Targeting the Local Level in Hungary. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 16(1), 105–117.

Political Capital (2024, 18 June). Szélsőségesen egyenlőtlen feltételek mellett zajlottak az európai parlamenti és önkormányzati választások.

Republikon Intézet (2023). Két választás egy napon 2024-ben: részvételi tendenciák.

Scheiring, G. (2022). The national-populist mutation of neoliberalism in dependent economies: The case of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. Socio-Economic Review, 20(4), 1597–1623.