Post-Conflict Reconciliation in Ukraine

One year after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, it is still unclear how a peace agreement might be achieved or what its terms could be. Nor is it apparent what territory and what balance of Russian, Ukrainian, and other communities will constitute post-war Ukraine. Nonetheless, the nature of this conflict as a war justified by claims about history, identity, and legitimacy suggests that there will be a need for post-war reconciliation measures. Such reconciliation mechanisms would be intended to enable Ukraine’s Russian, Ukrainian, and other communities to live together constructively within the same state by fostering ‘mutual recognition and acceptance’ among them. ¹  

While social reconciliation within Ukraine has value as an end in itself, the goals of social reconciliation also converge with Ukraine’s long-term, political aims vis-à-vis both Russia and Europe. Concerning Russia, social reconciliation has been found to support the success and longevity of peace accords by reducing the social incentives for conflict (although of course no form of reconciliation could prevent Russia from acting as the aggressor again should it choose to do so). ² Concerning Europe, as discussed below, transitional justice and minority group protections not only foster social reconciliation but are also core European values endorsed by European Union policy and Council of Europe treaties. Accordingly, engaging in these measures would also advance Ukraine’s interest in strengthening its ties with Europe. ³  

Conflict and Reconciliation

Many wars are not exclusively political acts, but rather, are instigated by social conflict or draw on social divisions between communities to justify and elicit violence. The premise that there are social aspects of conflict that must be addressed in some form of post-conflict process is familiar to many models of conflict and post-conflict redevelopment. Most relevant for this paper are socio-psychological theories, which have developed robust models of the relevant social dynamics and associated reconciliation processes. ⁴  

Socio-psychological theories posit armed conflict as both produced by and contributing to an interdependent, antagonistic relationship between communities. Over time, communities with competing needs and interests can create mutually exclusive narratives of their shared history, such as the contrasting Russian and Ukrainian histories of their relationship from the time of Kievan Rus’ through the Soviet and post-Soviet eras. These historical narratives typically express each group’s core needs and the perceived threat that the other group poses to its physical or cultural survival. Over time, each community’s sense of its collective identity comes to be grounded in its rejection of the other community’s identity and claims about the meaning of their shared history and current interactions. Escalation into armed conflict exacerbates this dynamic, causing extreme harms and grievances and reinforcing the perceived nature of the other community as an existential threat. The conflict feeds the opposition of identities, and the opposition of identities feeds the conflict. ⁵    

While a peace agreement may resolve political questions by means of a compromise between elites, typically it will not address the social dynamic of reciprocal, self-perpetuating hostility that is closely tied to the identity of both groups. Cooperative social, economic, and political activities will be difficult or impossible, and violence may easily arise again. The longer a conflict continues, the more embedded these social beliefs are in each community’s ethos, and the more intractable the conflict becomes. Reconciliation measures are intended to change this social dynamic. ⁶   

Accordingly, if the war in Ukraine solely concerned conflicting political interests in territory, national security, or access to resources, those issues might be fully resolved politically through a peace agreement between the governments of Russia and Ukraine, and there would be no need for reconciliation processes. ⁷ But instead, intertwined with these political disagreements are questions of social identity: the legitimacy of Ukraine as an independent state and of Ukrainians as a separate people, the contradictory histories of Russian dominance and Ukrainian nationalism, and the modern relationships between Russian-identified and Ukrainian-identified Ukrainian citizens. Putin deliberately incorporated these socio-psychological elements in justifying the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well as the previous seizure of Crimea and involvement in Donbas. ⁸ Ukraine has asserted its legitimacy as a people and as an independent state in countering Russian claims to those territories. ⁹  

Underlining the significance in the Ukrainian context of this social dynamic and of post-conflict reconciliation, the 2001 census and more recent studies indicate that many Ukrainian citizens have complex linguistic, ethnic, and national identifications. Often, families have both Russian and Ukrainian ancestry. Russian speakers do not necessarily identify as ethnically Russian. Those who do identify as Russian do not necessarily support the Russian invasion. While Russians are by far the largest minority group within Ukraine, there are many other minority and indigenous groups, including Romanians, Bulgarians, Crimean Tartars, Karaites, and Roma. Accordingly, Ukrainian citizens may have affiliations with and connections to multiple communities, rather than identifying exclusively with one community. ¹⁰  

Furthermore, these identifications and allegiances have been challenged and reshaped by the rising tensions between Russia and Ukraine over the last decade, through the Euromaidan protests, Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, and the armed conflict in Donbas. A 2018 Council of Europe report notes that ‘the conflict [in Donbas] has created an atmosphere in which persons who hitherto felt comfortable with complex, layered and multiple identities, feel the obligation to choose sides by showing loyalty to the state. The persons most impacted in this regard are those who identify as ethnic Russians or those who identify with the Ukrainian majority but communicate in the Russian language.’ ¹¹ Reporting from Ukraine suggests that the Russian invasion has heightened this sense of polarization. ¹²  

In such a context, reconciliation is intended to promote two interrelated objectives. The first is the vital goal of deterring armed conflict from recurring once it has been ended. ¹³ This will be particularly salient if Ukraine’s post-war territory includes Donbas and Crimea, where allegiances have been more divided than in the rest of Ukraine. The second is a more ambitious aim of shifting the dynamic between the concerned groups to a positive social, economic, and political interdependence, by enabling each group to accept and accommodate the legitimacy of the other group’s identity, interests, and historical narrative. ¹⁴ If successful, reconciliation would establish mutual understanding and acceptance, forming the basis for an ability to engage in education, businesses, and governmental administration together without rancor, and the capacity to negotiate touchy political and social issues such as the nature of relations with Russia and the European Union respectively. In a situation like Ukraine’s, where people may not identify solely with one community, recognition and acceptance of the existence of multiple affiliations, without requiring individuals to exclusively choose one affiliation, will also be significant.

Reconciliation Mechanisms

While there are many typologies of reconciliation mechanisms, this brief paper addresses three broad categories that could be relevant for post-conflict Ukraine: instrumental, historical, and structural mechanisms. Instrumental mechanisms attempt to disrupt the cycle of hostility and oppositional identities by enabling positive perceptions and shared experiences in the present. ¹⁵ The simplest such measure is public statements by political, social, cultural, and religious leaders. These could include statements of respect, apologies for harm suffered, or other symbolic gestures. ¹⁶ Nelson Mandela wearing a Springbok jersey at the 1995 Rugby World Cup shortly after the end of apartheid in South Africa is a famous example of a well-received symbolic gesture of reconciliation. ¹⁷ Another instrumental mechanism is cooperative economic, cultural, and social initiatives, like USAID support for interethnic microenterprises, joint business enterprises, and economic associations in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in the 1990s. ¹⁸ Such programs are jointly executed by and provide benefits for members of both communities. ¹⁹ In a post-conflict setting like Ukraine’s, in which significant infrastructure reconstruction and economic redevelopment projects will be needed, these can be designed to facilitate reconciliation by requiring inter-communal cooperation. A third instrumental mechanism can be direct dialogue, which comprises structured opportunities for conversation and sharing of experiences among ordinary citizens who are members of the affected communities. Such measures famously played a significant role in the immediate aftermath of the conflict in Northern Ireland and were endorsed by the Good Friday Agreement. ²⁰ Depending on the framing of the dialogue, this measure may be closely related to other instrumental measures, or, if a program is aimed primarily at discussing past traumatic experiences, may connect more closely to the historical measures described below. Some studies have found direct community dialogue to be quite popular with participants. ²¹

Acknowledgements, cooperative initiatives, and dialogue are all relatively uncontroversial and low-risk, especially to the extent that dialogue is more focused on the present and future rather than the past. Such positive measures do not require grappling with the core questions of identity or conflicting historical narratives that tend to drive conflict. Rather, they aim to shift the dynamic between groups by incrementally building trust and goodwill through mutually beneficial statements, projects, and interaction. Thus, while these strategies are unlikely to exacerbate tensions in the short-term, they also do not aspire to mitigate any of the underlying issues, risking that their persistence may contribute to future conflict. 

In contrast to instrumental measures, historical and structural mechanisms directly address aspects of the core dynamics that can contribute to conflict and undermine cooperative relationships among groups. Accordingly, such mechanisms are, by their nature, difficult and high-stakes projects. While they may enable a profound shift in how each group understands and interacts with the other, they are also likely to be controversial, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. If they fail, they risk contributing to the cycle of escalating conflict and oppositional identities, rather than disrupting that cycle. 

Historical mechanisms addressing the past can include educational programs to inform the public about past events, memorials to honor or commemorate them, or joint academic ventures to formally research and record historical events. ²² Perhaps the most prominent historical mechanism has become transitional justice. War crimes trials, truth commissions, and similar justice processes enable a public reckoning with the past and accountability for atrocities. ²³ The field of transitional justice takes as a premise that societies need to grapple with the harms caused by a conflict or authoritarian government in order to establish a democratic, fair, stable society. ²⁴ Ukraine developed both a non-public draft roadmap and a draft law addressing transitional justice for Donbas and Crimea in 2020, although neither was adopted and, of course, neither addresses the subsequent invasion. ²⁵ The since-withdrawn draft law proposed criminal trials, victim reparations, memorials, and lustration, as well as measures relating to gender justice and peacebuilding, among other measures relating to political transition and transitional justice. ²⁶

Concerning trials, since the 1990s, international and hybrid criminal courts have been established to hold trials for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity that occurred in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, and Timor-Leste, and the International Criminal Court has investigated situations in more than fifteen countries. ²⁷ Ukraine has already held some war crimes trials of Russian soldiers, and both Russian and Ukrainian soldiers could be held accountable in Ukrainian courts for war crimes or genocide. ²⁸ The International Criminal Court is also investigating allegations of international crimes in Ukraine, and the European Commission is considering options for an international or hybrid criminal court. ²⁹ One advantage of trials as a reconciliation measure is their focus on individual rather than group culpability. By asserting that individual soldiers, and not Russians or Ukrainians as a group, bear responsibility for the atrocities they have committed, trials may diminish the association of such harms with the perpetrator’s group as a whole, and thus function to break the escalating cycle of antagonism and oppositional identification. However, this focus on individuals also limits the effectiveness of trials as a reconciliation mechanism; trials address only the acts of an individual and not the conflict as a whole. Also, trial proceedings, transcripts, and judgments may not be readily accessible or easy for the public to understand. The Venice Commission criticized Ukraine’s 2020 draft law for treating Russians differently than other nationals with regard to criminal liability and eligibility for amnesties for war crimes and occupation activities in Donbas; for reconciliation purposes as well as basic principles of fairness, it will of course be important that all perpetrators, regardless of nationality, be equally subject to criminal prosecution for war crimes and other atrocities. ³⁰

Another well-established transitional justice mechanism is a truth commission, which can stand on its own or complement trials. Truth commissions have been widely used in more than forty countries, including South Africa, Canada, Germany, Timor-Leste, and Colombia. Truth commissions are aimed at creating an authoritative record of facts and events, rather than at establishing accountability for individuals. A truth commission typically produces a report that is intended to be publicly accessible and meaningful, in contrast to a trial transcript or judgment. A commission established for Ukraine could be given a broad mandate to explore not only conflict-related harms but also Soviet-era and other historical events. ³¹ In Ukraine, there is already a Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, which has developed an archive of documents from Soviet era law enforcement and secret police. ³² Ukraine’s draft transitional justice roadmap reportedly proposed a truth-seeking process to be carried out by an existing institution. ³³ However, its 2020 draft law was criticized by the Venice Commission for promoting a single official historical narrative rather than proposing a truth commission or similar institution, and for focusing solely on Russia’s aggression rather than on establishing the truth about all violations. ³⁴  ‘Defining truth is contentious,’ ³⁵ and it will be important for a Ukrainian truth commission to take steps to ensure that it is not  viewed as biased or one-sided, for example, through careful selection of commission members who will be perceived as neutral and by holding public hearings so that victims’ voices and other evidence can be heard directly. ³⁶ Otherwise, its investigation and its claim to authoritatively state the truth might itself become a point of contention. ³⁷ The complex, changing community affiliations and allegiances in Ukraine add to the uncertainty about how a truth commission report might be received, particularly if pursued immediately after the end of the conflict.

Finally, engaging in transitional justice is important to Ukraine’s interest in strengthening its relationship with Europe and becoming an EU member state. The EU’s Policy Framework on Supporting Transitional Justice explicitly requires candidate and potential candidate countries to engage in transitional justice in appropriate situations. ³⁸ This was a consideration for Kosovo in partnering with the EU to establish the Specialist Chambers in the Courts of Kosovo; ³⁹ a similar partnership could benefit Ukraine in its aspirations to EU membership. 

While transitional justice is backward-looking and addresses past wrongs, structural reforms are forward-looking and establish an equitable legal and administrative framework for the future. Structural mechanisms include reforms to ensure social equality, rights of political participation, and access to education and other government services for all communities, and particularly for affected minority groups. ⁴⁰ As with transitional justice, minority group protections are also a core aspect of the European agenda. Ukraine is a party to two European treaties concerning minority group protections: the Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities ⁴¹ and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. ⁴²  

Ukraine has already been grappling for years with how to balance the interest in developing an independent Ukrainian identity with protections for minority groups. Language use has often been central to this controversy. Ukraine’s engagement with the Council of Europe on its fulfilment of its treaty obligations under the Framework Convention reflect the complexity of these issues in Ukraine. Soviet policy promoted use of the Russian language. A policy enacted shortly before Euromaidan favored use of Russian and other regional languages. Laws enacted since then have promoted use of the Ukrainian language by, among other measures, setting quotas for use of Ukrainian language, songs, and programs on broadcast TV and radio. ⁴³ Ukrainian reports have emphasized the need to develop Ukrainian as a state language and have argued that Ukraine needs to recover from the Soviet-instigated overrepresentation of the Russian language in Ukrainian life. ⁴⁴ The Venice Commission’s evaluations, in turn, have acknowledged the legitimacy of the aim of promoting a state language and the protections Ukraine has offered to minority groups. However, they have also concluded that Ukraine should not elevate its legitimate interest in promoting use of the Ukrainian language above its obligation to protect minority interests in their own language use. The Venice Commission found particularly concerning policies that disfavor Russian as compared to other, European languages. ⁴⁵ Overall, language policies in Ukraine have been divisive. ⁴⁶  

Protections for minority groups are an important building block of reconciliation in the long-term by ensuring security and equitable participation in society and government for vulnerable groups. However, as with transitional justice, there is a risk that such protections will continue to play a role as a marker of support for one side or the other and could contribute to maintaining oppositional identities rather than resolving those differences, particularly in the short-term. 

Despite these risks, both historical and structural initiatives are central to Ukraine’s own policies and of considerable interest to the international community. There are already significant international efforts underway at pursuing transitional justice with regard to war crimes and other international crimes committed during the conflict. Both transitional justice and legal protections for minority groups would align Ukraine with European values. For these reasons, Ukraine needs to pursue war crimes trials and to address questions of minority languages, education, and political participation. Such measures are best undertaken cautiously and deliberately, with great care to ensure their fairness, and with an eye toward their long-term effects on relationships amongst communities within Ukraine.

Conclusion

When, as in Ukraine, armed conflicts are not solely political but build on and reinforce social divisions, reconciliation measures may be needed to address the self-reinforcing cycle of conflict and oppositional identities. Once a self-perpetuating, mutually antagonistic relationship has been established, it is difficult for the affected communities to collaborate constructively in the same society and easy for armed conflict to recur. In such contexts, reconciliation measures are important to promote the long-term success of any peace agreement and to enable constructive interactions between the concerned groups within the same state. 

Some instrumental reconciliation measures tend to be relatively low-risk and offer mutual benefits in the short-term. Historical and structural reconciliation measures that directly address core issues of history and identity, such as transitional justice and minority group protections, represent a high-risk, high-reward approach that have the potential to ameliorate some of the most fundamental contributors to conflict between the groups, but if unsuccessful, could exacerbate polarization. 

1. Daniel Bar-Tal & Gemma H Bennink, ‘The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process,’ in Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (ed.), From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation (OUP 2004) 15.
2. Elena Baylis, ‘Options for a Peace Settlement for Ukraine: Option Paper XI – Reconciliation,’ (Opinio Juris, 19 July 2022) <http://opiniojuris.org/2022/07/19/options-for-a-peace-settlement-for-ukraine-option-paper-xi-reconciliation/> accessed 7 March 2022.
3. Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities (Council of Europe 1995) <https://rm.coe.int/ 09000016800c10cf>; European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1998 Council of Europe) <https://rm.coe.int/1680695175>; The EU’s Policy Framework on Support to Transitional Justice (2015), <http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/the_eus_policy_framework_on_support_to_transitional_justice.pdf>.
4. Nevin T Aiken, Identity, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice: Overcoming Intractability in Divided Societies, (Taylor & Francis Group 2013) 13-29.
5. Herbert C Kelman, ‘Socio-Psychological Dimensions of Armed Conflict,’ in I. William Zartman (ed.), Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, (Revised edn, USIP 2007) 64; Arie Nadler and Nurit Shnabel, ‘Intergroup reconciliation: Instrumental and socio-emotional processes and the needs-based model,’ [2015] 26:1 European Review of Social Psychology 93, 94.
6. Bar-Tal and Bennink (n 1)13.
7. Ibid.
8. ‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’ (President of Russia 21 Feb 2022) <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828>.
9. Canan Saritepe, ‘Russians, Ukrainians Two Separate Nations: Kuleba to Putin’ (Qirim News 01 July 2021) <https://qirim.news/en/kryimskie-tataryi-en/russians-ukrainians-two-separate-nations-kuleba-to-putin/>.
10. Sergiu Constantin, ‘Ethnic and Linguistic Identity in Ukraine? It’s Complicated,’ (Eurac Research 21 Mar. 2022) <https://www.eurac.edu/en/blogs/mobile-people-and-diverse-societies/ethnic-and-linguistic-identity-in-ukraine-it-s-complicated>.
11. Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities, Fourth Opinion on Ukraine – adopted on 10 March 2017, Published on 5 March 2018, ACFC/OP/IV(2017)002, 1.
12. Eg, Simon Shuster, ‘Volodymyr Zelensky: 2022 Person of the Year’, (Time 7 Dec. 2022) <https://time.com/person-of-the-year-2022-volodymyr-zelensky/>; Naira Davlashyan, ‘How Locals in Kharkiv Are Switching to Ukrainian Language Amid the Terror of Russian Bombing,’ (Euronews 8 March 2022) <https://www.euronews.com/2022/03/08/how-locals-in-kharkiv-are-switching-to-ukrainian-language-amid-the-terror-of-russian-bombi>.
13. Herbert C Kelman, ‘Reconciliation as Identity Change: A Social-Psychological Perspective,’ in Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (Ed.), From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation (OUP 2004) 111, 122-24.
14. Ibid. 119-20; Bar-Tal and Bennink (n 1).
15. Arie Nadler and Nurit Shnabel, ‘Instrumental and Socioemotional paths to Intergroup Reconciliation,’ in A Nadler, T E Malloy and J D Fisher (eds.) The Social Psychology of Intergroup Reconciliation, (OUP 2008).
16. Nadler and Shnabel (n 5); Kelman (n 13); Bar-Tal and Bennink (n 1).
17. Melanie Esta Sarah Garson, The Third Pillar: The Role of Reconciliation in Supporting Peace Agreements, Dissertation, School of Public Policy, University College London (May 2017) 41.
18. Krishna Kumar, ‘Promoting Social Reconciliation in Postconflict Societies: Selected Lessons From USAID’s Experience,’ USAID Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 24 (January 1999), <https://www.oecd.org/derec/unitedstates/35112635.pdf>.
19. Nadler and Shnabel (n 5); Kelman (n 13); Bar-Tal and Bennink (n 1).
20. Baylis (n 2); Garson (n 17) 44.
21. Melanie Esta Sarah Garson, The Third Pillar: The Role of Reconciliation in Supporting Peace Agreements, Dissertation, School of Public Policy, University College London (May 2017) 175.
22. Nadler and Shnabel (n 5); Kelman (n 13); Bar-Tal and Bennink (n 1).
23. Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (OUP 2002) ; Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence (Beacon Hill Press 1998).
24. Nevin T Aiken, Identity, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice: Overcoming Intractability in Divided Societies, (Taylor & Francis Group 2013) 23-26 and 40-45.
25. Kateryna Busol, ‘Mariupol and the Origins and Avenues of Ukraine’s Transitional Justice Process,’ (Just Security 1 June 2022) <https://www.justsecurity.org/81680/mariupol-and-the-origins-and-avenues-of-ukraines-transitional-justice-process/>; Kateryna Busol and Rebecca Hamilton, ‘Transitional Justice in Ukraine: Guidance to Policymakers,’ (Just Security 2 June 2022) <https://www.justsecurity.org/81719/transitional-justice-in-ukraine-guidance-to-policymakers/>; Elisenda Calvet-Martinez, ‘Options for a Peace Settlement for Ukraine: Option Paper XIV – Transitional Justice in a Settlement to End the Conflict between Ukraine and Russia,’ (Opinio Juris 11 August 2022) <http://opiniojuris.org/2022/08/11/options-for-a-peace-settlement-for-ukraine-option-paper-xiv-transitional-justice-in-a-settlement-to-end-the-conflict-between-ukraine-and-russia/>.
26. Busol (n 25); European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Ukraine, Opinion on the Draft Law ‘On the Principles of State Policy of the Transition Period,’ Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 128^th Plenary Session (Venice and online, 15-16 October 2021), Opinion No.1046/2021, CDL-AD(2021)038 (18 October 2021) (‘Venice Commission 2021 Opinion’). The draft roadmap similarly proposed criminal prosecutions for war crimes and for occupation administration leaders, as well as lustration, a truth-seeking role, memorials, compensation for victims, and reforms to ensure fair administration in Donbas and Crimea. Oksana Kovalenko and Katerina Kobernik, ‘Punishment for War Criminals, Compensation for Victims and Monuments for Heroes – What Will Justice Be Like After the War: Interview with Permanent Representative of the President in Crimea Anton Korinevich’ (Babel 8 July 2020), <https://babel.ua/texts/46817-pokarannya-dlya-voyennih-zlochinciv-kompensaciji-dlya-zhertv-i-pam-yatniki-dlya-gerojiv-yakim-bude-pravosuddya-pislya-viyni-interv-yu-postiynogo-predstavnika-prezidenta-v-krimu-antona-korinevicha>. [Оксана Коваленко &  Катерина Коберник, ‘Покарання для воєнних злочинців, компенсації для жертв і памʼятники для героїв — яким буде правосуддя після війни. Інтервʼю постійного представника президента в Криму Антона Кориневича’ (Бабель 8 липня 2020)]
27. ‘The Hybrids’ (Hybrid Justice, accessed 10 March 2023),  <https://hybridjustice.com/hybrid-and-internationalised-mechanisms/>; Situations under investigations,’ (International Criminal Court, accessed 10 March 2023), <https://www.icc-cpi.int/situations-under-investigations>.
28. ‘Map of War Crimes Trials in Ukraine’ (Justice Info 6 December 2022), https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/109654-map-of-war-crimes-trials-in-ukraine.html.
29. ‘Situation in Ukraine,’ ICC-01/22, International Criminal Court <https://www.icc-cpi.int/ukraine>; ‘Ukraine: Commission Presents Options to Make Sure that Russia Pays for its Crimes,’ European Commission (30 Nov. 2022) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_7311>; ‘President’s Office Opposes “Hybrid Tribunal” on Russia’s Crime of Aggression,’ (Ukrainian Pravda 17 Feb. 2023) <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/02/17/7389799/>
30. Venice Commission 2021 Opinion, para. 53-54.
31. Priscilla B Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions, (2d edn, Routledge 2011) 20-23; Calvet-Martinez (n 25).
32. Archive of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance <https://hdauinp.org.ua/en/about-archive-en/about-us>
33. Busol (n 25); Kovalenko and Kobernik (n 26).
34. Venice Commission 2021 Opinion para. 63-66.
35. Hayner (n 31) 84.
36. Hayner (n 31) 214, 218.
37. Hayner (n 31) 20-23.
38. The EU’s Policy Framework on Support to Transitional Justice (2015), <http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/the_eus_policy_framework_on_support_to_transitional_justice.pdf>.
39. Emanuele Cimiotta, ‘The Specialist Chambers and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office in Kosovo: The “Regionalization” of International Criminal Justice in Context’ [2016] 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice 53, 69.
40. Nadler and Shnabel (n 5); Bar-Tal and Bennink (n 1).
41. Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities (Council of Europe 1995) <https://rm.coe.int/ 09000016800c10cf>.
42. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Council of Europe 1998) <https://rm.coe.int/1680695175>.
43. Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities, Fourth Opinion on Ukraine – adopted on 10 March 2017, Published on 5 March 2018, ACFC/OP/IV(2017)002, para. 117; Fifth Periodic Report of Ukraine on Implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (10 January 2022) 20-22.
44. Fifth Periodic Report of Ukraine on Implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (10 January 2022) 20.
45. European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Law on Supporting the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language, Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 121st Plenary Session (Venice, 6-7 December 2019), Opinion No. 960 / 2019, para. 33, 39-44, 68-69.
46. Roman Huba, ‘Why Ukraine’s New Language Law Will Have Long-term Consequences,’ (Open Democracy 28 May 2019) <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/ukraine-language-law-en/>.