Presidential election in Finland, January-February 2024

Electoral context

The Finnish presidential elections, held in January-February 2024, were characterized by both broader global political turmoil and specific hybrid security risks faced by Finland. Overall, the security and defense policy environment in Finland had changed significantly during the two years prior to the elections. Since its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has been openly described as an external threat. Within a few months’ time, a U-turn in public opinion led to a parliamentary decision to apply for NATO membership, interpreted as a necessary and viable military deterrent against Russia (Forsberg, 2024; Koskimaa and Raunio, 2024). After a complex chain of events and a period of waiting for ratification by Turkey and Hungary, Finland was accepted as a member of the defense alliance on April 4, 2023. Shortly after that, more concrete threats began to emerge, including damage to communication cables and Russian efforts to instrumentalize asylum seekers. The themes became particularly salient in the presidential election debates, together with the continuation of military, financial, and humanitarian support for Ukraine, the deepening divisions between the Global North and the Global South, the strained relations between China and the United States as well as the accelerating conflict in the Middle East.

The rapidly changing geopolitical and economic environment heightened voters’ security concerns. A survey conducted by the “Dynamic Support for Security and Defense Policy (NATOpoll)” research project before the elections showed that Finns were in favor of a strong NATO, perceived Finland’s active role as a member of the defense alliance as important, were ready to invest enough so that Finland could meet its membership commitments and felt Finland should be involved in the development of NATO’s nuclear deterrence strategy (Amadae et al., 2023). Likewise, Finns considered bilateral commitments, such as the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), signed with the United States, important alongside NATO membership. There was also strong support for increasing EU-level defense cooperation as well as maintaining a comprehensive national defense. Altogether, voters’ interests were both multifold and multidimensional, which formed a fertile ground for a security-orientated presidential campaign.

Electoral campaign

While the president’s constitutional powers are rather limited, with a focus on foreign and defense policy, Finns highly value the presidential institution. Voter turnout is higher in presidential elections than in parliamentary, European, regional, and local elections. The presidency is considered the most trustworthy of political institutions (Bäck et al., 2023), and incumbents typically have considerable approval ratings. The latter fact was particularly clear in the case of President Sauli Niinistö (2012–2023), who obtained satisfaction ratings as high as 90 percent at the end of his second term.

At the same time, voters seem to have realistic expectations about the president’s room for maneuver. In a survey carried out before the election by the Finnish Business and Policy Forum (EVA, 2023), being a “foreign relations professional” was seen as the most important role of the president, along with acting as the spokesperson for the nation. The increasing emphasis on foreign and defense policies in the current security environment, coupled with the president’s role in representing Finland at NATO summits, makes the presidency an attractive position. Furthermore, the campaign offers candidates as well as voters an opportunity to have a versatile and in-depth discussion on foreign, security, and defense policy issues and the global role of NATO and Finland. Such public debates are essential for citizens’ ability to exercise democratic control over foreign policy. The international focus was particularly warranted during the recent presidential elections since the previous parliamentary elections, held in April 2023, had been strongly focused on national economic policies.

Reflecting the high salience of the elections, all parliamentary parties except the Swedish People’s Party either nominated their own presidential candidate or publicly endorsed a candidate nominated by a voters’ association who had collected more than 20,000 signatures. As a result, nine high-profile candidates ran for office: the director the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), Mika Aaltola (nominated by a voters’ association); the leader of the Left Alliance, Li Anderson; the leader of the Christian Democrats, Sari Essayah; previous Minister of Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto (nominated by a voters’ association, endorsed by the Greens); Speaker of the Parliament Jussi Halla-aho (Finns Party); the leader of the Movement Now, Harry “Hjallis” Harkimo; the governor of the Bank of Finland, Olli Rehn (nominated by a voters’ association, endorsed by the Centre Party); the former prime minister, Alexander Stubb (the National Coalition Party); and Finland’s European Commissioner, Jutta Urpilainen (the Social Democratic Party). While most candidates announced their intention to run already during summer or early fall, it took until early December before Urpilainen was officially elected as the Social Democratic Party’s presidential candidate. Haavisto and Rehn’s decision to run as independents was partly tactical, as both were members of small parties. However, all candidates emphasized their commitment to promoting national unity instead of representing partisan interests. This pledge became evident, for instance, with Stubb’s refusal to defend the cuts on social spending implemented by the current government, led by his party, the National Coalition, and Haavisto’s reluctance to be identified as a left-green candidate.

The first election debate on television took place just before Christmas, and the intense media coverage continued until the end of the first round, held on January 28. The candidates also responded to a series of questions in various voting advice applications, published by all the major media outlets and other organizations. Furthermore, candidates used substantial financial resources for campaigning, with budgets ranging from 40,000 euros (Aaltola) to 1.5 million euros (Stubb) (Yle, 2024b), enabled by Finnish electoral legislation that does not set donation constraints for presidential elections. In addition to traditional TV and newspaper advertising and campaign posters and flyers, campaigning on social media has become more professional and versatile in Finnish elections of late (Mattila, 2024). Of the candidates, Stubb stood out with his active presence on TikTok, an effective channel for promoting young adult political engagement (Moffett and Rice, 2024). The candidates’ statements and appearances during the campaign provided a solid base for voters to identify their policy stances as well as detect personality-related differences.

Untypically for Finnish political culture in relation to defense and security issues, which has traditionally been built upon pragmatic adjustment and broad consensus across the political spectrum (Raunio, 2021), the presidential candidates openly debated foreign and security policies together with the opportunities and obligations that Finland’s NATO membership entails. It is worth noting that other issues, such as climate change and loss of biodiversity, migration, the national deficit and debt, social inequality, and polarization were framed as security risks. This tendency partly echoed the Finnish paradigm of “comprehensive security,” which involves a large number of public and private actors and a broad conceptualization of security, including military issues, the climate, pandemics, terrorism, resource scarcity, and migration (Security Committee, 2024). The issues that divided the candidates included their attitudes towards the demilitarization of the Åland Islands, the Ottawa Treaty banning landmines, the transportation of nuclear weapons through Finland, and gender-neutral conscription. Of the two candidates that consistently led the polls week after week, Stubb campaigned for a strong NATO, more NATO in Finland, and more Finland in NATO, including Finnish participation in NATO nuclear deterrence. Stubb frequently brough up the concept of “value-based realism,” which later became a paradigm for Finnish foreign policy (Finnish Government, 2024), suggesting that while Finland is committed to intrinsic values of liberal democracy, it should also be ready to interact with non-democratic regimes. Pekka Haavisto represented more of a diplomacy-orientated standpoint by emphasizing multipolar defense collaboration and presenting nuclear weapons as a mechanism for crisis escalation rather than a peace guarantee.

At the same time, the candidates agreed upon a large number of policy priorities, such as the urgency of mitigating climate change and the loss of natural habitat, strengthening Europe’s economic and military competence and European strategic autonomy, defending a treaty-based international system, closing borders in a situation of strongly increasing migration, and preserving the president’s foreign policy powers (see Amadae et al., 2024). While lively discussions helped to generate interest in the presidential campaign, there appeared to be a strong consensus among the candidates on the general guidelines for Finland’s security policy as well as on other key issues, such as Finland’s future relationship with Russia and its stance in the Ukraine peace negotiations. This level of consensus sent a reassuring message to voters: whoever is elected, Finland will continue on the path it has chosen after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Repeating a pattern from previous parliamentary elections, the right-wing populist Finns Party demonstrated its ability to twist the electoral agenda by cultivating themes related to socio-cultural issues and nativism (e.g., by framing the country of birth of MP candidates as a potential issue). The party also emphasized a narrative that the mainstream media holds a systematic bias against the party, demonstrated by their alleged reluctance to publish polls showing gains for Halla-aho. Halla-aho even raised the question of cutting the budget of the public broadcasting company Yle, accusing it of left-wing leanings. Many of the tactics were imported from international contexts but applied to a domestic presidential contest in an innovative way. The timing, just before the first round, was also ideal for generating a certain buzz. While the top candidates, Stubb and Haavisto, concentrated on avoiding mistakes, Halla-aho could portray himself as a viable yet polarizing challenger. A survey published on January 19 showed that Halla-aho was the most disliked candidate, particularly among left-green voters (Maaseudun Tulevaisuus, 2024). The situation opened an avenue for tactical voting, as had been seen in the parliamentary election a year earlier: some voters may have been incentivized to vote for either Stubb or Haavisto instead of their first choice to prevent Halla-aho from making it to the second round.

Socio-cultural issues and identity politics also gained visibility during the second round, after a Citizens’ Barometer survey by the University of Helsinki showed that a third of respondents cited Pekka Haavisto’s same-sex partner as a reason for not voting for him (Yle, 2024c). Similarly, a poll commissioned by the leading newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, indicated that 40 percent of Stubb’s supporters perceived Haavisto’s sexual orientation as making him unfit to be president (Helsingin Sanomat, 2024). These observations initiated a heated discussion on the state of equality, anti-discrimination attitudes, and sexual prejudice in Finland, a country with a reputation for egalitarianism. Both candidates were reluctant to address the issue in any way, focusing instead on the substance of the election. Yet, their spouses were highly visible throughout the campaign.

Election results

As a result of the intense campaigning and media attention, the proportion of early voters as well as the overall turnout were substantially higher than in the previous 2018 presidential election (44% vs. 75%). As suggested by numerous opinion polls conducted prior to the election, the competition was quite even. Stubb and Haavisto advanced to the second round, which is required by the electoral law in situations in which none of the candidates has received a majority of votes in the first round. The difference in their vote shares was only 1.4 percentage points (27.2% vs. 25.8%). Halla-aho came in third, obtaining almost the same share of votes (19%) as his party did in the 2023 parliamentary election. While Halla-aho himself claimed to be satisfied with the election result as an indication of voters’ preferences, the editor of the Finns Party magazine openly accused Yle and its academic commentator of “electoral harassment” (Suomen Uutiset, 2024).

The vote share of the fourth candidate, Rehn (15%), exceeded by far the vote share of his Centre Party in the previous parliamentary election. Rehn’s support was focused in the eastern, central, and northern parts of the country and identical to the support profile of the Centre Party, whereas Stubb distinctly dominated southern Finland and the west coast.

In the second round, held on February 11, Stubb clearly defeated Haavisto (51.6% vs. 48.4%), although the margin was closer than the latest polls had suggested. In contrast to the first round, Stubb was more popular across the country, suggesting that he gained many of the votes that had previously gone to Halla-aho and Rehn. Haavisto obtained a clear majority of the vote in some parts of northern Finland.

Closing remarks

The 2024 presidential election was largely described as a “civilized” contest, and it was called on one occasion a “moderate, bloodless duel” (Yle, 2024a). This impression was reinforced by Stubb’s televised visit to Haavisto’s campaign reception. Whereas Haavisto represented a slightly more idealistic viewpoint than Stubb, who emphasized “hard against hard” realism, both candidates shared a similar vision of Finland’s broadly construed security interests. The nation was thus hardly divided by the tight race.

As a result of the election, all the key actors responsible for shaping Finland’s security and foreign policy now either belong to or have roots in the same party. Consensual and fluid decision-making is a considerable strength for a small nation, especially in a turbulent international security environment (see Wass and Amadae, 2024). At the same time, it remains important to listen to dissenting voices to ensure that the security decisions made in the present will remain sustainable in the future.

The data

First round

Second tour

References

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