The Green Deal at the service of human security

What we are learning from the war in Ukraine is that any future rules based set of international political arrangements will have to be combined with a green new deal not just for Europe but world-wide. The war has revealed the way in which fossil fuel dependence is not just a problem for the environment. It has skewed the global economy and has contributed to the rise of authoritarianism and war. 

We are living through a fundamental transition, an ‘interregnum’ as Antonio Gramsci called it, ’ where the ‘old is dying and the new cannot be born’ and where all sorts of ‘morbid symptoms’ are experienced. ¹ This is a period when our political institutions are out of step with far-reaching economic, social and technological change. On the one hand, the American and Soviet dominated model of development based on mass production and mass consumption, militarism, and, above all excessive dependence on fossil fuels, is exhausted. On the other hand, a new model based on information and communications technology and resource saving is waiting in the wings, but our political institutions, mainly states, are still shaped by the outdated model. The old model was based on a set of political arrangements consisting of states and blocs. The new model requires a rules-based form of global governance, for which the European Union may offer a possible model. 

In the past, major inter-state wars played a critical role in enabling the new to be born, by transforming states and the international order. This is why the legitimacy of states is bound up with classic national security strategies, based on regular military forces designed to fight war against other states. This is no longer possible. Military technology has advanced so much in accuracy and lethality that wars cannot be decisively won. The kind of extremist contest theorised by Clausewitz would lead to annihilation. What this means is that any fundamental transition needed to avoid the possibility of human extinction has to involve not just climate action but also the end of war as a way of settling international differences. It does not necessarily mean the end of military force but it does mean a change in how military force is used and composed. It means a shift from war-fighting to the use of force, in limited ways, to uphold international law based on human rights. As I shall explain, this is what I understand by a shift from national to human security.

In what follows, I start by outlining the changing nature of warfare and the salience of fossil fuel dependence as a factor promoting war. I then describe the evolution of the concept of human security and what it means in practical terms for restructuring the security sector and preventing climate catastrophe. Then I consider recent developments in NATO and the European Union and whether they represent a new opening for the implementation of human security. 

The Changing Nature of warfare

Archetypal Inter-state wars were the wars theorised by Clausewitz in his classic book On War, required reading for every military man or woman. ² They are wars through which states capture territory militarily and consolidate their control over territory. Clausewitz defines such wars as a clash of political wills and his foundational argument is that such wars tend to the extreme as each side tries to win. The politicians want to achieve their political objectives; the generals need to disarm their opponents; and passion and hatred is unleashed among the population. 

These wars had clear beginnings and endings. Indeed, throughout the modern period, the duration of war declined and periods of peace began to alternate with periods of war whereas earlier, war was more or less continuous. At the same time, such wars grew in scale and intensity characterised by ever higher casualties and culminating in the two twentieth century world wars, which together may have involved between 80 and 100 million deaths including the genocides in both wars. The whole modern period was, of course, characterised by incessant violence in the colonised parts of the world, mainly directed against civilians but this violence was not counted as war. 

Clausewitzean war was intrinsically bound up with the modern state, empire, and the states system. ‘War made the state and the state made war’ says Charles Tilly. ³ Up until the mid-nineteenth century, states were primarily war-making machines. At the end of the seventeenth century, for example, Louis XIV was spending 75% of state revenues on the military, Britain was spending a similar amount, while Peter the Great was spending 82%. ⁴  

Clausewitzean wars were existential moments, when the war effort required large-scale adaptation involving far-reaching administrative, political, technological, social, cultural and economic changes. They were hugely destructive but also transformative. They were experimental moments when, after a period of trial and error, states adopted the kind of reforms needed to win wars or else were defeated. Thus the Napoleonic Wars ushered in administrative and judicial reforms all over Europe that provided the conditions for the spread of the industrial revolution. The wars of the mid-nineteenth century marked the end of slavery in the United States and of serfdom in the Russian and Habsburg empires, the unification of Germany and Italy, and the spread of the railway and the telegraph. 

Alongside this layering of the administrative and political foundations of the modern state, wars also forged the national identities of many states, and served to rank states into an established international pecking order. Indeed each of the major wars established the leading powers as well as a new set of international arrangements. ⁵ It can be argued that the Cold War represented the institutionalization of the innovations introduced during World War II, thus providing a framework for the spread of the American and Soviet models of development. ⁶ Central to these innovations was the widespread use of the international combustion engine, in the form of cars, tanks and aeroplanes, dependent on a continuing supply of oil.

Intractable Conflicts

The kind of contemporary wars that we observe in places like Syria, Yemen, or East and Central Africa are very different. They are better described as a social condition, or even a mutual enterprise, rather than a contest between ‘sides.’ They involve numerous armed groups, both global and local, who gain from the violence itself rather than from winning or losing. They may gain politically because they are associated with extremist identities (ethnic or religious) that are often constructed through violence. Or they may gain economically through revenue raising activities linked to violence, for example, loot, pillage and hostage-taking, the creation of checkpoints, the ‘taxation’ of humanitarian aid or diaspora remittances, or the smuggling of resources, whether oil, drugs, antiquities or human beings to name but a few. Battles between armed groups are rare, with most violence instead directed against civilians; this is because the various groups establish territorial control through political rather than military means – they kill or expel those who oppose them, usually those of a different religion and ethnicity. Forced displacement, ethnic cleansing, the destruction of cultural symbols, or systemic sexual violence are all hallmarks of contemporary wars. 

These wars tend to persistence rather than to the extreme. They are very difficult to end. And they tend to spread through refugees, smuggling networks or extremist ideologies. They are wars of state-unbuilding and fragmentation. They disassemble public authority and turn state power into an archipelago of armed fiefdoms. They deliberately weaken and undermine the rule of law. 

The wars are symptoms of the profound changes that took place in the last few decades as the prevailing model of development became started to falter and as neo-liberal recipes supplanted the kind of state intervention that had been typical of the post – World War II model of development. . Indeed, the new wars could be described as an extreme form of neo-liberalism. Typically, they take place in authoritarian societies opening up to the world as a consequence of economic and political liberalisation. 

In political terms, liberalisation opens up the possibility of pro-democracy protests or demonstrations and this is often the way that wars begin. This new type of war can be interpreted as a way of suppressing demands for democracy through fomenting sectarian conflict. Whether we are talking about the former Yugoslavia or Syria, the majority of protesters oppose violence and in response to violence, they transform themselves into civil society groups- providing the humanitarian first response, documenting crimes, offering local mediation, trying to maintain schools and medical facilities, opposing sectarian narratives. Those that turn to violence are often unemployed young men from rural areas who join militias or armed groups defined in terms of ethnic or religious identity. Civil society is often the first target of the warring parties; many leave or are killed. 

In economic terms, a typical combination of trade and capital liberalisation, privatisation , and macro-economic stabilisation leads to reductions in public spending including social services like health and education or food and energy subsidies, increased unemployment especially in rural areas, and the emergence of a ‘crony capitalist’ or ‘oligarchic’ class owning the newly privatised state sector or under contract to the state. The war speeds up these processes. National Income falls dramatically as does public spending and tax revenue. Unemployment increases. All this is often compounded by sanctions. War-related military/criminal elites come into being or are strengthened with a vested interest in continued disorder. ⁷

The Role of Oil

It is often argued that these new wars are caused by and contribute to climate change. Thus Prince Charles, now King Charles, suggested that it was drought that caused the wars in Darfur and Syria. ⁸ The problem with this argument is that whether or not extreme weather events cause conflict depends on social relations; water shortages, forest fires, or flooding can increase social co-operation as much as conflict. In Syria, it can be argued that it was the failure of the regime to help those affected by the drought that contributed to the war rather than drought in itself. As David Livingstone has put it: ‘When we shift the blame for violence to weather and treat human struggle as simply a state of nature, we reduce the complexity of warfare to a single dimension. We also absolve the agents of conflict of moral responsibility for their action. ⁹

As for the consequences, the evidence is mixed. Wars may involve illegal logging and deforestation and destruction of agricultural lands or even nuclear power stations as well as an absence of management that may lead to water depletion, lack of flood defences, and so on. On the other hand, the fall in industrial production reduces the use of fossil fuels and shortages may lead to more climate friendly local solutions. For example, in Syria, solar panels have been introduced to compensate for shortages of diesel oil due to the war, new types of ‘climate-smart’ agricultural practices have been introduced to compensate for water shortages, while organic fertilisers have replaced chemical fertilisers because the latter are less available. ¹⁰ Where there does seem to be a clear connection is the relation between war and oil dependence. ¹¹ The crony capitalist or oligarchic regimes that are associated with war are almost always rentier regimes; that is to say, state revenues depend on rent rather than taxation. Rent may take the form of economic aid or foreign borrowing, or mineral rents, especially oil. It was Max Weber who pointed out that the character of states is shaped by the type of revenue. ¹² Where states depend on taxation, this requires some kind of implicit or explicit social contract with the citizen, who pay taxes in return for the provision of services, such as policing, education, health, and so on. ¹³ Rentier states, by contrast, are very often characterised by political competition about access to rents rather than about the provision of public services. The term ‘resource curse’ originally applied to economies where value-adding forms of production like manufacturing or agriculture decline as a consequence of increased flows of oil rents. But it is increasingly used to describe the kind of systematic corruption linked to authoritarianism and violence associated with oil rents. What Alex de Waal calls the political marketplace refers to a situation where political entrepreneurs compete for access to resources controlled by the state and where violence is an integral part of that competition. ¹⁴ ‘Crony capitalists’ or ‘oligarchs’ created through the privatisation of state assets or through state contracts are typical of this syndrome. 

The War in Ukraine

So will the war in Ukraine become another intractable conflict? The Russian side bears a considerable resemblance to the sorts of regimes that characterise many contemporary wars.The Putin regime can be compared to to the Milošević regime in Yugoslavia or to Assad’s Syria. Putin has been fighting this kind of conflict ever since he came to power – Chechnya, Georgia, Syria. Through these wars, a narrative has been constructed in which a kleptocratic criminalised regime increasingly defines itself as a great power based on ethnic Russian nationalism. The war in Ukraine actually began in 2014 and can be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to suppress the democratic demands of the Euro-Maidan and to promote ethnic tension. It came straight out of the Gerrassimov playbook; the Russian Chief of Staff wrote an article in February 2013 where he coined the phrase non-linear war to describe a new type of “special operation” in which the use of information technology, special forces, and internal opposition can rapidly produce a “web of chaos, humanitarian catastrophe and civil war”. ¹⁵ It can be argued that the new phase of the war is an expression of Putin’s need to sustain and reproduce the ideology that underpins his political position and perhaps a desperate reaction to the prospect of the phasing out of oil. 

The Ukrainian side, however, is different. For Ukraine, this is a contest along the lines of the classic Clausewitzean war logic. It is a contest between Putinism (the criminalised ethnic nationalist system) and a civic state. Almost the entire country is mobilised in the war effort behind the type of activities typically carried out by civil society actors; in particular, the emphasis on international law and the efforts to collect evidence of war crimes is unprecedented. Moreover, the dominant idea of Ukraine is civic rather than ethnic – that is to say, an idea of a political entity that includes Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Poles, Crimean Tartars and so on; an idea that was cemented in the Maidan protests. While Ukraine has its own oligarchs and has experienced pervasive corruption, huge efforts are being made to reduce corruption and preserve the social infrastructure.

But how long can this be sustained? If Ukraine is able to carry out a successful counter-offensive, could this lead to the use of nuclear weapons? Alternatively, is there a risk of an intractable conflict on Europe’s doorstep if it turns into a long attritional struggle in the Donbass region. On the Russian side, we can already observe many of the characteristics of the contemporary wars – deliberate shelling of civilians, sexual violence, what appears to be systemic looting, mad and terrifying disinformation campaigns. Is it conceivable that, on the Ukrainian side, hatred of Russia could come to be directed against ethnic Russians and that the widespread arming of civilians to resist Russians could be used for looting and other crimes as shortages mount, weakening the Ukrainian civic spirit? There is also the risk that the main effect of economic sanctions on Russia, needed to express outrage, will further fragment and criminalise Russian society. Any diplomatic solution, which of course is preferable to continued fighting, would be likely to freeze current territorial positions allowing extremist criminal gangs to control the Russian occupied parts, as happened in Crimea, and maintaining permanent pressure on Ukraine, perhaps in the form of constitutional interference, as was the case in the earlier Minsk agreement.

Western countries are balancing on a tightrope between the risk of escalation and annihilation, the consequence of trying to win along classic Clausewitzean lines, and supporting Ukraine in all possible ways to prevent Russia from winning. What we are learning from this experience is not only are invasions wrong and illegal, but they can never succeed in Clausewitzean terms. They cannot be won. But they can be horrendously destructive and they can produce the new war social condition. 

So how should military force at the disposal of civic democratic states be organised? What kind of international arrangements and policies might minimise the syndrome of violence?

From National to Human Security

When the Cold War ended many hoped that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be dissolved and replaced by a new pan-European security system including Russia – it was Gorbachev’s  ‘Common European Home‘ or the Palme Commission’s ‘Common Security‘. ¹⁶ The idea was a security system based on the three Helsinki baskets that were agreed in the 1975 Helsinki Agreement. These included:

• Security and acceptance of the territorial status quo, that is to say, no aggressive wars

• Economic , social and cultural co-operation

• Human Rights

It can be argued that these three baskets together constitute what later came to be defined as human security. The Helsinki process, then the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was institutionalised after the end of the Cold War as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). But it never became the dominant security framework for European countries as initially envisaged. Instead NATO, an organisation based on national and bloc security, was expanded along with classic war-fighting military apparatuses. 

Human security is usually defined as the security of individuals and the communities in which they live, in the context of multiple economic, environmental, health and physical threats, as opposed to the security of states and borders from the threat of foreign attack. The first use of the term was UNDP’s Human Development Report of 1994, where the emphasis was on economic and social development as a way of preventing war; this understanding remains the main approach to human security in UN circles. Subsequently, it was associated with Canadian ideas about how to use military force to uphold human rights and led to the concept of Responsibility to Protect. But more relevant for our purposes is the way the term has been used, first, by the European Union, and subsequently by NATO.

In the early 2000’s, a series of reports on European security capabilities were presented to Javier Solana, then High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, by the Study Group on European Security Capabilities, later renamed the Human Security Study Group. ¹⁷ The Study Group proposed a human security doctrine for the EU as a distinctive way of doing security. According to this version, human security is what individuals enjoy in rights-based, law-governed societies. It is assumed that the state will protect individuals from existential threats and that emergency services – including ambulances, firefighters, and police – are part of state provision. In a global context, human security is about extending individual rights beyond domestic borders and about developing a capacity at a regional or global level to provide emergency services that can be deployed in situations where states either lack capacity or are themselves the source of existential threats. The Study Group also proposed a human security force composed of both civilians and military and based on a set of principles, which are very different from the principles that apply to the military in a classic war-fighting role. The commitment to human security was reiterated in both the Global Strategy and the Strategic Compass ¹⁸ and these proposals for a human security approach were echoed in the state of the Union address by Ursula van der Leyen in 2021:

‘The European Union is a unique security provider. There will be missions where NATO or the UN will not be present, but where the EU should be. On the ground, our soldiers work side-by-side with police officers, lawyers and doctors, with humanitarian workers and human rights defenders, with teachers and engineers. We can combine military and civilian, along with diplomacy and development – and we have a long history in building and protecting peace.’

2021 State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen.

More recently the term human security has been adopted by NATO as well as by some individual Nato countries. A Human Security Unit was established within the office of the NATO Secretary General in 2019. Human Security was understood as an umbrella term that encompass Building Integrity (anti-corruption), Protection of Civilians, Cultural Property Protection, Children and Armed Conflict, Conflict-related Sexual and Gender-based Violence, Human Trafficking, and Women, Peace and Security. Several NATO members have also applied the concept of human security along similar lines. These include Canada, Belgium, Portugal, Italy (in relation to cultural heritage), the UK, the Netherlands, Germany and France. In the 2022 Strategic Concept , the outcome of the June 2022 Summit in Madrid , Nato ‘emphasises’ the need to ‘integrate’ human security, along with climate change and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda ‘across all our core tasks’. ¹⁹  

These developments seem to suggest there are openings through which NATO as a security organisation might come closer to the kind of security approach that characterises ESDP and would have characterised the kind of pan-European security organisation originally envisaged through the Helsinki process when the Cold War ended. It can be argued that the European pillar of NATO has been enhanced partly as a consequence of the Trump years, when the US was less present, but more importantly under the impetus of the war in Ukraine and the impending membership of Sweden and Finland. The New Force Model proposed in the 2022 Strategic Concept will increase the number of ready forces available to NATO and these are likely to be European. ²⁰ If there really were to be a shift from national to human security, or from a predominantly geo-political alliance to one more in tune with human rights and the international rule of law, this should involve all three baskets of Helsinki. 

The first basket, security, requires a fundamental shift in military posture. It is not just about protecting civilians alongside military operations, it is about giving priority to the protection of civilians. NATO forces are currently guided by International Humanitarian law (IHL) or the Laws of war. An important principle of IHL is what is known as ‘necessity’, ‘proportionality’ or ‘double effect’. The idea behind these concepts is that killing or harming enemy civilians can be justifiable if it is an unavoidable side effect of an attack on a military target, which is necessary in order to win the war, if it is unintentional, and if the harm done is proportionate to the harm that might be done if the military target were not destroyed or captured. A human security approach implies that human rights overrides IHL and the protection of civilians comes before military victory. In other words, the principle is the other way round. Hence, killing, or better still arresting, of enemies is justifiable provided it is necessary to protect civilians. What does this mean in terms of NATO’s core tasks?

In terms of collective defence of NATO members, there is clearly a need to defend NATO members from attack as in the case of Ukraine. But this is different from engaging in military competition along geo-political lines. During the 1980s, there was much concern about the offensive posture of NATO and the dangers of weapons of mass destruction. It might be worth revisiting proposals for what was known as defensive deterrence, ²¹ i.e. deterring foreign attacks through a credible conventional defensive posture rather than through the threat of nuclear or conventional retaliation. It was the idea behind Gorbachev’s notion of ‘reasonable sufficiency’. Proposals for area defence or in-depth defence were put forward that would have meant drawing down nuclear weapons as well as conventional offensive capabilities, such as bombers or massed tanks (though evidently some are needed for defensive purposes). It is worth asking whether Putin would have invaded Ukraine had he realised that Ukraine would put up such an effective conventional defence. 

In terms of crisis management, that is to say intervention in intractable conflicts, the aim is to end such wars by dampening down conflict and reducing the incentives for violence rather than through victory or a single top-down peace agreement. Central to this goal is the establishment of legitimate and inclusive political authority and a rule of law. Human security interventions are always civilian led and involve a combination of civilian and military actors. The tasks of the (external) military in these circumstances could include; protecting civilians from attack and creating a safe environment in which a legitimate political authority can be established; monitoring and upholding local peace agreements and ceasefires as part of multi-level peace building involving civil society, especially women; establishing humanitarian space through corridors and safe havens that allow for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and arresting war criminals. A similar approach was adopted by the British in Northern Ireland or the EU-led anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, which combined the arrest of pirates with non-military measures such as the introduction of fishing licenses on the coast of Somalia. 

This is very different from counter-insurgency and counter-terror where the goal is victory over an enemy. In Afghanistan, for example, the goal was the destruction of the Taliban, al Qaeda and later ISIS Khorasan, rather than the security of Afghans. This meant continuing attacks that legitimised the insurgency as well as allying with corrupt commanders who undermined the legitimacy of the Afghan government. It also marginalised the civilian leadership of the international intervention, notably the United Nations Special Representative. ²²  

The second basket, economic, social and cultural co-operation needs to be given equal importance. There has to be co-operation even with authoritarian regimes on climate change and pandemics. There needs to be an alternative economic and social approach in contemporary war zones in order to generate legitimate livelihoods as an alternative to the criminalised, violent and fragmented war economy as well as a cultural approach emphasising civic alternatives to ethnic and religious sectarianism. In the case of Ukraine, for example, measures would need to include much greater state investment in infrastructure and social provision, as well as the introduction of progressive taxation (currently income tax is flat rate) and debt cancellation as a way of increasing domestic employment and production and financing the war effort. ²³ At present unemployment is at 35% and wages are falling – a situation typical of intractable conflicts where people often have no choice but to turn to violent and/or criminalised sources of revenue. This has to be reversed if Ukraine is not to degenerate into the social condition typical of intractable conflicts. Such a shift in economic policy in economic policy is also required more widely as part of the energy transition. The idea of a Green New Deal implies both greater state intervention and more emphasis on social justice. 

There is also a need to recalibrate sanctions on Russia and indeed other areas of the world where sanctions apply. Economic sanctions are an important non-violent way of expressing disapproval. But the blanket application of sanctions often affect the population rather the elites (who have many ways of evading sanctions) disproportionately and this may consequently have counter-productive polarising outcomes. Sanctions on oil and gas are very important. Indeed reducing fossil fuel dependence can be viewed as a tool for starving petro-states and countering wars. 

Finally human rights and the spread of rights based international law or what Teitel calls Humanity’s Law is a crucial component of human security. ²⁴ This might include such measures as the widening of membership in the International Criminal Court, the establishment of special tribunals to address war crimes or crimes against humanity, and the extension of universal jurisdiction. Consideration should be given to climate crimes. 

Conclusion

The high price of oil and gas is not just about the Ukraine war. It is a symptom of the exhaustion of the post-World War II model of development and also associated with other ‘morbid symptoms’ such as authoritarianism and intractable conflict.  Oil was the core factor of production for the post-World War II model of development and cheap oil was a condition for continued economic prosperity. Now the condition for renewed prosperity and stability is a transition to renewable energy and, above all, energy efficiency. But this transition is likely to be turbulent and requires a shift to a different set of international political arrangements.

Failure to act on climate change would very likely lead to human extinction. Yet the kind of inter-state war that, in the past, brought about fundamental political, economic and social transformation would, if fought today, also lead to human extinction. Paradoxically, Putin’s nuclear threats, deliberate gas leaks, and cavalier behaviour towards nuclear reactors draws attention to the dual existential challenge we face. So the current transition is both about addressing climate change and about ending war.

This essay has focussed on potential changes in the European Union and NATO that could lead to a shift away from national security postures, based on the assumption of inter-state war, towards a human security approach that would involve a rights based rule of international law. These changes provide a possible model for other areas. There are parallel developments in the African Union and in Latin America. But there are still terrifying conflagrations in the Middle East, the deepening of autocracy in India and China, and the risk of similar types of war on their borders. The global application of human security is inextricably linked to the challenge of global action on climate change; both are very difficult.

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