The Russian “Non-Election” and the Kremlin’s European Proxies

Between March 15th and 17th, the Russian Federation held its eighth presidential election since the collapse of the Soviet Union — the fifth won by Vladimir Putin. But with large-scale repression, widespread fraud and the exclusion of any truly independent candidates, it’s hard to call this ritual organized by the ruling power for its own benefit an election.

While the March 17th election offer further proof of the Russian regime’s authoritarian nature, it would be a mistake to interpret the Kremlin’s political practices as simply an inverse image of Europe’s liberal democracy. This is because the Kremlin has strong connections within the European Union. To be sure, the war waged by the Russian army in Ukraine since February 2022 has temporarily muted some of this discourse. But as the war drags on, the temptation of a rapprochement with the Kremlin is likely to intensify.

What does the March 17th election tell us about the Putin regime? What support can it count on within the European political system? We examine these questions with Marlène Laruelle, Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University.

This discussion was first conducted as part of our electoral podcast “Decoding 2024.” You can find our audio episode on Spotify here (in French).

The election that took place in Russia from March 15-17 was, admittedly, neither free nor fair. In fact, the Russian opposition referred to it as a “non-election” (невыборы ), and studies conducted after the vote, in particular using the Kiesling-Shpilkin method, show that fraud may have involved at least twenty million votes. According to the official results, Vladimir Putin won around 88% of the vote, or some 76 million votes for 113 million registered voters. If we subtract 20 million votes from this result, we get 56 million votes for Putin, or roughly 50% of the electorate. Does this mean that the majority of Russian citizens do indeed support the current regime? Or are we already playing the game of an election that wasn’t an election at all?

Marlène Laruelle

I think that talking about elections is problematic. What we have to realize is that it was a plebiscite that was asked of citizens. So, if we take the figures you’ve just mentioned and imagine that 50% of the population actually voted for Putin, even then it’s hard to interpret that 50%.

I still think that, despite everything, a large part of the population still supports the regime. But there has also been a lot of pressure on the population to go out and vote. This isn’t a matter of ballot stuffing. We know very well that there was a lot of pressure, particularly on students, teachers, anyone employed by the state, as well as some private sector employees.

Another important factor is that the party is engaged in a war that the regime presents as an existential war with the West. The result is that part of the population self-censors and, in a difficult moment, resolves to vote Putin. This population is not necessarily satisfied with what the regime delivers in terms of public policy, but it views support for the President as part of its civic duty at a time when it doesn’t seem appropriate to create political discord. The regime has played with this mechanism very effectively for many years.

The geography of the results is also a geography of fraud. The results published by the Central Electoral Commission report results that are totally unrealistic for certain areas, notably in certain republics of the Caucasus where Vladimir Putin won with 95-100% of votes in many polling stations. In other regions, a more sophisticated falsification strategy has been used, in which attempts are being made to obtain results that would substantiate the thesis of broad popular support. What are the factors that lead different regions to adopt different strategies?

There are several reasons for this. First, there are structural reasons. We know that certain regions are extremely dependent on the State budget. For the governors of these regions, falsification enables them to produce concrete political results. In addition to these structural reasons, there are questions of political loyalty. Some regional representatives and governors are extremely subservient to the Kremlin. For them, falsification can be a real personal strategy because their region is both financially dependent on the center and because they are driven by a desire for personal advancement. They really want to show that they were very good and were able to deliver the expected votes.

On the other hand, some governors have a slightly more sophisticated approach; they know they have a basis of legitimacy in their region, and they feel sufficiently secure in Russia’s internal political game to not feel they have to deliver 95% of the vote.

We can’t capture all the regional nuances that still exist in the Russian political system if we view it as a centralized one. In Russia, there are still highly diverse regional characteristics and policies, depending on the governor. In the so-called “ethnic” republics, in particular, there is a long tradition of authoritarianism, based on the rationale of delivering what are known in Russian as “administrative resources”, by exerting pressure on the population to ensure delivery of highly visible results. In contrast, other regions have a larger middle-class population, where it is recognized that fraud cannot be overplayed to the extreme, and that more refined strategies are required.

The Kremlin, for its part, seems to be trending towards the second strategy. What’s stopping it from adopting the more relaxed approach seen, for example, in Belarus?

It seems to me that this situation is rather difficult to interpret because there are contradictory approaches within the Russian political apparatus itself. One part of the Kremlin thinks it’s important to put on a full plebiscite, and they aren’t afraid to push falsification to the limit — particularly as they don’t imagine that such a production will necessarily result in a reaction from the population. Another part of the Kremlin thinks that such manipulation is unnecessary, and that it’s enough to reach the 80-85% mark without overdoing it.

Generally speaking, there is a group within the Kremlin that wants Russian society to be fully mobilized in the context of the war that is also pushing for fraud, as well as a more technocratic group for whom a symbolic plebiscite is enough. The bureaucrats have different rationales for how they approach the degree of plebiscite they wish to obtain and show to their hierarchy.

Most polling places are located in schools. Teachers often act as assessors, overseeing the voting process and taking part in the count. What do we know about the profile of the people involved in fraud?

We know the personal and collective fragility of certain professional circles, those known in Russian as budgetniki (бюджетники) — those whose salary is paid by the state. Teachers, hospital staff, and the armed services (силовики) fall into this category. Teachers, in particular, are one of those groups that can come under extreme pressure, both ideologically and in terms of the things they may be asked to do.

Over the last few days, videos have been circulating showing older women, probably teachers, desperately trying to achieve the expected results during the vote count. This shows that the methods of fraud used by the regime can be very diverse. Alongside the sophisticated fraud associated with online voting, we can also observe, depending on the context, very crafty forms of fraud. The regime has a wide variety of methods at its disposal in this area, which can be adapted to different regional and social contexts.

Along with Vladimir Putin, were three candidates from the so-called mainstream opposition, who are de facto allies of the Kremlin: Nikolai Kharitonov of the Communist Party, Vladislav Davankov of the pro-business “New People” party, and Leonid Slutsky of the ultranationalist LDPR party. How can we characterize the voters who cast their ballots for these various candidates as well as those who — it would appear in fairly large numbers — cast blank ballots?

The Communist Party has always had a very loyal, traditionally quite elderly, conservative, and rural electorate. Over the past decade, however, we have also seen the arrival of young people from urban areas and the middle classes, for whom the Communist vote is a form of protest vote within the limits of what the regime allows. In this instance, it’s a vote that signals their attachment to the welfare state as well as social justice.

The nationalist vote for the LDPR is also fairly well identified. The LDPR has some important regional strongholds and often attracts a middle-class population from economically depressed small towns. For a long time, Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s eccentric personality was one of the main factors behind the LDPR’s success. With Slutsky, we can see that the party has lost its momentum.

Finally, there is a certain class in the private sector — not the big oligarchs, but rather small business — for whom there is still a willingness to vote within the system for parties that would defend economic freedom or a certain number of private rights against a ruling party, United Russia, perceived as a party of bureaucrats and technocrats.

Obviously, those who wanted to vote for the liberal opposition could not find a candidate from their camp among those admitted to the race. These people either cast a blank vote, cast their vote for one of the three opposition candidates — presumably not the LDPR — or simply abstained.

While no reliable exit polls are available in Russia, there are independent exit polls carried out by volunteers outside Russia, reported for example on the voteabroad.info website. These surveys provide additional insight into the voting behavior of the diaspora. In the majority of countries with polling locations, candidate Vladislav Davankov won a majority of votes, with particularly high scores in Serbia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey — where recent immigration is largely due to mobilizations and the war. On the other hand, Putin probably came out on top in Germany, and won by a wide margin in Italy and Greece, where independent surveys show very high scores in his favor. How can we explain these divergent voting patterns within the diaspora?

These results largely depend on the diaspora’s demographics. In some older diasporas, mainly in Western Europe, there is a clear vote in favor of Putin. In Greece, there are long-standing ties between the two countries, as in Italy. The case of Germany is also interesting with its large Russian-speaking diaspora, a significant proportion of which is known to support the AfD in national elections — which is ideologically consistent with the Putin vote.

Conversely, in the countries you mentioned — Serbia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and to which I would add Poland and the Czech Republic — there is a much more pronounced protest vote. This is clearly the vote of diasporas who arrived either in February-March 2022, in September-October of the same year, or a few years earlier for political reasons. In these countries, the mobilization of the diaspora is much stronger, and reflects the activity of the resident countries on the international stage — in Poland, for example — which is much more unfavorable to Russia.

In Germany, these two diasporas, old and new, seem to overlap…

Absolutely. And we know, thanks to the many demographic studies carried out on these diasporas, that within them, there are strong tensions between different trends, between older emigrants and new generations who are much more politicized.

The purely political stakes of the June 15-17 election were, of course, limited. There were, however, a number of opposition actions, such as the “Noon Against Putin” launched by people close to Navalny. And then there was Davankov’s probable second place in the absence of fraud, which seems to suggest that some young people and urbanites wanted to show their disagreement with current policy. Could these few gestures of opposition lead to increased persecution by the regime?

There will certainly be effects, but they may not be very direct or widespread. We know, for example, that those who bravely laid flowers on Navalny’s grave were probably filmed, and we can imagine that searches will be carried out and will have consequences for certain people. But for the rest, I think the regime still feels it is not up against widespread dissent. Its control over society seems sufficient insofar as a majority of those opposed to the war and the regime are not ready to actively join the resistance. The Kremlin is probably not extremely worried about this. It was more worried about Navalny’s funeral, but generally speaking, the prevailing impression is that the liberals are already under control thanks to existing tools. I don’t think, therefore, that the repression will change in scale.

The most pressing question today is that of a second mobilization. Will it be well managed? Will it create new opposition? Those with liberal leanings are a small minority, while the mobilization will affect much larger groups who have traditionally been more supportive of the regime. As a result, the regime needs to be sure that its base does not turn against it. For the Kremlin, the question is far more pressing than how to deal with the liberals still present in Russia.

The Russian election has most often been analyzed as a way of mobilizing or controlling the population, particularly in view of the future mobilization you mentioned. What do we know about the ability of this type of election — whose winner was known in advance — to have a mobilizing effect on the population?

Its capacity for mobilization greatly depends on social groups.

The vast majority of provincial, rural, and elderly Russians still believe in the ritual symbolism of the election as a plebiscite in support of the president in difficult times. I think there is indeed a symbolic effect that is effective with certain sections of the population.

But it’s also true that among the middle classes in big cities, whether or not they voted for Putin, people are well aware that they are being asked to play a role to which they attach little importance. People either don’t vote, or they vote, but without attaching any value to their action. Voting is seen as a kind of compulsory action, carried out without question.

One consequence of this situation is that the regime can never be entirely sure of the degree of public acquiescence. It can never really know what percentage of the population believes in the myth and what percentage only passively accepts what is asked of it, because individuals are not looking to clash with the system.

Finally, is the election just another tool? It seems that the importance we attach to it in analyzing the political situation must be given some nuance with regard to the various means of pressure available.

Absolutely. The repertoire of actions available to the regime is extremely broad, and the various tools at its disposal appeal to different segments of the population. The symbolic effect of the election, where it exists, may be fairly minimal for the population. The key elements that currently unite Putin’s supporters are, on the one hand, the ideological discourse on the existential war with the West and, on the other, the financial and material support that the regime gives to all those who go to the front and their families.

The Putin regime’s actions combine material support for its base, ideological mobilization, and repression. Each of these tools works for certain groups, but none works for the entire population.

In Europe — except Belarus — only the Serbian and Hungarian leaders, Vučić and Orbán, congratulated Putin on his victory. Both countries have experienced a significant decline in democratic quality as well as cases of electoral fraud — including suspicions of massive fraud in Belgrade last December. Do the reactions of these two leaders stem primarily from geopolitical considerations, or does it simply betray a lack of interest in the normative framework of liberal democracy and free elections?

Both aspects coexist, of course. Obviously, the two leaders are guided by what I call an illiberal approach, so they have no particular difficulty in congratulating Putin on an election that is really a plebiscite. But it seems to me that the geopolitical dimension, the doctrine of equidistance, is really the crucial point in both cases. For Orbán, it’s a way of upsetting Brussels and the other European partners; for Vučić, it’s about maintaining a situation where Serbia feels it can put pressure on Europe, and not just be put under pressure itself. Moreover, there is a political tradition in both countries of engaging in provocation, because provocation creates geopolitical room for maneuver.

The other major illiberal element is in the United States. How has the Trump camp reacted to this election?

The Trump universe showed mixed reactions. Some within the Trumpist world were able to make very demonstratively pro-Russian statements — notably in the way they reacted to Tucker Carlson’s interview with Putin. And then there are Trumpist circles that are much more “reasonable” and moderate in their assessment of Putin’s election; either they don’t comment on it, or they comment on it in a very neutral way because, addressing an American electorate and being part of the establishment, they don’t necessarily want to be identified as pro-Putin. Some are part of a very anti-Russian tradition in the House or the Senate.

We can therefore observe a whole spectrum of reactions. In the “MAGA ecosystem”, there are both those who are truly pro-Russia, who admire Vladimir Putin, as well as isolationists for whom the important thing is not Vladimir Putin’s supposed qualities, but their refusal to pay for the war and finance the Ukrainians. So don’t think that the Trump camp is enthusiastic about Putin. In fact, the vast majority of the Trump camp operates from an isolationist approach — neither pro-Russian or anti-Russian — for whom support for Ukraine doesn’t really matter.

Beyond the Putin regime’s classic interference and disinformation maneuvers in Europe, the Russian political world maintains close ideological and even personal ties with parts of the European political world. A substantial portion of the Western far right has expressed, and continues to express, sympathy for a nationalist, ultraconservative Putin. As for certain fringe groups on the left, nostalgic for a bygone USSR, they are ambivalent towards the Kremlin. Finally, many of the Russian minority political parties in Eastern Europe as well as parts of the diaspora still openly support Putinism. Of course, the war in Ukraine has muted most of this rhetoric and is forcing some actors to shift their positions, though this doesn’t mean that it’s disappeared. Politically speaking, how attractive is Putin’s ideology in Europe today? What individual intermediaries can they still mobilize?

This question has become more difficult to answer in recent months due to the fact that, on the surface at least, these ties have become much more tenuous. I think that the basic ideological attraction remains centered around a Russia that is considered capable of resisting American influence, that denounces liberalism, that believes in conservative, Christian values, in old Europe, that rejects multiculturalism, and promotes political, geopolitical, economic, cultural, and symbolic sovereignty. This attraction remains strong in certain circles, but cannot be expressed politically because of the war.

The more political forces adopt a strategy of normalization and de-demonization, the more they have to distance themselves from their ties to Russia in order to stay in tune with their own public opinion. Conversely, when we look at extremely radical movements that are not part of the electoral landscape, we see that they can publicly express, or continue to express, their admiration for Putin.

The case of the National Rally in France is particularly blatant, where there has been a marked shift from a very openly pro-Russian stance to a much more nuanced one. Two cases that I find interesting because both continue to display openly pro-Russian far-right views are Germany’s AfD and part of Italy’s far-right centered around Matteo Salvini. In Italy, the two far-right forces, the pro-Russian (Salvini) and the pro-NATO (Meloni), continue to govern together despite their differences.

In Central Europe, we of course find Hungary and Slovakia — which is now in a very similar situation to Hungary’s in terms of discourse — as well as Serbia. But the case I find most fascinating is that of Germany, where the AfD is still very openly pro-Russian and has not at all made the ideological shift that the National Rally has made over the last two years. So I think the regime’s political symbolism is still there, even if geostrategic alliances have changed.

With regard to the specifically nationalist aspect of Putin’s discourse, there are a number of similarities between the Kremlin’s ideology and that which is prevalent in certain Western nations where the far right is on the rise. Could this trend enable Putin’s discourse to gain the foothold in public opinion that it currently lacks?

The studies available to us show that, although there may be an ideological symbiosis between certain European elites and Russian discourse, this symbiosis is not necessarily established at the level of public opinion. For example, just because someone votes for Marine Le Pen does not necessarily mean they have a favorable opinion of Russia. Generally speaking, internal ideological leanings are focused on domestic issues and very little on international politics.

Having said that, I do think that there are deeper trends in European societies which can only be explained through internal reasons and not by Russia’s actions, and which could ultimately serve Russian interests: tensions over migration issues, demand for more authoritarian regimes, for a leader who would not be afraid to sidestep democratic norms in the name of government efficiency, and so on.

What the war has shown above all is that the two issues of illiberalism and geopolitical orientation can be completely dissociated from each other. In fact, illiberal trends could develop in Europe and give power to far-right political elites who would not have pro-Russian geopolitical leanings. This was the case in Poland until recently, where the Law and Justice party, despite a rather striking parallel with United Russia in terms of its discourse on values, was in complete opposition to Russian power. We see a similar tendency in Meloni.

The war enabled us to separate what we imagined to be Russian influence from certain internal dynamics within European societies that could be compared with the discourse of the Russian political elite. More than influence, in many cases there was a confluence of interests.

In the case of the AfD, several factors contribute to greater permissiveness towards Putin’s power: on the one hand, the diaspora’s role in the very make-up of the party, and on the other, its deeper roots in the East, whose ideology rejects Western domination, with a nostalgic, critical and even ultra-critical rejection of the United States’ role. Is this nostalgia for the East in the German example perhaps the closest equivalent within the Union to the nostalgia for the USSR, as is seen in part of the Russian electorate?

Yes, absolutely. I think there is indeed a form of nostalgia which comes with a sense of subjectivity, a feeling of having been “colonized”. It’s a recurring theme: colonization arrived by way of Brussels. Some political circles in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia have been able to play the “real Europe” card, opposing Brussels for imposing standards that are not real European ones. But the case of East Germany is even clearer, with the former GDR losing its national identity and being absorbed into eastern Germany, followed by a long period of readjustment. This experience can be compared with the experience of a large part of the Russian population, for whom the collapse of the Soviet Union was a true social, economic, cultural, and political trauma, which was subsequently revived by the various political regimes.Professor of International Affairs and Political Science at George Washington University

The resulting frustrations are extremely deep-rooted, both socially and culturally. Obviously, they are fostered by the political elites, but they are rooted in the lived experiences of population groups that form part of the European far-right’s traditionally pro-Kremlin electoral base.

Within the Identity and Democracy (ID) group in the European Parliament, reactions have been varied. While the Finns Party have switched groups in the European Parliament to join the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), some parties within the group continue to oppose sanctions head-on and advocate a certain distance. One example is the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), whose position remains pro-Kremlin. Are we seeing a true break between these two parties, or is it simply a difference in rhetoric?

In spite of everything, I think there’s a true break within a certain number of these parties. Of course, some of this political realignment can be viewed as opportunistic. However, some of them undoubtedly felt that Russia has committed actions that could not be condoned.

What’s more, the more that illiberal and far-right discourse grows in Europe, the less its representatives are bound to Russia’s image. These representatives can much more easily find like-minded European role models. In many ways, Orbán has replaced Putin as the symbolic figurehead of this illiberal European movement. Orbán is ambiguous about his relations with Russia; he is pro-Russian in many respects, but when you look at the institutes and think tanks that gravitate towards him, they are all connected to Republican and Trumpist circles. He therefore has many American connections, while at the same time playing a pro-Russian geopolitical card.

We are witnessing an overall restructuring of the European field, which makes Russia no longer necessary to promote a kind of return to true conservative, Christian, and other European values. Nevertheless, there is definitely a certain circumstantial dimension. Some parties, depending on their leader’s personality and their electoral strategies, sincerely adapt, while others “play the game” for a while, believing they can’t afford to be pro-Russian. If this discourse were to one day become acceptable again, we may well see a number of figures change tack. Disentangling the two sides is always difficult, as it’s not easy to judge how sincere political figures are.

In the case of the FPÖ, expressing support for Moscow has not prevented the party from doing well in polls. The far-right is currently leading opinion polls, and the likelihood of its participation in the next government is quite high. Is this proof, paradoxically, that the National Rally’s about-face was not necessary from a purely electoral point of view?

What helps the part of the European far right that hasn’t updated its position is primarily the fact that the war is dragging on, that we’re entering a phase where Russia’s predicted defeat hasn’t actually happened. We find ourselves in a situation where the weight of the war on Europe is changing. This makes it easier to normalize the rhetoric coming from all these far-right parties, which was “we can’t afford it, the war is going to be expensive and long, it will be too heavy a burden on us”. The parties in question disagreed with the general, highly emotional, tone of the pro-Ukraine discourse. But as we enter a period in which the discourse has become much more subdued and worried, they are finding that their message is a little more accepted by the population.

In a way, the FPÖ and other parties anticipated a shift in public opinion that has brought them into the mainstream, which was not the case at the very start of the war when they were seen as not being sufficiently pro-Ukraine and still too pro-Russian.Professor of International Affairs and Political Science at George Washington University

Putin’s ultraconservative discourse is, in broad terms, very much in line with what we hear from political figures such as Kaczyński or Zemmour. We could, at the very least, imagine a scenario where all the illiberals rally behind this ultra-conservative line, as we have seen to a certain extent in the United States with the most hardline fringe of the Republican Party. Could one of the risks of prolonging the conflict, with a potentially unfavorable outcome for Ukraine, be the reemergence in Europe of a far-right that would regroup around and with Putin?

It seems to me that the main risk today is of seeing the emergence of far-right forces within the governments of several European countries, who are not returning to a pro-Russian stance, but who believe that they cannot pay for Ukraine. This does not require an ideological rallying to the values represented by the Russian state. Pragmatic arguments about the costs of war are enough. This is also the case for the Americans, whose isolationist policies are the primary justification for rejecting aid to Ukraine.

Once again, I don’t think ideology is the primary factor here. Just look at the Polish or Italian cases. What will come into play, more than anything else, is the idea that we can’t pay and that we must therefore, at some point, end our support for Ukraine. Depending on how the conflict evolves, and with the debate that has recently been revived, particularly in France, another question may also arise around sending troops. The question of material and financial commitment could then be joined by a question of human commitment.

ore than any ideological argument about Russia’s great ultraconservative power, it’s the inward-looking argument about the inability to pay more for Ukraine that is likely to be the most visible to emerge from the European election following the success of the far-right parties, and then again in November with the American election.

You mentioned the decisive role of the next American election. What do you see as the possible convergences and divergences between Putinism and Trumpism in the current situation?

The two ideologies overlap on some points, but not all. Tucker Carlson’s interview with Putin showed just how difficult it was for the two sides to talk to each other. Putin talked a lot about Russia, the conflict, and the history of the Russia-Ukraine relationship, all of which Carlson didn’t expect. He couldn’t get Putin to talk about conservative and traditional values in the way he expected. They also disagreed on China. Obviously, the Trumpist view of China is extremely negative, while the Russian view of China is relatively positive.

Generally speaking, divergent interpretations of the international stage make it difficult to highlight their shared points in terms of sovereignty, protectionism, criticism of globalization, and liberal values. In practice, therefore, the relationship is difficult to make work. And, as I mentioned, there’s a whole Republican establishment within the Trumpist movement that doesn’t want to pay for Ukraine, but isn’t necessarily pro-Putin. So the relationship is more complex than is often imagined.

The November election will obviously have a major impact. If Trump is elected, we can imagine that part of his establishment will seek to force Ukraine’s hand in finding a peace solution, putting Europe in a truly complicated situation. If Trump doesn’t win, there will probably be violence within American society, which will certainly also be seen as problematic for the Russian regime. Of course, we can see the positive side for the Kremlin’s PR, which would doubtless take advantage of the situation to portray the United States as a country in decline, plagued by internal violence. But I’m not sure the Kremlin has any interest in this kind of instability either. The best solution for Putin would obviously be Trump’s election, followed by Trump’s offer to Moscow of a ceasefire. Of course, we know very well that it’s not Moscow and Washington who will decide what the Ukrainian position will be.

Russia’s strategy is in fact multidimensional. On the one hand, there may be a strategy of trying to get along with Trump if he is elected, particularly on the issues of Ukraine, NATO, and Europe, which coincides with a mindset of confrontation with the United States in the rest of the world. On other occasions, the Russian regime adopts a pro-Chinese, pro-Iranian approach, and the global south, favoring a multipolar world, which will really run counter to what much of Trump’s foreign policy will be if he is elected. In reality, the only time when we could really imagine overlapping interests is on the Ukraine question and the relationship with Europe, which doesn’t work in our favor. On all other issues, it will be much more difficult for Russia to find itself in a position of support for Trump.

For both Trump and Putin, this won’t necessarily be a problem. We live in an international order that has become much more transactional, where agents can partner on one issue and disagree on another. I think they’ll probably try to reach agreement on the Ukrainian issue, but we shouldn’t expect any kind of unanimity, because the two sides still disagree on many things.