The Ukraine War at One: A Silver Lining

One year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the fog of war still obscures its full implications. The war continues to cause unspeakable suffering. Estimates indicate that Ukraine and Russia each sustained 100,000 military casualties by November 2022. Ukraine suffered upward of 40,000 civilian casualties. Dozens of millions have been displaced. ¹ Reports of war crimes have become frequent. ² The war has tested the resilience of international institutions, partnerships and alliances. The Russian invasion violated a basic tenet of the international order: the prohibition on aggressive use of force. It raised the specter of cyber war that threatens to draw other countries in. It once again highlighted the role of online disinformation in fueling conflict. 

Facing these alarming prospects, many were pessimistic about what the war in Ukraine may portend for the future of international law and institutions. Surprisingly, however, some elements of the war and the international responses to date offer a silver lining. The responses defied expectations about the significance of international law and norms, and about the relevance of post-WWII institutions. We argue that there is much to be optimistic about. ³ More specifically, we argue that European Union institutions in particular have dramatically centralized and expanded their capacity, in ways that are, on net, very positive.

The strong international response has reaffirmed the prohibition on international use of force and the forceful acquisition of territory. The Russian invasion came at a time when article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the use of force in international relations, was already facing immense pressure because of recurring violations on scales large and small. Many believed that Russia’s blatant invasion of a sovereign nation with the stated aim of ending Ukraine’s existence as an independent state would be the last nail in article 2(4)’s coffin. ⁴ But as Tom Ginsburg observed, ‘Just when Ukraine’s death by five cuts seemed a possibility…. the Atlantic alliance and many other countries …. have vociferously reiterated the importance of Article 2(4).’ ⁵   

The international response did not just reaffirm a longstanding legal norm. Cyber warfare remains, to date, relatively contained. International powers have mobilized in unprecedented ways to offer solutions for Ukrainian refugees. And states and private actors alike have taken much more significant measures than in the past to stem Russian disinformation. There is extensive debate on the role of NATO in the Ukraine conflict, but critics and proponents alike acknowledge that this alliance received a major injection of energy and direction. We focus however is a different institution: the EU. We believe that the EU has built on the Ukraine crisis to advance ambitious and unprecedented policies and strengthen Brussels further. This comes on the heels of a major expansion of EU powers as part of the Covid epidemic.

To focus on the silver lining is not to deny the shortcomings of the international response. It still reflects longstanding pathologies, chief among them the selective nature of how powerful actors address international law violations. Past crises on a similar scale have not received the same international treatment and resource allocation as the Ukraine war. Moreover, for many, the prospect of NATO expansion is no cause for celebration. Relatedly, for some, the accretion of power by the EU’s central institutions represent a victory of bureaucracy over democracy. 

Recognizing this, however, we argue that the Ukraine response is an unusual window of opportunity to address these shortcomings. The arduous and frustrating process of moving international law forward got jump-started following the Russian invasion. In fields including the law of war, economic sanctions, refugee law, international criminal law, disinformation and cyberwarfare, new ideas are being developed, and old ideas are getting new backers. Generous and ambitious policies to address a threat to European security can become precedents to reference when crises hit parts of the world that garner much less attention. ⁶  

1- The Silver Lining 

1-1 Galvanizing Institutions, Alliances and Partnerships 

The war in Ukraine proved that international alliances and partnerships, long criticized as obsolete, still have an important role to play in enforcing international norms and maintaining international security. Multilateralism once again emerged after some major world powers, notably the United States, chose to turn inward and retreat from international and regional cooperation.

NATO is one major example. For the first time in years, European countries like Sweden and Finland have expressed interest in joining NATO, reinvigorating an alliance in need of energy and purpose. NATO allies worked to provide Ukraine with aid, weapons and intelligence that has proved crucial in complicating Russia’s military campaign and shoring up Ukraine’s odds-defying defense. ⁷ The United States has already invested upward of 22 billion euro in military aid to Ukraine. ⁸ EU member states and EU institutions have made military commitments exceeding euro 11 billion. ⁹

Another example is the extensive transatlantic cooperation around the comprehensive sanctions regime that world powers have built up against Russia. Never before have such comprehensive economic sanctions been imposed on a G-20 economy. As the conflict progressed and evidence of atrocities mounted, the United States and the European Union began targeting the Russian energy sector despite the potential costs to the world economy. The economic sanctions campaign—at least in its early stages—moved at breakneck speed, bringing the Unites States, the EU, the WTO, and other powers from North America to Asia into the fold. The conflict also strengthened public-private coordination alongside traditional multilateralism. The sanctions campaign against Moscow coincided with an exodus of private companies from Russia, above and beyond what sanctions required. ¹⁰

In Europe, the EU built on the Ukraine emergency to breathe new life into European integration. ¹¹ It harnessed a swell of political will among member states fueled by the geographic proximity of the war and memories of life under Soviet occupation. In the run up to the war, prominent observers lamented the EU’s unraveling as consecutive economic and migration crises, Brexit and internal challenges from member states like Hungary and Poland seemed to threaten its existence. Defying expectations, however, Brussels has emerged from the Ukraine conflict stronger. The central EU institutions have been able to push through unprecedented legal reforms and policies in the areas of defense and security, migration and asylum, and energy that expanded the EU’s reach globally and, consequentially, within its own borders. ¹²  

We start with some financial figures, because until recently, EU institutions had huge regulatory, but no financial, muscle. The EU annual budget was, until 2019, tiny – representing only 1% of the gross national income of the EU member states, on the order of 100 million euro. ¹³ For comparison, the US federal budget has long been at least 20 times as large. Until 2019, the EU ruled through regulation, not money. This all changed with the Covid pandemic, and extraordinary the NGEU program. The issuance of hundreds of billions in common debt, backed by Germany’s excellent credit, to pay for anti-poverty programs in the European periphery has been called Europe’s Hamiltonian’s moment. We argue that the Ukraine crisis has further reinforced this trend to centralization of EU financial resources. 

European figures on aid to Ukraine are  striking when it comes to overall assistance, including non-military financial and humanitarian commitments. The EU total of military, financial and humanitarian aid comes to 52 billion euro, a number on par with the 48 million euro in US aid in these three categories. ¹⁴ But what is striking is that the vast majority of European financial and humanitarian funds come through EU institutions – not directly through the member states. ¹⁵ When the Council and Commission typically fight over one or a few hundred million to be shared each year among 27 member states, but go ahead and commit 30 billion to a non-member state (perhaps on a longer and less clear time horizon), the transformation seems striking. 

The regulatory techniques to accomplish EU integration goals are also fascinating. As we have shown elsewhere, the EU Ukraine emergency measures have used several techniques: legal workarounds; scaling up; consolidation; and technocracy-maximization. They created legal workarounds by circumventing constitutional restrictions or suspending longstanding EU rules. They leveraged and repurposed existing programs to scale them up. They consolidated power by migrating important authority from the member states to the central EU institutions. In some cases, like migration policy, they pushed through policies that EU member states had affirmatively rejected before. And they maximized technocracy by deploying centrally predetermined quotas, formulae, and legal definitions for allocating obligations and entitlements among member states to reduce—if not eliminate—political haggling around implementation. ¹⁶  

In defense and security, the Russian invasion allowed the EU to consolidate key defense authorities and reshape its regional and global security role. The EU circumvented a constitutional prohibition on funding military and defense actions from the regular EU budget to provide Ukraine with billions of euros in military assistance, thus setting a precedent for collectively arming a third state during armed conflict. To accomplish this, the EU used a little known preexisting legal instrument called the European Peace Facility (EPF). ¹⁷ Before Russia invaded Ukraine, the Council adopted several assistance measures under the EPF to support limited action in various countries, ¹⁸ including non-lethal assistance to Ukraine. ¹⁹ But none were as extensive as the post-invasion Ukraine measures. And none involved the provision of lethal weapons to a third country during armed conflict or 3.6 billion in centralized EU funding. 

The EPF is an important framework for military and defense spending moving forward. Unlike related past programs, the EPF can be used for any conflict, anywhere in the world, and to assist any third state. This gives the EU a vital tool for consolidating power and pushing for a more robust common security and defense policy (CSDP), which largely remained aspirational before Ukraine. The Ukraine assistance measure also extends the EU’s reach into the defense and security realm by creating a precedent for collective EU provision of lethal weapons to a third state during an armed conflict. It is a new model of EU international military engagement.    

In the energy field, the Ukraine invasion accelerated EU policies to collectively promote energy independence and divest from rogue exporters like Russia. Facing the prospect of Russian supply manipulation, skyrocketing energy prices and possible winter shortages, the EU even introduced an extraordinary authority to mandate EU-wide emergency energy rationing. The authority derives from Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which allows the EU Council to act ‘if severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products, notably in the area of energy.’ As a first step, member states were asked to voluntarily reduce their consumption by 15 percent by spring 2023. If voluntary measures prove insufficient, however, the new energy measures grant the EU emergency authority to mandate rationing with some exceptions. ²⁰  

In addition, the war accelerated the promotion of longstanding domestic EU policy goals such as transitioning to green energy and a more sustainable EU economy. The EU Commission proposed an ambitious energy plan, REPowerEU, to wean Europe off Russian energy by the end of the decade and diversify EU suppliers. Alongside these immediate goals, the plan leverages the Ukraine crisis to advance a broader climate agenda of gradually moving the EU toward green energy sources. ²¹ The plan emphasizes the advantages of the EU working as a union to accomplish the goals of divestment from Russia and energy sustainability faster. ²²  

Once again, the plan repurposes a preexisting EU instrument called the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), much like the EU did with the European Peace Facility in the defense and security context. The RRF is a coordination and investment mechanism that the EU created as part of the response to yet another emergency, COVID-19. ²³ REPowerEU proposes to amend the RRF regulation to implement the divestment, diversification, and sustainability goals of the plan as part of the response to the Russian invasion. It includes guidance and rules that member states should follow to reshape their national ‘recovery and resilience’ plans to incorporate REPowerEU’s objectives. ²⁴  

Adding to these elements, the REPowerEU plan includes initiatives to collectivize and centralize EU energy procurement. Under the EU treaties, although the EU has competence in certain areas of internal energy policy, each member state maintains its right to ‘determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply.’ ²⁵ But in the wake of Ukraine, the EU—not individual member states—has led the effort to reduce the bloc’s dependence on Russia. ²⁶ REPowerEU builds on this trend and expands it. In December 2022, the European Parliament and the EU Council reached political agreement on financing REPowerEU and ‘enabling Member States to introduce REPowerEU chapters in their recovery and resilience plans’. ²⁷  

Refugee and migration policy is yet another area in which the EU took unprecedented steps following the Russian invasion. ²⁸ Within days of the invasion, the EU Council decided to activate for the first time the EU Temporary Protection Directive, a 2001 directive issued in response to the war in the Balkans to address mass influxes of individuals fleeing conflict. ²⁹ The Council granted Ukrainian nationals and others fleeing Ukraine the right to live, work, and receive benefits in any EU country. ³⁰ Refugees and asylum seekers have never before enjoyed this degree of choice regarding the country where they will live and work. The Ukraine temporary protection decision is also generous in defining the group of eligible individuals and the rights they would enjoy. These rights apply automatically across the EU.   

The temporary protection decision is a model of centralized administration of a mass displacement by the EU institutions. It is a remarkable collective response that replaced the EU default of placing all responsibility with the individual member states immediately neighboring Ukraine under the Dublin regime—the controlling EU instrument that typically governs responsibility for hosting and processing asylum seekers. It is a striking example of refugee responsibility sharing that significantly expands even the most generous responsibility sharing measures that the EU had adopted during the 2015 middle eastern migration crisis. ³¹ Poland and Hungary—two EU countries that vehemently opposed asylum seeker assistance measures in the past and have long played spoilers in many EU projects—supported these extensive measures this time around. 

1-2 Operationalizing Refugee Responsibility Sharing 

Against the backdrop of repeated failures by world powers to alleviate the plight of displaced persons fleeing from the Middle East, Africa, and Central America, it was difficult to imagine that the world would rapidly mobilize to welcome Ukrainians. Yet, the EU’s extraordinary measures to help those displaced from Ukraine as well as measures taken by other countries are one of the most striking examples to date of true responsibility sharing for asylum seekers. The EU has taken an estimated 4 million Ukrainians in under the Temporary Protection Directive. ³² The United States awarded Temporary Protected Status to Ukrainians resident in the United States, created exceptions for Ukrainians in restrictive policies that apply to migrants arriving at its southern border, promised to welcome 100,000 Ukrainians, and has provided considerable economic aid to Ukraine and its neighbors. ³³  

Before Ukraine, the growing incidence and geographic spread of mass displacements has fueled consideration of various arrangements designed to relieve the pressure on heavily burdened receiving states while addressing the plight of international protection seekers. The vast majority of asylum seekers today are hosted in a handful of largely developing countries bordering areas of mass displacement. Responsibility sharing has become a key concept in the migration policy debate. Long viewed as theoretical and hortatory, responsibility sharing has been increasingly translated from theory to practice as the UN, the EU, the United States and other actors have experimented with different responsibility sharing mechanisms of vastly varying adequacy. 

Responsibility sharing arrangements may deviate from the international refugee law baseline of an obligation for individualized assessment of eligibility for refugee status in the country of arrival. They adopt a more systemic approach that also accounts for the perspective of host countries and the difficulty of conducting individualized assessments when millions of asylum seekers flee at once.  In previous work, we proposed a model for evaluating responsibility sharing arrangements and assessing whether they are regressive or progressive. Progressive arrangements that ought to spread are ones that shift asylum seekers to more secure, more affluent and more administratively competent states. Regressive arrangements are ones that do the opposite and should be discouraged. We identify four key parameters for classification, including hosting commitments, a monetary component or equivalent non-monetary assistance, multilateralism and legal anchoring. ³⁴

Both the EU and the U.S. Ukraine refugee responses are very close to the progressive end of the scale. They involve the relocation of millions displaced from Ukraine to some of the most powerful, most affluent western countries. They grant asylum seekers robust legal protection and economic rights. They are accompanied by generous aid to Ukraine and its neighbors. They are grounded in legally binding instruments. And at least the EU Temporary Protection Directive is a collective responsibility sharing mechanism.  The conflict in Ukraine, then, has produced a model for a highly progressive refugee responsibility sharing arrangement. That model can and should be replicated in dealing with future instances of mass displacement. It also illustrates the importance of reforming international refugee and migration law to better address mass influxes of asylum seekers and accommodate responsibility sharing arrangements. 

1-3 Warfare and Cyberspace 

The war in Ukraine defied expectations regarding the methods of warfare in ways that give cause for optimism. Many assumed before the invasion that a dominant cyber power like Russia would deploy major cyber operations extensively. ³⁵ But in practice, Russia has conducted few successful large scale cyber operations in Ukraine or elsewhere in this conflict to date. ³⁶ Scholars have maintained that this may be evidence of effective defenses set up by the Ukrainians and their powerful allies, or a desire to avoid unintended escalation that may rope other powers into the conflict. Both explanations challenge well-established operational assumptions in cyber security, such as the assumption that the defender is at a structural disadvantage or that deterrence works poorly in cyberspace. ³⁷   

Online disinformation is another way in which the Ukraine war has penetrated cyberspace. Scholars have observed that private internet platforms and state actors have come together to do a lot more than they had at previous geopolitical inflection points to counter Russian disinformation and misuse of internet platforms to promote its objectives in Ukraine. ³⁸ For example, the EU Council prohibited the broadcasting of Russian state media organs RT and Sputnik within the EU, and banned private platforms from hosting their content or making it accessible via search. ³⁹ Major tech companies like Meta, Google, Twitter and Microsoft all took action to contain Russian disinformation and to warn against Russian cyberattacks. ⁴⁰

Indeed, scholars have argued that these efforts may have gone too far, resulting in excessive censorship based on opaque rules and state intervention in online content governance. ⁴¹ Still, here, as in the other contexts we discuss, the Ukraine War has motivated a strong international response implementing lessons learned from previous successful Russian cyber and disinformation campaigns. 

***

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a significant stress test for the international order and the norms that undergird it. Far from meeting predictions of the international order’s demise, we argue that the extraordinary response to the war reaffirmed and reinvigorated many of its most important elements.  

2- The Downside and the Future 

The flip side of the exceptional response to the Russian invasion is that it is, by definition, different from the international response to other crises. Is it sustainable to have an international regime that responds to grave threats selectively, with some triggering billions in spending on weapons and humanitarian aid and others barely registering diplomatic condemnations?  Does the response to the Ukraine invasion expose the so-called rules based international order for what it is—an empty vehicle for the interests of powerful, mostly western, countries? Russia’s justification for its actions emphasized the hypocrisy of western powers who condemn Russia while engaging in similar actions themselves. ⁴² And Russia is certainly not alone in making this argument. ⁴³  

In the refugee context, the warm welcome Ukrainians received is often contrasted with inadequate responses to other recent major displacements in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Central America and elsewhere. Many view this disparity as an expression of racism. The West perceives Ukrainians as fellow Europeans, while asylum seekers from the global south are “others”. ⁴⁴ Likewise, the United States has taken relatively extraordinary measures to assist Ukrainians who reach the United States while consistently falling short in providing solutions for asylum seekers along its southern border and those displaced by its Middle East wars. 

In the sanctions context, the coalition against Russia excludes many developing countries and key players like China, who do not share the objectives of those leading the sanctions coalition or their view of international law and the international order. ⁴⁵ Law of war violations by western powers and allies have not been met with similar economic ostracization. 

In the disinformation context, scholars worry about the lack of coherence and standards in how private actors approach content moderation in different conflicts around the world. Scholars have also criticized the EU for an overbroad ban on Russian media that fails to account for the broader implications of wholesale state content restrictions. ⁴⁶

For some, the selectivity problem nullifies whatever virtues the international response to the Ukraine war may have. If predominantly western world powers apply a double standard grounded in political interests in deciding what violations of international law to punish severely and which individuals deserve protection, the whole international rule of law enterprise loses its legitimacy and appeal for those who are not a part of the dominant coalition. 

This view, we argue, goes too far. It is better for all nations that world powers reaffirm the prohibition against international use of force this time, even if they wavered in the past, so that we can do more in the future. It is better to offer solutions for Ukrainians and alleviate a mass humanitarian crisis this time even if world powers have not been as generous in the past, as this generosity can serve as a benchmark for what is possible. It is better for internet platforms who control global information flows to accept responsibility for their role in geopolitical conflicts than to have them stand idly by as disinformation and harmful online behavior spread because they failed to come up with a coherent and workable rulebook that they can apply consistently across regions and conflicts. 

International law and the international order have always been works in progress. International law has always been enforced haphazardly, and politics and cold state interests have always played a substantial role. We should welcome instances, like the Ukraine war, in which international law, norms and partnerships function as intended. At the same time, it is important to work toward more equitable, less selective application of international law and to  address the pathologies that have long plagued the international system across different subject-matter areas. And in that respect, the Ukraine war may prove rather generative. By resurfacing challenges related to selectivity, racism, north-south relations, mass displacement, and new methods and theaters of warfare, the war has reinvigorated discussions that could precipitate important reforms. 

For example, the Ukraine conflict stirred the longstanding debate over the legality, effectiveness, and collateral costs of economic sanctions. A year into the conflict, one of the most comprehensive sanctions regimes in post-Cold War history has failed to dissuade Russia from pressing forward with its military aspirations in Ukraine. This has contributed to an impression that sanctions do more harm than good in hurting the international economy, imposing immense compliance costs, encouraging overcompliance, bolstering alternative economic systems to the dollar dominated one, sparing sophisticated sanctions targets that conceal their assets well, and taking an excessive toll on individual liberties. 

Scholars have considered potential avenues for reform, from incremental addition of due process requirements, through using domestic law to impose restrictions on the resort to sanctions in the main sanctions-imposing jurisdictions, to even more ambitious and fundamental reforms like pushing for greater financial transparency worldwide and moving toward energy self-sufficiency to diminish dependence on powers like Russia that violate international norms. ⁴⁷ All of these proposals are currently on the table, and international players would do well not to let this moment go to waste in assessing and implementing them. 

Ukraine also highlights how dated the international refugee and migration law framework is. An international framework more in tune with the reality of mass displacements today would expand the international refugee definition to cover situations of armed conflict and generalized violence, address problems of racism and equity, and institutionalize mechanisms for facilitating true responsibly sharing mechanisms when mass displacements occur. The time has come to heed calls from scholars and policymakers to refocus attention on responsibility sharing as a promising path for addressing global migration and displacement. The Ukraine war is an important millstone toward more systematic consideration of concrete responsibility sharing mechanisms that may follow the Ukraine blueprint. ⁴⁸  

Much work remains to be done in the thorny field of content restrictions in conflict and the individual rights challenges that they raise. This is a relatively new field, with a world of unanswered questions that will continue to occupy lawyers and policymakers in both the public and private sectors. Ukraine once again demonstrated the importance of developing capacity and mechanisms within private online intermediaries to better address harmful content. This is one of the objectives of the EU’s recent comprehensive Digital Services Act, which requires online intermediaries to put in place procedures for addressing a variety of harmful online behaviors and imposes various related requirements. ⁴⁹  

Whether the Act strikes the right balance between state intervention in content moderation and preventing online harms has been intensely debated. In any event, the EU model is bound to be a globally influential one. ⁵⁰ Its implementation should be informed by instances of success—and overreach—during the Ukraine conflict to date. In particular, the EU experience with comprehensive crisis-driven bans on certain content cautions against using the emergency intervention authority that the Digital Services Act provides for such purposes. As David Kaye has argued, the EU Russian state media ban backfired in giving authoritarians license to restrict what they see as disinformation in the guise of emergency measures. ⁵¹  

Finally, scholars have called on regulators and policymakers to move their thinking forward from flashy, high impact cyber operations to ‘lower-level operations that have proven more consistently problematic, both in Ukraine and elsewhere.’ ⁵² While there is an emerging consensus that the former should be treated as use of force equivalents, the latter category of operations continues to raise difficult policy and regulatory questions that should receive more attention.     

Conclusion 

The war in Ukraine injected much needed energy into an international system of norms and institutions that has lost much of its vigor. The international response to the war has been far from perfect, and it has suffered from familiar pathologies of the international order. One year after the Russian invasion, it is becoming clear that the international response has failed to meet its ultimate objective: ending the war and the unspeakable suffering that it has caused. Nonetheless, the response has involved a set of significant actions across a range of international law institutions and disciplines. The EU in particular appears to have emerged from the crisis stronger, with more power in the hands of the central institutions and far greater reach into fields like defense and energy, traditionally dominated by member states. The international response also generated ideas and illuminated pathways for long overdue reforms or future development of emerging legal areas. To supporters of international law and European integration, this is a silver lining in an otherwise bleak situation.   

1. Helene Cooper, ‘Russia and Ukraine Each Have Suffered Over 100,000 Casualties, the Top U.S. General Says’ (10 Nov. 2022) N.Y. Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/10/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-casualties-deaths.html.
2. U.S. Dep’t of State, Evidence of Russia’s War Crimes and Other Atrocities in Ukraine: Recent Reporting on Child Relocations, Feb 14, 2023, https://www.state.gov/evidence-of-russias-war-crimes-and-other-atrocities-in-ukraine-recent-reporting-on-child-relocations/; ‘Germany Has Evidence of War Crimes in Ukraine “in three-digit range” Prosecutor Says’ (4 Feb. 2023) Reuters,, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-has-evidence-war-crimes-ukraine-in-three-digit-range-prosecutor-2023-02-04/.
3. This essay revises and updates previous work published in Elena Chachko & Katerina Linos, ‘Ukraine and the Emergency Powers of International Institutions’ (2022) 116 Am. J. of Int’l L. 775 (‘Chachko & Linos, Emergency Powers’); Elena Chachko & Katerina Linos, ‘International Law After Ukraine: Introduction to the Symposium’ (2022) 116 American Journal of International Law Unbound 124; Elena Chachko & Katerina Linos, ‘Refugee Responsibility Sharing or Responsibility Dumping?’ 110 Cal. L. Rev. 897 (2022) (‘Chachko & Linos, Responsibility Sharing’).
4. See eg, ‘Kori Schake, Putin Accidentally Revitalizes the West’s Liberal Order’, (1 March 2022) The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/02/vladimir-putin-ukraine-invasion-liberal-order/622950/.
5. Tom Ginsburg, ‘Article 2(4) and Authoritarian International Law’ (2022) 116 American Journal of International Law Unbound 130.
6. Katerina Linos, ‘Diffusion through Democracy’ (2011) 55 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 678; Katerina Linos, The Democratic Foundations of Policy Diffusion: How Health, Family and Employment Laws Spread Across Countries (Oxford University Press 2013).
7. See eg, David Brown, Jake Horton & Tural Ahmedzade, ‘Ukraine Weapons: What Tanks and Other Equipment are The World Giving?’ (18 Feb. 2023) BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62002218.
8. We use data from the 8^th edition of the Ukraine support tracker for comparability in our main text. This includes expenditures from January 24 2022 through November 20 2023. See Ariana Anteza et al., ‘The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?’ Available at https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/262746 [heirinafter Ukraine Support Tracker]. See also Anthony J. Blinken, ‘Significant New Military Assistance to Ukraine’ (19 Jan. 2023) U.S. Dep’t of State, https://www.state.gov/significant-new-u-s-military-assistance-to-ukraine/   (explaining that as of January 2023, the US has committed over $27 billion in military aid to Ukraine).
9. See Ukraine Support Tracker, supra note 8. See also Press Release, ‘Ukraine: Council Agrees on Further Military Support Under the European Peace Facility’, Council of the EU (Feb. 2, 2023), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/02/ukraine-council-agrees-on-further-military-support-under-the-european-peace-facility/. (noting that EU institutions have committed 3.6 billion euros worth of military assistance). See also ‘Military Support for Ukraine’, Die Bundesregierung, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/military-support-ukraine-2054992 (noting that Germany alone allocated over 4 billion Euros in 2022-2023 to fund Ukraine military aid).
10. Elena Chachko & J. Benton Heath, ‘A Watershed Moment for Sanctions? Russia, Ukraine, and the Economic Battlefield’ (2022) 116 American Journal of International Law Unbound 135; See also Sanctions against Russia – a Timeline, S&P Global, https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/sanctions-against-russia-8211-a-timeline-69602559.
11. But see Veronica Anghel & Erik Jones, ‘Is Europe Really Forged Through Crisis? Pandemic EU and the Russia – Ukraine War’ (2022) J. of Eur. Public Pol’y 1.
12. See Chachko & Linos, Emergency Powers, supra note 3.
13. See Deutsche Bundesbank, The EU budget and its financing: looking back and ahead (April 2020) https://www.bundesbank.de/resource/blob/831226/a569592c0a71b7c5c2494f6acace6a75/mL/2020-04-eu-haushalt-finanzierung-data.pdf
14. See Ukraine Support Tracker, supra note 8. See also Steven Erlanger, ‘When It Comes to Building Its Own Defense, Europe Has Blinked’ (4 Feb. 2023) N.Y. Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/04/world/europe/europe-defense-ukraine-war.html?smid=url-share (noting that overall EU assistance to Ukraine exceeds 50 billion Euro).
15. See Ukraine Support Tracker, supra note 8.
16. Id.
17. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509, at 14, OJ L102 (24 March 2021).
18. Eur. Comm’n, European Peace Facility, https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/what-we-do/european-peace-facility_en.
19. Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2135, at 59, OJ L432 (3 Dec. 2021).
20. Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1369, OJ L  206/1. See also Chachko & Linos, Emergency Powers, supra note 2; Katja Yafimava, ‘EU Solidarity at a Time of Gas Crisis: Even With a Will the Way Still Looks Difficult’ (Feb. 2023) The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, https://a9w7k6q9.stackpathcdn.com/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/EU-solidarity-at-a-time-of-gas-crisis-NG179.pdf.
21. See Chachko & Linos, Emergency Powers, supra note 3.
22. Eur. Comm’n Press Release, ‘REPowerEU: A Plan to Rapidly Reduce Dependence on Russian Fossil Fuels and Fast Forward the Green Transition’, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_3131.
23. Eur. Comm’n, Recovery and Resilience Facility, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/recovery-coronavirus/recovery-and-resilience-facility_en.
24. COM(2022) 231 (May 18, 2022).
25. TFEU, supra note 3, Art. 194(2); see also Kaisa Huhta, ‘The Scope of State Sovereignty Under Article 194(2) TFEU and the Evolution of EU Competences in the Energy Sector’ (2021) 70 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 991.
26. See Chachko & Linos, Emergency Powers, supra note 2.
27. See Eur. Comm’n, ‘REPowerEU: affordable, Secure and Sustainable Energy for Europe’, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en.
28. Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382, at 1, OJ L71 (Mar. 4, 2022).
29. Council Directive 2001/55/EC, at 12, OJ L212 (July 20, 2001).
30. Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382, supra note 28.
31. Linos & Chachko, Responsibility Sharing, supra; Elena Chachko & Katerina Linos, ‘Sharing Responsibility for Ukrainian Refugees: An Unprecedented Response’ (5 March 2022) Lawfare, https://www.lawfareblog.com/sharing-responsibility-ukrainian-refugees-unprecedented-response.
32. EU Council, Refugee Inflow from Ukraine, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-migration-policy/refugee-inflow-from-ukraine/ (reflecting the number of Ukrainians registered for temporary protection or similar schemes in the EU).
33. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, ‘Ukrainians in Flight: Politics, Race, and Regional Solutions’ (2022) 116 Am. J. Int’l L. Unbound 150.
34. Linos & Chachko, Responsibility Sharing, supra note 3.
35. Kristen Eichensehr, ‘Ukraine, Cyberattacks, and the Lessons for International Law’ (2022) 116 Am. J. Int’l L. Unbound 145.
36. See eg, Gavin Wilde, ‘Cyber Operations in Ukraine: Russia’s Unmet Expectations’ (12 Dec. 2022) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/12/cyber-operations-in-ukraine-russia-s-unmet-expectations-pub-88607; James A. Lewis, ‘Cyber War and Ukraine’ (June 2022), CSIS, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/220616_Lewis_Cyber_War.pdf?VersionId=S.iEKeom79InugnYWlcZL4r3Ljuq.ash; Susan Landau, ‘Cyberwar in Ukraine: What You See Is Not What’s Really There’ (30 Sep. 2022) Lawfare, https://www.lawfareblog.com/cyberwar-ukraine-what-you-see-not-whats-really-there.
37. See Eichensehr, supra note 35.
38. David Kaye, ‘Online Propaganda, Censorship, and Human Rights in Russia’s War against Reality’ (2022) 116 Am. J. Int’l L. Unbound; See also Elena Chachko, ‘National Security by Platform’ (2021) 25 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 55; Elena Chachko, ‘Platforms at War’, (28 March 2022) Lawfare, https://www.lawfareblog.com/platforms-war.
39. Council Regulation (EU) 2022/350, OJ L65, paras. 5–8 (1 March 2022).
40. Chachko, supra note 38.
41. Kaye, supra note 38.
42. ‘Full Text: Putin’s Declaration of War on Ukraine’ (24 Feb. 2022), The Spectator, https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/full-text-putin-s-declaration-of-war-on-ukraine.
43. See eg, Katrina Vanden Heuvel, ‘America’s Hypocrisy Over Ukraine and Spheres of Influence’ (12 April 2022), Wash. Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/04/12/americas-hypocrisy-over-ukraine-spheres-influence/; Joseph Krauss, ‘Many in Mideast See Hypocrisy in Western Embrace of Ukraine’ (29 March 2022), ABC News, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/mideast-hypocrisy-western-embrace-ukraine-83734095.
44. See eg, United Nations, ‘UNHCR Chief Condemns “Discrimination, Violence and Racism” Against Some Fleeing Ukraine’ (16 April 2022), https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114282.
45. Chachko & Heath, supra note 10.
46. Kaye, supra note 35.
47. Chachko & Heath, supra note 10.
48. Linos & Chachko, supra note 2; Ramjii-Nogales, supra note 33.
49. Regulation (EU) 2022/2065), OJ L277/1 (19 Oct. 2022).
50. See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect: The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World (Oxford University Press 2020); in this journal see Anu Bradford, ‘The European Union in a globalised world: the “Brussels effect”’ (2021) 2 Revue européenne du droit 1.
51. Kaye, supra note 35.
52. Eichensehr, supra note 38.