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“We must learn to live with China”, a conversation with Josep Borrell

In your address to the European foreign ministers in Stockholm, you stated that China was not Russia — can you explain what you mean by this?

Both Russia and China have authoritarian and anti–liberal political systems. Their systemic weight, however, cannot be compared to each other. Russia represents about 2% of global gross domestic product (GDP). China, on the other hand, represents about 20% and is aiming for parity with the United States. To truly understand this dynamic, it is important to note that in 1995, Russia’s GDP was equal to China’s. Today, China’s GDP is nearly 20 times greater than Russia’s. The two countries are no longer in the same league, even if the possession of nuclear weapons gives Russia the appearance of a great power. It is obvious that a defeat for Russia in Ukraine would only exacerbate this imbalance in China’s favor.

How would you describe the international system today?

I am not making any of this up. We are in a geopolitical configuration that has been extensively studied by theorists of international relations: that of a transition in which an ascendant power seeks to challenge a dominant power for leadership. China’s ambition is clearly to build a new world order, one in which it would take a central position by becoming the world’s leading power, symbolically in 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic. This ambition is not only backed by rhetoric, but also by abundant natural, human, technological and scientific resources. The reality of this challenge was very clearly acknowledged by the U.S. Treasury Secretary herself when she declared that “China’s economic growth need not be incompatible with American leadership”.

Both Russia and China have authoritarian and anti–liberal political systems. Their systemic weight, however, is incomparable.

Josep Borrell

But the return to a kind of strategic and technological bipolarity is also accompanied by a dynamic multipolarity where many countries will want to take advantage of the reshuffling of the deck to play their own hand, either by aligning themselves or by navigating between the poles like a sailor navigates among the reefs in a stormy sea. They will aim to increase their room for maneuver without taking sides. In Asia, in particular, they will occasionally ask for the guarantee of American security while at the same time developing important economic ties with Beijing. China is adapting to this reality by increasingly redirecting its trade and investment flows towards the non-Western world. Its main field of action is Asia, where it aims to affirm its power and leadership. China has begun to reduce its risks — what we now call de-risking.

So, a Russian defeat in Ukraine would not alter China’s trajectory?

I do not think so. China was initially counting on a swift Russian military victory. However, Putin’s blitzkrieg was a failure. Now China is trying to recalibrate its aim. Of course, a Russian defeat would be a major blow to the coalition of anti-liberal countries that China and Russia were hoping to build. But China will adapt to a Russian defeat because, once again, its political, economic and strategic weight is considerable. And this could even increase because we cannot rule out the possibility that countries in the South would seek Beijing’s protection if Russia were to fall.

Should we, as Europeans, block China?

I believe that our European Union is a force for peace and shared progress. It has no intention of blocking the rise of emerging countries as it develops. We do not wish to impede their emergence, but we must be vigilant to ensure that their rise to power does not threaten our interests, our values, or the rules-based international order. This is why our China strategy is multidimensional: cooperation, competition and rivalry will continue to be at the heart of the Union’s China policy, even if the balance between these different elements may vary according to China’s behavior. It is clear that in recent years, the rivalry aspect has become more significant. China’s political presence has become much stronger, and at times more aggressive. This does not work in its favor in terms of public opinion.

The Union has no intention of blocking the rise of emerging countries as it develops.

Josep Borrell

You also said that the stakes of our relationship with China are threefold: values, economic security and strategic security. Let us begin with values.

I wouldn’t be telling you anything new if I told you that the EU and China do not share the same vision of human rights. In every international forum, and with other countries, China has crafted a discourse that makes fundamental rights subordinate to the right to development. The Union must counter this discourse and challenge China’s vision. The Declaration of Human Rights is a universal declaration, not a Western one, even if certain parties pretend to have forgotten this.

Nonetheless, we really do need to discuss these issues with China, both bilaterally and multilaterally. It is also essential to develop a better understanding between European and Chinese societies, particularly through renewing contact between our populations — which was interrupted by Covid-19 and has yet to reach its full potential.

Beijing tells us that European and Chinese societies need to get to know each other better. Fair enough. But in order for this to happen, the obstacles to the free circulation of ideas and to the presence of Europeans in China for the purpose of understanding Chinese society must be removed: if China wants to improve the quality of its dialogue with Europe, it will have to be open and welcoming to Europeans. China and Europe cannot become alienated from each other. If this were to happen, misunderstandings could multiply and spread to other areas.

Beijing tells us that European and Chinese societies need to get to know each other better. Fair enough. But in order for this to happen, the obstacles to the free circulation of ideas and to the presence of Europeans in China for the purpose of understanding Chinese society must be removed.

Josep Borrell

You also place a great deal of emphasis on the issue of economic imbalances…

It is necessary. Economic and trade relations between the EU and China have become unbalanced. Our trade deficit is abysmal. This is not due to a lack of competitiveness on the Union’s part, but to China’s deliberate choices and policies to restrict access to its market. These are obstacles for Europeans, except in niches where China has only limited interest in developing national champions. EU–China relations are also imbalanced because in China, it is not the market but the State that is the pilot. What’s more, the Union’s strategic dependence upon certain products, which are embedded in finished goods imported from China, is very high — thereby increasing our vulnerabilities. Europe imports 98% of its rare earth materials from China. Overall, our vulnerability in relation to China is greater than that of the United States. If you look at the list of companies listed on the stock exchange, you’ll see that their revenues coming from China are twice as high in Europe compared to the United States: 8% in Europe versus 4% in the United States. Our trade exposure is also higher, especially for certain countries such as Germany.

But how can we mitigate these dependencies and vulnerabilities?

There is no magic bullet. But there is already a strong awareness of the problem, which began with Covid-19. This will require diversification of our supply chains, reconfiguration of our value chains, control of incoming and possibly outgoing investments — as well as the development of an anti–coercion instrument. We must also build closer ties with certain major Asian countries such as India, Japan and Korea, among others. But all this must be done in accordance with the rules, particularly those of the WTO. The multilateral system needs to be revitalized. It is not certain that Europe can feel completely at ease in a world structured around two disconnected technological ecosystems, both because the Union’s dependence on world markets is so great, and because the Union fundamentally believes in the value of open, integrated economies.

How do you see things from a strategic point of view this time?

Strategic security is the third pillar of EU-China relations. The two most sensitive issues affecting relations between us are Taiwan and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

As far as Taiwan is concerned, the Union’s position remains consistent and based on its “one China” policy. However, the situation in the Taiwan Strait is important for the Union, which is following it very closely, as it is strategic for trade, particularly European trade. Any unilateral change to the status quo or use of force could have far-reaching economic, political and security consequences. The EU must therefore engage with China to maintain the status quo ante and defuse tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Armed conflict is not inevitable.

As far as Taiwan is concerned, the Union’s position remains consistent and based on its “one China” policy. However, the situation in the Taiwan Strait is important for the Union, which is following it very closely, as it is strategic for trade, particularly European trade.

Josep Borrell

As far as Ukraine is concerned, our relationship will not develop if China does not push Putin’s Russia to withdraw from Ukraine. Faced with a conflict involving the territorial integrity and sovereignty of an independent nation whose borders are guaranteed by international law and the major powers, including China, any pretense of neutrality is tantamount to siding with the aggressor. This is a point I make and will continue to make to my Chinese counterparts at every opportunity. Furthermore, I think they are realistic enough to see the total impasse in which Putin’s Russia finds itself. And I cannot see them sacrificing their interests to save him. At least I hope not.