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A Conversation With Salomé Zourabichvili

The elections in Moldova were a test between a firm European anchor or the Russian sphere of influence. Georgia went through a similar process. What do you make of the result, and how does it resonate with your own experience?

It evokes a very direct comparison because we went through the same type of election just a year ago. We had the same high level of Russian interference in our elections, the same manipulations. Unfortunately, we didn’t have all the means to counter this interference or all the support that Moldova received, because by then everyone was already aware that this was ongoing.

In our case, I was even asked to demonstrate that there had been Russian interference — which would be funny, if it were funny. We were the first test case, as it often happens with Georgia, being Russia’s test case. In 2008, we were the test case for a new direct military aggression, which we later saw in Crimea and in Ukraine. Last year, we became the test case for how to win over a country not by taking territory, but by manipulating elections and installing a proxy government that does exactly what Russia wants.

Russia doesn’t need more territory to effectively control Georgia. Is that your point? 

Russia already occupies 20% of our territory with military bases. But there is something more perverse in the way Moscow operates now. The objective is not to capture the country territorially, but to capture the state. 

They are in the process of doing that.

We are still resisting, and we have a very resilient population. In a similar way as Ukrainians, who are fighting and resisting a militarily the aggression they have been subjected to for three and a half years, the Georgian population is resisting a non-military, but nonetheless hybrid, aggression. This is a new kind of war that Russia is testing against us, that it has tried to apply to Moldova, to Romania, and will certainly try again if we let it.

Ukraine President Zelensky echoed those words after the Moldovan vote. He insisted Europeans should not forget Georgia nor Belarus, because a Russian win is a loss for Europe. In the case of Georgia, did Europe simply not do enough? At such a pivotal moment for your country,  were you abandoned?

“Abandoned” is not the word I would use.

But indeed, the West did not do enough, and it did not see clearly what was happening.

Perhaps because we are a small country and further away geographically, we did not receive the type of attention that others did. We talked about Moldova, in their case, there was a much higher level of awareness about the implications of a pro-Russian victory.

At the time of our election, Ukraine was under direct military aggression, and the focus was on supporting Ukraine in their existential fight rather than on Georgia, which did not seem under such direct attack. I can understand that, but can only wish we had received more attention and more support because, as I mentioned, Russia is now looking to take over a state through other means. It cannot win militarily, so it is casting a different type of menace. But we shouldn’t blame others, we also have to look at ourselves.

What do you mean?

The Georgian opposition, the population, civil society, and myself as a representative of the Georgian people were not cautious enough during those elections.

There was a precedent with the so-called “Russian laws” that triggered massive protests in the streets of Tsibilisi, successfully pushing back against an executive power grab. People would take to the streets, time and time again and it mostly worked. That gave us a certain overconfidence that we would also win the elections. But that was only the start of the assault of the democratic foundations and independent institutions. 

We were not prepared for the new technologies that were used: call centers, cyber manipulation, and all sorts of political interference. NGOs, which usually act as watchdogs during elections, were themselves under pressure from the “Russian laws,” facing threats of fines and restrictions. These laws were presented as legislation to counter foreign interference, but it was a way of silencing internal opposition. This is the Soviet playbook.

The traditional safeguards of a democratic process were weakened by these actions to a level that we did not fully process ourselves, we were overconfident, and there was also a lack of direct involvement and attention from our partners.

All of that combined explains the result: we won the elections, but we didn’t have the means — in the courts and in the system — to prove and repel this situation.

When you say there was a lack of direct involvement from your partners, who and what are you referring to?

When I was under impeachment, a motion which ultimately did not go through because the Georgian Dream failed to reach a majority in parliament, I can’t say that I received the support from our European partners that they would usually deploy in such cases.

I believe it was a question of not seeing, not seeing with your own eyes the erosion of rule of law and the independent institutions of a country, which ultimately means eroding democracy itself. Today my appeal to our partners is: turn your attention to Georgia, do not forget. What is happening in Georgia will determine the future of many other countries, and ultimately of Europe itself.

We are the border, the front. 

Today, the democratic front is in Ukraine, where Ukrainians are fighting; it is in Belarus, in Moldova, and in Georgia. These are the countries defending democracy. Then comes the second frontline — Poland and the Baltic states — who understand this better and are supporting and fighting with us.

How do you break the pattern of election interference, which has affected multiple democratic processes from Moldova to Romania?

This is the battleground.

There will no longer be military wars of the type we have known, because Russia has understood that they are extremely costly and that it cannot win them. Knowing this, it is turning its efforts elsewhere. For Russia, this psychological warfare is almost natural — it was already practiced in Soviet times, and Vladimir Putin is an expert in it. It’s about creating chaos, eroding trust, spreading paranoia and diminishing faith in democracy largely using social media and disinformation. 

There is a real operation. 

I fully understand and support the need for rearmament and for building a common defence policy, but the security of Europe tomorrow will depend just as much on a common policy for countering cyberattacks, countering election manipulation, and improving election observation. 

This is a task the Union should undertake collectively, together with NATO. Cyberattacks are already a threat and a real issue. We experienced them in Georgia, and most countries have faced them and will face more. When we talk about drones flying over Poland or naval incidents in the Baltic Sea, all of that is psychological warfare. It is not the case that tomorrow the Russians will bomb Warsaw, but they are playing with populations, manipulating psychology, seeking to disturb and influence through fear and internet warfare. 

You argue Russia doesn’t need to take over a country militarily, because it can take over a state from within. How? 

By undermining state institutions, you destroy the state itself. In Georgia today, the state is being eroded from inside and outside at once. Institutions exist only in name; they are no longer independent. This has been a slow but steady process ongoing for two or three years. We no longer have a truly independent judiciary — our courts, including the Constitutional Court, are completely dependent. Our justice system, which was far from perfect but was reforming itself, has stopped. Our central bank is no longer independent; it is in the hands of the ruling party, and so on.

Georgia exists on paper as an independent state, but all the foundations that make up an independent state are being eroded by this ruling party, applying Russian methods.

What comes next for Georgia, is the damage irreparable? 

It can be repaired as long as civil society remains active and people do not leave the country. 

That is one of the reasons why I am in Georgia and why I will remain in Georgia — because it is very important that young people, especially, do not give up and decide to seek their future only in Europe. 

We also still have parts of the administration that have not been politicized or purged. Before this assault began, our administration functioned quite well. We still have most of the abilities needed to return to the previous situation. But we must resist.

We are also seeing cracks within the regime itself, because nothing is as solid as it appears. These regimes are never quite as stable as they make it out to be. There is a large factor of outside projection, but the situation is more nuanced. 

How so? 

There are internal battles. 

Like in Russia, they have relied on criminals to push their political ambitions, but in Georgia they are less solid and less organized than in Russia. 

There is a high level of paranoia among the top leadership of the ruling party. We are in a time competition: who will resist longer, and who will eventually be forced to resign first? For now, society continues to protest and shows that it has resources and will not defer under repression.

On Thursday, the European Political Community will meet in Copenhagen. One of the main points of debate for the leaders gathering will be enlargement. Georgia aspired to join the Union, and that was your personal aspiration as well. But, under the current political context, is the path over for Georgia? 

It is not the end of the road. 

Saying so would mean condemning a population that is still fighting. It would be an error. As long as people continue to resist and to show their desire for Europe — and they have taken many risks to do so — the door must remain open. 

But that same door should be firmly closed — much more than it is now — to those responsible for Georgia’s derailment in the accession process. 

Allow me to elaborate: a clear distinction must be made between the population and the illegitimate leaders who currently take decisions. 

These people have not truly been elected; most of them were appointed. They should be fully delegitimized, and European elites should be less afraid to say openly: we do not deal with you. In practice, they do it, but they do not state it clearly.

Should the European leadership be more clear in their condemnation?

It should be clear: if you behave in that way and harm your country as you are doing, we cannot deal with you. But we can, and must, continue to recognize and engage with civil society, even if concrete means are limited. In practice, as I mentioned, the European leadership is not engaging with the regime, but it should say so clearly in public: we do not recognise what you do. 

In practice, however, it is very difficult to separate the people from the government. What makes you confident that the Union will not give up on Georgia’s European path, when talks are de facto suspended? 

Fortunately, the EU does not take such decisions so quickly, and in that sense we are lucky. 

Again, conclusions should not be drawn from the actions of an illegitimate government that has only been in place for a few years. Georgia has thirty years of striving for progress, and it has made enormous progress. We were frontrunners. 

I myself invited the trio of associated countries to Georgia in 2021, together with the then European Council President Charles Michel. At that time, Georgia was certain it would be first among the candidate countries and our goal was to take Ukraine and Moldova with us. Clearly, now that is not possible, but nothing is ever definitive. 

Enlargement is a process in which Georgia and the Georgian people have already taken huge steps, and the future also holds important steps. Those working for Russia should not be allowed to block the future of the Georgian people. That would be an immense error for Europe and a victory for Russia. 

Viktor Orbán argued that the leaders of Georgian Dream are not Russian agents, congratulated them after the disputed election and even said Georgia had avoided becoming a “second Ukraine”.  Do you regard that as interference and  were you surprised his words did not raise condemnation from the rest of the European leadership? 

Viktor Orbán did what he wanted to do, and what he does or says does not interest me very much. 

But what I would say is that the European Union should have been more vocal about condemning the way this election was hijacked and power usurped. Orbán is not the only one who can talk and make statements, Europe can too. And they should have been more definitive and firm. 

Imagine if the results of the elections in Moldova had been different — I am sure the European Union  would have issued a strong statement saying it was the result of Moscow’s direct interference. 

We should have had the same statement after the Georgian elections. But that did not happen. I don’t want to dwell on what happened. What is done is done. And what matters now is that we stay focused, keep the attention on Georgia and prepare for the future. But we should take the lessons. 

Lastly, has the US administration under President Trump shown any interest in mediating, do you still see a path to engage with the administration or have contacts stopped? 

Georgia is very important for the United States. 

The definition of importance, which we know is very specific when it comes to President Trump, is based on concrete economic and strategic interests. We should speak in those terms. 

Georgia controls routes towards Central Asia, which are vital for the US economy and shares control of the Black Sea shores together with Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania. 

When you look at the region geographically, you can perfectly understand what is at stake for Russia and why it seeks to maintain and enlarge its influence. The investments the United States has made in Georgia over the past 30 years were not made just for our sake, or me, or just simply because of good faith, they were made because Georgia matters strategically. They reflected US interests, and those interests have not disappeared. So to answer your question, I see the door to the administration very much open.