Géopolitique, Réseau, Énergie, Environnement, Nature
Climate Justice in Europe in Light of The Green Deal
Issue #3
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Issue

Issue #3

Authors

Marta Torre-Schaub

GREEN is published by Groupe d'études géopolitiques, with the support of the Fondation de l'École normale supérieure

After Cop 27: Geopolitics of the Green Deal

Introduction

On 4 March 2020, the European Commission presented a proposal aimed at making several improvements to legislative policies on climate change. The proposal contains a set of elements which form what is known as the “European Green Deal”. 1 As a transitional step towards climate neutrality, the EU increased its climate ambitions for 2030 committing to reducing emissions by 55% by then. As part of the “Fit for 55” package, the European Union is currently working on revising its climate, energy, and transport legislation to bring it in line with the ambitions set for both 2030 and 2050. A number of new initiatives are also included in the package.

While the target of a 55% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 is intended to be binding and will have to be adopted by Member States — once the Union has structured it as a legally binding form — it is still under negotiation following the ordinary legislative procedure of Union law. In fact, the Fit for 55 package was presented to the Council in July 2021 and is currently being discussed in several policy areas such as environment, energy, transport, and economic and financial affairs.

A deal for a more ‘just’ society

On 11 December 2019, the European Commission made public the Deal’s full set of measures, thereby establishing it as the framework for all new legislation proposed by the European Union: eliminating net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050; setting up a “just transition” mechanism to support all regions in the ecological transition, especially those dependent on fossil fuels; establishing European climate law; promoting economic growth through the efficient use of resources by moving to a clean and circular economy. All economic sectors are concerned: transport, energy, construction, agriculture, environment, transportation, industry, sustainable finance; massive investments, a carbon tax at the EU borders, protection and promotion of biodiversity; societies where each citizen finds a place.

Although the package has been named the ‘Climate law’, it is at present a set of proposals containing a diverse and ambitious set of measures that would complement existing climate and energy packages, the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading schemes, and a number of tools aimed at significantly reducing GHG emissions. It would also complement social and economic mechanisms aimed at making the European system more ‘resilient’ and more just in terms of climate change impacts.

A mechanism to strengthen the European climate agenda and achieve ‘climate justice’

The package’s main objective is to ensure that the European Union commits to achieving climate neutrality by 2050. This commitment is based on European communications about the Green Deal. 2 Once adopted, it became the main tool for including climate neutrality and sustainable growth objectives into European climate legislation. 3  

The ‘Fit for 55′ package is a set of proposals to revise and update EU legislation and put in place new initiatives to ensure that EU policies are consistent with the climate objectives agreed by the Council and the European Parliament.

Other than the question of the proposed mechanism’s effectiveness and feasibility — which we will not analyze here — it is interesting to consider what the Green Deal could change in terms of climate justice. 4 What is meant here is that there is a dual sense of climate justice. First of all, it is a question of designing a European legislative system that takes into account the equity between Member States, equitable burden sharing in terms of the fight against climate change, as well as taking into account the different economic, social, political and legal vulnerabilities of different states.

The second aspect of climate justice that will be of particular interest to us is the aspect of access to justice (understood as the courtroom) by civil society in Europe, thereby asserting their fundamental and human rights before the courts in the face of adverse effects of climate change. Climate justice in this sense also refers to the set of legal proceedings brought by civil society to pressure states to honor the GHG emission reduction targets they have committed to, both through the ratification of the Paris Agreement and through their commitments under European law.

This makes it worth considering whether the Green Deal — which entails a ambitious timetable for achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 for the entire European Union, as well as for states individually — will have an influence on climate justice. 5 Conversely, this article will explore whether the climate justice movement, as it has been developing in Europe since 2015, will be able to improve existing European mechanisms and advance the goal of carbon neutrality. 6

This article raises the question of the interactions between the proposed Green Deal and climate justice, in both the broad sense and, above all, in the sense of court action combined with civil society initiatives. In this sense, what will be of interest in these pages is to know whether ‘climate justice’ — understood as actions and lawsuits that give a ‘boost’ to achieving the targets set by the Paris Agreement — will be modified or improved in the European framework modified by the new Climate Package.

Because the European Union (EU) legal system operates with inflexible rules, especially regarding access to justice (the General Court and EU Court of Justice), I will also analyze the obstacles to climate justice that may persist at the procedural and substantive legal levels. However, in order to give a complete picture of the issue, I will also present the promising work of national courts in the field of climate justice, which may in the medium term influence the functioning of the ECJ itself.

To conclude the presentation of the following pages, it is interesting to take an ‘aside’ and ask whether and how the two systems of European law — that of the EU and that of the Council of Europe — interact in climate matters. It is also interesting in this sense to not overlook the work of developing the jurisprudence of a nascent climate justice, which is carried out by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in its interpretation of EU law as well as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 7 Indeed, several appeals are currently pending before the ECtHR concerning climate justice. Given that the two European legal systems are not completely isolated, it is likely that the one will have an influence on the other. Finally, these various appeals will in turn have a definite influence on the law of member states. All these elements are therefore inseparable from the study of the relationship between the Green Deal and climate justice in Europe.

I. The European Green Deal and climate justice

The Deal, which is now a set of proposals to ‘adjust European law to meet the 55% target by 2050’, is rich in content and ambition. It aims to realign existing climate, energy, and transport legislation, while giving it a more ‘just’ approach. It presents a number of central issues and legislative priorities. 8  

First of all, and from a purely legislative point of view, the proposal attempts to overcome three challenges that international environmental treaties often confront:

  • First, the matter of whether all States will participate in the process implemented by the regulation.
  • Second incorporating the functions of international organizations in legislative forms.
  • And as a third issue, the proposal wants to ensure the cooperation of all parties. 9 10

These three elements — participation, integration, cooperation — are already a major step towards climate justice.

In terms of content and purpose, it is worth recalling that the main, binding long-term goal is no net emissions in the European Union until the year 2050 (General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 2021). Another binding target is a 55% reduction in greenhouse gas (other GHG) emissions in the European Union by 2030 compared to 1990 emissions levels (General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 2021). This is known as ’55 for 50′.

In accordance with the binding mechanism, each member state will have to prepare a national energy and climate plan in which all the objectives of the European climate law will have to be adhered to. Consequently, the proposal’s requirements, which will become a directive or a set of directives, i.e., a series of regulations, would have to be directly integrated into each EU country’s national plans (General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 2021).

If the Deal were to become a set of directives, the matter would still take several years to be incorporated into national law by each member state. However, given the fact that many countries already have fairly advanced “climate laws” that are consistent with the objectives of the Paris Agreement and EU regulations, this should not be a major problem. The only question raised in this scenario is that of obligation: as long as there is no national law in each State incorporating the new directive(s) resulting from the Green Deal proposal, are the Member States bound by the ‘Fit for 55? The answer is clearly yes, because the directive or directives resulting from the Green Deal are binding from the moment of their announcement. The time given each State to “adapt” their law to the new European measures is not the time frame that will determine the level of obligation, but the time given for national legislation to develop national implementation measures.

We are therefore in a ‘process’ of updating existing law and adjusting it to a new, more ambitious target. This ‘process’ will have a ‘cascading’ or ‘interlocking’ effect: first, the relevant provisions of Union law will be reviewed and modified if necessary, by adopting a classic legislative form of European law, so that it can be given the appropriate legal form and become binding legislation. It will then be the turn of member states’ laws, which will have to do the same and update their normative and legislative provisions containing emissions reduction targets in order to adapt them to the European ’55to 50′ objective. On paper, it could not be simpler.

Should the Deal become one or more regulations, the issue would be even more simply resolved. This is because an EU regulation does not need to be incorporated into national law. There is therefore no deadline for States to immediately adopt the European regulation(s). In this case, the regulations will be directly enforceable before the national courts of each member state and will become binding for both national and European public administrations, which will have to promptly ‘implement’ the targets of the ’55 to 50′ regulation(s) in their internal policies.

The difference between this and the previous scenario is significant. In the first case, that of a directive, the deadline would in a way be ‘postponed’, until all the member states had reached the end of the time allowed for incorporation into their respective laws. In a way, this would delay the adjustment process. In this scenario, the ’55 to 50′ target would be shortened and it would be even more difficult to achieve because there would be even less time for transition. The conditions for a just transition could be lessened, or even end up in jeopardy.

In the second scenario the adjustment of the ’50 to 50′ target is accomplished through regulation. In this case, the target becomes immediately binding and must be applied directly and immediately by States. The ‘just’ transition would require a little more time. We would gain at least 4 or 5 years to better adapt to the new limits by 2050. Our lifestyles, our energy consumption, the use of sustainable transport, and our climate policies would be able to ‘readjust’ in a more calm and serene manner because we would have a bit more time.

In the end, the ‘just’ transition and ‘climate justice’ will largely depend on the legal form that the package will take. To some extent, ‘the ball is in the court of the EU institutions’ and our future rests on these discussions.

II. Climate justice improved through the Green Deal

The European Commission is seeking to strike a balance between legislation and the national policies of member states in order to make them inclusive and open to ideas and discussions from all sectors so as to achieve the common goal of climate neutrality.

Through implementation of the transition, the Green Deal is expected to have a positive effect on many areas, such as energy security, equity, and solidarity of European member states’ economies, as well as education and training programs.

The proposal also draws on the principle of sustainable development by establishing climate neutrality for all sectors.

Another important point is the responsible contribution of all European Union member states to implementing the Paris Agreement’s climate change targets 11 , based on the principles of precaution, ‘polluter pays’, ‘priority to energy efficiency’, ‘transparency’ and the ‘no-harm’ principle. 12 All these principles are clearly present in climate justice, which emerged as a concept in the 2000s in Latin America around the NGO movement that promoted this doctrine, and which also appears in the preamble to the Paris Agreement, referring to the “ability of all to contribute to the fight against climate change”. 13 Similarly, when it comes to protecting minorities and different vulnerable populations in the face of climate change, the Green Deal envisions linking climate policies to social and energy policies.

The only negative factor is that since the conflict between Russia and Ukraine began, energy prices have spiraled out of control and out of proportion to the purchasing power of European citizens, with both poverty and energy insecurity on the rise. Faced with these exceptional circumstances, the Green Deal will have to demonstrate flexibility or else exceptional measures will have to be taken while awaiting the more generalized deployment of non-fossil fuels in Europe.

III. Towards greater or limited climate justice?

Two factors could constrain the rapid advancement of climate justice. One is the nature of the climate package (A) and the other is the existing procedural system of justice before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) (B).

Is the new climate legislation ”justice-able” in nature?

The first factor is that the so-called ‘European climate law’ seems to be too ambitious in relation to its legal basis, thereby limiting it before it can even be implemented.

In fact, for the time being, it does not include binding measures for individual countries. In the event that a member state decides to pursue policies that are inconsistent with the climate neutrality targets, the European proposal does not provide for any sanctions, except that it become a directive or regulation as soon as possible.

In the meantime, a regular evaluation of implemented national measures will be carried out. Also, additional recommendations will be provided in case of non-compliance with the major targets. 14 In this sense, the ‘European climate law’ can be described as a structure or framework treaty similar to other international treaties such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change or the Paris Agreement. The Green Deal primarily offers guidelines for member states and other stakeholders to follow in order to implement climate neutrality targets, though it does not yet include binding measures. 15 However, the proposal will eventually be broken down into several binding texts, which, as mentioned earlier, will be either directly applicable or transposable and therefore also invocable before national and European courts. 16

It is precisely this last point that could also pose a problem for climate justice in its ‘judicial’ aspect.

Is the European justice system suited to ‘climate justice’?

The answer deserves some thought because it is not simple. There are several possible scenarios to consider.

The first is that private individuals may cite European legislation before the ECJ. In this regard, and given the rather disappointing result of the ‘climate people’s’ Carvalho v. European Commission case, the ECJ will adhere to its ‘Plauman’ 17 jurisprudential doctrine and will not accept — in line with what has already been decided on many occasions — a petition directly from citizens. 18 In fact, the ECJ’s procedural doctrine is currently such that it does not accept petitions filed directly by citizens because it does not recognize their legal interests, and only accepts petitions from States.

If this doctrine were to be relaxed, climate justice cases would undoubtedly be brought before EU courts in the years to come. This is due not only to the fact that the new legislative package establishing the Green Deal will give citizens a strong case for claiming before the ECJ that the Green Deal should be implemented by member states, but also to the fact that the Commission itself will be able to bring cases before the ECJ against member states for failing to adopt or comply with climate legislation. Even if the climate legislation package is not yet binding, it will be binding the moment it is turned into a regulation or a directive. Moreover, even if the package itself does not contain any sanctions, the fact that it contains requirements that climate policies and neutrality objectives be reassessed as part of the 55 to 50 package is already likely to be brought before the ECJ.

IV. Climate justice strengthened through connections between European and human rights

Although EU law remains an independent and separate legal system from that arising from the Council of Europe, both are subject to mutual influences and confluences.

For example, the EU is a member of the Council of Europe, which therefore implies that the EU is subject to the European Convention on Human Rights. In addition, most EU member states have agreed to the European Convention on Human Rights. This means, again, that the law of the European Convention on Human Rights applies to them. What effect can this have on climate justice within the EU? 19  

The well-known Urgenda case, 20 consisting of three court decisions in the Netherlands is a prime example of this crucial, evolving point. 21 In 2014, the Urgenda Foundation, together with nearly 900 citizens, filed an appeal with the Court of First Instance in The Hague. On June 24, 2015, the court handed down a decision that was unanimously described as historic, because it recognized the responsibility of the Dutch state for its lack of ambitious climate action, and also gave normative value to international, European, and — by extension — Dutch climate law. The court ruled that the Dutch government 22 had to take the necessary steps to bring its climate policy into line with reduction targets set by European law and that the Netherlands, as a “leading” and developed country, had to fulfil its duty of care towards citizens and prevent the damage and risks that unambitious climate legislation could cause to the population.

In this appeal, the plaintiffs also pointed out that the Dutch government had violated articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights by not acting ambitiously to prevent increased CO2 emissions. By failing to act, the State violated its ‘positive obligations’ under the European Convention on Human Rights and failed to protect Dutch citizens’ human right to life (article 2 ECHR) and their right to private and family life (article 8 ECHR). The court of first instance in The Hague did not wish to rule on this point.

The Dutch government had appealed to the Court of Appeal in The Hague and the latter and, on October 9, 2018, 23 the court once again ruled in favor of the Urgenda Foundation and the plaintiffs, faulting the government once more for its weak climate policy. The appeal decision acknowledges the violation of Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This appeals decision is therefore pioneering in Europe in this respect: it is the first time that a national court has ruled on the applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights to climate justice.

The Dutch State submitted a cassation appeal to the Court of Cassation in The Hague, which again ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and dismissed the State’ claim. The ruling from December 20, 2019 upholds that articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights were violated. 24

During the same period, a coalition of NGOs and citizens from various member states filed an appeal for climate justice, claiming that their fundamental rights (to life, to property, to culture, to freedom of trade) had been violated. The ECJ dismissed this appeal on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not have any legal standing before the Court, and that only States could file an action.

Two types of climate justice are therefore being implemented in Europe. One is on the side of the European Court of Human Rights, which has a broad and flexible interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights on the rights to life and to private and family life, and recognizes that government inaction can violate these rights. 25 In this respect, six petitions are currently before the ECHR concerning climate justice: 26 a Swiss petition regarding climate vulnerability; a Portuguese petition, for violation of the right to life and to equal opportunities; a Norwegian petition, for violation of the right to life and to private and family life; and a French petition based on the same arguments. The French petition, presented on behalf of Mr. Damien Carême, former mayor of the municipality of Grande Synthe, follows decisions concerning climate justice handed down by the Conseil d’Etat in 2020 and 2022, in which the latter, while finding that the French State has binding CO2 emission reduction targets, and while recognizing the delay in its climate policies, nevertheless dismissed the petition filed on behalf of Mr. Carême as a potential victim vulnerable to the negative effects of climate change. As a result, in May 2022, Mr. Carême submitted a petition to the ECHR, which will soon have to rule on the issue. 27

The other climate justice that is being implemented in Europe is the one before the CJEC. But, as explained earlier, climate appeals before the EU justice system are not moving in the desired direction. The procedural obstacles are still high and the CJEC’s doctrine in this respect is not very flexible. However, with the adoption of the Green Deal measures, this is expected to change. If the climate package soon becomes applicable to all Member States, and if the Fit for 55 targets become ‘hard law’, and are binding, it is very likely that enforceability will further develop; governments will have to adopt these measures and then comply with them. This will have implications for the way litigation develops at the European level.

Not only will appeals to EU bodies increase, but climate appeals before national and member state courts will grow exponentially.

V. Climate justice strengthened by the Green Deal in Europe and member states

Since 2015, following the first Urgenda decision mentioned earlier, the judicial aspect of climate justice has been developing at a rapid pace. 28

The last IPCC report of 2022 29 refers to this by explaining that climate appeals are a new element in climate governance and that thanks to them, governments are obligated to improve their climate policies and also, thanks to these appeals, States are tending to clarify their GHG reduction targets by adopting more ambitious climate laws. 30 The IPCC has therefore dedicated long passages extensively praising the beneficial effects of climate justice.

The fact remains that while the phenomenon is now global, climate justice structured and delivered in this way remains at a national level. It consists of legal actions brought before national jurisdictions so that domestic judges can render decisions that are largely based on each country’s national law. International climate law, and in particular the Paris Agreement, forms a basis for these appeals. In Europe, EU law is also cited as a source of obligations for States. Laws resulting from the European Convention on Human Rights have so far had limited success, but they can also be cited. However, it will be the national laws of the country where the climate trial takes place that will apply and be interpreted mainly by domestic judges.

This is why it is important that within the EU, each member state has robust climate law which is also common to all member states, which is infused by European law itself, and which can eventually serve as a model for other regions of the world.

 Let us therefore stick to the idea that the stronger and more binding European law is, the more obligations it imposes, and which must be adopted and applied by member states, the more they will be obligated to apply it. Similarly, the more demanding European law becomes towards member states so that they quickly adapt their national laws to the new Fit for 55 reduction targets, the more national laws will include these reduction rules that can be enforced before a judge.

Therefore, the more understandable, binding, feasible, and ambitious European climate law is, the more that national law in member states will be in the image and likeness of EU law.

 These new national climate laws could be cited before a national judge, who would then be required to apply and rule on them. Climate justice will therefore be strengthened by EU law and, in turn, national law.

There would therefore be no need to file an appeal directly with the CJEC because member states would be subject to European law as enacted into national law. But even if someone wants to file a climate appeal with the CJEC, this will be even more possible once the climate package has been fully integrated into national law. If member states do not adopt the package, individuals will be able to demand that the Commission force a member state to adopt it. Through this, which is still somewhat limited and indirect, climate justice can be further developed within the EU.

Conclusion 

Climate justice is being implemented in Europe faster than we could have thought 3 years ago. The Green Deal will most certainly give this movement a boost and encourage its development. It would, however, be preferable for the CJEC to be more flexible in its procedural rules and more readily accept citizen appeals. After all, climate justice is characterized by ‘access to justice’, and this access must therefore be open, without discrimination and without obstacles, to all of civil society. The new climate package also poses the challenge of ‘allowing for the construction of a society where everyone finds their place’. It is time for EU institutions to get to work and modify their doctrines concerning access to justice in order to better implement these new provisions. By doing so, Europe will not only become the home of a new model of climate legislation but also of a new democratic model that is more just and closer to citizens.

Notes

  1. Commission européenne 2020, Proposal for a Regulation of The European Parliament and of The Council establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law). COM/2020/80 final.
  2. Sikora, A. (2021). European Green Deal – legal and financial challenges of the climate change. ERA Forum, 21(4), 681–697.
  3. Dröge, S., Schrader, T.-S., & Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik. (2021). Back to the future?: International climate policy in 2021: New constellations for the EU’s climate diplomacy. SWP Comment.
  4. C. Larrère, « La justice climatique dans l’Accord de Paris », in M. Torre-Schaub (dir.), Bilan et Perspectives de l’Accord de Paris, IRJS éd, 2017.
  5. Mary Robinson Foundation for Climate Justice, “Principles of Climate Justice” 2017.
  6. Mary Robinson Foundation for Climate Justice, “Principles of Climate Justice” 2017.
  7. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, more commonly known as the European Convention on Human Rights, was first opened for signature in Rome on 4 November 1950 and entered into force on 3 September 1953. It was the first instrument to give concrete form and binding force to some of the rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the original system, three institutions were responsible for enforcing the commitments made by the contracting states: the European Commission of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. All applications under the Convention, by individual applicants and by Contracting States, were subject to a preliminary examination by the Commission, which decided on their admissibility. If a complaint was declared admissible, and if a friendly settlement could not be reached, the Commission drew up a report in which it established the facts and formulated a non-binding opinion on the merits of the case. The Commission and/or the government of an interested State could then refer the case to the Court for a final and binding judgment. If the case was not referred to the Court, it was the Committee of Ministers that decided. Since its adoption in 1950, the Convention has been amended several times and many rights have been added to the original text.
  8. Council of the European Union General Secretariat. (2021). Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law) Letter to the Chair of the European Parliament Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI). ST 8440 2021 INIT. Principles of International Environmental Law. Cambridge University Press.
  9. Ibid note 1.
  10. Ibid note 2.
  11. Council of the European Union General Secretariat. (2021). Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law) Letter to the Chair of the European Parliament Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI). ST 8440 2021 INIT.
  12. General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 2021.
  13. M. Torre-Schaub et S. Lavorel, Justice climatique. Pour une nouvelle gouvernance du climat plus juste’, Paris, éd Léopold Mayer, in the process of publication. The concept of “climate justice” comes from the recognition that climate change has and will have environmental and social impacts that will not affect everyone equally. Studies on vulnerability to climate change, such as those conducted by the Tyndall Center for Climate Change Research, have found that the countries most affected by global warming and where its consequences will be felt most intensely (desertification, droughts, floods and other extreme weather events) will be developing countries, which have worse starting conditions and fewer resources to adapt to these new situations. The idea of climate justice is to promote a just transition to a sustainable, fossil-free future that protects the most vulnerable people and countries from the impacts of climate change. In 2004, the Durban Climate Justice Group was established at the international meeting in Durban, South Africa. There, representatives of NGOs and grassroots movements discussed realistic policies to address climate change. At the Bali conference in 2007, the global coalition Climate Justice Now was founded, and in 2008, at the inaugural meeting in Geneva, the Global Humanitarian Forum focused on climate justice; “Durban Group for Climate Justice”. Transnational Institute 6 July 2009; The Global Humanitarian Forum Annual Meeting 2008.
  14. Ibid note 8.
  15. Sands, P., Peel, J., Fabra, A., & MacKenzie, R. (2018). Principles of International Environmental Law. Cambridge University Press. 
  16. O. Fontan, « Le caractère contraignant des obligations climatiques », Revue Energie, environnement, Infrastructures, March 2021, §10 ; Paris Agreement; A.-J. J. Saiger, « Domestic Courts and the Paris Agreement: the need for a comparative approach », Transnational Environmental Review 2019, p.p. 1-18.
  17. Affaire C-25/62 Plaumann c. Commission.
  18. Armando Ferrão Carvalho et Al c. European Parliament and the Council, EU Court of First Instance, 22 May 2019. ; M. Pagano, « Climate Change before Courts and the butterfly effect », Blog de droit européen 16 octobre 2019; M. Torre-Schaub, « La justice climatique en Europe : bilan et perspective d’avenir», Blog de droit européen, 15 January 2020.
  19. M. Torre-Schaub, « la protection de l’air et de l’atmosphère. Focus sur la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Quelles potentialités pour la lutte contre le changement climatique » Blog de ClimaLex, 30 May 2022 ; . Kobylarz, « Derniers développements sur la question environnementale et climatique au sein des différents Organes du Conseil de l’Europe », RIDC, 1, 2022, p.p. 59-69 in dossier spécial Climat et droits de l’homme, Regards croisés et comparés, M. Torre-Schaub et C. Le Bris (dir.). ; Bentirou Mathlouthi, R. Le droit à un environnement sain en droit européen. Dynamique normative et mise en œuvre jurisprudentielle, L’Harmattan, 2020 ; Fontaine A. , La jurisprudence pro-environnementale de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Mémoire de M2, Université Paris 13, Sorbonne Université, 2010-2011 ; Madelaine C., La technique des obligations positives en droit de la Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme, Dalloz, Nouvelle collection de Thèses, 2014.
  20. Urgenda Fondation c. the Netherlans, Rechtbank Den Haag.
  21. M. Torre-Schaub et A. Michelot, ‘Justice climatique’ in M. Torre-Schaub, A. Jezequel et al. (dir.) Dictionnaire Juridique du changement climatique, Paris, Mare & Martin, 2022.
  22. J. Lin, The First Successful Climate Negligence Case: A Comment on Urgenda Foundation v. the State of the Netherlands, 5 Climate L. 65-81 (2015) ; J. K. De Graaf & J. H. Jans, The Urgenda Decision: Netherlands Liable for Role in Causing Dangerous Global Climate Change, 27(3) J. of Env’t L. 517–527 (2015); J. Van Zeben, Establishing a Governmental Duty of Care for Climate Change Mitigation: Will Urgenda Turn the Tide?, 4 Transnat’l Env’t L. 339–357 (2015) ; R. Cox, A Climate Change Litigation Precedent: Urgenda Foundation v. the State of the Netherlands, 34 J. Energy & Nat. Res. L. 143–163 (2016) ; Conference Report: Samvel Varvaštian, Climate Change Litigation, Liability and Global Climate Governance – Can Judicial Policy-making Become a Game-changer?, Berlin Conference: Transformative Global Climate Governance après Paris (2016) ; M. Torre-Schaub, Climate Justice. Regarding the Judgment of the District Court of The Hague of June 24, 2015], 68(3) Revue Internationale de droit compare 672–693, 2016.
  23. The Netherlands c. Urgenda 9 oct 2018, The Hague Court of Appeal.
  24. Procesinleiding vorderingsprocedure hoge raad 2019.
  25. F. Tulkens, « La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et les procès climatiques », RIDC, 1, 2022, p. 74 et s. ; N. Kobylarz, « Derniers développements sur la question environnementale et climatique au sein des différents Organes du Conseil de l’Europe », RIDC, 1, 2022, p.p. 66 et s.; H. Keller et C. Heri, The future is now. Climate cases before the ECtHR , Nordic Journal of Human Rights, 2022, 2, p.p. 15.
  26. N. Kobylarz presents the pending cases in his quoted article : Duarte Agostinho et autres c. le Portugal et 32 autres États, no. 39371/20 ; Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz et autres c. la Suisse, 53600/20 ; Uricchio c. Italie et 32 autres États, 14615/21 ; De Conto c. Italie et 32 autres États 14620/21 ; Müllner c. Autriche, 18859/21 ; The Norwegian Grandparents’ Climate Campaign et Autres c. Norvège, 19026/21 ; Greenpeace Nordic et Autres c. Norvège, 34068/21 et Carême c. France, 7189/21 ; Voir aussi sur ce sujet, F. Tulkens, « La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et les procès climatiques », RIDC, 1, 2022, p.p. 71-76, in dossier spécial Climat et droits de l’homme : Regards croisés et comparés, cit. ; N. Kobylarz, Balancing its way out of strong anthropocentrism : integration of ecological minimum standards in the European Court of Human Rights fair balance review, Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, 2022, p.p. 1-61, cit. ; M. Feria-Tinta, Climate Change Litigation in the European Court of Human Rights : causation, Imminence and other Key underlying notions, Europe of Rights & Liberties, 2021, p.p. 51-71 ; H. Keller et C. Heri, The future is now. Climate cases before the ECtHR », Nordic Journal of Human Rights, 2022 ; M. Torre-Schaub, The future of european climate litigation, Verfassung Blog, 10 août 2022 ; M. Torre-Schaub, La protection de l’air et de l’atmosphère en Europe. Focus sur la Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme. Quelles potentialités pour la lutte contre le changement climatique?, Blog de ClimaLex, 30 May 2022.
  27. M. Torre-Schaub, The future of european climate litigation, Verfassung Blog, 10 août 2022 ; Commune de Grande Synthe et autre CE, section du contentieux, 6ème et 5ème chambres réunies, Novembre 19th 2020 n° 427301 et Conseil d’Etat N° 427301 ECLI:FR:CECHR:2021:427301.20210701.
  28. M. Torre-Schaub, Dynamics, prospects and trends in Climate Change litigation. Making Climate Change emergency a priority in France, German Law Review, 2021, vol 16, n° 22, 02, p.p. 172-190. ; C. Voigt, Climate Change Litigation and International Governance, in Climate Change Litigation: A Handbook 2–19 Wolfgang Kahl & Marc-Philippe Weller eds., 2021 ; M. Torre-Schaub, Climate Change Litigation in France, in Climate Change Litigation: Global Perspectives 124 (Ivano Alogna ed., 2021) ; M. Torre-Schaub & B. Lormeteau, Legal Aspects of Climate Change: From Climate Governance to Climate Justice, 39 La Semaine Juridique 1674, pt. 1–2 (2019).
  29. 6th 2022 IPCC Report.
  30. 6th 2022 IPCC Report ; M. Torre-Schaub, Le droit à l’honneur dans le dernier rapport du GIEC, JCP G, 2 May 2022, n° 17, Aperçu rapide 545.