Politics In The Shadow of the Russian Threat: Understanding Elections in the Baltic Nations

Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the three Baltic states have gained a new central role in debates around the Union’s security and defense. Affected by high inflation and growing security threats, they are also experiencing a period of turbulent domestic politics. Consequently, the Estonian, Lithuanian, and Latvian leaders are facing contradictory trends at the national and European levels: on the one hand, the parties in power are, for the most part, facing trouble in the polls; on the other hand, several members of current political majorities will be playing a key role in the next European legislature — from the Latvian Vice-President of the Commission, Valdis Dombrovskis, to the Estonian prime minister, Kaja Kallas.

To analyze these current trends in Baltic politics and how they tie into with European politics as a whole, we spoke with Piret Ehin (University of Tartu), Jānis Ikstens (University of Latvia), and Ainė Ramonaitė (Vilnius University).

This discussion was first conducted as part of our electoral podcast “Decoding 2024.” You can find our audio episode on Spotify here.

On Sunday, May 12, 2024, outgoing Lithuanian President, Gitanas Nausėda, came in first in the first round of the presidential election with 44% of votes. He beat the second-place candidate, outgoing center-right Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė, by a wide margin. Nausėda’s victory seems almost certain even before the second round took place — an exceptional feat at a moment when Europe is facing growing mistrust of the political class. What is the secret of his popularity?

Ainė Ramonaitė

In the period between the two rounds, Nausėda’s chances of losing this election seemed largely hypothetical. This would have required very low turnout among her electorate, which her campaign team worked hard to motivate. Moreover, the gap between Nausėda and Šimonytė appeared too wide to envisage any other outcome, especially as the votes of the other candidates, with the possible exception of Dainius Žalimas, were expected to be overwhelmingly in favor of the incumbent.

Gitanas Nausėda offers a profile that appeals to the average Latvian voter. He is very centrist, fairly conservative or liberal-conservative on the social front, and a little to the left on the economic front. He has a clear, pro-Ukraine stance on issues relating to the conflict with Russia. His positions are therefore quite in line with those of the population. Moreover, Nausėda has always campaigned as an independent candidate, which is generally well regarded by the population.

Did other first-round candidates stand out?

The third, fourth and fifth candidates are, more or less, newcomers to politics. Ignas Vėgėlė (right-wing) has not held political office in the past, nor has Eduardas Vaitkus (right-wing conspiracy theorist, pro-Kremlin). As for Remigijus Žemaitaitis (right-wing nationalist), although he was a member of parliament in the past, he recently formed a new party. This election was a sort of preparation for the parliamentary election in October [which were won by the Social Democrats, editor’s note]. In this context, the strong showing by Žemaitaitis and Vaitkus came as a surprise to many observers. This was particularly the case for Vaitkus, who was the only one to defend slightly pro-Russian positions in a political landscape that is overwhelmingly pro-Ukraine. In the public debate, Vaitkus was the first to voice a dissenting opinion on the subject.

Eduardas Vaitkus is similar to other leading opinion makers who emerged from the opposition to health measures during the Covid-19 pandemic: he defends conspiracy theories, populism, pro-Russian geopolitical positions, and questions the scientific consensus…

Indeed. Vaitkus made a name for himself among part of the population during the Covid-19 crisis. He was very active in protests against the government’s measures at the time. Although he had previously been a member of several parties, it was only during the pandemic that he really broke through.

His good results can be explained in part by the absence of any candidate from parties that represent Polish and Russian ethnic minorities. He won a significant share of the vote in the eastern part of Lithuania and in the city of Visaginas, which is home to a large number of Russian speakers. In the eastern part of the country, many voters who identify with the Polish ethnic minority are also Russian-speaking and get their news from Russian or Belarussian television. They therefore inhabit an information sphere that is quite different from that of the rest of the population.

In Latvia, the 2022 election saw the victory of New Unity (JV, EPP), which formed a government with the second-place party, the Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS, agrarian), and the small Progressives party (Greens/EFA). Since then, New Unity’s and ZZS’s approval ratings in the polls have fallen, while the Progressives’ have seen their popularity grow. At the same time, two right-wing, or even far-right parties, the National Alliance and “Latvia First”, have seen their popularity increase. How is the Latvian government seen today? Are we seeing a growing radical right in the same way as in the Netherlands and France, for example?

Jānis Ikstens

Given its history, I wouldn’t consider the National Alliance to be a far-right party. If anything, this label could be applied to “Latvia First”, which is more populist in character. But their positions are very different, particularly on the matter of relations with Russia, which would seem to rule out an alliance or coalition between them.

Today, Latvia is led by the first center-left government of the post-Soviet period. This government has adopted several key measures championed by the Progressives, such as ratifying the Istanbul Convention on violence against women and a new law on same-sex civil unions. This is a new development in what has been until now a fairly conservative political landscape. However, these issues are not central to the public debate. Latvians are much more concerned with the security situation in Europe, particularly the war in Ukraine, and this largely shapes their political attitudes. There is strong public support for increasing the defense budget and actively supporting Ukraine in all areas. But these measures require substantial investment. Given the current economic recession, such investments are painful, especially as the European Union imposes certain limits on public deficit and debt. The government therefore finds itself in a rather difficult situation, leading it to consider an overhaul of the tax system. At this stage, a working group has put forward some proposals for tax reform, but these have not yet led to a concrete plan — and there are still major uncertainties.

In Lithuania, too, the center-right government led by Ingrida Šimonytė (TS-LKD, EPP) is not very popular. The Social Democratic Party LSDP (S&D) won the autumn parliamentary election, in which the TS-LKD-led coalition government took just 30% of the vote. How can this lack of popularity be explained?

Ainė Ramonaitė

In reality, TS-LKD’s performance was not all that bad. Šimonytė won 19% of the vote in the first round of the presidential election, even though she was running not as an independent, but as a party candidate and had been prime minister for four years. Given that public opinion in Lithuania rarely favors incumbent governments, this result is not particularly disappointing.

The economic situation in Lithuania is comparatively quite good. Despite fairly high inflation, GDP has risen and income has grown slightly faster than inflation. This is therefore not the reason for the government’s unpopularity. A more significant factor is that, generally speaking, support for right-wing parties in Lithuania is somewhat weaker than support for left-wing parties, and the former generally find it difficult to win or retain a majority of votes. Another important factor is that the TS-LKD’s smallest coalition partner, the Freedom Party, is a new and very progressive party, and this progressiveness may have frightened off a more conservative part of the population.

In Estonia, the 2023 election saw the victory of Kaja Kallas‘ Reform Party (RE) with 31%, followed by the far-right EKRE (ID) in second place with 16%. In the third and fourth place positions were another liberal party, Estonia 200 (E200, RE) and the Social Democrats (S&D). The conservative Isamaa party (EPP) received just 8% of the vote at the time. However, after a year and a half of center-left government, Isamaa is now leading the polls at 28%, while Reform and E200 have lost almost half their voters. How can we interpret these difficulties for the coalition led by former Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, future High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs?

Piret Ehin

Kaja Kallas is viewed more positively internationally than domestically. Support for the Reform party began to seriously dwindle in the autumn of 2023, some six months after the general election. At the end of August 2023, it was revealed that a transport company partly owned by Kaja Kallas’s husband had continued to operate in Russia since the beginning of the post-war period. In a context where the Prime Minister has been a vocal critic of Putin’s actions in Ukraine and one of Ukraine’s most fervent defenders on the European stage, many voters saw this as hypocritical. The opposition, meanwhile, immediately called for her resignation. Although Kallas made it clear that she had no intention of resigning, her popularity suffered a major setback.

External factors also explain this unpopularity. The economy is not doing well, with high inflation over the past two years and a 3.5% contraction of the economy in 2023. In an attempt to offset deficits in the national budget, the government raised taxes and created new ones, including a particularly controversial one on vehicles. All these combined reasons have led to a sharp decline in the Prime Minister’s popularity in the country.

In Latvia, even more so than in Estonia and Lithuania, several parties specifically represent the interests of the Russian-speaking minority. These include the Social Democratic Party “Harmony”, the “For Stability!” party and the Latvian Russian Union. How have these parties positioned themselves since the start of the Russian war in Ukraine? How has support for these parties evolved?

Jānis Ikstens

Reactions have been mixed. The “Harmony” party, which was the most popular of the three, sided with Ukraine from the outset, declaring that the Russian invasion of February 2022 was unacceptable and amounted to a form of rupture. But in the October election, the party suffered a major defeat, failing to enter parliament for the first time in its history. More radical parties, which were much more reluctant to criticize the war, took their place, notably “For Stability!”, which managed to win seats in the same election.

As the European election approached, however, “Harmony” seems to have learned lessons from the previous elections, and is beginning to return to its pre-war levels. I see this as an indication of how the Russian-speaking population of Latvia feels. Despite polls suggesting that the Russian-speaking minority may be split, with one half supporting Russia and the other half supporting Ukraine, there do seem to be underlying shifts in opinion, with changes in recent months. But these shifts are difficult to identify: pollsters in Latvia have often said that it’s very difficult to reach Russian speakers and persuade them to take part in polls.

In Estonia, the Centre Party is the leading party in the Russian-speaking community, while traditionally enjoying a significant support base among the rest of the population. How has this evolved since February 2022?

Piret Ehin

Estonia doesn’t really have any major ethnic parties. This is partly due to the fact that one of the main parties, the Centre Party — a liberal party with populist tendencies — has been able to attract Russian-speaking votes over the past two decades. Until recently, the Centre Party was an example of the successful integration of Russian-speaking voters into Estonian politics, with a mixed electorate and leadership. However, in its efforts to attract Russian-speaking voters, the Centre Party has always been more flexible towards Russia than most other Estonian parties.

In February 2022, this position became untenable, and the party was pushed into adopting a firmer stance, at the risk of alienating Russian-speaking voters whose opinions are sometimes more mixed, or even ambiguous. This led to tensions and friction within the party, which severely affected its popularity. Before the start of Russia’s large-scale war in Ukraine, the Centre Party could count on the support of around 20% of the population. Today, its electoral potential has fallen to around 10%. In fact, among Estonian-speaking voters, support for the Centre Party has fallen to just 3.4%.

Meanwhile, there was a kind of exodus of non-Russian-speaking voters, and many influential figures left the party. Some of them joined the Social Democrats, while others, including Jyri Ratas, former prime minister and party chairman, joined the conservative Pro Patria Union party. Mihhail Kõlvart, former mayor of Tallinn, now heads the party. But the exodus of Estonian speakers basically means that the party will no longer be able to play an important role in Estonian politics over the next few years, which could contribute to the marginalization of Russian speakers in Estonian politics.

And what about Lithuania?

Ainė Ramonaitė

The Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (LLRA) is the main party representing a national minority. In the past, the LLRA has sought to represent the Russian-speaking minority as well, with some degree of success. To a lesser extent, the Labour Party has a Russian-speaking element, not so much in its electorate as in its leader, Viktor Uspaskich, who is a Russian speaker.

The Labour Party is currently in an unfavorable position, particularly because Viktor Uspaskich, who is an MEP, resigned from all his partisan positions following the revelation of scandals surrounding his spending in parliament. The results of the party’s candidate in the first round of the presidential election were very poor.

We’ll have to keep an eye on how Eduardas Vaitkus positions himself over the coming months. A large proportion of his votes came from regions where Polish or Russian minorities live. He is now planning to set up his own party and, according to some rumors, may be moving closer to the LLRA.

What do you see as the main issues shaping public debate today?

Piret Ehin

The two main themes dominating public debate in Estonia are security and the economy. For Estonia, the ongoing war in Ukraine is of the utmost importance: it’s clear that Ukraine must win and Russia must lose — if not, the consequences could be catastrophic not only for Russia’s neighbors, but perhaps also for Europe and, more broadly, for the rules-based international order. The war in Ukraine sparked a new awareness in Estonia of its status as a border state. The country is now aiming to strengthen its eastern border, along which it has built 600 concrete bunkers.  The Russian Federation’s attitude is also causing very real problems in everyday life: in Tartu, Estonia’s second-largest city, Finnair had to suspend its flights due to GPS interference problems. Finally, the geopolitical situation is also causing tension within civil society. This spring, the Estonian Parliament adopted a declaration designating the Moscow Patriarchate as an institution that supports military aggression in Ukraine. The Estonian government is demanding that the Russian Orthodox Church in Estonia break with the Moscow Patriarchate. At this stage, the long-term consequences of this decision for the 31 congregations that make up the Church are still uncertain.

The second major problem concerns the economy and finances, which have been hit hard by inflation and the economic recession in recent years. Exports are down, demand is weak, and solutions are hard to find.

Ainė Ramonaitė

In Lithuania, security issues are most important. A major public campaign has been launched to raise defense spending to 4% of GDP. This naturally raises the question of the tax increases that will be required to accommodate this spending. Another related topic of debate concerns universal conscription, which was reinstated in 2015.

Another important topic in the public debate is same-sex civil unions. The Freedom Party has still not succeeded in getting this bill through Parliament, so debate continues on the subject. Economic issues have played a less important role in recent months, mainly due to the relatively favorable economic climate, although Lithuania has seen some sector-specific protests, notably by farmers and teachers.

Within the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR), the National Alliance is allied with Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party, which has been widely criticized on the issue of the rule of law and has been in open conflict with European institutions. What does the National Alliance’s good electoral performance mean for Latvia’s participation in the Union in the next legislature?

Jānis Ikstens

Since Latvia only has nine seats in the European Parliament, Latvian MEPs by themselves certainly cannot have a major impact on European policies. Furthermore, I don’t think that a hypothetical National Alliance victory should be interpreted as a sign of latent or growing Euroscepticism. The National Alliance is not calling to leave the European Union, and its positions in this election are fairly pragmatic. The party has a cautious attitude towards the Green Deal. It is concerned about the slow pace and insufficient support for Ukraine. Although it would like to limit immigration from non-European countries, a victory in this election would not have a major influence on Latvian domestic policy in this area.

One of the factors contributing to the National Alliance’s success is that it has put together a list that includes influential political figures who are well known to the population, including a long-standing member of the European Parliament, a chairman of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee, and a former speaker of parliament. In Latvia, the European election tends to be highly personalized, and given the experienced profiles on its list, a National Alliance victory would not be surprising. On the other hand, it would raise the question of how the party would function in Latvia once some of its leaders have moved to Brussels.

At the EU level, the three Baltic states are often seen as displaying a natural form of political and geopolitical unity. Is this just a cliché, or are the beginnings of a common public sphere beginning to emerge?

Piret Ehin

There really isn’t a common public sphere in the three Baltic states, and the three languages are obviously very different. But there is a shared sentiment based on similar security concerns, which leads the states to act jointly and coordinate their foreign security policy actions. Still, this cooperative effort has room for improvement.

Ainė Ramonaitė

There are similarities between the Baltic states’ public spheres, but communication between them remains limited. Above all, the three countries are connected by a shared geopolitical position and shared problems. This closeness is not due to the fact that we engage with each other, but simply because we are in the same geopolitical position and have similar problems.